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ABSTRACT 
 
Petro-Hegemony and the Carbon Rebellion: Strategies, Narratives, and Tactics 
on the Frontlines of Climate Justice 
By Theodore F. LeQuesne 
 
This dissertation explores the power of the fossil fuel industry and the strategies narratives 
and tactics climate justice activists in frontlines struggles to keep fossil fuels in the ground 
are using to challenge that power. It asks how might the climate justice movement better 
understand the power of the fossil fuel industry and through that understanding develop 
strategies and tactics that can respond to it?  It deploys a Gramscian theoretical framework 
to assess, explore, and critique social movement and industry interventions in hegemonic 
power relations. It offers a rereading of hegemony and argues that rather than emphasizing 
relations of consent to the exclusion of other power relations, scholars and activists might 
understand hegemony as synthesizing and balancing relations of consent, coercion, and 
compliance. Counter-hegemonic social movement strategy must, therefore, intervene in each 
one of these power relations. 
 
This reformulated version of hegemony is developed in and applied to community led 
struggles against the fossil fuel industry in the context of climate justice with two more 
concepts: petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion. Petro-hegemony synthesizes petro-
culture, petro-capitalism, and the petro-state to organize interventions in relations of consent, 
compliance, and coercion, to maintain and advance the interests of fossil fuel industry. The 
carbon rebellion is the counter hegemonic formation through which the climate justice 
 vii 
movement could organize strategies and tactics that intervene in each of the hegemonic 
relations of power to challenge petro-hegemony. Between petro-hegemony and the carbon 
rebellion exist three terrains of struggle, each characterized by a different relation of power. 
The dissertation argues that if climate justice activists are to counter petro-hegemony they 
must challenge the fossil fuel industry at different points of intervention existing on each one 
of these terrains. 
 
The dissertation places this theoretical strategic framework in conversation with empirical 
field work and analysis in two case study sites: the First Nations-led resistance to the Trans 
Mountain tar sands pipeline in Coast Salish Territory, British Columbia, and a grassroots 
community uprising for climate and environmental justice in the wake of confrontation with 
Chevron and its plans to expand its oil refinery to process heavier crude oil in Richmond, 
California. The fieldwork included 10 weeks of participant action research, 27 key informant 
interviews, the curation of an online archive of over 1500 articles, Tweets, Facebook posts, 
videos and memes, and in-depth discourse analysis. Developing this theoretical framework in 
conversation with fieldwork yields three further conceptual categories that could advance 
counter hegemonic strategies for climate justice. These are intersectional populism, the 
spectrum of strategy, and aggregating to scale. This dissertation concludes that each of these 
conceptual advances are critical to facilitating the emergence and flourishing of carbon 
rebellion as a counter hegemonic formation capable of defeating petro-hegemony. 
 
 
Key terms: Hegemony, Petro-Hegemony, Gramsci, Climate Justice Movement, Keep it in the 
ground, Blockadia, Carbon Rebellion, Social Movements, Energy Politics 
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INTRODUCTION1 
 
On February 22nd, 2017, heavily armed police, security agents, and private contractors 
descended upon what remained of the Water Protectors and their encampment on the banks 
of the Cannon Ball River in traditional Sioux territory, just outside the Standing Rock Sioux 
reservation. Following what, by all estimates in the United States, must be considered the 
most energized, hopeful, organized, and sophisticated uprising for Indigenous sovereignty in 
a generation, the Oceti Sakowin camp was violently, brutally, and illegally evicted. The 
Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), having received its final permits to bore beneath the river 
under the recently inaugurated Trump administration, was completed on stolen Sioux land. 
Fracked oil from North Dakota’s Bakken Shale formation now flows under the river to 
refineries and transport hubs in Illinois, and onwards to the Gulf of Mexico and markets 
abroad. Meanwhile, in its last moments of defiant convulsion, the uprising disbanded and has 
diffused across the country. Like the seeds of a dandelion flower, which are blown apart and 
sail off on the wind, Standing Rock’s Water Protectors have dispersed to settle and take root 
elsewhere, sowing resistances of their own wherever they land. “Standing Rock is 
everywhere now,” said Native Organizer’s Alliance director, Judith LeBlanc.2 
 
 
1 Some arguments and ideas developed in this dissertation have been previously articulated by the author in 
earlier publications. These articles are: LeQuesne, T. (2019). Petro-hegemony and the matrix of resistance: 
What can Standing Rock’s Water Protectors teach us about organizing for climate justice in the United 
States?. Environmental Sociology, 5(2). Pp. 188-206 and LeQuesne, T. (2019). From Carbon Democracy to 
Carbon Rebellion: Confronting Petro-Hegemony on the Frontlines of Climate Justice. In Journal of World 
Systems Research, 25 (1). Pp. 15-27. 
2 Judith LeBlanc is the director of the Native Organizers Alliance and is a member of the Caddo Nation in 
Oklahoma. Her sentiment here is one that was shared by many participants following the uprising (Jaffe 2017). 
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To speak of victories and defeats, and for that matter of beginnings and ends, is almost 
always premature in the study of social movements. As the playwright William Faulkner 
famously wrote, “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.” Similarly, Lakota prophecy, and 
their story of the Seventh Generation, reminds us that the decisions of today and yesterday 
may be buried for a lifetime only to reemerge decades, even generations, later as 
consequences, confluences, rewards and retribution. Three years after the intensity of the 
Water Protector’s battle at Standing Rock, we still do not know what the ultimate 
consequences of this confrontation will be. Nevertheless, it was a moment in a centuries-long 
struggle for decolonization that has had fundamental implications for another, interrelated, 
movement – the climate justice movement – and its campaigns to keep fossil fuels in the 
ground across North America. Standing Rock is everywhere now. Across the frontlines of 
what Naomi Klein calls Blockadia (2014), where communities are defending their rights, 
their land, their water, their democracy, their homes, and their climate against the fossil fuel 
industry’s insatiable advance, Standing Rock is invoked with a mix of awe, envy, hope, and 
caution. Some of these frontlines predate the confrontation at Standing Rock and some are its 
direct descendants, almost all of them look to what happened at Standing Rock as a pivotal 
moment in the climate justice movement’s development. 
 
At one level, Standing Rock was a moment of struggle against colonial intrusion in a long 
history of struggle against colonial intrusion, dating back 500 years, in what is now the 
United States. At another level, the story of the uprising at Standing Rock can be compressed 
into an excited frenzy of events that unfolded over just a matter of months. Both stories can 
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be told well and accurately, and indeed, neither can really be understood without the other.3 
For my part, as I recount the events that transpired there, I offer only a partial, situated, 
perspective stitched together from many other partial, situated perspectives. The uprising that 
was brewing in North Dakota caught my attention in August 2016. My Facebook feed was 
inundated the hashtags #MniWiconi and #WaterIsLife alongside images and videos of 
Indigenous men, women and children facing down security agents and police officers as they 
put their bodies in between the pipeline and the land and water they sought to protect. They 
called themselves the Water Protectors and they were about to capture the imaginations of 
millions of people around the world. 
 
In April 2016, Energy Transfer Partners and their subsidiary, Dakota Access, had been 
granted permits for a 1,172-mile pipeline connecting the, until recently, booming Bakken 
Shale oil region to refineries to the east and markets abroad. The permit applications had 
been fast tracked and opponents argued that the environmental impact assessment had been 
inadequate and ignored Native peoples’ claims that the pipeline would desecrate sacred sites 
and disturb burial lands. Moreover, after residents voiced concerns that a pipeline rupture 
could threaten the water supply of North Dakota’s state capital, Bismarck, the pipeline was 
rerouted downstream of the city but just upstream of the Standing Rock Sioux reservation. It 
then traversed land managed by the US Army Corps of Engineers and promised, but never 
relinquished, to the Sioux in the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. Instead of intersecting the river 
 
3 For an account that contextualizes the uprising at Standing Rock in a long history of anti-colonial resistance 
and Indigenous resurgence read Nick Estes’ new book, Our History is Our Future: Standing Rock Versus the 
Dakota Access Pipeline and the Long Tradition of Indigenous Resistance (2019). For an account that 
contextualizes the events at Standing Rock in climate justice read Kyle Powys Whyte’s essay, Why the Native 
American Pipeline Resistance in North Dakota is About Climate Justice (2016). For a near comprehensive set 
of Indigenous perspectives on the events that transpired at Standing Rock see The Standing Rock Syllabus 
online. 
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north of Bismarck the pipeline would bore beneath the Standing Rock’s Sioux’s primary 
source of drinking water just upstream of the reservation. Bismarck is a community that is 
nearly 90% white, while Standing Rock is a Native American reservation and home to some 
of the most impoverished communities in the country.  
 
Responding to this flagrant example of environmental racism and colonial expansion, 
Standing Rock youth activists first drew national attention to the pipeline by gathering 
together groups of runners who would take their message from the reservation to nearby 
states and, eventually, Washington D.C.. Meanwhile, Lakota activist and historian, Ladonna 
Brave Bull Allard, took to social media, posting a video imploring Native allies and people 
all over the country to come to Standing Rock and block the passage of the pipeline. With 
support from Indigenous Environmental Network organizers, she opened her land on the 
reservation to what became known as the Sacred Stone camp. Dozens, then hundreds, and 
later thousands, would heed the Standing Rock Sioux’s call for support. So many people 
arrived, in fact, that by the summer several new camps had been established. The “big camp” 
just outside the boundaries of the reservation was called Oceti Sakowin, named after the 
Sioux Council of the Seven Fires, and at its height housed thousands of Indigenous Water 
Protectors and non-native allies. This would become the largest gathering and alliance of 
Indigenous nations and tribes in generations, perhaps ever. 
 
By August 2016, the Water Protectors were leading daily blockades from the camps to 
obstruct the highway and prevent equipment reaching the DAPL construction site. These 
marches and demonstrations were led “in peace and prayer” by Sioux Elders and spiritual 
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leaders. Their message was simple, consistent, and deeply compelling: we are gathered 
peacefully and in prayer to protect the water and our sacred lands from the pipeline. In early 
August, some Water Protectors intensified the pressure on DAPL by locking themselves to 
construction equipment. Many were arrested and others were brutalized. In September, 
Indigenous women led a prayer walk to a sacred burial site that pipeline workers had 
bulldozed the day before. They were met with security contractors’ attack dogs, pepper 
spray, and intimidated and harassed by armed police officers. Images and a Democracy Now! 
video documenting these attacks on unarmed women, men, and in some case children, all 
gathered in peace and prayer to protect the water, went viral online (2016). These images 
next to the hashtags #WaterIsLife and #MniWiconi were shared millions of times on social 
media. This broke through a dominant media blackout and instigated a major public backlash 
across the United States.  
 
North Dakota’s governor, Jack Dalrymple, declared a state of emergency following the 
backlash. He deployed the National Guard to surround the encampments and provide “safe” 
passage for the pipeline construction workers and equipment (Grueskin 2016). The clear 
demonstration of the alliance between Big Oil and state power only reinforced perceptions of 
their conjoined colonial ambitions and enflamed the situation further. More people joined the 
camps over the summer and fall of 2016. Those who could not attend physically sent 
resources and supplies and organized solidarity actions in their hometowns across the 
country. Supporters raised several million dollars for the camp’s upkeep and legal defense 
fund, while celebrities like Mark Ruffalo and Shailene Woodly visited the camps and shared 
the story to new audiences.   
 6 
 
The standoff intensified with lawsuits and counter lawsuits declaring the pipeline illegal, then 
being appealed and overturned, only for permits to be appealed again. Meanwhile, direct 
action and civil disobedience were met with ever-increasing police militarization, brutality, 
and punitive sentencing. Security agents from the FBI and the Morton County police 
department worked together with Dakota Access and its private security contractors, Tiger 
Swan, to repress the resistance, infiltrate it, and sow division from the inside (The Intercept 
2017; Parrish 2017). The armored vehicles, surveillance helicopters, and riot police bearing 
shotguns and machine guns, firing off stun grenades, deploying “less than lethal” weapons, 
spraying Water Protectors with tear gas, and drenching them with water cannons in frigid 
conditions, offered scenes reminiscent of a warzone – which, by some accounts, is exactly 
what it was (Charger 2017). This imagery juxtaposed with the Water Protectors disciplined 
messaging, the clarity of the injustice being imposed upon them, and their commitment to 
non-violence rapidly eroded the pipeline’s perceived legitimacy. 
 
In December 2016, then President Obama halted the pipeline and ordered the Army Corps of 
Engineers to redo the pipeline’s environmental impact assessment (CNN 2016). As many had 
predicted, the Water Protectors’ victory was reversed in January 2017, in one of the newly 
inaugurated President Trump’s very first presidential orders (Medina 2017). With many 
progressives and leftists still reeling following the Trump election, and many Indigenous 
leaders now divided over strategy, the camps were forcibly evicted in February 2017 
(Democracy Now! 2017). Permanent structures activists had built in Oceti Sakowin over the 
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winter were bulldozed, those who had stayed at the camp and resisted were arrested, and an 
uprising that had filled so many with hope was brutally quashed.  
 
But uprisings are rarely truly quashed. The Indigenous-led resistance has reignited or 
reinforced a sense of revolutionary empowerment amongst the thousands of Indigenous 
peoples who participated, and amongst Indigenous youth in particular. The uprising also 
brought together an unprecedented alliance of Indigenous communities, non-native allies, 
environmental justice activists, faith-based organizations, army veterans, ranchers, and more, 
to focus the country’s attention on the history and politics of colonization, Indigenous 
sovereignty, climate justice, oil extraction, water, and energy. New relationships and bonds 
of solidarity were forged, strategies experimented with, and stories told and changed. 
Meanwhile, many within the climate justice movement learned a new language and practices 
with which to articulate their purpose. In this way, the Water Protector’s narrative 
interventions have fundamentally changed and challenged the dominant discourses of oil, 
energy, climate change, and colonialism in the United States. Three years later, climate 
justice activists are forging alliances with movements for Indigenous sovereignty, rights, and 
liberation on the frontlines of dozens of struggles, new and old. Together they are defending 
and protecting homes, climate, sacred lands, water, and democracy against colonialism, 
capitalist accumulation, environmental racism, dispossession, and pollution - all of which are 
embodied in the fossil fuel industry’s reckless expansionism.  
 
But this dissertation isn’t about Standing Rock. Or at least, the confrontation that took place 
at Standing Rock is not the primary focus of this dissertation’s contributions. Nevertheless, I 
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begin with Standing Rock because of the enormous implications it has had for my own 
activist experiences and how these have influenced the arguments and agenda advanced in 
the pages that follow. Even more so than the resistance to Keystone XL pipeline, the events 
at Standing Rock gave birth to a reinvigorated climate justice movement in the United States, 
and brought the protection of land, water, homes, and self-determination to the forefront of 
the movement’s narratives and activism. The movement’s “keep-it-in-the-ground” contingent 
that emerged almost a decade earlier was filled with new purpose and, in the intervening 
years, has developed into a sophisticated global network of frontlines communities defending 
their homes against fossil fuel extraction, transportation, and refining. All of these very much 
are the subject of my dissertation’s intervention. Moreover, Standing Rock holds vital lessons 
for the climate justice movement about the power of the fossil fuel industry and the 
strategies, narratives, and tactics we might use to counter it. It is these lessons, and the 
influence Standing Rock has had on my own activism and theories of change, that set me on 
the path that led me to writing this dissertation. 
 
Situating myself in this dissertation 
 
I joined Standing Rock’s Water Protectors in September 2016 and worked on fundraising and 
divestment solidarity campaigns where I live in Santa Barbara throughout the following fall. 
I had just finished my master’s thesis when the uprising broke out on the floodplains of the 
Missouri River. The master’s thesis had developed a Gramscian analysis of the 
communications strategies climate justice activists deploy to undermine the fossil fuel 
industry’s “social license to operate,” challenge its social legitimacy, and ultimately shift 
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consent away from the industry’s operations. I studied two different campaigns and the 
narrative strategies each one used to revoke consent to the fossil fuel industry and articulate 
consent around alternative alignments of social actors and agendas instead. I had been a 
campus organizer for the fossil fuel divestment campaign, Fossil Free, and so fossil fuel 
divestment campaign became one of my case studies. This campaign reframed the climate 
narrative, emphasizing a story of “good guys and bad guys,” and positioning the fossil fuel 
industry as the principal obstacles to achieving climate solutions. Our target, therefore, was 
not individual consumption habits but the industry and the role it has played in obstructing 
climate policy. Through divestment activism I also learned about activists in Richmond, 
California who had won a series of significant victories against the fossil fuel industry in 
their own neighborhoods. Since I first heard of them, I found their victories to be a 
fascinating example of climate justice activism and so developed a second case study around 
the narrative strategies these campaigners had employed. 
 
By the time I arrived in Standing Rock, therefore, I had thought of myself as a seasoned 
climate justice activist, organizer, and scholar. Since I was very young, the threat climate 
change poses to the longevity of our species has dominated my political thought and action. 
Moreover, through college and student-activism, I came to see how this threat is stratified 
according to intersections of class, race, gender, identity, and privilege to produce climate 
injustice. Alongside the master’s and fossil fuel divestment activism, I had participated in an 
anti-fracking protest camp in Balcombe near my hometown in the UK in 2013, helped bring 
students at my campus to the 400,000 strong People’s Climate March in New York in 2014, 
and worked with international youth campaigners at the United Nations climate talks in 
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Poland 2013 and in Paris in 2015.  Therefore, by 2016, the connections between keeping 
fossil fuels in the ground, environmental racism, defending Indigenous rights and 
sovereignty, protecting the water, and climate change articulated by the Water Protectors 
seemed obvious to me. However, none of my academic training nor activist experience 
prepared me for what I would learn from Standing Rock, how it would change my orientation 
towards achieving radical social change, and how much more profoundly it would force me 
to engage with the intersections of race, class, colonialism, gender, dispossession, violence 
and pollution that configure forms of domination and resistance on the frontlines of resource 
extraction.  
 
Of course, I must hasten to add, it is not lost on me that as a relatively privileged young, 
white, male scholar, Standing Rock’s significance to my own life and experiences means 
little in comparison to the significance of its interventions for frontlines, low 
income/underpaid, communities of color, the colonized, the racialized others, and the 
subaltern. Nevertheless, the implications it has had on my own theories of change which 
came to animate this dissertation’s contributions to the theory and practice of climate justice 
activism cannot be overstated.  It is for this reason that I begin this dissertation at Standing 
Rock and how it came to shape the research questions with which I embarked upon this 
project. 
 
As a young activist, particularly as a participant in Occupy, and other campus-based 
campaigns I was involved in as an undergraduate, I was (and, to an extent, remain) deeply 
frustrated with friends and allies whose language, narratives, frames of reference, group 
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culture, and even dress code I believed were alienating large numbers of potential supporters 
and activists from the movement. I felt they had created self-referential spaces that prioritized 
group identity over collective action, excluding everyone but the most ideologically pure, and 
welcoming only those who could participate in what Johnathan Smucker calls “the life of the 
group” (2017).4  In Patrick Reinsborough and Doyle Canning’s social movement manual, 
Re:Imagining Change (2011), I found the language to articulate these frustrations 
productively. It seemed to me that the language and interventions that these activists 
espoused did a great deal to “tell the story of the battle,” or reinforce the group’s sense of 
identity and righteousness, but little to “fight the battle of story” to challenge the discourses 
upon which systems of domination are premised. Meanwhile through the Italian Marxist, 
Antonio Gramcsi’s Prison Notebook’s I was making connections between the “story-based 
strategy” and the “battle of the story” for which Reinsborough and Canning advocated with 
what Gramsci called a “war of position” (1971). Gramsci’s work introduced me to hegemony 
and counter hegemony, and through these terms I learned a new language with which to 
understand how power operates and how it might be challenged, revoked, or realigned. 
 
Both Reinsborough and Canning’s work and Gramsci’s advocated for a struggle over the 
discourses and cultural institutions through which we make meaning of the world around us 
and through which our consent to the ideas, institutions, and people who rule society is 
produced.5 Both also placed tremendous emphasis on building broad-based alliances across 
 
4 The life of the group refers to the frames, language, norms, practices, rites, and culture that shape a social 
group’s identity.  Later, I would be greatly influenced by Smucker’s writing and particularly Hegemony How To 
(2017) which deploys a Gramscian analysis to articulate many of the same frustrations with social movement 
spaces that I had experienced as a young activist. 
5 I will provide a detailed discussion of how we might understand consent and its role as a relation of power in 
Chapter Two. Suffice it to say for now that consent is produced when the rule of a class, set of ideas, 
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society that reached far beyond traditional activist enclaves and isolated moments of 
uprising. I found all this deeply compelling. My master’s thesis brought their arguments 
together and applied them to the climate justice movement’s confrontations with the fossil 
fuel industry. I argued we might view the fossil fuel industry as a hegemonic force in society 
and that the climate justice movement, could organize itself into a counter hegemonic force 
to revoke consent to the industry (indeed, as my case studies illustrated, much of it already 
was doing just this). Through narrative interventions we could, in the language of the fossil 
fuel divestment movement, “revoke the industry’s social license to operate.” Inspired by the 
divestment movement, and these writings, I came to the understanding that in order to 
challenge the fossil fuel industry’s hegemonic status in society, we needed to change the 
stories that produce consent to the industry and intervene in the cultural institutions that 
mediate them. In other words, if we could just change the story, we could win. 
 
Of all the things I learned from participating in, and studying, the Water Protectors’ 
interventions at Standing Rock, the most significant was coming to understand how much of 
what I’d written about, and acted upon as an organizer throughout my master’s scholarship, 
was wrong – or, at least, only very partially right. While not even primarily an intervention in 
climate justice, the Water Protectors, it seemed to me, were telling one of the most 
compelling narratives ever told about climate justice. In narratives that combined anti-
colonialism, the vitality of water, and the threat posed by the oil industry, they had 
successfully garnered support from millions of people across the country in a way that no 
climate justice campaign ever had. Combining the protection of the water and the land with 
 
institutions, and so on, is accepted as common sense, is taken for granted, and goes unchallenged, and within a 
given society. 
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the cultural survival and resurgence of Indigenous peoples and broader concerns about the 
implications of further oil extraction for the climate, the Water Protectors fundamentally 
changed the story that maintained consent to the fossil fuel industry. DAPL saw its social 
license collapse across the country as audiences reassessed the role of oil in their lives, their 
own participation in colonialism, and broader threats the fossil fuel industry poses to the 
ecosystems upon which the longevity of our species depends. And yet, despite all this, the 
Water Protectors and the uprising at Standing Rock was still infiltrated, brutally repressed, 
and some activists still remain in jail as political prisoners (Parrish 2017; Charger 2017). The 
uprising, for all its successful interventions in discourse, was, at least in this moment, 
defeated.  
 
Oil now flows beneath the River. We cannot know upon what timeline the full implications 
of the Standing Rock Sioux’s confrontation with DAPL will manifest themselves, 
particularly with regards to decolonization and Indigenous liberation. But in so far as the 
immediate goals of the uprising are concerned, the pipeline was completed, oil is being 
pumped through it, and Indigenous tribal sovereignty has, once again, been undeniably 
violated. Despite winning the battle of the story, shifting relations of consent, and waging a 
highly sophisticated war of position, the Water Protectors could not halt the advance of the 
fossil fuel industry. To me, the Water Protectors’ intervention therefore illustrated 
fundamental questions about the theories of change many within the climate justice 
movement still subscribe to, that I had been developing upon, and that had been guiding my 
academic and activist interventions. The colonial, state-sanctioned violence and coercion 
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upon which the industry had depended was almost entirely absent from the theory of change 
my master’s thesis advanced.  
 
Research questions and Gramscian polemics: Petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion   
 
Like all good scholars, seeing my theoretical contributions fundamentally challenged by the 
empirical reality of the efficacy of this violence, I went back to the books with a new 
research question: how might we, as the climate justice movement, better understand the 
power of the fossil fuel industry and through that understanding develop strategies and 
tactics that can respond to it?6 My dissertation assesses this question through an exploration 
of the strategies, narratives and tactics activists are deploying against the fossil fuel industry 
on the frontlines of climate justice. The arguments and insights I have developed as I’ve 
explored this question are produced out of the interplay of theory and practice and fill the 
remainder of this dissertation. Moreover, through my participation in, and engagement with, 
the climate justice movement, these arguments do more to show how climate justice activists 
can learn from one another, and rearticulates, shares, and reflects the movement’s ideas back 
to itself, rather than necessarily telling climate justice strategists anything they don’t already 
know.  
 
Since discovering Gramsci’s concept, I have always found hegemony a particularly 
compelling account of the operations of power. Moreover, as Chapter Two and the following 
case studies contained in this dissertation will illustrate, I am convinced that hegemony is an 
 
6 “Better understand” here refers to the ways in which we might complicate, nuance, and more accurately assess 
the power relations through which the fossil fuel industry operates and upon which it depends. 
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appropriate and valuable lens through which to understand the power relations the fossil fuel 
industry intervenes upon to maintain and advance its interests. However, as I went back to 
the books, and particularly to Gramscian theory, I found that I, along with many other 
scholars and activists, had not fully understood the extent of the Italian Marxist’s conceptual 
contributions. While Gramsci’s major intervention is to have explained how rulers, classes, 
ideas, and institutions become hegemonic by producing consent to their rule (in other words, 
how their rule becomes taken for granted as common sense), Gramsci never suggests that the 
production of consent is the only relation of power contained within the concept. Indeed, 
drawing on scholars like Raymond Williams (1971), Richard Day (2016), and Perry 
Anderson (1976), as well as Gramsci himself, this dissertation will argue that the concept of 
hegemony contains not one but three interrelated and interactive relations of power: consent, 
coercion, and, I add, compliance. 
 
In this reading of hegemony, consent is primarily a cultural relation that refers to the ways 
common sense is mediated, and meaning is discursively articulated, to legitimize the rule of 
the hegemon. Coercion refers to the use of violence and force to discipline, repress and 
eliminate dissent which is made possible through the hegemon’s access to the state’s 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence or physical force.7 Compliance is a term I add to 
Gramscian vocabulary. It is an economic relation of power characterized by the blurring of 
the lines between consent and coercion, where choice technically exists but is circumscribed 
by dependency on the benevolence of the hegemon. Thus, hegemony simultaneously 
combines cultural, political (state), and economic relations of power. 
 
7 See Weber’s Politics as Vocation (1919) on the state as defined by its monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical force. 
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In this dissertation, I apply this approach to hegemony to the fossil fuel industry. Petro-
hegemony, therefore, is the term I advance to better understand the power of the fossil fuel 
industry. Through petro-hegemony the fossil fuel industry organizes and intervenes in 
relations of consent, coercion, and compliance to maintain and extend its status and interests 
in a given society. These power relations are organized and intervened upon through three 
mediators of strategy. I argue the industry organizes strategies and tactics to intervene in 
relations of consent through petro-culture, interventions in relations of coercion are organized 
through the petro-state, while petro-capitalism organizes interventions in relations of 
compliance. Retroactively applying these power relations and their mediators to the 
industry’s operations at Standing Rock, elsewhere I have argued conceptualizing petro-
hegemony helps explain the fossil fuel industry’s ultimately successful bid to build the 
Dakota Access Pipeline (see LeQuesne 2019).  
 
While this rethinking of hegemony helps us understand the power relations upon which the 
industry depends, my research agenda also interrogates what the climate justice movement’s 
response to petro-hegemony could look like. As a response to petro-hegemony, the 
movement may organize itself into a counter hegemonic force. I call the emergence of this 
counter hegemonic force the carbon rebellion. Mirroring petro-hegemony, the carbon 
rebellion framework contains three mediators: a political culture of opposition and creation 
for climate justice (or PCOC, see Foran 2016), regimes of climate justice, and the economics 
of a just transition. The movement’s interventions in relations of consent are, or could be, 
organized through the PCOC, interventions in relations of coercion and the state are, or could 
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be, organized through regimes of climate justice, and interventions in relations of compliance 
are, or could be, organized through the economics of a just transition. My fundamental 
contribution to the climate justice movement’s many theories of change is to argue that 
counter hegemonic strategies to confront the fossil fuel industry should be organized to 
intervene in each of these three hegemonic relations of power. In other words, we may 
challenge, counter, defeat, and replace the fossil fuel industry’s hegemonic status only when 
we successfully intervene in and shift each of these three power relations in our favor. Many 
of the strategies, narratives and tactics we need to make these interventions have already 
been devised. My contribution, therefore, is a coherent framework through which we might 
organize and assess them. 
 
This framework positions petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion as oppositional forces 
that in many ways mirror one another (although, yielding very different results). I suggest 
that in between carbon rebellion and petro-hegemony we should imagine three terrains of 
struggle upon which an almost innumerable quantity of points of intervention exist. Each 
terrain of struggle and its corresponding points of intervention is primarily (though not 
singularly) defined by a relation of power – either consent, coercion, or compliance. As such, 
consent defines the terrain of struggle and points of intervention existing between the PCOC 
and petro-culture, coercion defines the terrain of struggle between the petro-state and regimes 
of climate justice, and compliance defines the terrain of struggle we might imagine existing 
between petro-capitalism and the economics of a just transition. The counter hegemonic path 
to victory over the industry, therefore, depends upon the movement’s ability to influence, 
capture, direct, eliminate, or shape different strategic points of intervention on each of these 
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terrains of struggle. The strategies and tactics organized through both petro-hegemony and 
the carbon rebellion to intervene in a particular point of intervention would be primarily 
oriented towards the relation of power defining the terrain of struggle upon which the points 
of intervention in question exists. 
 
The terrains of struggle and relations of power that characterize each of them are each 
distinction from one another, however they are not silos but are profoundly intertwined. As 
such, interventions in a relation of power on one terrain of struggle will almost inevitably 
have consequences for interventions in the other relations of power too and terrains of 
struggle too. If all this seems tremendously abstract, that’s because it is. It is deliberately 
abstract so that the framework may be generalizable at one level but then deployed in a 
multiplicity of struggles and populated with the specificity of those deeply contextualized 
struggles accordingly. Placing the entire framework in two empirical case study examples, I 
bring the abstract and the contextual together with specific illustrations of different points of 
intervention and how industry agents and activists have devised tactics to engage with them. 
 
Conceptual contributions to movement praxis 
  
Remaining in the realm of the abstract a little while longer, however, this framework also 
leads to three more corollary arguments discussed in separate chapters through the 
dissertation. Exploring the relationship between petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion, I 
have developed three concepts that I argue could support the emergence and development of 
carbon rebellion and its counter hegemonic interventions against petro-hegemony. These are 
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intersectional populism, the spectrum of strategy, and aggregating to scale. Each of these 
respond to tensions, contradictions and challenges within counter hegemonic social 
movement strategy and seeks the means by which such tensions might be navigated. In the 
development of each concept I have made the case for synthesis and synergy across positions 
rather than privileging one over another or reinforcing divisions between them. 
 
Intersectional populism 
I advance the concept of intersectional populism to navigate strategic orientations favoring 
universalizing discourses and movement practices on the one hand, and those prioritizing 
particularism and difference on the other. Drawing upon Zoltán Grossman, Laclau and 
Mouffe, Kimberlé Crenshaw, and Patricia Hill Collins, I explore the relationship between 
populism, alliances, and intersectionality. Intersectional populism is my attempt at 
identifying discourses and movement practices that are both populist in the sense that they 
articulate a unified “we” against an external “enemy,” while also paying close attention to the 
relations of difference, privilege, and accountability that must exist within any articulation of 
the politically circumscribed “we.” I argue intersectional populism is vital to the articulation 
and construction of broad-based, diverse, inclusive and accountable alliances and alignments 
through which a political culture of opposition and creation may be forged.  
 
The spectrum of strategy 
The spectrum of strategy concept is developed though a discussion of the major tensions and 
debates over different orientations towards strategy and tactics that I identify in the climate 
justice movement. The debates I engage with are the role of the state in climate justice 
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strategy, the appropriate deployment of direct action, and the competing theories of change 
oriented towards either community organizing on the one hand and mass movement 
mobilizing on the other. The spectrum of strategy seeks to break the divisive binary of 
reformism and radicalism that can infiltrate these debates. Arguing that no tactic is inherently 
radical or inherently reformist, I temporarily eschew the terms in favor of a multiplicity of 
interventions aligned according to a spectrum ranging from non-confrontational to 
confrontational strategies.  I suggest that shared commitment to a spectrum of strategy makes 
a diversity of tactics both possible and accountable. In turn, these provide greater scope for 
deploying different tactics that are able to engage with the full range of available points of 
intervention on different terrains of struggle.  
 
Aggregating to scale 
Lastly, I demonstrate how the size and scope of petro-hegemony and the broader modes of 
domination upon which it thrives, forces the climate justice movement to engage with the 
complexities of scale. I argue movements can grow in at least two ways: they can aggrandize 
to scale or they can aggregate to scale. Aggrandizement implies conquest, authoritarianism, 
and the development of a monolithic mass. In this manner, some movements grow out from a 
central hub that then absorbs more and more constituents and, in that way, one comes to 
represent all. I show that counter hegemonic movement strategy risks mirroring this model of 
scaling up. Instead, I argue for aggregation to scale. Aggregation to scale recognizes the 
multiplicity of nodes and hubs that make up a movement. Each node is an entity unto itself 
but movement leaders in each node forge connections with leaders in other nodes. Through 
these connections flows collective purpose, solidarity, shared principles and identity, but 
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without directives from a centralized authority. The aggregate of these nodes, and the 
connections between them, scales the movement.  Here I bring together Adrienne Maree 
Brown’s orientation towards “critical connection” (2017) and contrast it with Smucker’s 
orientation towards critical mass (2017). I argue both critical connection and critical mass are 
necessary and suggest that it may be only through forging critical connections that we 
achieve critical mass. This formulation addresses an important critique of hegemonic politics 
from the anti-authoritarian and anarchist left and seeks to establish a counter hegemonic 
orientation that bridges preferences for leaderless and leaderful movements. 
 
Defining the carbon rebellion 
 
Before describing the methodological orientation and research philosophy that built this 
dissertation, I must make a final theoretical remark about the naming of the concept I decided 
to call carbon rebellion. It is not intended to invoke the recent rise to prominence of 
Extinction Rebellion in the climate movement. I developed the term before Extinction 
Rebellion made its debut and have insisted upon keeping it despite possible confusion. 
Carbon rebellion is a term specific to Blockadia and the frontlines of fossil fuel extraction, 
transportation and production. Extinction Rebellion, meanwhile, has captured international 
attention with direct action tactics, a broad tent approach to mass mobilizing, and impressive 
message discipline. Its target, however, is government legislation and policy.8 While 
 
8 Moreover, the primacy Extinction Rebellion places on mass arrests over all other tactics, its troubling record 
of racially tone-deaf mobilizations and commitment to “apolitical” interventions, and its organizing philosophy 
premised on the argument that regime change may be achieved by mobilizing just 3.5% of a society’s 
population, are all components of a strategic orientation that is antithetical to counter hegemonic politics. 
Nafeez Ahmed has written an excellent and constructive critique of Extinction Rebellion’s theory of change 
titled The Flawed Social Science Behind Extinction Rebellion’s Change Strategy (2019). Translating Ahmed’s 
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strategies developed through the carbon rebellion framework may involve policy 
interventions, the purpose and scope of carbon rebellion is not limited to policy or 
government engagement. In addition, carbon rebellion is more a theoretical framework than 
the name of the movement or a campaign. Carbon rebellion would be a part of the climate 
justice movement’s theory of change, but it is not intended as a name to replace the climate 
justice movement, nor is it intended to replace the climate justice movement’s broader 
strategic interventions that take place outside the confines of resource frontiers and frontlines 
of resource extraction and production.  
 
In making these remarks, I also wish to divorce the carbon rebellion from any association 
with carbon fundamentalism. Carbon fundamentalism is an orientation towards climate 
politics in which the primary, indeed only, objective of climate action is keeping carbon 
emissions out of the atmosphere (Dayaneni 2009). It fails to recognize the systemic roots of 
the climate crisis while depoliticizing the injustices and modes of domination embedded in 
climate disruption. This is precisely the approach to climate politics that this dissertation 
fundamentally rejects. Carbon rebellion is intended to invoke a rebellion of communities 
across the globe who are rising up against both the ideology and practice of extraction. We 
might call this the “keep-it-in-the-ground” contingent of the climate justice movement but in 
their efforts to keep fossil fuels in the ground, these frontlines communities are forging 
connections, shifting political orientations, pushing the boundaries of strategic comfort 
zones, and cultivating soil fertile for far deeper and more systemic rebellion against the 
 
ideas into Gramscian terms, we might say Extinction Rebellion is fighting a war of maneuver without a war of 
position. 
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ideologies and practices that threaten the longevity of our species.9 Working through the 
carbon rebellion, climate justice activists come into confrontation with the modes of 
domination upon which petro-hegemony thrives and which make ecological collapse all but 
inevitable. This means that as they mobilize and organize against the fossil fuel industry, 
frontlines communities are encountering structural racism, settler colonialism, patriarchy, 
capitalism and the necessity of confronting systemic inequalities of all kinds. Thus, as 
Chapter Eight will explore in greater depth, carbon rebellion has truly revolutionary 
potential. 
 
My research philosophy  
 
As both a scholar and an activist, my research philosophy is grounded in three principals: 1) 
That all knowledge is situated, partial, and incomplete. 2) That my research must be useful, 
relevant, and accessible to the movement with which it is concerned. 3) That my research 
must be critical and rigorous but must not endanger the campaigns or people with whom I am 
working. Throughout the dissertation I place the experiences, knowledges, and voices of the 
campaigns in which I’ve worked at the heart of the arguments I develop, while remaining 
critically sensitive to the partial nature of their knowledge and my own.  
 
 
9As a metaphor, therefore, carbon rebellion could also allude to carbon as one of the fundamental building 
blocks of all life rebelling against the denigration and destruction of life that fossil fuel expansion implies. I like 
to think of it as subtly invoking a rebellion in the name of the building blocks of life whose very molecules have 
been put into the service of the potential destruction of all life on earth. In this way we might think of a carbon 
rebellion as reclaiming carbon from the shackles of fossil fuel powered extractivism. 
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My research philosophy and commitment to scholar-activism owes an important debt to 
feminist interventions. Donna Haraway explains that we should challenge the “tempting 
dichotomy on the question of objectivity” (1988, 577). Her term, “situated knowledges,” 
abolishes the hierarchy of knowledge construction and the dominant “orderings of what can 
count as knowledge” that positivism in the social sciences seeks to impose. Meanwhile it 
leaves intact the possibility of knowledge production that is valuable precisely because it is 
partial, particular, and contextualized. As Haraway writes, “Feminist objectivity is about 
limited location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting subject and 
object” (1988, 583). Following Haraway’s position, scholar-activism can be rigorous and 
methodical without falling into the positivist “god trick” of “seeing everything from 
nowhere” (Haraway 1988, 581). My research approach has embraced the contextualized 
nature of knowledge and knowledge production. I believe acknowledging the contextualized 
nature of my own knowledge and research interests is a much more honest approach to 
research than to pretend that I have no interest or stake in its outcome.  I am profoundly 
invested in what I am studying, and I am a part of this movement while I am studying it. I 
place myself in the text and at all times offer situated knowledge and partial perspective.  
 
To the extent that it influences and inspires my writing, my readers should know my politics. 
I am anti-capitalist although there exists some diversity within the climate justice movement 
over what type of capitalism we collectively oppose. If there appears to be ambiguity about 
capitalism in this dissertation it is because that ambiguity is a reflection of the diversity of 
political orientations contained within the climate justice movement itself. I am anti-racist, as 
the climate justice movement must be. Despite recognizing much of the contradiction 
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existing between these positions, I am profoundly anti-authoritarian although not inherently 
anti-state – at least not in any short-term strategic sense.  I am committed to decolonization 
and decolonial methodology, while still learning from a multiplicity of Indigenous 
perspectives about everything that that must entail in the context of researching and 
participating in the climate justice movement (Smith 1999). Finally, I am much more 
interested in defining myself by what I am for than by what I am against. I am for 
redistribution and decentralization of wealth and power.  I am for a fair and just transition 
away from extractive economics and that prioritizes the experiences and leadership of 
frontlines communities and Indigenous peoples, along with workers who are employed in the 
fossil fuel industry and extractive economy today. I am for an energy system that is 
simultaneously decarbonized, decolonized, democratized, and decentralized. I believe 
another world is possible and I am for “pluriversal” politics and a world in which many 
worlds may exist (Escobar forthcoming). I am for democracy, self-governance, equity, 
dignity, solidarity and collective liberation from all modes of domination. Put simply, I am 
for climate justice.  
 
Throughout this research and writing I have sought to recognize my own privileged 
positionality and the effects it has had on my conclusions and the relationships I have built 
with frontline activists. I am a foreign, white, male, middle class researcher and activist, and 
this undoubtedly shapes the way people communicate with me and how I respond. Moreover, 
as Laura Pulido suggests, scholar activists must not essentialize environmental racism nor 
fetishize communities on the frontlines (1996). There are complex and nuanced dynamics of 
identity, privilege and power that exist amongst activists in any frontline struggle. Both of the 
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case studies I explored contained their own internal hierarchies, privileges and power 
relationships. Just as I remained attuned to my own privilege, my research was also deeply 
attentive to the power dynamics within and between climate justice activists, the 
communities of which they are a part, and the industry against which they fight.  
 
Finally, throughout this process, I remained committed to Participant Action Research (PAR) 
(Gaventa and Cornwall 2001).  In other words, my participation in the movement, my 
personal location within it, and my commitment to ensuring my research was, to the extent 
possible, developed in and through my participation in the movement also became resources 
of study and introspection. This level of engagement allows scholars to explore, describe and 
analyze social movements in unique and privileged ways that would be impossible for the 
detached, dispassionate researcher. PAR provides scholar activists with a powerful 
framework from which to devise methods and carry out research with integrity and rigor, 
while remaining active within, and accountable to, social movements. PAR places an 
emphasis on the emancipatory capacity of research methods, so it is common for researchers 
to foreground the voices and experience of the people within the communities in which their 
studies are situated, and to work with and not on those communities. The research strategies I 
derived from PAR made it possible for me to both participate in the campaigns I am 
studying, while learning from them and building knowledge alongside their members. 
 
Methods 
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Applying this research philosophy to my methodological approach I devised a research 
agenda based upon empirical case study fieldwork in two case study sites. This involved 
participant action research, discourse analysis, online and offline archival research, key 
informant interviews, and profound engagement with activist and social movement theory 
through formal academic literature as well as activist manuals, handbooks, blogs, and zines. 
This research approach afforded me a great deal of flexibility in the range of resources 
available to me and the uses to which I put them.  I have also placed all of these methods in 
conversation with one another to challenge and develop the ideas I drew from each one. In 
particular, I have sought to place theory and empirical study of, and participation in, 
movement practices in conversation with one another so that they might productively 
elucidate a contextualized yet generalizable framework that I hope to put in the services of 
scholars and activists alike. 
 
While my methodological engagement with theory is incorporated into Chapter Two and 
descriptions of my case studies have earned a chapter each, I will describe my research 
process in a little more depth here. I had expected to use my case studies to “test” my 
theorical interventions with empirical observations, but I found this was an overly simplified 
way of thinking about the relationship between the field and theory. Each has informed my 
engagement with the other. The theoretical interpretative framework I developed is as much 
constituted by my engagement with the field as it is by the literature I explore in Chapter 2. 
As such, the chapter that sets out my theoretical framework and engagement with the 
literature is produced in conversation with the ideas I explored and developed during my time 
in the field. Similarly, my case study chapters are the product of engagement with theory. 
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The divisions between chapters and methodologies are therefore somewhat artificial and 
maintained only for the sake of clarity and organization.  
 
I spent ten weeks in two case study sites. The first was in city of Burnaby in Coast Salish 
Territory adjacent to the city of Vancouver in British Columbia, Canada. Here I studied the 
operations of petro-hegemony and the strategies, narrative and tactics that climate justice 
activists, led by First Nations campaigners, are using to halt the construction of the Trans 
Mountain Pipeline. The pipeline would transport diluted bitumen from Edmonton in Alberta 
to Burnaby and triple export capacity of Alberta’s tar sands off the Pacific Coast. The second 
case study took me back to Richmond, California. With the same research objective, I 
explored petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion in the city and studied the process by 
which Chevron’s hegemonic status had been challenged by an alliance of progressives and 
climate justice activists. Chevron operates a refinery in the city which remains the state of 
California’s largest stationary source of Greenhouse Gases. Oil interests have controlled city 
politics for over 100 years this case is especially concerned with community resistance to 
Chevron’s proposed refinery upgrades over the last 15 years. While both case studies provide 
ample evidence of the existence of petro-hegemony or the carbon rebellion, their purpose is 
to illustrate and complicate my understanding of this theoretical framework with empirical 
and practical examples.  
 
In addition to my case study research in the field, I also built an online database of over 1500 
news articles, opinion pieces, blog posts, Tweets and Facebook posts, memes and video clips 
that pertained to each case study field site. The campaigns and movements I studied continue 
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to develop in real time and so I needed to create a “living archive” that would allow me to 
maintain up-to-date contact with the field and the shifting dynamics shaping it. I used this 
database or archive for three purposes. Firstly, it provided the formal basis for analyzing the 
discursive interventions the fossil fuel industry and climate justice activists deployed to 
advance their respective agendas. Secondly, it offered essential secondary sources necessary 
for delving deeper into the nuances of the histories and politics of each case study site, as 
well as for staying up to date with developments on the ground when I left the field. And 
thirdly, I used it to inform the questions I would bring to my key informant interviewees. 
This helped me develop a recursive approach to interviews where I would use contemporary 
developments to open up questions that advanced my research agenda.  
 
I interviewed 27 local movement leaders, strategists, activists, administrators, and politicians. 
My interviews were open ended and took the form of guided conversations, or what Burgess 
calls “conversations with a purpose” (1985). They ranged between 45 minutes and two hours 
and I transcribed them using Otter software. The purpose of these interviews was not to 
survey opinions or make generalizations about what movement leaders and strategist think, 
but rather to add depth and detail to my research and to challenge preconceived arguments I 
had developed before entering the field. These proved absolutely vital resource in elucidating 
and complicating my arguments throughout the dissertation and in bringing the voices and 
perspectives of movement leaders to the forefront of the chapters that follow. 
 
Dissertation structure: what to expect  
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This dissertation’s contributions are developed in four parts each of which contain two 
chapters. Part One introduces readers to my theoretical framework and the wide-ranging 
literature I have drawn upon to construct my arguments. It also provides readers with a brief 
insight into contemporary theories of climate justice, the current status of the climate justice 
movement, and explains why keeping fossil fuels in the ground on the frontlines of resource 
extraction has become a strategic necessity in the context of climate emergency. Part Two 
brings readers to the frontlines of my two case studies. Here I situate my research in Burnaby 
and Richmond’s respective histories, geographies and politics, provide a narrativized 
timeline of the events under particular scrutiny, illustrate the operations of petro-hegemony, 
and raise the questions my fieldwork has challenged this dissertation to ask and explore. It is 
worth mentioning that where petro-hegemony dominates my contributions in Parts One and 
Two, Parts Three and Four explore the potential for the emergence and cultivation of the 
carbon rebellion, the organization of strategies and tactics that it implies, and the questions 
and tensions raised about the process through which it might develop. Specifically, Part 
Three identifies and categorizes the mobilizing and organizing strategies being deployed on 
the frontlines of the two case studies, while Part Four describes and engages with some of the 
major debates defining the movement’s strategic orientations today. Below I provide a short 
description of what readers can expect from each chapter. 
 
Chapter One offers a brief theoretical overview of climate justice(s) and introduces readers to 
the climate justice movement. It explores the revolutionary potential of climate justice and 
specifically the contingent of the movement working on keeping fossil fuels in the ground at 
their source. I explain why these campaigns are the focus of this study and place them in the 
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broader context of climate disruption and environmental politics. Building on Chapter One, 
Chapter Two provides readers with the theoretical framework and arguments this dissertation 
advances. Offering a deep examination of Gramscian theory, and engagement with 
Environmental Sociology, Political Ecology, Energy Studies, Social Movement Studies, and 
Critical Theory, as well as drawing upon public intellectuals and field manuals written by 
and for members of social movements, this chapter speaks and responds to the synthetic field 
in which I have placed my research agenda. Readers will note, I draw on insights from a 
wide range of interdisciplinary scholarship to lay the theoretical foundations upon which this 
dissertation rests. Thus, Chapter Two reviews the evidence through which my rereading of 
Gramscian hegemony is advanced and that petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion are 
premised upon. 
 
Chapter Three situates my first case study in Burnaby, British Columbia. In doing so it 
locates the region as a strategic hub in the fossil fuel commodity chain, emphasizes the 
significance of settler colonial relations in the region, province and country, and describes the 
contemporary political, culture and economic contexts in which the fight over the Trans 
Mountain pipeline continues to unfold. It offers a situated narrative in which I describe a 
period of seven years over which the struggle to prevent the construction of the Trans 
Mountain Pipeline has taken place. This narrative brings readers into the intensity of the 
struggle and provides them with crucial details that allow us to better understand the power 
of the fossil fuel industry and the climate justice movement’s response to it in the region. The 
chapter goes on to explore the operations of petro-hegemony in practice. It provides detailed 
accounts of the different points of intervention, relations of power, and strategies, narratives 
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and tactics the industry has deployed. It organizes these into the petro-hegemony framework. 
Finally, it raises questions that the case study evoked about the construction and maintenance 
of the carbon rebellion and that much of rest of the dissertation will engage with. Chapter 
Four follows the same format but contextualizes my case study in Richmond, California. The 
case study features a 15-year period over which climate justice activists and progressive have 
contested Chevron’s plans to upgrade its refinery in the city. The case is a classic example of 
environmental injustice and racism. In particular, I situate Richmond in its history of 
racialized impoverishment and corruption, the consequences of neoliberalism and 
deindustrialization, and the role that Chevron’s refinery has played in this history. Both 
cases, I argue, offer vital insights into the operations of petro-hegemony and how it might be 
defeated.  
 
Chapters Five and Six should be read together because they offer accounts of the relationship 
between community organizing and mass mobilizing. Drawing on both case studies, they 
identify, categorize and assess the narratives, strategies, tactics climate justice activists have 
deployed in their respective campaigns. Chapter Five emphasizes narrative, alliance building 
and the possibility of intersectional populism. Here I argue that the populist counter 
hegemonic narratives that climate justice activists have shared are helping to articulate into 
alignment a broad “hegemonic bloc,” through a political culture of opposition and creation 
(Foran, Grosse and Gray 2017). However, as a counter hegemonic strategy, populism risks, 
and indeed is premised upon, erasing particularisms and ignoring relations of difference, 
privilege and power within the “we” that it articulates. This forces us to problematize alliance 
building through the lens of accountability and intersectionality. Working with Zoltán 
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Grossman’s book Unlikely Alliances (2017), Patricia Hill Collins “matrix of domination” 
(2012) and Kimberlé Crenshaw’s coining of the term intersectionality (1990), I offer 
intersectional populism as one way we might navigate the tensions between universalism and 
particularism. While Chapter Five explores how climate justice activists organize 
communities into counter hegemonic alliances and intervene in relations of consent, Chapter 
Six focuses on the strategies and tactics climate justice campaigners use to intervene in all 
three power relations and specifically to mobilize communities against the industry. This 
chapter shows readers how we can organize and categorize these strategies, narratives and 
tactics into the carbon rebellion framework. 
 
Chapter Six may neatly organize and categorize strategies into the carbon rebellion 
framework but, as Chapter Seven goes on to illustrate, these do not necessarily fit cohesively 
together outside the confines of theory. With an emphasis on potential for synthesis, Chapter 
Seven explores the deep strategic and politico-strategic divisions within the movement that 
threaten to render the realization of carbon rebellion all but impossible. In particular, I 
confront three debates: firstly, the role of the state in the climate justice movement’s strategic 
repertoire, secondly the value and appropriateness of direct action as an intervention in petro-
hegemony, and thirdly the division between preferences for mobilizing strategies, on the one 
hand, and organizing strategies, on the other. Working through each of these debates, this 
chapter asserts that there is potential for convergence and even synergy amongst their 
different positions. Introducing readers to the spectrum of strategy, I argue that strategic 
orientations tend to be premised upon political and experiential prejudices that we should 
respect, but also that tend to categorize strategies into either reformist or radical dispositions. 
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I argue that attributing these political values to strategy is partly responsible for divisions 
between strategic orientations. The spectrum of strategy organizes strategies not according to 
how radical or reformist they are, but around the extent to which they could be considered on 
spectrum from non-confrontational to confrontational. Attempting to break the radical-
reformist binary, I illustrate the importance of a framework through which a diversity of 
tactics could actually bring activists together across strategic differences and intervene in a 
far larger array of points of intervention across all three terrains of struggle. 
 
Chapter Eight engages with critical questions of scale. Questions of scale loom in the 
background of each of the preceding chapters but are not engaged with until this final 
chapter. Wrapped up in the complexities of scale are questions about the broader matrix of 
domination in which petro-hegemony operates and whether carbon rebellion is an adequate 
response to confronting that matrix. Thus, we are forced to again confront the revolutionary 
potential of carbon rebellion and keep-it-in-the-ground campaigns. Also embedded in this 
question is the possibility of relationships between different complimentary hegemonies, or 
layered hegemonies. Moreover, the fossil fuel industry itself is enormous in scope and scale. 
All of these considerations lead to the fundamental concern of the scale at which the climate 
justice movement’s interventions are appropriate or even possible. I remain convinced that 
scaling the movement up is necessary to address the industry in a way that is commensurate 
with its size and scope, but this chapter problematizes the different processes by which scale 
may be achieved. Namely, I explore the difference between aggrandizing to scale and 
aggregation to scale. Again, searching for the possibility of synthesis across a broad spectrum 
of political strategy, in aggregation to scale I argue the movement may be able to scale up 
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through frontlines leadership while maintaining a democratic and accountable orientation 
towards its operations. I show that this depends upon the deliberate cultivation of what 
Adirenne Maree Brown calls critical connections, alongside a commitment counter 
hegemonic articulations and alignment across space and difference.  
 
Lastly, I offer a short conclusion to this dissertation by demonstrating the logic connecting 
each chapter’s main arguments to those before and after it. In doing so, I provide readers with 
a broader perspective on the dissertation and reflect upon its relevance to the field and to 
climate justice activists. Therefore, the conclusion will present a holistic account of petro-
hegemony and how we might facilitate the emergence and flourishing of the carbon 
rebellion. In this way, I hope to illustrate the significance of this dissertation’s contributions 
and the way in which each chapter provides tools and frameworks that scholars and activists 
alike can build upon and put to work in their own contexts. 
 
Conclusion to the introduction 
 
Standing Rock is everywhere now and that’s why this dissertation matters. Across the world, 
communities are organizing and mobilizing against the expansion of the fossil fuel industry. 
They are doing so in the name of climate justice, but also in the name of democracy, 
sovereignty, self-determination, and for the sake of public health, water, land, homes and the 
ecosystems upon which our lives depend. Naomi Klein has called this new political 
landscape of contestation Blockadia (2014). As governments and leaders around the world 
fail to advance anything like the ambition required of addressing the climate crisis, let alone 
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addressing it in a just way, Blockadia’s campaigns to keep fossil fuels in the ground are 
emerging as a crucial force holding back the recklessness of an industry that is prepared to 
extract and burn more fossil fuels than even the most conservative estimates say are safe to 
burn and maintain a stable climate. In this struggle, however, communities are recognizing 
that the fossil fuel industry is merely the physical embodiment of broader systems of 
violence, extraction, dispossession and domination through which the world’s most 
marginalized people feel the impacts of fossil fuel pollution and climate disruption first and 
hardest. It is from these communities that the climate justice movement has emerged and 
whose leadership it must follow. My dissertation makes its intervention here, in Blockadia 
and on the frontlines of climate justice. 
 
If we are to stand any chance of mitigating climate catastrophe, we must keep fossil fuels in 
the ground but we must do so in a way that advances a just transition away from the 
extractive systems of domination out of which climate crisis has emerged and with leadership 
from those most impacted. How we do so will require the minds and actions of millions. My 
dissertation is one small offering towards that effort. In its assessment of the power of the 
fossil fuel industry and the strategies, narratives, and tactics the climate justice movement 
could, and is, using to counter it, I hope to offer a framework of understanding activists and 
scholars can work with and build upon to keep fossil fuels in the ground and advance a 
revolutionary agenda in the name of climate justice. In my rereading of hegemony and the 
relations of consent, coercion and compliance, I hope to provoke serious thought and 
conversation about the adequacy of our theories of change and strategic orientations, while 
offering a productive channel through which we might map our power and the industry’s. 
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And through concepts like intersectional populism, a spectrum of strategy, and aggregating to 
scale, I hope to facilitate and encourage the development of the carbon rebellion.  If this 
dissertation is able to contribute even half of this ambitious program, then I believe it will be 
a valuable and significant intervention in the study, politics and practice of climate justice 
during what may be one of the most consequential moments in our collective struggle for a 
fairer, more democratic, more equitable, more just, and more sustainable future. 
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PART 1: THEORETICAL ENGAGEMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 - Climate Justice, The Climate Justice Movement, and Keeping Fossil Fuels 
in the Ground  
 
The climate justice movement has prioritized keeping fossil fuels in the ground as a critical 
intervention to prevent greenhouse gas emissions raising the planet’s temperature by more 
than 1.5 degrees Celsius. As global governance has failed to produce anything close to the 
ambition climate change mitigation requires, climate justice activists have found allies in 
frontlines struggles against the expansion of the fossil fuel industry. This has connected 
climate justice to local, place-based struggles to protect water, land, homes, self-
determination, and public health, and to resist the colonial, gendered, classist and racialized 
ways in which climate change and the fossil fuel industry’s operations impact already 
marginalized communities first and hardest. This development is promising an alternative to 
mainstream and hegemonic climate politics which depoliticizes the climate crisis, rendering 
it a technocratic problem rather than one of power, resources, and conflict.  
 
In this chapter I navigate the different interpretations of climate justice that exist within the 
climate justice movement, indicate the approaches to climate justice upon which this 
dissertation is premised, and introduce readers to the keep-it-in-the-ground contingent of the 
movement operating on the frontlines of Blockadia. Exploring the climate science motivating 
this movement, I make the case that keeping the vast majority of known fossil fuels reserves 
in the ground is a fundamental, though necessarily incomplete, component of the struggle for 
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climate justice. I show that this movement is a translocal network, connected by shared 
principles and strategies of intervention, and that it is taking this fight to the fossil fuel 
industry around the globe. I argue that a large contingent of the climate justice movement has 
eschewed intervention at the annual United Nations climate talks and are taking climate 
politics into their own hands in frontlines struggles against the expansion of the fossil fuel 
industry. In framing the industry as the target of climate action, they are challenging 
dominant climate discourses and politics. Nevertheless, I problematize the keep-it-in-the-
ground framing of intervention as one that risks replicating mainstream carbon 
fundamentalism. Responding to this risk, I argue that through their confrontations with the 
fossil fuel industry, communities and activists confront the systems of domination out of 
which the climate crisis has emerged. This exposure lays the groundwork for broader 
confrontation with these systems of domination. Finally, therefore, I explore the 
revolutionary potential of climate justice and the extent which revolutionary action in the 
name of climate justice may be cultivated in, and grow out of, the frontlines of Blockadia. 
 
Climate Justice 
 
Climate justice is at once a theoretical framework, a framing discourse, a distinct set of 
objectives and principles, and a loosely articulated collection of utopian visions for the 
future. With different meanings and different interpretations around the world, climate justice 
is also a contested concept. Compare these definitions for example: 
 
“Climate justice links human rights and development to achieve a human-centred 
approach, safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable people and sharing the 
burdens and benefits of climate change and its impacts equitably and fairly. Climate 
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justice is informed by science, responds to science and acknowledges the need for 
equitable stewardship of the world’s resources.” – The Mary Robinson Foundation 
(2018) 
 
“The heart of climate justice is the understanding that the urgent action needed to 
prevent climate change must be based on community-led solutions and the well-being 
of local communities, Indigenous Peoples and the global poor, as well as biodiversity 
and intact ecosystems.” – Global Justice Ecology Project (2018) 
 
“Frontline, community-based organizations have the solutions to the extractive 
industrial systems that are eroding human’s primary means of existence on the planet. 
Nature and humans are interdependent. Effective climate crisis solutions honor 
human rights and the rights of nature. Localized democracies that champion 
community rights to energy, land, water, and food sovereignty are the best answers to 
combating exploitation. Shared leadership produces community wellbeing and the 
most innovative solutions to our climate crisis. Workers should be at the forefront of 
shaping new economies rooted in fairness, equity and ecological values.” – Climate 
Justice Alliance (2019) 
 
“Climate justice is a term used for framing global warming as an ethical and political 
issue, rather than one that is purely environmental or physical in nature.” – Wikipedia 
(2018) 
 
Identifying “three different articulations of climate justice – those embodied in academic 
discourse, elite nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and grassroots movements,” 
Schlosberg and Collins help make sense of these different approaches (2014, 1). The first 
articulation tends to concern questions of accountability, responsibility, and interrogating 
justice as philosophical category (See Shue 2014, for example). The second tends to focus on 
policy interventions, human rights, the rights of industrializing countries to develop, and 
market-based mechanisms aimed at decoupling fossil fuel emissions and economic 
development. The third, which in so far as market-based mechanisms are considered is 
antithetical to the second, emerged to address the perceived root causes of climate change. It 
presents the climate crisis as rooted in capitalism, racism, patriarchy, and colonialism. In 
many accounts, these systems of domination are embodied in the fossil fuel industry. A “just 
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transition” away from the fossil fuel economy and the systems of domination upon which it 
thrives is therefore necessary to avert climate catastrophe.  
 
John Foran identifies a further distinction within this third articulation of climate justice. 
Here grassroots movements may be classified into those advancing climate justice discourses 
and those advancing radical climate justice discourses. This difference usually hinges on 
whether capitalism tout court or specifically neoliberal capitalism is considered the focus of 
the movement’s revolutionary orientation (2016). This dissertation is positioned in the former 
camp but embraces and is profoundly relevant to those also occupying the latter. Meanwhile, 
Schlosberg and Collins concede there is in fact a great deal of overlap between the three 
articulations they identify and that these should be considered ideal types rather than fixed 
categories (2014). Nonetheless, their renderings help demonstrate the nuances and 
contestation of the term climate justice. 
 
Climate justice, as I will use it, resonates most with what Schlosberg and Collins identify as 
the “grassroots movement articulation.” Throughout this chapter, however, I will also seek to 
challenge approaches articulating necessarily sutured distinctions between academic, NGO, 
and grassroots approaches climate justice. In this dissertation, then, climate justice is the 
recognition that climate disruption has systemic causes and is a crisis rooted in legacies of 
colonialism, racism, and (neoliberal) capitalism (Bond and Dorsey 2011; Bond 2012; Powys 
Whyte 2017; Klein 2014; Mann and Wainwright 2018). Climate justice asserts that the 
people most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and fossil fuel production are often 
those least responsible for them (Tokar 2014; Harlan, Pellow, and Roberts 2015; Mohai, 
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Pellow and Roberts 2009). These people tend to be some of global society’s most 
marginalized communities: Indigenous peoples – particularly Indigenous women – people of 
color, and low-income communities, as well as vast swathes of the global poor living in the 
Global South (Pellow 2012; Bond 2012; Powys Whyte 2017; Bullard and Wright 2012). 
Accordingly, there can be no just solutions to climate disruption that are derived from the 
dominant epistemologies, hierarchies, ideologies, narratives, and assumptions that produced 
the climate crisis or that replicate the systems of domination and exploitation from which it 
has emerged (Bond 2014; Foran 2016).   
 
While some earlier iterations of climate justice favored some market-based mechanisms as 
climate solutions, like carbon pricing or a carbon-tax-and-dividend, more recently climate 
justice has tended to exclude these from its repertoire of just solutions (Gilbertson 2017). 
Very few within the climate justice movement believe that “techno-fixes” like geo-
engineering and Carbon Capture Sequestration (CCS), and market mechanisms like Cap and 
Trade and carbon offsets, favored by establishment elites and dominant neoliberal paradigms 
can prevent climate chaos (ibid; Müller and Passakadis 2010; Fauset 2010; Lohmann 2011; 
Gilbertson 2017). Fewer, still, believe that such solutions will prevent climate chaos and 
emancipate their communities from environmental racism and inequality (Harlan, Pellow, 
and Roberts 2015; Bullard and Müller 2012). Just solutions to the climate crisis must, 
therefore, be advanced through a just transition, embodying an emancipatory departure away 
from the logic of extraction, “accumulation by dispossession,”10 contemporary relations of 
 
10 For more on accumulation by dispossession see David Harvey’s The New Imperialism (2003). Here Harvey 
also recognizes that accumulation by dispossession takes place through a combination of the power relations of 
coercion and consent. 
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power and distributions of wealth and resources (Brecher 2017; Rosemburg 2010; Climate 
Justice Alliance 2019; Healy and Barry 2017). In other words, achieving solutions to climate 
change, let alone just solutions, means radically reorganizing the logics of consumption, 
wealth and domination upon which society is currently predicated (Klein 2014; Anderson 
2012; Urry 2011; Climate Justice Alliance 2019a). Moreover, just solutions must ensure that 
communities and workers dependent upon extractive industries are not abandoned to 
unemployment and destitution but are instead helping lead the transition to sustainable 
energy infrastructure.  
 
A just transition addresses the historical responsibility and accountability for fossil fuel 
pollution internally within nations and externally between them. According to the Climate 
Justice Alliance, the economics of a just transition first arose out of collaboration between 
labor unions and environmental justice groups who recognized “the need to phase out the 
industries that were harming workers, community health and the planet; and at the same time 
provide just pathways for workers to transition to other jobs.” The idea has been developed 
further to mean a transition that is “just and equitable; redressing past harms and creating 
new relationships of power for the future through reparations” (Climate Justice Alliance 
2019a). Elements of a just transition include leadership of communities on the frontlines of 
climate disruption and fossil fuel extraction, community ownership of sustainable energy 
production, some articulations of a Green New Deal, and climate solutions that would create 
millions of meaningful jobs, retrain workers to move out of the fossil fuel sector, invest in 
local economies and community’s own mitigation and adaptation strategies, supporting 
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democratic, healthy, regenerative communities, and a momentous shift in societal values 
around work, consumption, and leisure.  
 
The US network of climate justice community organizers, the Climate Justice Alliance, has 
endorsed Senator Bernie Sanders’ Green New Deal Plan because it contains many of these 
elements (Climate Justice Alliance 2019c). Similarly, in Canada, much of this political 
program is replicated in the Leap Manifesto (Leap Manifesto 2016). Meanwhile, Indigenous 
organizers and academics with The Red Nation have sought to critique and build upon the 
Green New Deal with a Red Deal which positions Indigenous peoples, experiences, and 
power at the forefront of a just transition (Estes 2019; Red Nation 2019). In all its iterations, 
from policy prescriptions to presidential agendas to revolutionary projects, the just transition 
decarbonizes, democratizes, decentralizes and decolonizes energy and economy. Between 
nations, it is the richest and most industrialized countries that have benefited most from fossil 
fuel energy. Within and between nations, it is the richest and most powerful people, 
institutions and companies that have benefited the most from fossil fuel energy. In both cases 
these are the entities who must be forced to halt further fossil fuel extraction and to pay for a 
just transition. Climate justice, therefore, is a counter hegemonic and unashamedly utopian 
project for radical social change. It cannot be achieved without the most powerful, most 
diverse, most creative, most resilient social movement the world has ever seen (Foran 2016).  
 
The Climate Justice Movement 
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The climate justice movement (CJM) is global and translocal, and is comprised of a vast 
network of movements, campaigns and organizations, encompassing many different 
ideologies, cultures, geographies, theories of change, and differences in members’ access to 
wealth, privilege, and power (Routledge 2011; Tokar 2014). Nevertheless, the movement 
coheres, more or less, around the project outlined above, and many of its members have 
rallied around the slogan and sentiment “system change not climate change” (Bullard and 
Müller 2012). The movement has always sought to challenge a perceived depoliticization of 
climate change, in which the crisis is reduced simply to a question of market mechanisms, 
demand-side policy interventions, and technological solutions incentivizing energy transition 
(Kenis and Mathijs 2014). The movement has its roots in the environmental justice 
movement and the global justice movement. Its emergence as a global network with a 
coherent agenda has been traced back to the creation of the 2002 Bali Principles of Climate 
Justice (Bond 2014, Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Bali Principles 2002).  From its very 
beginning, and by the very nature of what it signifies, climate justice has been a necessarily 
global concept. Emerging out of frustration with the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the annual climate negotiations, the Conference of the 
Parties (COP)’s, failure to meaningfully engage with questions of historical responsibility, 
reign in the influence of the fossil fuel industry, or recognize the ecological debt 
industrialized countries owe industrializing, formerly colonized, countries, the CJM has 
always been global in its scope and ambitions (Bond 2014).  
 
Decoupling economic growth from fossil fuel energy has been the urgent question of the 
global political and business elites who claim to take climate change seriously (Anderson 
 46 
2012; Li 2009; Peet, Robbins, and Watts 2011). The annual UN COPs are heavily influenced 
by neoliberal, market-based solutions that elites argue will decouple growth from emissions 
and bring about an era of sustainable capitalism (Bond 2014; An Eco Modernist Manifesto 
2015; Paris Agreement 2015). The CJM considers these to be false solutions that don’t 
address the structural inequalities in which climate change and ecological degradation are 
rooted (Bond 2014). As Princen, Manno and Martin conclude: 
To presume that fossil fuels will stay in the ground as a by-product of rational 
environmental and energy policies is, to put it bluntly, politically deficient. It 
presumes that techno-rationalism – cost benefit analysis, efficacy measures, new 
technologies, designed markets – will eventually overcome the capacities of 
entrenched fossil fuel interests. It presumes a politics without power. (2015, 333) 
 
Moreover, as the “political opportunity structures” (Tarrow 1998) available for civil society 
actors to engage in the negotiation process at the COPs to address these critiques have 
become increasingly circumscribed, much of the CJM has abandoned the negations as a 
legitimate arena of struggle (Foran 2016). The globalized CJM developed in the streets, in 
protests and rallies, and at parallel conferences held outside the conference halls of the COP 
meetings (Brecher 2017).  Movement members now use the annual conferences as moments 
to mobilize discourses that cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the negotiation process, 
condemn the market solutions, carbon pricing, and techno-fixes, and, of course, to converge 
in one place to strategize and share knowledge across the global movement (Bullard and 
Müller 2012).  
 
From the UN conferences, to the halls of statecraft, to municipal government, to our 
ideologies and our very bodies, the fossil fuel industry has responded to attempts to reign in 
fossil fuel emissions by shoring up its cultural and political legitimacy, influencing public 
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discourse with misinformation campaigns, buying and financing  politician’s obstruction of 
climate policy, and defaming climate scientists (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Mulvey et al. 
2016). This has ensured that global governance and national legislation that might otherwise 
restrict the extraction and burning of fossil fuels remains weak or non-existent (Oreskes and 
Conway 2010; McKibben 2012). Thus, the industry has enjoyed cultural and political support 
as it continues exploring for, extracting and selling fossil fuel energy, despite the 
overwhelming evidence linking its activities directly to the effects of climate change (see 
Heede 2014; Ekwurzel et al. 2017). Meanwhile, an Oil Change International report, 
published in 2016, articulated the scientific case for keeping for keeping fossil fuels, and 
especially oil and gas, in the ground. It found that even if coal production were taken out of 
the equation, “the reserves in currently operating oil and gas fields alone… would take the 
world beyond 1.5°C” (Oil Change International 2016). In response to all this, the CJM has 
taken the fight over climate change to the fossil fuel industry, targeting its legitimizing 
narratives and its financial and political supporters.  
 
Simultaneously, the global movement has gone (trans)local (Routledge 2011; Brecher 2017). 
While the climate crisis is a global phenomenon, climate justice can be fought over at many 
different scales. Place-based, local resistance has proven a particularly effective site of 
struggle. As climate justice has moved to confronting the fossil fuel industry on local 
frontlines around the world, Naomi Klein writes: 
 
These place-based stands are stopping real climate crimes in progress. Seeing those 
successes, as well as the failures of top-down environmentalism, many young people 
concerned about climate change are taking a pass on the slick green groups and the 
big U.N. summits. Instead, they are flocking to the barricades of Blockadia. This is 
more than a change in strategy; it’s a fundamental change in perspective. The 
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collective response to the climate crisis is changing from something that primarily 
takes place in closed-door policy and lobbying meetings into something alive and 
unpredictable and very much in the streets (and mountains, and farmers’ fields, and 
forests). (2014, 254-255) 
 
Klein’s exploration of “Blockadia” describes the CJM’s shifting geographical orientations 
between the local and the global, and the translocal, which has taken precedence as climate 
negotiations fail year after year to produce legally binding commitments to emissions 
reductions. Blockadia, as Klein explains, “is not a specific location on a map but rather a 
roving transnational conflict zone that is cropping up with increasing frequency and intensity 
wherever extractive projects are attempting to dig and drill, whether for open-pit mines, or 
gas fracking, or tar sands oil pipelines” (2014, 254). Blockadia exists where resistance to 
fossil fuel extraction, transportation, and refining exists. Seeking to politicize the climate 
crisis and advance climate justice by specifically targeting and curtailing the expansion of 
fossil fuel infrastructure, a large contingent of the movement has adopted the slogan “Keep it 
in the ground.” While the CJM operates in many different contexts and campaigns, it is this 
contingent of the climate justice movement, and its counter hegemonic activity in Blockadia, 
that are the primary focus of this dissertation’s interventions. The frontlines of Blockadia, 
therefore, are the frontlines of climate justice referred to throughout the chapters that follow. 
 
In the United States, the Keystone XL pipeline and the Dakota Access Pipeline became two 
highly visible examples of Keep-it-in-the-ground campaigning infused with Indigenous 
leadership and place-based struggle. But such activism is by no means limited to the North 
America. From Bolivia to Germany, from Nigeria to Bangladesh, from England to Australia, 
all around the world these zones of intense conflict and confrontation over energy resource 
extraction are multiplying and expanding. Klein writes that the frontlines of Blockadia seem 
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“more reminiscent of civil war than political protest” (2014, 257). These place-based 
struggles are connected to the global movement deploying climate change as a frame around 
which very different organizations and interests may coalesce, mobilizing support and 
resources (Grossman 2017). These local fights tend to be led by the people most affected by 
fossil fuel extraction and exposure to climate change: Indigenous peoples, communities of 
color, low-income communities, and particularly women (Klein 2014; Grossman 2017; 
Gaard 2015). Much of this activism has involved building alliances with other struggles over 
land rights, Indigenous sovereignty, labor practices, through emphasizing the intersections of 
race, class, and gender with resource extraction and pollution. 
  
Why we must keep-it-in-the-ground 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released a report in 2018 claiming that the 
globe (writ large) had just 12 years left to implement emissions reductions that could limit 
global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius and avoid the most severe consequences of 
climate disruption (IPCC summary for policy makers, 2018). Six years earlier, 350.org 
cofounder, Bill McKibben, published his zeitgeist article, Global Warming’s Terrifying New 
Math: Three simple numbers that add up to global catastrophe – and that make clear who 
the real enemy is (2012), in which he framed global carbon dioxide emissions in terms of 
how much we have left to burn before exceeding 2 degrees Celsius. This article informed 
350.org’s subsequent fossil fuel divestment campaign and climate activism and introduced 
audiences to our global “carbon budget.” Drawing on data from the Grantham Institute’s 
2012 Carbon Tracker Report and an array of climate scientists’ carbon budget modeling, 
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McKibben argued that roughly 80% of known fossil fuel reserves must remain unburned if 
we are to have an 80% chance of staying below 2 degrees Celsius (see the update Carbon 
Tracker Report 2013). McKibben claimed that we then had about 565 gigatons11 of carbon 
dioxide left in our carbon budget. But he also showed that fossil fuel reserves belonging to 
companies and nation-states at that time contained roughly 2,795 gigatons of carbon dioxide. 
In other words, in 2012 the fossil fuel industry (private and state-owned fossil fuel 
companies) owned five times more coal, oil, gas than even the most conservative scientific 
estimates said was safe to burn and maintain a stable climate.  
 
Climate scientists at the Tyndall Centre and the Grantham Institute more or less concurred 
with McKibben’s analysis, estimating that approximately 80% of fossil fuels existing in 
known fossil fuel reserves must remain unburned to avoid catastrophic climate change 
(Carbon Tracker 2013; Anderson 2012). The numbers have changed slightly with more 
recent data and more advanced climate modeling (Le Quéré et al. 2018). The IPCC 2018 
Summary for Policy Makers’ global carbon budget now allots the world 580 gigatons by 
mid-century for a 50% probability of staying below 1.5 degrees, and 420 gigatons of carbon 
dioxide for a 66% probability (IPCC 2018, section C1.3).  As of November 2019, The 
Guardian’s “Carbon Countdown Clock” suggested we have roughly 682 gigatons of carbon 
dioxide equivalent left to burn for “a good chance” of remaining below 2 degrees warming 
(Evershed 2017). At current rates of emissions, we will exceed the global carbon budget for 2 
degrees in about 17 years. However, where 2 degrees had previously been considered the 
“safe” threshold of global warming in 2012, that number has been reduced to 1.5 degrees. 
 
11 One gigaton is equivalent to one billion tons.  
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The suggested “safety threshold” of both numbers has always been politically negotiated 
rather than scientifically determined.  
 
The Paris Climate Agreement negotiated in 2015 saw all signatories agree that 1.5 degrees 
was a safer warming threshold and committed to limiting warming at 1.5 degrees as an 
“aspirational” goal. Incidentally, the Paris Climate Agreement does not include the words 
fossil fuels anywhere in the document.  Meanwhile, discoveries of massive oil and gas 
deposits in Texas and Bahrain, and further investment in extreme extraction like fracking, 
cyclic steam injection, and tar sands mining have all increased the amount of fossil fuels 
countries and companies own in their reserves (Bridge and LeBillon 2017).  While the Paris 
Agreement marked a rare breakthrough in global climate negotiations, the Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) to emissions reductions to which each signatory will now 
voluntarily commit still place global warming on track for 3 degrees by 2100 (Harvey 2016; 
Climate Action Tracker 2019). The Paris Climate Agreement was a failure of climate 
ambition and a betrayal of all those who are already experiencing the consequences of 
climate chaos. As of writing, the United Nations’ World Meteorological Organization has 
found greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere reached a record high in November 
2019 and that there is “no sign of a slowdown, let alone decline” in emissions production 
(Carrington 2019a). 
 
Nevertheless, in January 2019, climate scientists at the University of Manchester released a 
report suggesting that the globe’s 1.5 degrees target is still within reach but only if an 
immediate halt is imposed upon the construction of all new fossil infrastructure and 
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exploration, allowing current production to run down reserves as rapid advances are made 
towards energy transition (Carrington 2019b; Smith et al. 2019). Avoiding what Healy and 
Barry call “carbon lock-in,” a scenario in which the construction of fossil fuel infrastructure 
today locks in cheap access to fossil fuels for decades to come, entails halting the 
construction of any new fossil fuel infrastructure projects now (2018). According to them, 
fossil fuel infrastructure is much harder to take offline once it is up and running than it is not 
to build the infrastructure in the first place. Crucially, the climate science, the emissions 
modelling, and the threat of carbon lock-in all demonstrate that avoiding the most severe 
consequences of climate disruption means we must leave the vast majority of fossil fuels in 
the ground, unburned. With just 10 years left to cut emissions in half, we cannot afford to 
build out any new fossil fuel infrastructure. This places climate science and climate justice in 
direct confrontation with both the fossil fuel industry and also the energy sources that have 
driven modern capitalist development for the past two centuries. 
 
While the CJM has maintained a focus on the fossil fuel industry since the 2002 Bali 
Principles, in the Global North McKibben’s article helped popularize these numbers and 
advanced the framing of the fossil fuel industry as the real enemy of climate action in 2012.  
Turning to Blockadia, large swathes of the CJM have mobilized around holding the industry 
accountable, preventing the further expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure, keeping fossil 
fuels in the ground, and advancing a just transition away from economies based on fossil fuel 
extraction (Brecher 2017). Throughout Blockadia, fossil fuel extraction zones, refineries, 
power plants, pipelines and transportation routes, as well as public discourses, courts and 
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policy, have all become sites of intense struggle and should be considered some of the major 
frontlines of climate justice activism (ibid).   
 
Despite the growing significance of Blockadia and its implications for fossil fuel production, 
however, Cheon and Urpelainen note that flashpoint spectacles of struggle that single out 
specific fossil fuel projects around the world cannot be relied upon to arrest the global trend 
of rising greenhouse gas emissions (2018). It is clear that even the marked increase in 
activism against local fossil fuel expansion is hardly going to contain rising emissions on its 
own. Indeed, there is no doubt, even amongst Blockadia’s climate justice activists, that 
keeping fossil fuels in the ground is at their source is just one small part of a much broader 
suite of interventions that both climate science and climate justice demand. Nevertheless, 
interventions in Blockadia are making the industry’s expansionist ambition much harder to 
achieve and there is also little doubt within the movement that this should count for a very 
great deal. In July 2019, the Secretary General of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) told reporters that climate activists were becoming the fossil fuel 
industry’s greatest threat (Watts 2019a). Moreover, keep-it-in-the-ground activism certainly 
can have a significant impact on emissions with regards to specific projects like the tar sands 
in Alberta. For example, as activists make it harder for fossil fuel companies to dig, drill, 
extract, transport, and refine their product, investment in such projects may dry up. Not one 
of the five major tar sands pipelines proposed in the last 15 years has been built, ensuring 
much of Alberta’s oil remains landlocked. This has stymied tar sands expansion and 
prevented significant increases in emissions. 
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Confronting Carbon Fundamentalism  
 
Keep-it-in-the-ground activism and the multiplying sites of energy conflict in Blockadia have 
drawn attention to climate justice, but it is also important to question whether this kind of 
activism is too narrowly focused on carbon emissions and the fossil fuel industry. The keep-
it-in-the-ground narrative and its focus on carbon emissions may displace a more systemic 
analysis of the crisis rooted in extractive economics, the legacies of colonialism, and 
enduring environmental racism. Environmental Sociologist, John Urry, writes that, “to slow 
down, let alone reverse, increasing carbon emissions and temperatures requires the 
reorganization of social life, nothing more and nothing less” (2011, 89). This cannot be 
achieved by fighting the fossil fuel industry alone.  A theory of change that singles out the 
industry and fossil fuel infrastructure as the site of intervention in the broader politics of 
climate change may ignore the other strategies that are necessary to halt our freefall into 
ecological collapse. The question here, is how a keep-it-in-the-ground framing of the climate 
crisis can achieve the radical socioecological transformations that are necessary to address 
collapse, and, moreover, exceed the singular emphasis on carbon emissions found in 
mainstream climate politics. 
 
It is true, strategies addressing the roots of the climate crisis must go far deeper and be far 
broader than confronting the fossil fuel industry alone. Indeed, at least as early as 2009, 
Gopal Dayaneni formerly of Movement Generation and the Climate Justice Alliance, was 
warning against a “carbon fundamentalist” framing of the climate crisis (2009). According to 
Dayaneni, carbon fundamentalism frames climate disruption as simply a question of 
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molecules of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the solution for which is to find ways of 
reducing emissions of those molecules and to take them out of the atmosphere. For Dayeneni 
carbon fundamentalism, where the single most important objective is reducing emissions of 
carbon dioxide, opens up space for the urgency of the crisis to give way to actions born of 
desperation, like geo-engineering or forcing Indigenous peoples off their land to make way 
for planting carbon sinks. It also depoliticizes the crisis, rendering it a technocratic question, 
rather than one of power and privilege (Kenis and Mathjis 2014). Targeting the fossil fuel 
industry as the source of emissions may reinforce carbon fundamentalism while ignoring the 
systems of domination that gave rise to the crisis in the first place. Climate change is not 
only, or even primarily, a question of technology and infrastructure, but one of politics and 
power. Even though, as Timothy Mitchell so presciently demonstrates, energy infrastructure 
can facilitate or obstruct particular forms of political action and agendas (2011), shifting 
energy inputs from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources and “green development” alone 
cannot achieve climate justice (Chen 2013). Solar energy can be nearly as centralized, 
resource extractive, exploitative and profit-oriented as fossil fuels. As the CJM consolidates 
its power around breaking the fossil fuel industry’s influence, it must avoid not only carbon 
fundamentalism, but also ‘energy determinism.’ Energy sources do not predetermine the 
values and ideologies of society, their interaction with energy politics, however, may shape 
them.  
 
All of this is to say that framing the fossil fuel industry as “the enemy” certainly politicizes 
and reframes climate change in discursive terms more favorable to the CJM’s agenda, but it 
can also suggest that averting climate catastrophe is simply a question of reigning in the 
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excesses of a single industry. Framing carbon and a single industry as the problem can place 
limits on our movement’s political imagination and ambition. Thus, the revolutionary 
potential of climate justice may be diluted through the frames and narratives which position 
fossil fuel companies and carbon as the problem. 
 
I do not disagree with this analysis and throughout this dissertation I will assert that keeping 
fossil fuels in the ground is just one of the many things the CJM emerged to do. The CJM’s 
other operations include resisting carbon pricing, emissions trading and carbon offsets; 
developing the seeds of new economic relations in the shell of the old; experimentation with 
energy cooperatives and democratizing access to, and production of, energy; campaigning for 
reparations and restitution for climate induced damages, and demanding that ecological debts 
be recognized; working at the municipal level to persuade counties and cities to commit to 
sustainability policies that involve a just transition; suing governments for failure to act on 
climate; holding negotiators accountable at the United Nations; and working in solidarity 
with food sovereignty and food justice campaigns. All of these are vital components of the 
CJM’s activism and not one of them, on their own, can achieve climate justice. Moreover, in 
their conflict with the fossil fuel industry, climate justice activists are addressing fossil fuel 
companies as the embodiment of the broader systems of domination out of which climate 
change has arisen. As such, keep-it-in-the-ground activism is teaching activists and 
communities about how fossil fuel extraction cannot be separated from the growth 
imperative, the profit motive, and structural inequalities of race, class, colonialism and 
gender. In this way, fighting the fossil fuel industry is becoming a form of community 
pedagogy that cultivates within constituents a recognition that the climate crisis cannot be 
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addressed without simultaneously confronting the broader systems of domination which 
allow the industry to thrive. 
 
The Revolutionary Potential of Climate Justice in Blockadia 
 
Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright’s incisive new political theory outlines a set of four 
possible “climate futures” in their book Climate Leviathan (2018).12 Their fourth future is 
called Climate X, with X intentionally standing in for an unknown or a variable. X would be 
informed by climate justice, would be anti-capitalist and opposed to addressing the climate 
crisis through consolidating power at the scale of a “planetary sovereign” (a global network 
of global governance institutions designed to enforce a world order). It would undo the 
oppressive logics of capital, of sovereignty, and of the nation-state. It would be premised on 
three guiding political principles: equality, inclusion and dignity of all, and solidarity “in 
composing a world of many worlds” (Mann and Wainwright 2018, 176). Beyond these 
principles, Climate X is necessarily undefined, but it is this world of many worlds, visions, 
and life ways that the CJM would build. Mann and Wainwright are under no illusions about 
the contradictions, scale, and indeed utopianism of such a project, but the CJM is itself 
unashamedly utopian. If anything, the authors are perhaps overly cautious and skeptical of 
the movement’s ability to assert radical or revolutionary social change.  
 
12 Before turning to Climate X they outline three other climate futures. One future, Climate Leviathan, most 
closely resembles an extension of hegemonic neoliberal action on climate change. It will maintain a global 
capitalist regime, reinforcing, and reinforced by, a network of global governance institutions, a planetary 
sovereign, to enforce climate action through the commodification of every aspect of the “natural” world. 
Climate Behemoth, also capitalist but reacting against planetary sovereignty and climate action in favor of 
nationalist, religious or ethnic sovereignty, reflects the contemporary anti-globalization stance held in the global 
rise of far right movements and religious fundamentalism. Most likely arising in East Asia, the third climate 
future, Climate Mao, would be anti-capitalist but would also control climate action through consolidating power 
at the scale of planetary sovereignty.  
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Nevertheless, Mann and Wainwright do ask readers to consider whether we can “conceive of 
revolution(s) in the name of climate justice, and if so what do they look like?” They suggest 
that Naomi Klein and the campaigns she studies on the frontlines of Blockadia offer part of 
the answer.  Arguing that “we can overcome the deadlock in the struggle between capitalism 
and climate justice by building a global movement from “Blockadia”” (2018, 9 emphasis 
added), the authors suggest that the campaigns currently seeking to keep fossil fuels in the 
ground may be where a revolution in the name of climate justice will emerge. They “strongly 
endorse this utopian vision of a movement from Blockadia, one that overturns fossil fuels 
and capitalist political economy in the name of a new relationship to community and the 
environment” (2018, 10). Framing the question and response in this way, Mann and 
Wainwright force us to ask how we move from resistance on the frontlines of keep-it-in-the-
ground activism in Blockadia to a systemic assault on not just the fossil fuel industry but the 
structures, ideas, and conditions upon which global capitalist hegemony depends. In other 
words, if the impetus for Climate X is to be realized in Blockadia how does the movement 
carry climate justice out of Blockadia (or perhaps expand Blockadia) to encompass a much 
larger range of radical and revolutionary impulses with which to mount a global revolution in 
the name of dignity, solidarity, multiplicity, and equality? 
 
Mann and Wainwright are decidedly vague, refusing to own a response, and suggesting 
instead that they are opening up the question rather than seeking to answer it. I too must 
hasten to add that the theorizing of revolutionary change on this scale is not under the 
purview of this dissertation. This dissertation is concerned with breaking the influence of the 
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fossil fuel industry, which, I argue is a necessary, but incomplete, condition of moving 
towards Climate X. The hegemony of the fossil fuel industry must be broken but in response 
to Mann and Wainwright’s intervention, a question I will return to throughout the dissertation 
is how, in the process of breaking the industry, climate justice might be realized. Chapter 
Eight in particular takes up this question with its engagement with questions of scale. Here I 
argue that we can use concepts like carbon rebellion to push beyond the typically limited 
ways of imagining and defining carbon and resisting fossil fuels in a way that it is 
transformative in its imagery and possibilities. Working with Mann and Wainwright, I later 
show how resistance to the fossil fuel industry at the local scale is cultivating terrain fertile 
for revolutionary action against broader systems of domination. 
 
As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, targeting the fossil fuel industry has proven a 
particularly effective mobilizing and organizing strategy that engages local communities in 
the global struggle for climate justice.  Moreover, the fights in Blockadia can become proxies 
for resisting “accumulation by dispossession” and the very logic of extractivism while 
advancing the struggle for decolonization, racial justice, and equity. Standing Rock or the 
Keystone XL in the US, have become lighting rods for broader coalition building that 
confront the structures and belief-systems upon which legacies of colonialism, environmental 
racism, and extractivism are based. Where climate change and climate justice may be more 
abstract and less relevant to the everyday oppressions marginalized communities across the 
globe face, the encroachment of the fossil fuel industry and the localized impacts of its 
pollution can connect place-based struggles into a globalized attack on systems of oppression 
through which all these groups can work towards collective liberation. This is one of the 
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ways we might conceive of revolution in the name of climate justice emerging from 
Blockadia.  
 
To conclude, then, climate justice strives for new political, economic, and social systems 
based upon dignity, solidarity, and equity for all. Halting the construction of all new fossil 
fuel projects is imperative if the most severe consequences of climate disruption are to be 
avoided. As the failures of global governance to reign in fossil fuel interests and advance 
ambitious climate legislation becomes increasingly obvious, more and more activists have 
developed climate justice interventions at the local scale in Blockadia. Here they are resisting 
the expansion of the fossil fuel industry while calling for a just transition away from the 
economies and ideologies of extraction that decolonizes, decarbonizes, democratizes, and 
decentralizes energy and that is led by communities on the frontlines.  
 
Keeping fossil fuels in the ground is a crucial, but on its own incomplete, part of climate 
justice. Moreover, climate justice may well be a crucial, but on its own incomplete, part of 
bringing about the kind of radical socioecological transformation our very survival as a 
species depends upon. I do not pretend for a moment, that either keep-it-in-the-ground 
activism or climate justice are on their own able to galvanize the momentum required for 
such revolutionary action, but I do believe, and will show how, they can play significant roles 
in contributing to it. As such, this dissertation focuses on keep-in-the-ground campaigning in 
the US and Canada, not because this is necessarily the most important type of climate justice 
activism, but because these geographies are rapidly becoming vital nodes in the global supply 
of fossil fuels. They are also some of the most visceral and intense places to examine the 
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contradictions between “liberal democracy” and global capitalism, colonialism, and racism in 
struggles for climate justice that are binding communities together in what is likely our very 
last chance to hold the most devastating consequences of climate disruption at bay. 
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Chapter 2 – Interventions in Theory and Practice: Hegemony and Counter Hegemony 
in Blockadia 
 
Introduction 
 
Theory matters. There are those within social movement spaces who might disparage theory 
and theorists, but without theory there can be no strategy and there are no tactics – just wild, 
often desperate, reactions to external provocations. Theory organizes thought and action into 
intelligible systems of explanation, principles, strategies, and goals, ultimately providing our 
movements with direction, purpose and meaning. Moreover, theory is just as likely to be 
developed and acted upon outside the academy as within it. Social movements, formally or 
informally, operate according to theories of change. Campaigners and activists use theory to 
justify action, develop and align strategy and objectives, and execute tactics. Academic 
theory does not disqualify academics from membership of social movements, nor does 
membership of, and participation in, social movements disqualify activists from engaging in 
academic theory. In fact, it is to the people occupying the terrain intersecting theory and 
practice that the theoretical framework developed in these pages owes its greatest debt.  
 
It is also true, however, that theory and theorists, social movement theory and theorists 
included, can be overly complicated, obfuscating, and inaccessible, rendering them largely 
useless to the movements in whose service they should be placed.  Because it is true that 
theory matters and also true that far too much academic theory is too dense to be of much use 
to social movements, in this chapter I develop an intervention in understandings of power 
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and theories of change in language and a framework that is relevant and useful to social 
movement actors. For the sake of precision, I will also be using language specific to the 
academy but will define these terms clearly where I do. I have adopted the principles of the 
philosophy of praxis, an action-oriented intellectual tradition that inspired and has been 
inspired by the Marxist thinker and once-leader of the Italian Communist Party, Antonio 
Gramsci. As he wrote “the philosophy of praxis is realized through the concrete study of past 
history through present activity to construct new history” (1971, 427). In other words, the 
making of a new world, is an intellectual and a pragmatic endeavor, requiring experience, 
reflection, study, and action.  It is on the terrain existing at the intersection of theory and 
practice that my dissertation makes its intervention. 
 
As an interdisciplinary scholar, trained in Global Studies, I draw upon a wide and diverse 
range of literature and fields. This chapter synthesizes insights from Environmental 
Sociology, Political Ecology, Energy Studies, Social Movement Studies, and Critical Theory, 
as well as from public intellectuals and field manuals written by and for members of social 
movements, to develop the theoretical foundations upon which this dissertation’s arguments 
rest.  This chapter asserts four arguments, each one building on the next, to advance a logic 
of intervention that can supplement and adjust the Climate Justice Movement’s present 
theories of change, and particularly its engagements with the fossil fuel industry:  
 
1) Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony contains within it three relations of power – 
consent, compliance, and coercion – that counter hegemonic actors must intervene in 
simultaneously to challenge and dismantle the hegemonic order. 
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2) It is theoretically and pragmatically valuable to understand struggles to keep fossil 
fuels in the ground and the power relations existing between the fossil fuel industry 
and the Climate Justice Movement in hegemonic terms.  
3) If we are to understand the fight to keep fossil fuels in the ground in hegemonic 
terms, then we must do so paying attention to how the three relations of power 
incorporated under hegemony structure their own distinct terrains of struggle upon 
which activists and industry agents alike must intervene. 
4) Paying attention to these distinct relations of power helps us see that upon each of the 
terrains of struggle, there exist many different points of intervention, each requiring 
different actors and diverse sets of tactics and strategy to engage with them.  
 
Therefore, to successfully challenge the fossil fuel industry’s hegemony and keep fossil fuels 
in the ground, climate justice activists must devise strategies, advance narratives, and deploy 
tactics that are specifically tailored to each one of the three terrains of struggle. This 
requires us to forge larger and more diverse coalitions across political and identity groups, 
embrace a diversity of strategies and a multiplicity of tactics, and critically address the 
different scales at which our activism takes place. 
 
This chapter first introduces the term hegemony and explains its pivotal importance to the 
interventions and contributions my dissertation is offering. I discuss contemporary debates 
surrounding hegemony that span Critical Theory, (post)Marxist Theory, and Social 
Movement Studies, and demonstrate the value of combining three relations of power – 
consent, coercion, and compliance – under the term to truly grasp its significance as a theory 
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of power.  Next, this chapter explores the ways the fossil fuel industry has been studied in 
Political Ecology, Energy Humanities, and Environmental Sociology literatures. It illustrates 
how these perspectives have informed my own, and where they diverge from mine.  I apply 
my reconfigured approach to hegemony to understanding each of the relations of power upon 
which the fossil fuel industry depends and in which, I argue, counter hegemonic actors must 
seek to intervene. Here I introduce two key concepts: petro-hegemony and the carbon 
rebellion. I develop these two concepts into a framework for understanding the terrains of 
struggle and points of intervention that exist between the fossil fuel industry and its counter 
hegemonic challengers. Finally, this chapter assesses the limitations of the theoretical 
framework I’ve developed and suggests how other theoretical traditions and debates, might 
supplement, challenge or critically engage theories of hegemony. The chapter concludes with 
reflections on how the theoretical framework I’ve developed may be used to map relations of 
power and engage with debates about strategy which animate the climate justice movement 
today. 
 
Rereading Hegemony  
 
The contested interpretations of hegemony 
 
Conceptualizing hegemony is fundamental to the theoretical interventions my dissertation 
makes. The climate justice movement is engaged in a counter hegemonic struggle, both 
against the hegemony of neoliberal solutions to the climate crisis and the hegemony of the 
fossil fuel industry. I use the term hegemony very deliberately to summon Antonio Gramsci’s 
 66 
insights into relations of power, rule, domination, and modes of resistance, that continue to 
shape social movement theory and strategy decades after his death. Gramsci’s contributions 
to theorizing hegemony and social change can help interpret and advance the fight climate 
justice activists are now engaged in. Theories of hegemony are used to explore how the ideas 
and social groups that govern gain and maintain their position and how that position might be 
challenged, undone, and supplanted.  Gramsci developed the term to analyze the power 
relations existing between the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, states, and ideas, in ways that 
challenged the orthodox Marxist materialism of the Communist Party and workers’ 
movement in which he was deeply involved. Hegemony recognizes culture, narratives, and 
discourse as sites of social struggle, legitimacy, and movement building that are just as 
important as more material sites like government or the economic “means of production.” 
Theorists of hegemony since Gramsci have helped move the concept out of its strictly 
Marxist context and placed it in the service of social movement theory and strategy across 
many different social struggles, including but not limited to, class struggle (Day 2016; Lacalu 
and Mouffe 2014; Ekers et al. 2013; Kenis and Mathjis 2014). My application of the term to 
the CJM and its campaigns to keep fossil fuels in the ground follows in this tradition.  
 
While it was not Gramsci but Lenin who popularized the concept in Marxist social 
movement theory, Gramsci is credited with having developed and theorized hegemony in the 
terms that it is understood today. This allowed Marxists who followed to view the possibility 
of social change occurring outside of a singularly materialist lens. However, the incomplete 
and often cryptic nature of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, especially given his long 
internment, censorship, and death under the Italian fascist regime in the 1920s and 30s, (not 
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to mention some of the nuance of his work inevitably having been lost in its translation from 
Italian), has left his theoretical interventions open to a good degree of interpretation 
(Anderson 1976). This is particularly true of hegemony. In The Antinomies of Antonio 
Gramsci, Perry Anderson writes that, “The very range of the appeals now made to 
[Gramsci’s] authority, from the most contrasted sectors of the Left, suggests the limits of 
close study or comprehension of his ideas. The price of so ecumenical an admiration is 
necessarily ambiguity: multiple and incompatible interpretations of the themes of the Prison 
Notebooks” (1976, 1). Anderson argues that this ambiguity is partly attributable to the 
paradoxes that exist internally to Gramsci’s own writings in which, for example, “the words 
‘State’, ‘civil society’, ‘political society’, ‘hegemony’, ‘domination’ or ‘direction’ all 
undergo a persistent slippage” (1976, 25). Thus, how hegemony operates and the specific 
relations of power it is comprised of are the subjects of great debate - a debate into which I 
now intervene.13  
 
Much of what we believe we know about Gramsci’s work is derived from theorists that have 
acted as his interpreters and interlocutors, developing it in directions that advance their own 
theoretical agendas. Indeed, echoing Anderson, Chris Maisano writes that, “the incomplete 
nature of Gramsci’s prison writings has given rise to a vast industry of academic 
interpretation” (2017). Yet the development of this industry seems justified when, as Ekers 
 
13 Anderson identifies three seemingly contradictory positions within Gramsci’s theorizing of the relations 
between state and civil society, hegemony and violence. First, hegemony is confined to the realm of civil 
society or culture and associated only with consent, while coercion and violence operate in the realm of the 
state. These are presented as opposites. Second, civil society and the state are said to balance one another with 
hegemony synthesizing the relations of coercion and consent. In the third, the state is said to absorb civil society 
and the synthesized coercion-consent version of hegemony, and the state along with its coercive capacity is 
again given primacy. Here the state and civil society are (problematically, Anderson notes) conflated.  For a 
more complete account of the complicated paradoxes, slippages, messiness of interpretations, and 
contradictions in Gramsci’s writing see Anderson’s essay Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci (1976).  
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and Loftus argue, “translating Gramsci requires bringing his writings to bear on “new” 
situations, albeit always containing a number of historical and geographical social currents,” 
and, moreover, that “engagements with Gramsci have been influenced by the concrete 
conditions in which scholar-activists have worked” (2013, 18, 23). In that process his 
writings are inevitably reinterpreted, transformed and put to new use. This is an industry to 
which I myself am contributing even while my own interpretations of Gramsci’s work have 
been challenged and changed a great deal.  Taking all this ambiguity, the different research 
agendas, and variegated contexts of struggle, into account, I’ve engaged in a close reading of 
Quentin and Hoares’ translation of Gramsci’s writings (1971), as well as supplementary 
materials, and these form the theoretical foundations of my interventions in the debates 
concerning hegemony and social movement strategy. 
 
Hegemony as consent  
 
One of Gramcsi’s most influential interlocutors, Raymond Williams, described hegemony as 
the extension of politics into daily life, into culture and into shaping what constitutes 
“common sense” in a given society. Hegemony circumscribes what is imaginable and 
considered possible. It is through shaping what is taken for granted as “common sense” that 
hegemony produces a population’s consent, and “rulers,” the ruling class, ruling institutions, 
the ruling elite, or ruling ideas, become “leaders,” or the leading class, institutions, elite, or 
ideas. Gramsci distinguished between “leadership” and “domination” where he considered 
leadership to entail gaining the active consent of a population, and domination to be the 
exercising, or threat of exercising, violence to maintain one’s position. Williams thus 
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interprets that Gramsci positioned consent and coercion as opposing relations of power, with 
consent and leadership captured under the term hegemony and coercion and violence 
contained by the concept of domination. He writes that, “Gramsci made a distinction between 
rule (dominio) and hegemony. Rule is expressed in directly political forms and in times of 
crisis by direct or effective coercion” (Williams 1977, 108). Hegemony, meanwhile, is the 
“more normal situation” produced through a “complex interlocking of political, social, and 
cultural forces” (ibid). Hegemony is thus a consensual power relation while domination is 
coercive. The concept veiws culture, distinguished from simply an expression of economic 
relations, as a terrain of struggle upon which revolutionaries must seek to make counter 
hegemonic interventions. Gramsci’s great innovation in the Marxist intellectual tradition, 
therefore, is to have established the foundations of “a Marxist theory of politics” (Hobsbawm 
1977, 206). 
 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantelle Mouffe adopt and extend this reading of Gramsci’s hegemony 
further in their book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985/2014). Here, countering 
hegemony becomes a project of intervening in, or structuring, “discursive conditions” which 
they argue helps to shape “common sense” and assert which ideas become hegemonic. In 
their reading, hegemony operates through culture and relies upon the structuring of 
discourses (or the narratives and symbols through which we make sense of the world) to gain 
consent. According to Laclau and Mouffe, therefore, the goal of counter hegemonic actors 
must be to identify and shape “the discursive conditions for the emergence of a collective 
action, directed towards struggling against inequalities and challenging relations of 
subordination” (2014, 137). Challengers must discursively “articulate” the “chains of 
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equivalence” across different social struggles and locate points of shared antagonism in 
hegemonic discourses around which new challenger alliances can cohere. Laclau and 
Mouffe’s most important innovation, however, is to have contextualized hegemony in 
contemporary democratic politics and extended it “beyond class struggle to anyone with a 
grievance against the existing order” (Day 2016, 188). Maisano writes that Laclau and 
Mouffe believed they were extending Gramsci’s theory to its logical conclusions: “a rejection 
of Marxism’s ostensible “class essentialism,” as well as its insistence that material conditions 
decisively shape popular consciousness” (2017). Class struggle is rendered just one link in 
the chain of equivalence. This move allows Laclau and Mouffe to emphasize the significance 
of discursive articulation of chains of equivalence across social struggles to mount counter 
hegemonic, broad-based, political coalitions against the existing hegemonic order.  
 
Hegemony combines consent and coercion 
 
Richard Day, meanwhile, historicizes what he identifies as “a shift in the understanding of 
hegemony, which came increasingly to be viewed as “cultural” and “consensual” in nature” 
(2016, 187). Both Williams’ and Laclau and Mouffe’s theorizing of hegemony follow this 
tradition and in doing so make a significant departure from Gramsci’s use of the term. Day 
argues that, particularly since Laclau and Mouffe’s adoption of the concept, hegemony’s 
coercive and materialist dimensions have been abandoned leaving scholars only with the 
cultural elements of hegemony when they apply it to social movement studies and strategies 
for radical social change (Day 2016). More orthodox Marxists have thus accused Laclau and 
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Mouffe’s work of “liberal reformism” and of stepping away from radical engagement with 
class, the state and materialist relations of power (ibid).  
 
Anderson is one of Laclau and Mouffe’s harsher critics and charges that their particular 
reading of hegemony misses the intricate relationship that exists between consent and 
coercion that hegemony is supposed to denote. Anderson does concede, however, that Laclau 
and Mouffe’s interpretation is due to what he calls the “antinomies” or seeming paradoxes 
and definitional slippages in Gramsci’s writing. In the Prison Notebooks, readers can 
simultaneously find hegemony described simply as a relation of consent operating through 
civil society and culture which should be contrasted with coercion operating solely through 
the state; or as a balancing and synthesizing of consent and coercion to maintain the ruler’s 
position; or as rule gained and maintained through an intricate relationship between consent 
and coercion in which consent plays the “dominant” role and coercion plays a “determinant” 
role.14 Thus, while Laclau and Mouffe offer significant contributions to theorizing 
hegemonic discourses and counter hegemonic articulations of interests, they also risk 
ignoring or obscuring the relationship between coercion and consent. A more holistic 
interpretation of Gramscian hegemony would balance and synthesize consent and coercion 
under the term. This constitution of hegemony could then be positioned in opposition to 
“domination,” or rule through coercion alone. 
 
Gramsci writes that “the “normal” exercise of hegemony… is characterized by the 
combination of force and consent which balance each other reciprocally” (1971, 80). As he 
 
14 I will return to a more complete analysis of Anderson’s distinction between “dominant” and “determinant” 
roles in later paragraphs. 
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explains, the constitution of hegemony is twofold: Firstly, “the “spontaneous” consent given 
by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life” and 
secondly, “the apparatus of state coercive power which “legally” enforces discipline on those 
groups who do not “consent”” (1971, 12). He goes on to write that the authority of a social 
group manifests itself in two ways: it “dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to 
“liquidate,” or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force;” however, that social group “must 
already exercise “leadership” before winning governmental power… It subsequently 
becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must 
continue to “lead” as well” (Gramsci 1971, 57 -58). In other words, the coercive disciplining 
of those who do not consent is just as an important component of hegemony as consent is, 
while the ability to coerce dissenters requires some degree of consent within the broader 
community. When reading Gramsci, domination should indeed be held in contrast to 
hegemony, as Raymond Williams does, but this passage forces us to also recognize that 
hegemony consists of both leadership and domination, consent and coercion. Citing this 
same passage, Day contends that here “the disparate elements, meanings, and contexts of 
“hegemony” … become fused into a self-conscious whole” (Day 2016, 186). Consent and 
coercion, and the simultaneously material-ideational relationship existing between them, co-
constitute hegemony. The violence and coercion accompanying discourse and consent that is 
integral to Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony have, therefore, too often been abandoned, 
inoculating what is otherwise an essential theory of power and social movement strategy.  
 
Consent and Coercion in the Wars of position and Maneuver  
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Gramsci’s comparison of social movement strategy to military strategy throughout his Prison 
Notebooks also suggests at the continuous presence of both consent and coercion contained 
by hegemony.15 Having explained how hegemony is gained and maintained through culture 
and civil society, Gramsci was particularly attentive to the strategies available to 
revolutionaries with which they could engage in culture as at terrain of struggle against the 
bourgeoisie. This is captured in the differences he saw between waging a “war of position” 
and waging a “war of maneuver.” Counter hegemony involved both. Waging a war of 
position entailed encouraging the populace to revoke their consent from the hegemonic ideas, 
institutions, elites, social group, or class. It is a cultural battle in which revolutionaries seek 
to gain footholds in the cultural institutions, symbols, and media through which populations 
make meaning of the world around them. In other words, the war of position entails 
capturing those institutions which mediate and reinforce the ideas taken for granted as 
“common sense” and which produce a population’s consent to the ruling class. These might 
include newspapers, churches, sports teams, philanthropies, and so on. In wresting consent 
away from the hegemon, the war of position challenges the perceived legitimacy of the ideas, 
discourse and symbols that uphold the hegemon’s authority. If successful, a war of position 
forces a crisis of legitimacy upon the hegemonic order such that its leadership is no longer 
considered legitimate.  
 
 
15 It is also important to note here that the militaristic and masculinist terms in which hegemonic strategy is 
described may also limit our revolutionary imaginations and reproduce some of the very modes of domination 
the climate justice movement seeks to undo. Gramsci’s deliberate use of militaristic terminology is partly 
derived from his attempts to avoid censorship while in prison, but it may also suggest at the patriarchal 
dominance of 1930s (and contemporary) intellectual society. As such, I adopt and use Gramsci’s terminology 
with this caution in mind.  
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While Gramsci was still writing in terms of classes and states being the primary agents of 
social change, the war of position aligns with Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive conditioning 
and involved developing a “historic bloc,” or an alliance of social groups complete with a set 
of ideas and norms around which to forge a new consent and an alternative hegemony 
(1971). The war of maneuver, on the other hand, involves open conflict with the coercive 
apparatuses of the state and the ruling class, whether through elections, seizing the means of 
production, sabotage, or revolutionary insurrection. Anderson argues that authors following 
in Laclau and Mouffe’s reading of hegemony have abandoned the war of maneuver 
altogether and have elevated the war of position to a status of singular strategic importance 
(Anderson 1976). While Gramsci’s writing emphasizes the importance of waging the war of 
position, a singular focus on its strategic role in forging radical social change was not his 
intention.  
 
Gramsci viewed waging a war of position as the necessary prelude to waging the war of 
maneuver. As he wrote “A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise ‘leadership’ 
before winning governmental power (this is indeed one of the principal conditions for the 
winning of such power)” (1971, 207). Reflecting on his own experiences with the failures of 
Communist insurrection in Italy, Gramsci believed one of their major errors was to have 
waged a war of maneuver without having first built the necessary alliances and support 
through a war of position (Ekers and Loftus 2013; Featherstone 2013). In his view, it was the 
failure of revolutionaries to draw together the peasants of the agricultural South and 
proletariats of the industrial North together in a historic bloc that saw workers’ uprisings 
remain isolated and weak. A war of position had to be fought before an assault on the 
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Bourgeoisie and its government institutions could be won.  Comparing trench warfare to the 
opening of political opportunities that crises in particular economic conjunctures may yield, 
he writes: 
In war it would sometimes happen that a fierce artillery attack seemed to have 
destroyed the enemies’ entire defensive system, whereas in fact it had only 
destroyed the outer perimeter; and at the moment of their advance and attack the 
assailants would find themselves confronted by a line of defense which was still 
effective. (Gramsci 1971, 235) 
  
Extending the metaphor to politics, Gramsci compares this “fierce artillery attack” to the 
direct confrontation with the state that revolutionaries may believe is necessary to take full 
advantage of a moment of economic crisis. They put up barricades, take over factories, 
occupy state buildings, call for general strikes, and arm themselves. In the excitement of the 
assault, however, they have forgotten that they have not yet forged far reaching alliances 
across much larger swathes of society, that they have not yet shifted discursive or cultural 
positions of enough people, and so they do not yet have the consent of the broader 
population, they are not yet “leading.”  The state may then depend upon a “line of defense 
which was still effective,” the continuing consent of the majority of people shored up by the 
cultural institutions and apparatus that mediate “common sense,” to weather the assault and 
advance a counterattack.16  
 
However, there are also instances in which the reverse is true.  Gramsci was aware that 
fighting a war of position alone would not be enough to overthrow the hegemonic order.17 
 
16 In later chapters, I will compare wars of maneuver and position to strategic orientations prioritizing mass 
mobilization (sharing elements in common with the war of maneuver) on the one hand, and community 
organizing (sharing elements in common with the war of position) on the other. 
17 Indeed, given the extent to which Gramsci’s definitional categories were subject to slippages it is not entirely 
clear if the excerpt above is referring to the state or civil society being the “line of defense that was still 
effective.” Either way around, I maintain that both are true. 
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Forcing a crisis of legitimacy on the hegemon does not necessarily lead to its demise. 
Challenger groups, having successfully shifted discursive conditions and undermined consent 
to the hegemon, may exalt in their victories. Yet they will often go on to find a second line of 
defense that is ready to respond with the full force of state-sanctioned coercion or physical 
force. If challengers are not prepared with strategies to engage with that second line of 
defense, winning a war of position may only prove a short-term victory.  While it is often 
helpful to think of consent and coercion as distinct categories of power, Gramsci’s writing 
demonstrates that the two are never truly separated, and that constructing theories of social 
change that hinge only upon analysis of one but not the other will yield an inherently 
incomplete analysis that ignores the relations between the two (Gramsci 1971).18 So when 
challengers force a crisis of legitimacy on the hegemon they should expect, and be prepared 
for, coercion in response.  Similarly, when challengers launch an assault that depends upon 
coercive strategies alone, they should be prepared to lose quickly without gaining a position 
of leadership.  
 
Privileging Consent in Crises of Legitimacy  
 
Winning a war of position and forcing a crisis of legitimacy means the ruling class have to 
resort to coercion to restabilize their authority. As Gramsci famously explains: 
If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer “leading” but only 
“dominant,” exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great 
masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe 
 
18 Gramsci also writes that (cultural) hegemony is “protected by the armour of coercion” (Gramsci 1971, 263). 
This may be one of the examples that has led many scholars to decouple the consensual and cultural from the 
coercive and material constitution of hegemony. Based on my reading of the rest of Gramsci’s work, however, 
what this actually suggests to me is that hegemony cannot exist or is severely weakened without coercion. 
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what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that 
the old is dying and the new cannot be born. (1971, 275-276)  
 
How this crisis gets resolved is of crucial importance because the demise of the hegemon is 
by no mean an inevitable conclusion. Winning the war of position, building alliances, and 
restructuring discursive conditions is just one component of counter hegemonic strategy. 
Thus Gramsci goes on to pose two very important questions: 
 
The problem is the following: can a rift between popular masses and ruling 
ideologies … be “cured” by the simple exercise of force, preventing the new 
ideologies from imposing themselves? Will the interregnum, the crisis whose 
historically normal solution is blocked in this way, necessarily be resolved in favour 
of a restoration of the old? (1971, 276). 
 
Gramsci is asking whether coercion will be enough for those in power to restore the old order 
after a crisis of legitimacy. Undoubtedly a successful war of position leaves the hegemonic 
order fundamentally changed and the common sense ideas that once upheld its legitimacy 
must be adjusted, while dissenters must be isolated and crushed. As such, with a combination 
of consent and coercion-based strategies, the ruling class may still re-stabilize its position 
through violence, buying it time to regain its former status with new allies and adjusted 
legitimizing narratives. Therefore, in the interregnum, in this moment of crisis, when the old 
is dying and the new cannot yet be born, counter hegemonic actors must act as midwives of 
the new, and while vital, this will require more than discursive strategies and cultural 
intervention alone. To ensure the old is not restored and the new can be born, challengers 
must advance strategies that engage not only in cultural politics but are able to withstand 
coercion, institutionalize their discursive victories, and prefigure new modes of organizing 
politics and economies. Hegemony contains relations of consent and coercion. Theorizing 
counter hegemonic strategies, therefore, requires us to analyze and account for the 
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relationship between consent and coercion and how we might intervene in both relations of 
power. 
 
Consent, Coercion, and Compliance  
 
Hegemony, in this reconstituted sense, balances and synthesizes the power relations of 
consent, through culture and civil society, and coercion, through the state and enforcement of 
laws. It may also help explain the relationship between these power relations. But Gramsci 
also gives us the tools with which to consider a third power relation that constitutes 
hegemony alongside coercion and consent. Gramsci is well known for his critique of 
orthodox Marxist economic determinism, but, as a Marxist, his theory never fully dispensed 
with the importance of materialism. In other words, he cannot dismiss the role that economic 
relations must play in the maintenance of hegemony. Writing that “hegemony presupposes 
that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony 
is to be exercised” and that although “hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be 
economic,” Gramsci alludes to a third relation of power contained within the concept  (1971, 
161). While abandoning economic determinism, hegemony, here, depends upon the 
subordinates’ economic interests being met. 
 
Along with coercion, Laclau and Mouffe neglect a theorization of this material dimension of 
hegemony, arguing that social positions and interests are discursively and culturally 
constructed, rather than materially produced as a direct function of economic, material 
resources (Maisano 2017). Perry Anderson, however, places this dynamic back in Gramscian 
 79 
terms arguing that “it is evident, in effect, that the whole range of directly economic 
constraints to which the exploited classes within capitalism are subjected cannot immediately 
be classified within either of the political categories of coercion or consent” (1976, 25 
emphasis in original). He goes on to write: 
 
The dualist analysis to which Gramsci’s notes typically tend does not permit an 
adequate treatment of economic constraints that act directly to enforce bourgeois 
class power: among others, the fear of unemployment or dismissal that can, in certain 
historical circumstances, produce a ‘silenced majority’ of obedient citizens and 
pliable voters among the exploited. Such constraints involve neither the conviction of 
consent, nor the violence of coercion. (Anderson 1976, 41 emphasis added) 
 
As Gramsci suggests, hegemony is not only ethico-political but also economic in nature and 
presupposes, or is premised upon, the constraints that economic forces place upon subjects 
and their ability to dissent. Therefore, we also need to theorize a relation of power that exists 
between consent and coercion, which must necessarily also be encompassed under the 
concept of hegemony. I call this the relation of compliance. Citing Anderson’s same passage, 
Maisano explains that “What Marx called the “silent compulsion of economic relations” 
performs a disciplinary function somewhere between the poles of coercion and consent that 
define Gramsci’s theory of hegemony” (2017).19 This third relation, compliance, blurs the 
line between consent and coercion. It rests upon a dynamic of dependency that subordinates 
have developed upon the economic, material conditions in which they are situated and 
therefore are compelled, but not coerced, to comply with the hegemonic order. The hegemon 
may establish compliance by structuring economic conditions such that a community’s 
 
19 In Regimes of Dispossession (2018) Michael Levien uses Marx’s term “economic compulsion” in a slightly 
different context to describe how the confluence of particular events produce particular economic situations in 
which people are compelled to submit to the domination of the market. Here economic conditions create a 
situation of dependency where the extent to which people are coerced or actively give consent is largely 
ambiguous. His theorizing of economic compulsion helped me developed compliance into a category of power. 
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choice to actively consent or dissent is circumscribed by dependency upon those economic 
conditions.  
 
Privileging Coercion 
 
Finally, Anderson draws his readers’ attention to an important distinction Gramsci makes 
between “preponderant” and “fundamental” or between “dominant” and “determinant” 
relations of consent and coercion captured under hegemony.  As Anderson writes: 
 
 If we revert to Gramsci’s original problematic, the normal structure of capitalist 
political power in bourgeois-democratic states is in effect simultaneously and 
indivisibly dominated by culture and determined by coercion… The day-to-day 
system of bourgeois rule is thus based on the consent of the masses, in the form of the 
ideological belief that they exercise self-government in the representative State. At 
the same time, however, to forget the ‘fundamental’ or determinant role of violence 
within the power structure of contemporary capitalism in the final instance is to 
regress to reformism… (1976, 42 original emphasis).  
 
The distinction Anderson articulates is a helpful one. However, its logical extension, and the 
crux of Anderson’s thesis, suggests that in the last instance it is violence and not discourse or 
culture that ultimately drives social change. Coercion thus becomes both the determinant and 
the dominant relation of power captured by hegemony. We must challenge Anderson’s 
position here because, even in the last instance, the maintenance of coercive and violent 
recourse requires enormous cultural resources and discursive investment. To some degree, 
the deployment of violence against dissenters or others often requires other parts of the 
population to accept the legitimacy of that violence. In other words, relations of coercion and 
consent must always co-constitute one another through hegemony. We cannot privilege one 
relation over the other. As such I revert to the position that hegemony is a synthesis and 
 81 
balancing of consent and coercion against which we may position domination which is rule 
through coercion alone. 
 
Different interlocutors have found one version of hegemony or another more or less 
compelling. Anderson’s position is ultimately to assert coercion as history’s driving force 
and to place this in the context of hegemony’s multiple, variegated meanings.  As Bruce 
Robbins summarizes Anderson’s position:  
 
One might have expected that in his criticisms of Gramsci and the Gramscians, a 
Marxist like Anderson would have shifted the emphasis back from the cultural 
superstructure to the economic base. But that’s not what happens. What both books 
[The H-Word (2017) And Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci: Revised edition (2017)] 
set against culture and ideology is not economics but physical coercion: military force 
as a—perhaps even the—decisive component of power, hence as perhaps the 
determining factor in history. (2018) 
 
The distinction Anderson makes between “determinant” and “dominant” understandings of 
the relationship between consent and coercion is compelling. However, this reading of 
Gramsci leads Anderson to his own somewhat paradoxical conclusions. Anderson suggests 
that by analyzing the relationship between consent and coercion, in which the former is 
considered as dominant and the latter as determinant, it becomes apparent that “coercion 
becomes both dominant and determinant in the supreme crisis” and so the “ultimate 
determinant of the power system [is] coercion” (1976, 44). By logical extension, then, 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony forces us to recognize the dominance of consent in Western 
capitalist democracies but also that, in the last instance, it is coercion that defines the 
trajectory of radical social change. In arguing this case Anderson creates a mirror image of 
the error for which he holds Laclau and Mouffe accountable (albeit not to quite such a 
degree), emphasizing one relation of power over and above the other. Where Laclau and 
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Mouffe’s discussion of hegemony explains the intricate mechanics of the relation of consent, 
their analysis more or less discards an analysis of hegemony’s material and coercive 
relations. Meanwhile, Anderson’s reversal of the position, in which coercion is identified as 
the determining and decisive feature of hegemony overrides the very balance between 
consent and coercion Anderson argues Gramsci intended to communicate. 
 
My Theoretical Interventions and Contributions to Gramscian Hegemony 
 
The passage below is where I’ve found the relations of power Gramsci sought to describe 
under hegemony most clearly synthesized: 
 
The “normal” exercise of hegemony is characterized by the combination of force and 
consent which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating 
excessively over consent. Indeed the attempt is always made to ensure that force will 
appear to be based on the consent of the majority, expressed in the so-called organs of 
public opinion… Between consent and force stands corruption or fraud (Gramsci 
1971, 80).20  
 
As such, while I find Anderson’s distinction between determinant and dominant features 
useful, I want to keep them in tension or balance so that we may understand how consent, 
coercion, and (I will add) compliance operate together, interact with one another as co-
dependent support structures that uphold the hegemonic order. Rather than privileging one or 
the other of these power relations over another, I suggest we must be willing to abandon the 
attempt to force any one of these “drivers of history” on Gramsci. Instead let us recognize 
how Gramsci’s work allows us to imaginatively synthesize economy, state, and culture 
 
20 Gramsci develops upon the question of fraud in his writings on American Fordism, which for the sake of 
brevity, I do not have the space to discuss. Suffice it to say that, Gramsci redevelops the concept of fraud into 
what he understood as the negotiation of economic interests and which he argued hegemony presupposes. This 
notion of fraud allows me to bring compliance fully into the concept of hegemony. 
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(along with compliance, consent, and coercion) as important terrains of struggle upon which 
to advance radical social change. In doing so, let us resist the temptation of devising a meta-
narrative that asserts one or the other feature of hegemony as the driver of history and the key 
to social change. Instead of rejecting his ambiguity and seeking to fix meaning to what will 
always be a necessarily contested text, let us use the antinomies Gramsci’s leaves us with to 
innovate and experiment with theories of social change in our own contexts for our own 
purposes.  
 
Taking up this challenge, I move hegemony out of the specifically Marxist, class-based and 
state-oriented assumptions through which Gramsci’s theory is mediated. Simultaneously, and 
perhaps somewhat paradoxically, I develop the tools Gramsci gives us to draw together an 
economic understanding of hegemony that also contains the relation of compliance. This 
returns us to a version of hegemony closely aligned with passage above, such that it contains 
three relations of power, upon each of which counter hegemonic actors must develop 
strategies to intervene. Thus, hegemony is constituted and supported by three interlocking 
relations of power: consent, coercion, and compliance. A counter hegemonic theory of 
change must, therefore, include strategies that engage with each. As such, we requires 
strategies for a war of position that would engage in relations of consent, a war of maneuver 
for coercion, and for what I call a war of economies deployed to intervene in relations of 
compliance. Moving hegemony out of its strictly class and state-centric orientation, I will 
place all of these ideas in the service of climate justice activism and contribute to an analysis 
of the hegemonic status of the fossil fuel industry. 
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Translations in praxis: Movement strategy using these ideas 
 
What do these dense, abstract, theoretical debates have to do with the strategies and theories 
of change currently being deployed amongst contemporary social movements? Quite a lot, as 
it would happen. Firstly, let’s not forget that as a leader in the Italian Communist Party, 
Gramsci was himself deeply rooted in social movements. The influence of Gramsci’s 
theoretical legacy, and the debates concerning hegemony, on social movement strategy can 
be traced within the pages of influential social movement handbooks and manuals written for 
and by activists. Saul Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals is perhaps one of the most influential 
social movement handbooks to have been circulated in the United States. Generations of 
community organizers have learned from it and applied its rules. Alinsky’s very first 
sentence in that book is “The revolutionary force today has two targets, moral as well as 
material” (1971, xiii). The idea is precisely the one captured in Gramsci’s intervention in 
Marxist political strategy in which he shifts away from the singular focus on the material 
relations of power and forces us to consider culture too. Throughout the book, Alinsky uses 
the term “moral” to denote discursive, ideational, cultural, or the politics of consent. In 
similarly Gramscian terms, Alinsky argues that “Moral rationalization is indispensable at all 
times of action whether to justify the selection or the use of ends or means” (1971, 43).  The 
community organizing tactics Alinsky describes are, in effect, an operationalization of the 
war of position. Even while Alinsky never explicitly references Gramsci, the model of 
community organizing Alinsky advocates and Gramsci’ war of position share significant 
similarities.21 Alinsky’s rules include intervention in the cultural institutions that influence 
 
21 Think tanks and blogs representing the political right in the United States have, in characteristically hysterical 
fashion, traced a somewhat tenuous line from Gramsci’s revolutionary strategy, to its adoption and 
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popular discourse, aligning different social agents into coherent alliances, and a highly 
populist approach to political activity. 
 
Alinsky also writes that “one can lack any of the qualities of an organizer – with one 
exception – and still be effective and successful. The exception is the art of communication” 
(1971, 81). Reinsborough and Canning take this up in their own activist manual 
Re:Imagining Change: How to use Story Based Strategy to win campaigns, build movements, 
and change the world (2010/2017). Changing the story, they argue, is crucial to 
communicating radical social change and winning in the terrain of culture. Citing Gramsci 
directly, they write: 
 
The power of hegemony is expressed through coercion and consent rather through 
armed force. This multifaceted cultural process limits the terms of debate to make 
ideas that challenge the status quo almost unthinkable. Hegemony operates in cultural 
stories that over time gain widespread acceptance and reinforce a dominant 
perspective or worldview. (Reisnborough and Canning 2010, 22-23) 
 
Drawing on Gramsci, alongside a great deal more social movement literature and praxis, they 
translate successful discursive intervention into winning “the battle of the story,” or the 
struggle over narratives that shape and filter the norms, values, and meanings that are taken 
for granted within a given social milieu and inform “common sense.” Counter hegemony is a 
process of changing narratives to shift what is taken for granted as common sense. This 
 
operationalizing by Alinsky, to the influence Alinsky had on both Hillary Clinton and Present Obama’s political 
theory, to make the case that Obama and Clinton are both closet communists in (albeit very heavy) disguise 
(Carlson 2017; Hultberg 2016; Ayotte 2012). Given the wildly divergent politics of Clinton and Obama as 
compared to Alinsky and Gramsci, the connection does indeed seem dubious. Nevertheless, it is very possible 
that Alinsky found inspiration in Gramsci’s writing, and it is true that he corresponded with Clinton, and helped 
devise the community organizing strategies Obama worked with as a community organizer in Chicago. Of 
course, it goes without saying that one can be inspired by a strategy without being indoctrinated by the political 
persuasion from which it emerged.  
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challenges the legitimacy of established elites and may wrest consent away from them to be 
forged instead around new stories. Their book illustrates the different tactics campaigners 
and activists will need to fight the battle of story and alter the discursive conditions through 
which people make sense of the world, and of what is or is not possible.  
 
Beautiful Trouble: A Toolbox for Revolution (2012) is an edited volume containing 
contributions from dozens of social movement strategists, academics and activists, who offer 
insights into waging wars of position and maneuver. It also includes a section on what 
scholar-activist Stephen Duncombe, drawing on Stuart Hall, calls cultural hegemony. Of 
cultural hegemony Duncombe explains that “politics is not only fought out in state houses, 
workplaces, or on battlefields but also in the language we use, the stories we tell, and the 
images we conjure – in short the ways we make sense of the world.” In Duncombe’s 
interpretation, Gramsci understood that:  
 
“You may be able to seize a factory or storm a palace, but unless this material power 
is backed up by a culture that reinforces the notion that what you are doing is good 
and beautiful and just and possible, then any gains on the economic, military and 
political fronts are likely to be short-lived.”  
 
To this Duncombe adds an important caveat: “Gramsci never believed that cultural power 
alone was enough. The fight for cultural hegemony had to be part of an overall strategy that 
also incorporated struggles for political and economic power” (2012, 222-23). Beautiful 
Trouble presents key insights on tactics, theory, principles and case studies by activists for 
activists. Cultural hegemony is one of the theories the book’s editors suggests community 
organizers and change agents ought to know about. Here counter hegemony is considered to 
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be a solely cultural struggle with other forms of struggle being equally as important but 
existing outside of strictly hegemonic terms. 
 
Jonathan Smucker’s Hegemony How To: A Road Map for Radicals (2017) has been 
described as Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals for the 21st Century. Reflecting on the successes 
and failures of Occupy Wall Street, and drawing heavily upon Laclau and Mouffe’s theories 
on populism and discourse, Smucker operationalizes an explicitly Gramscian account of 
power, strategy and social change. In Smucker’s reading of Gramscian theory, populism is a 
vital ingredient to achieving revolutionary change. Smucker argues that, far too often, 
activists insulate themselves in their own political cultures, creating their own political 
identities and reference points. In doing so they fail to build and extend their politics across 
larger and more diverse swathes of society. Occupy’s framing of the political moment with 
memes like “the 99%” were highly populist and had the potential to grow a historic bloc and 
materialize and politically institutional their discursive gains. Instead, he argues, members of 
Occupy replaced prioritizing strategy with an overemphasis on building the “lifeworld” of 
the activist groups. The movement became inward looking and insular, creating its own 
rituals and movement practices that established the terms of inclusion and exclusion from the 
group.22  
Opposed to this, Smucker argues that counter hegemonic agents must articulate “the We in 
politics” which can be mobilized into broad-based alliances spanning a multiplicity of 
 
22 Smucker calls this the political identity paradox, in which members of social movements must share strong 
bonds, discourses and practices to build solidarity but these can simultaneously alienate and exclude other 
potential members from joining the organization (Smucker 2017). Failure to include more members can quickly 
turn a social movement that challenges power into a social club that cannot reach out to larger and more diverse 
publics.  
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interests and identities and cohere around popular and populist progressive messages. Story-
based strategy is an important part of the process but Smucker, like Gramsci, is wary of a 
singular approach to counter hegemony. Smucker also interprets Gramsci’s hegemony as a 
balance of consent and coercion. He explains that just as movements for radical social 
change have to learn how to intervene in the cultural terrain of struggle defined by consent, 
so too must they engage with the state, bureaucracy, and coercion. They must, in his words, 
translate the “symbolic victories” and gains they make on the cultural terrain into 
“institutional victories” through policy intervention, elections, legal rulings, and winning 
over the institutions and bureaucracies of the state. Moreover, he explicitly references the 
ever-present coercive dimension of hegemonic power writing that “When an underdog 
challenger wins a contest over meanings ... the challenged hegemon does not throw his arms 
up and walk away ... He musters whatever infrastructure he can to squash the threat to his 
power” (2017, 150). Smucker’s reading of Gramsci is similar to my own here. Challenging 
the hegemon’s consent and cultural legitimacy alone is not enough to topple it. Rather than 
consecutively, however, the war of position and the war of maneuver take place 
simultaneously, or at least activists and campaigners should be preparing for both at the same 
time. 
 
Organizing Cools The Planet (2012), an activist manual specifically for community 
organizers working on climate justice campaigns, draws directly on insights from all these 
thinkers. Authors Hillary Moore and Joshua Kahn Russell quote Gramsci in the epigraph 
opening their introduction: “The challenge of modernity is to live without illusions and 
without becoming disillusioned.” This is yet another allusion to Gramsci’s influence over a 
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new generation of social movement strategists and campaigners and its relevance to the 
campaigns described in my case studies. The organizing strategies Moore and Kahn Russell 
discuss point towards crucial strategies that a war of position for climate justice could 
include. 
 
 Like Organizing Cools the Planet, Jeremy Brecher’s Against Doom: A Climate Insurgency 
Manual (2017), lays out a theory of power, points of strategic intervention, and tactics for the 
Climate Justice Movement. Drawing more upon Gene Sharp’s writings on Nonviolent Direct 
Action and Civil Disobedience, the book is less obviously Gramscian in its outlook. 
However, it also contains important insights derived from a strain of Gramscian lineage, 
particularly its emphasis on consent and his understanding of power in relational rather than 
possessive terms. Take for example, Brecher’s explanation of the power relation upon which 
elites depend and how to challenge it: 
 
The powers that are responsible for climate change could not continue for a day 
without the acquiescence of those whose lives and future they are destroying. They 
are only able to continue with their destructive course because other enable or 
acquiesce in it… A movement can impose its will without weapons or violence if it 
can withdraw that cooperation from the powers that be. (2017, 22) 
 
While neither references it directly, we can see a version of Gramsci’s legacy here as Brecher 
applies Sharp’s insights from The Politics of Nonviolent Action to climate justice 
campaigning (1973).23 The objective of climate justice activists, as Brecher articulates it 
 
23 Chapter Six will discuss the relationship been counter hegemony and non-cooperation or civil disobedience in 
greater detail. Suffice it to say here that if we read Gramsci’s insights into Brecher, and indeed Sharp’s, 
arguments, then we may be looking at the version of hegemony that is more closely aligned with Laclau and 
Mouffe or Raymond Williams’ interpretation as simply a consensual relation of power. At the same time, non-
violent direct action is a highly effective coercive tool as well. 
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here, must be to remove broader society’s consent from “the powers that are responsible for 
climate change” because the powers that be cannot continue to rule without the consent of 
those over whom they govern. For Brecher, power (he doesn’t mention hegemony) is 
ultimately a relation of cooperation that may be undone by abandoning the relationship and 
refusing to continue cooperating. This understanding of power is mostly closely associated 
with the ways hegemony has been interpreted as a relation of consent alone.  
 
As these selections make clear, Gramsci’s influence upon social movement strategy and 
community organizing, even in the United States, has become extensive. In each of these 
social movement interpretations of Gramsci’s political strategy – or at least political 
strategies in which Gramsci’s influence can be seen – we find an emphasis on the importance 
of intervening in culture and discourse to contest the relation of consent and forge new 
allegiance around alternative “common sense” narratives. In addition, most, if not all, of 
these movement strategists recognize in some way that intervening in consent and culture 
alone is not enough to oust the ruling class, social groups, elites or ideas. Mirroring the 
discord in academic theory, some recognize that hegemony balances coercion and consent, 
synthesizing them into a complex relationship, while others view hegemony as pertaining 
solely to the relation of consent and should be contrasted with violence and coercion. While 
these all provide useful insights into the concrete tactical and strategic considerations 
involved in a war of position, few have really begun theorizing how social movements might 
combine these with the tactics and strategies pertinent to a war of maneuver, and fewer still 
to those relevant to a war of economies. We can productively synthesize insights of social 
movement theorists and strategists, inside and outside the academy, to better understand 
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hegemonic politics and strategy. However, we will need to do so paying close attention to 
their different interpretations of hegemony, the slippages between these interpretations, the 
dynamics they are able to capture and those they miss, and how all of these are manifested in 
the strategic praxis social movements operate with today. 
 
Petro-Hegemony and the Oil Assemblage 
 
Theorizing hegemony helps us understand the power relations upon which ruling elites and 
ideas depend and it helps us imagine the possible strategies by which those power relations 
may be undone, remade, and intervened upon. Theorizing hegemony should always allow us 
to both think about power and also to think about counter power. John Agnew encourages his 
readers to “see territory and sovereignty as both involving the exercise of putative powers 
that need not be restricted to the entities that we call state” and also to “include so-called 
private actors and political organizations other than state” in our analyses of power (Agnew 
2010, 782). I suggest we do the same thing with hegemony. In removing it from its state-
centric origins we can experiment with what theorizing hegemony, as applied to fossil fuel 
companies and the CJM, might reveal about both power and counter power in Blockadia. 
Understanding the fossil fuel industry’s power in terms of hegemony exposes how the 
relations of power upon which fossil fuel companies depends (coercion, compliance, and 
consent), operate through the state, economics, and culture. It may also indicate how climate 
just activists might intervene upon on, challenge, and counter these power relations. 
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The dimensions and geography of the fossil fuel industry can be mystifying. When I describe 
the “fossil fuel industry” I am generally referring to both private and state-owned fossil fuel 
companies, and particularly those primarily concerned with oil and gas resources. While the 
vast majority of fossil fuel reserves around the world are state-owned, involving “joint 
ventures” between private companies, field contractors, and the state, the resource 
infrastructures under consideration in this dissertation are either privately owned or have 
recently been bought by the state. According to Bridge and Le Billon, 80% of the world’s 
conventional oil and gas reserves are owned by states or otherwise lay outside of the control 
of the world’s largest private oil companies (2017). Fossil fuel companies and reserves in the 
United States and Canada, on the other hand, are much more likely to be privately owned 
than they are elsewhere even while, as Bridge and Le Billon explain, the boundaries between 
national and private companies are becoming increasingly fluid (2017).  Exploring the many 
dimensions of the oil and gas industry, Appel, Mason and Watts write that “the scale and 
reach of the sector is in fact almost impossible to fully grasp, in part because of the difficulty 
of deciding on its circumference and limits” (2015, 5). This renders it particularly difficult to 
delineate where a study of the power of the fossil fuel industry should, or even could, begin 
and end. In other words, the scope and scale of the industry is ambiguous. As such, the 
objects of study in this analysis must necessarily be far-reaching and inclusive, meanwhile all 
researchers are at some point forced to choose what will and will not be excluded from their 
study. 
 
Michael Watts has developed the invaluable concept of the “oil assemblage,” providing a 
useful framework to navigate this ambiguity (2014). The term oil assemblage is deployed to 
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capture the complexity of the entanglements of networks, institutions and infrastructure in 
which the oil and gas industry is situated. The oil assemblage encompasses national and 
transnational fossil fuel companies, governments, financial institutions, public relations 
firms, traders, investment funds, development agencies, contracting agencies and contractors, 
construction firms, oil fields, transportation routes, tribal chiefs, politicians and political 
initiatives, private and state security forces, insurgents, militias, as well as cultural and social 
organizations and programs like extra-curricular activities or community development 
initiatives (Watts 2014). All of these make up the life world of oil. The industry is the 
gravitational force drawing these constituents into an assemblage and its existence cannot be 
understood outside of the assemblage. The oil assemblage concept transforms what may 
seem – and often is – a disorderly sprawl into a highly dynamic network that supports and 
sustains the oil and gas industry.24  Watts has also theorized what he calls “Oil frontiers,” to 
describes the politics, culture, economics and social context of the spaces in which oil 
extraction actually occurs. They are spaces of “violent accumulation working hand in hand 
with militarism and empire” (Appel, Mason, and Watts 2015, 11). The term brings into focus 
the “conditions of existence” upon which the “local operation” of the oil assemblage is made 
possible (Watts 2014, 194). In exploring hegemonic struggle to keep fossil fuels in the 
ground in Blockadia, the oil assemblage and frontier become essential reference points. 
 
 
24 I will use fossil fuel industry and oil and gas industry more or less interchangeably. This, of course excludes 
the coal industry from my analysis. The case studies visited in this dissertation concern oil and keeping oil in 
the ground. There are a great deal of resonances and similarities across the hegemonic status of coal companies, 
particularly in Appalachia, and petro-hegemony. While I will use examples of the coal industry’s hegemony in 
coal mining regions to bolster my analysis of petro-hegemony, it is important to remember that the coal industry 
and oil industry are ultimately very different forms of industrial activity. The three power relations and their 
corresponding fields remain the same but, as Timothy Mitchell points out, the coal and oil industries involve 
different fuel sources, different technologies, different economies, and often quite different political 
opportunities (2011).  
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Pipelines, railways and shipping routes connect oil frontiers through the oil assemblage to 
refineries, gas pumps, and factories. The industry itself is divided into three operational 
segments: upstream, midstream, and downstream (Bridge and Le Billon 2017). Sites of 
resource extraction constitute upstream operations, transportation and shipping are managed 
by midstream operations, and refining and end-use distribution fall under the category of 
downstream operations.  Some companies specialize in particular operations. For example, 
some contractors focus on building pipelines and other transportation infrastructure, others 
specialize in management of extraction sites, while others might develop and operate the 
drilling equipment. The largest oil companies, however, have tended towards “vertical 
integration,” meaning the upstream, midstream, and downstream operations are all contained 
within one company.25 Depending on pricing structures and profitability these vertically 
integrated companies may opt to contract with a pipeline company to ship their product and, 
of course, they will often sell their oil to other oil refineries. However, control of the entire 
supply chain has historically given the largest oil companies immense privileges to set prices 
and insulate themselves from price fluctuation or political instability (Yergin 1992). 
Generally speaking, if the price of oil is high then extraction companies are profitable while 
refineries do poorly, meanwhile if the price of oil is low then refineries are more profitable 
and extraction companies less so. If a company owns the oil it extracted, the route by which 
it will be transported, and the refinery in which it will be processed, then the company may 
remain relatively profitable regardless of the price of oil (Bridge and LeBillon 2017).26 
 
 
25 Daniel Yergin’s epic, The Prize, documents in great detail the rise of Standard Oil and John D. Rockefeller’s 
attempt to construct one of the first vertically integrated oil companies in the United States. 
26 I will return to this dynamic throughout the dissertation because it particularly relevant to the escalation of 
pipeline politics in Canada. 
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Sites of extraction, transportation routes, and refineries have all become the frontlines of 
Blockadia as Indigenous peoples, climate justice campaigns, and local communities confront 
the invasion, pollution, or degradation of their homes and fight to keep fossil fuels in the 
ground. Pipeline and transportation infrastructure are particularly vulnerable targets for keep-
it-in-the-ground activism because of the outsized impact stalling transportation can have on 
the industry within the broader oil assemblage (Grossman 2017; Cheon and Urpelainen 2018; 
Klein 2014). Similarly, their deployment at different points in the supply chain of oil may at 
specific times (for example corresponding to fluctuations in the price of oil or periods of 
oversupply) make particular counter hegemonic tactics more or less effective. The terms oil 
assemblage and oil frontier provide useful a topography of the industry and make possible an 
analysis of how the oil assemblage informs and shapes the relations of power upon which the 
industry depends. Meanwhile, understanding the structuring of the industry itself may allow 
campaigners to devise tactics most suitable to a specific segment of the supply chain. These 
are all vital insights for constructing a theory of the industry’s hegemony.  
 
It is becoming increasingly popular for scholars to describe the fossil fuel industry in terms 
of hegemony (see Huber 2013; Bell 2016; Haluza DeLay 2014; Haluza DeLay and Carter 
2016; Adkin and Stares 2016; Kinder 2016). They explain how the fossil fuel industry 
produces consent to its activities and projects by shaping cultural norms, discourses, 
narratives, and embedding fossil fuels in our life worlds and epistemologies such that 
elements of our very identities are constituted by fossil fuels. Hegemony understood on these 
authors’ terms, however, often mirrors the divorcing of consent from compliance and 
coercion I detailed in the previous section. The fossil fuel industry’s hegemony is 
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circumscribed as a cultural phenomenon separate from its’ “dominance” through violence 
(Zalik 2015; Zalik 2011) or its ability to structure compliance (Gaventa 1980). Much of this 
work emerges from Cultural Studies, the Environmental Humanities, and a burgeoning 
“petro-cultures” subfield (see Barrett and Worden 2014; Szeman et al. 2015). Their 
intervention provides incredibly important insights into relations of consent. They 
demonstrate how cultural and discursive norms both legitimize and are comprised by fossil 
fuels. Moreover, they show how the industry, produces “social license” to operate, and 
embeds fossil fuel energy in our understandings of who we are (ibid; Bowles and Veltmeyer 
2016). Their work comprises a crucial dimension of the literature on fossil fuels, and 
particularly oil, that for far too long went unrecognized and unnoticed. However, the petro-
cultures field, as many petro-cultures scholars would be the first to acknowledge, does not, 
and does not seek to, explain or theorize other relations of power upon which oil and the 
industry depend. Associating the industry’s hegemony with the petro-culture literatures alone 
risks enforcing the same intellectual schism I identified within the literature on hegemony. 
 
Instead, I argue, a more nuanced and holistic approach to a theory of the industry’s 
hegemony should synthesize consent, compliance, and coercion under the concept. This 
should pay close attention to the role each relation of power plays separately in supporting 
the industry, but also help us understand how the relationships between power relations 
maintain the industry’s hegemony. I suggest that we analyze the three power relations as they 
appear in three corresponding domains or mediators: the petro-state through which the 
industry intervenes in relations of coercion, petro-culture through which it shapes relations of 
consent, and petro-capitalism through which it conditions situations of compliance. The term 
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petro-hegemony, therefore, refers to the synthesis of petro-culture, petro-capitalism, and the 
petro-state and how strategies and tactics are operationalized through these domains or 
strategic mediators to intervene in relations of consent, compliance, and coercion to advance 
and maintain the fossil fuel industry’s interests. I find this a useful lens of analysis for 
academics and movement strategists alike to study the relations of power upon which the 
industry depends and to develop strategic frameworks through which we might contest it 
with counter hegemonic strategies, narratives, and tactics.27  
 
Petro-culture 
 
Imre Szeman et al. use the term petro-culture to highlight the extent to which oil is embedded 
in the narratives, morals, meanings, ideas, in a word, culture, of contemporary Western 
capitalist societies.  Accordingly, contemporary consumer society is:  
 
shaped by oil in physical and material ways, from the automobiles and highways we 
use to the plastics that permeate our food supply and built environments. Even more 
significantly, fossil fuels have also shaped our values, practices, habits, beliefs, and 
feelings. (Szeman et al. 2015, 9) 
 
Stephanie LeMenager’s Living Oil (2013), Imre Szeman’s convening of the petro-cultures 
research group and their corresponding publication After Oil (2015), Matt Huber’s Lifeblood 
(2013), and Barrett and Worden’s edited volume Oil Culture (2014) have charted an 
important new field in the study of oil, industry, and power, fast becoming known as petro-
 
27  I developed this term independently but later discovered that both Haluza-DeLay and Carter (2016) and 
Kinder (2016) have also used the term “petro-hegemony” to describe the industry’s power. However, despite 
the significant advances their contributions make, neither capitalize on the term’s conceptual potential. I am 
using petro-hegemony as a conceptual framework to better understand and think about the industry and 
resistance to it. Both texts use the term as a descriptor while I am developing it as a useful lens of analysis that 
encompasses a more holistic approach to the industry’s hegemony. 
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cultures. Petro-culture (like petro-capitalism and the petro-state) aren’t only fields or domains 
of study, however, they are mediators through which industry agents organize and deploy 
strategies to engage and intervene with these respective power relations. These ideas have 
laid the groundwork for a many more scholars to take up the study of petro-culture and 
explore its significance as a mediator of industry strategy through which fossil fuels and 
fossil fuel companies gains consent, social license, or legitimacy (Bowles and Veltmeyer 
2016; Damluji 2015; Kinder 2016; ). Recognizing the role oil discourses and identity 
construction play in maintaining the fossil fuel industry’s hegemony is not particularly 
recent.  Indeed, William Freudenburg, invoking an explicitly Gramscian perspective 
documented what he called “privileged accounts” to signify the way that environmentally 
and socially destructive industries mediate and shape dominant discourses around the 
perceived “necessity” of, and identification with, their product (Freudenburg 2005). 
Nevertheless, the field has burgeoned and is now filled with insights into how oil and the 
fossil fuel industry intervene in and shape consent through culture. 
 
Fossil fuel companies deploy a large range of tactics to intervene in the relation of consent. 
They fund museum exhibits and the arts, sponsor education programs and sports teams, 
finance police and fire departments, fund local charities, and pump millions of dollars into 
public relations and advertising campaigns. Purchasing consent in this way is intended to 
reinforce discourses favorable to the industry and present it as benevolent and necessary. 
While throwing its money around may help reinforce discourses favorable to the industry, 
this isn’t necessarily what establishes such discourses in the first place nor what makes them 
so compelling. These narratives are rooted in identity, community, and deeply held values. In 
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Fighting King Coal, Shannon E. Bell exposes the mechanisms through which the coal 
industry assembled consent to its operations in Appalachia for nearly a century. The industry 
has successfully constructed coal as integral to the Appalachian economy, to Appalachian 
identity, and to ideas of masculinity in local discourses. Active support for coal mining is 
deeply rooted in what it means to be a loyal member of Appalachian society, particularly 
amongst men (Bell 2016). Meanwhile the image of the coal miner is celebrated and aspired 
toward, even while coal mining jobs decline and the coal industry abandon workers to 
destitution. Some of these discourses are actively reinforced and developed through industry 
funded “Astroturf” organizations posing as grassroots interest groups, like Friends of Coal.  
 
Randolph Haluza DeLay notes a similar phenomenon in Alberta and the Athabasca Tar 
Sands where public relations firms and oil company representatives, in coordination with the 
Canadian government, have “assembled consent” through efforts like the “Alberta is Energy” 
campaign. The campaign tries to tie provincial identity, notions of citizenship, and what it 
means to be an Albertan, to the interests of oil companies operating in the tar sands (Haluza 
DeLay 2014). Oil’s role in the construction of Albertan identity has become deeply 
embedded in the province’s culture. Haluza DeLay and Carter explain how “the oil industry 
has manipulated and heightened these cultural tendencies such that the hegemonic ‘common 
sense’ notion of Albertan identity has become intimately connected with energy” (2016, 
458). Adkin and Stares argue this has developed around a discourse they call “neoliberal 
nativism” through which the industry and the provincial government construct Albertans as 
“a besieged people that must repeatedly defend its greatest source of wealth (oil and gas) 
from the grasping hands of governments representing the larger, urban populations of eastern 
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Canada”(Adkin and Stares 2016, 220).28 As I observed while studying in British Columbia, 
this discourse presents Albertans as victims of federal overreach and pits them against 
ungrateful, yet oil-dependent, provincial neighbors. Meanwhile, the “I love Canadian Oil and 
Gas campaign,” and the “Rally for Resources,” two pro-industry, apparently grassroots 
initiatives, have performed an increasingly important role reinforcing discourses favorable to 
the industry.29 These discourses culturally embed fossil fuel production’s benevolence in 
local communities, legitimize oil company operations, and equate challenges to the industry 
to an attack on all Albertans.30 
 
Looking beyond the industry and placing emphasis on oil itself, several authors argue that the 
discursive power of the oil industry is more deeply embedded in society than any public 
relations or Astroturf campaigns can account for. Emphasizing the cultural significance of 
the product, Matt Huber employs a “Gramscian-Foucauldian” approach to studying “the role 
of petroleum products in both powering and provisioning neoliberal forms of common sense” 
(Huber 2014, 228). He argues that neoliberal ideology and ways of life are predicated on the 
multiplicity of products that depend on oil extraction. Thus neoliberalism, both as ideology 
and economic formation, would not be possible without oil (Huber 2013). Frederick Buell, 
 
28 In Alberta there exists a deep resentment of provinces to the east and especially the federal government 
deciding what can and can’t be done with “Alberta’s oil.” Such resentment has periodically fueled fantasies of 
Alberta seceding from the rest of Canada so Albertans can govern themselves and their resources without 
interference. The oil industry will cynically exploit these sentiments and rile up Albertan separatism to suit its 
interests. 
29 The “I Love Canadian Oil and Gas” logo is now printed on both of Calgary’s hockey teams’ stadium’s ice 
hockey rinks. The Edmonton Oilers is the name of  the Edmonton hockey team, Calgary’s rivals (Romero 
2019).  
30 I focus mostly on oil and gas throughout my dissertation but draw upon Shannon E. Bell’s indispensible 
studies into the cultural politics of coal mining too because much of what she has found is transposable to the 
study of petro-hegemony. I also find John Gaventa’s account of the nearly 5 decades of the Coal industry’s 
power in Appalachia a highly compelling account of compliance that also contains transposable elements 
(1980). 
 101 
looking back at the discourses that shaped settler expansion across what became the United 
States, delves even deeper, arguing that the very process of oil extraction is tied to 
expansionism and is constitutive of American Individualism (2014).  In this way oil 
discourses are deeply embedded in mainstream American values, identity and nationhood. 
Daniel Worden extends this argument stating that “petroleum underlies the normative vision 
of family, work and social belonging” and shows that even the most intimate relations and 
values in American society are predicated on access to cheap, abundant oil (Worden 2014, 
109). All of this matters because, as Szeman et al. argue, “Oil is so deeply and extensively 
embedded in our social, economic, and political structures and practices that imagining or 
enacting an alternative feels impossible” (2015, 16). Oil’s penetration into culture serves to 
construct oil and oil companies as indispensable, unassailable features of modern life in 
North America. Even while fossil fuel companies are publicly vilified, their product and thus 
the industry, are often unquestioningly considered inevitable, and this is one their greatest 
strengths (Coll 2012). 
 
It is important to examine the extent to which the fossil fuel industry deliberately orchestrates 
strategies with which to manage and intervene in relations consent. We might contrast this 
with the extent to which consent to the industry and its products is reproduced spontaneously 
through the everyday discourses and expectations we have all formed around what energy 
can do for us. 
 
This question remains unresolved question in the petro-cultures field. Szeman and many of 
his collaborators have taken a position that petro-culture is something all of us reproduce and 
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are (albeit unwittingly) complicit in (2015). Through our narratives about energy and oil we 
shape ourselves into “petro-subjects” (ibid). Authors like Haluza-DeLay (2014), Adkin and 
Stares (2016) and Bell (2016), however, demonstrate the lengths to which fossil fuel 
companies go to exploit these discourses to produce consent, social license and legitimacy. 
They show that consent to the industry is indeed carefully and deliberately orchestrated 
through the industry’s strategic interventions in this relation of power.  It seems that the 
distinction between these two positions lies in whether we focus on the industry or the 
product. Where the industry is privileged as our object of analysis the mechanics of its 
consent-building projects are visible, whereas when oil-as-energy-resource is privileged, 
scholars have tended to affirm the organic and self-sustaining reproduction of consent to oil. 
I’ve found that while these oil discourses may develop organically through our cultural 
relationship to the product, they are reinforced and strategically weaponized many times over 
by the fossil fuel industry to produce consent. Thus, we might suggest at a mutually 
reinforcing relationship between spontaneity and orchestration in the (re)production of oil 
culture. 
 
Petro-capitalism 
 
Linking the co-dependency between fossil fuels and the development of capitalist societies, 
scholars have developed important insight in the field of petro-capitalism (Malm 2016). 
Angela Carter uses the term to “indicate just how dependent this political economic system is 
on fossil energy, particularly oil” (Carter 2014, 25).  This dependency operates in different 
ways and at different scales. Research into the so called “oil curse” has sought to explain how 
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oil rich nations, particularly formerly colonized countries which have restructured their entire 
economies to extract and sell unrefined oil, paradoxically decreases standards of living and 
increases tendencies towards authoritarianism (Karl 1995; Collier 2010; Yergin 1992). In 
structuring their economies around this one lucrative product, countries become singularly 
dependent upon oil and are, therefore, highly sensitive to price fluctuation in the cost of a 
barrel of oil. This gives multinational oil companies and oil producers an inordinate degree of 
influence over the political economy of that region. The already blurred lines between states 
and industry become even more porous with governments turning their whole legislative and 
administrative capacity, bureaucracy, and, often times, monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force, over to the oil industry. The result, resource curse scholars argue, is often corruption, 
authoritarianism, and violence. As these lines are more or less erased, we see the rise of the 
“petro-state” which I will problematize in more detail in the following section. 
 
The dependency that defines petro-capitalism operates at local and global scales too and the 
mechanics of this dynamic has not received as much attention as the resource curse. It is clear, 
however, that a dynamic of dependency endows the fossil fuel industry with an enormous 
amount of influence, ensuring compliance at the local, state, and global scale. Moreover, our 
society’s dependency on oil means that whether or not we consent to the industry’s operations, 
we certainly rely upon the industry for livelihoods, transport, food, heat, and all the other 
comforts associated with consumer capitalism. This dependency has particularly severe 
implications at the local scale and is often deliberately conditioned by fossil fuel companies. 
Indeed, Naomi Klein argues that the very destructiveness of the industry’s impacts on other 
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economic and environmental sources of livelihoods leaves communities with little choice but 
to submit to the fossil fuel industry:  
 
This is the Catch-22 of the fossil fuel economy: precisely because these activities are 
so dirty and disruptive, they tend to weaken or even destroy other economic drivers: 
fish stocks are hurt by pollution, the scarred landscape becomes less attractive to 
tourists, and farmland becomes unhealthy. But rather than spark a popular backlash, 
this slow poisoning can end up strengthening the power of the fossil fuel companies 
because they end up being virtually the only game in town. (2014, 273) 
 
Communities living in close proximity to fossil fuel infrastructure are often all too aware of 
the damage the industry’s operations may be doing to their health and homes but remain 
dependent on that industry for employment, philanthropy, school funding and so on (Auyero 
and Swistun 2009). John Gaventa (1980) and later Bell (2016) document exactly this dynamic 
in their respective studies of Appalachian coal mining towns in the United States.  
 
The “company town” has a long history and is associated with a large literature most 
thoroughly reviewed in Thomas G. Andrews’ Killing for Coal (2008). The 19th and 20th 
century company towns of the United States represent one of the clearest examples of the 
techniques the industry used and uses to engineer a population’s compliance. In two quite 
different conjunctures of Appalachian history Bell (2016) and Gaventa (1980) both explore 
why, knowing what people know about exploitation and environmental degradation for which 
coal companies are responsible in the region, communities don’t rebel against them. Both 
explain that the answer corresponds, at least in part, to the legacy of a dynamic of dependency 
fossil fuel companies engineered through the development of company towns. Originally a 
strategy to discipline labor, coal companies would buy up most or all of the surrounding land, 
as well as all the shops, controlling entertainment venues and even churches. Workers were 
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paid in “scrips” or credits that were exchangeable only at the company stores, and the 
company owned the only stores in the company town. Whole communities came to depend 
upon the company for work, land use, religion, entertainment, and even groceries. Workers, or 
workers’ families, who demanded reforms would be blacklisted and barred from all of these 
venues, virtually guaranteeing social exclusion and destitution. The seeming omnipotence of 
the company, and the dependency everyone had upon it, often, though certainly with some 
very notable exceptions, succeeded in engineering a situation in which even if communities 
dissented, they could not actively resist. In these situations, the industry needed neither their 
consent nor to coerce them. Only their compliance mattered (Gaventa 1980). The legacies of 
this relationship exist to this day (Andrews 2008; Bell 2016).  
 
Compliance and dependency operate at a macro scale as well. Canada is home to the world’s 
third largest oil reserves and the United States has consistently ranked amongst the top three 
largest oil and gas producers in the world (Bridge and LeBillon 2017). In 2018, Canada was 
the fourth largest producer and exporter of crude oil in the world (Natural Resources Canada 
2019). In the US, the oil industry employs “four hundred thousand people in Louisiana, 
Texas, Alabama, and Mississippi” alone, which together generate “$70 billion annually in 
economic value and $20 billion annually in tax revenue and royalty payments to local, state, 
and federal governments” (Watts 2012, 456). In the Gulf of Mexico, “the total fixed capital 
in the Gulf oil complex is now valued at an estimated $2 trillion” (ibid). In Alberta, “45 
percent of the province’s jobs are in the oil and gas sector,” (Adkin 2016, 30). Meanwhile, 
the Bakken Shale formation in North Dakota could hold up to “five hundred billion barrels of 
oil equivalent” and “the global oil and gas industry is valued at several trillions of dollars” 
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(Appel, Mason, and Watts 2015, 2,5).  According to Appel, Mason, and Watts, the total 
global value “of recoverable oil and gas is roughly $160 trillion,” while “the fixed assets of 
the entire industry now total over $40 trillion” and “over one million barrels of oil can be 
traded in a day” (2015, 19). These powerful numbers reveal how Marx’s “silent compulsion 
of the market” operates at the scale of states fostering a dynamic of dependency between the 
economic development of those states and the oil industry.  These estimates also give some 
insight into the degree of disruption that halting fossil fuel operations would cause globally 
and also within local economies where thousands of jobs depend directly or indirectly on oil 
and gas extraction (ibid).  
 
The extent to which oil and gas companies are embedded in local economies fosters a dynamic 
of dependency and reinforces relations of compliance. But the local can never really be 
disconnected from the global. The construction of oil infrastructure, investment in oil 
production, oil markets, and the manufacturing of demand for oil are all deeply entrenched in 
the global economy (Bridge and LeBillon 2017; Grewal 2014). The industry experiences 
intense boom and bust cycles, or periods of “exuberance and catastrophe,” as Buell puts it, that 
have enormous consequences for global political economy (Buell 2014). The oil market is 
global and is characterized by erratic fluctuation, where prices are subject not to the logic of 
supply and demand but to “a transnational corporate oligarchy (The Seven Sisters), a Third 
World cartel (OPEC), a First World consumer lobby (the International Energy Agency), and 
long-term contracts” (Appel, Mason, and Watts 2015, 8). Jane Guyer says that to make sense 
of oil prices, researchers would do better looking to the decisions these actors make rather than 
to market relations of supply and demand (Guyer 2015). Similarly, Bridge and LeBillon, show 
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that demand itself is often manufactured by fossil fuel companies, inflated by International 
Energy Agency (IEA) estimates and then reified by corresponding capital investment decisions 
(2017). Through all this, then, it is the (often international) investors and shareholders who 
tend to have an extraordinary amount of influence over local oil economies and the 
development of oil infrastructure (Carter 2014). In this way states, countries, communities 
form dependency not just on the oil company, or the product, but upon oil company 
shareholders and investment decisions, complying with industry’s interests to attract 
investment of their capital.   
 
The jobs associated with fossil fuel infrastructure and development often place unions in 
strategic, if fickle, alliances with fossil fuel companies (Haluza-DeLay and Carter 2016). In 
the United States and Canada, some unions have become little more than another lobbying 
arm of the fossil fuel industry. Meanwhile, in some cases the associated tax revenue and oil 
severance taxes may attracts supportive politicians. Seeking to turn oil wealth into political 
capital through “petropopulism,” these politicians funnel oil revenue into public services and 
popular infrastructure projects (Watts 2014, 202). Both of these dynamics also condition 
dependency on oil revenue for vital public services.  
 
Finally, feeding the “oil curse,” the allure of attracting transnational capital investment in oil 
development leads many local, state, and national governments into becoming rentier-states, 
turning their economies over to the oil and gas industry in exchange for oil revenues and job 
growth (Adkin 2016; Mitchell 2011). Dependence on oil products, oil jobs, oil investment, 
oil extraction, oil growth, and oil infrastructure development makes rentier-states, and all of 
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us (obviously to varying degrees), vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of oil, while thriving 
oil economies can crash literally overnight (Appel, Mason, and Watts 2015). As a result, the 
price of oil, somewhat tenuously, is used to predict social unrest, intensification of conflict, 
and economic growth (Bridge and LeBillon 2017). The speed with which decisions made 
about oil at a global scale can impact local economies has only intensified. This has given the 
oil industry even more privileges and reinforced its influence over governance at global and 
local scales (ibid). 
 
Petro-state 
 
Oil frontiers and oil extraction almost always include collaboration between state and 
industry, obscuring the distinction between public and private interests. Describing what he 
calls “the resource-state nexus,” Gavin Bridge has explained how states deploy discourses to 
legitimize resource extraction, violence to securitize it, and subsidies to finance it (2014). 
These are some of the functions of the petro-state. This is particularly so in the case of “joint 
ventures” between states and companies, and when the state owns extraction industries, or at 
least has a large stake in them (Engler 2014).  However, the relationships between private oil 
companies and government in the United States and Canada, and the extent which they 
collaborate in legitimizing projects, securitization, and subsidies, is well documented too 
(Zalik 2016, 2015; McBeath 2016; Haluza-DeLay 2014; Wilson 2014; Monaghan and 
Wallby 2017).  
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Laurie Adkin explains that, in the case of the Albertan government, “reliance upon oil and 
gas revenue… has driven bureaucratic restructuring, government investment priorities, public 
policy, political rights and representation, and citizenship” (2016, 13). The industry is able to 
intervene in relations of coercion through the petro-state. Such interventions may include the 
legitimizing and subsidizing of extraction, the legal enforcement of dispossession and land 
enclosure, the processes of who is included and excluded from the benefits of resource 
wealth, and the disciplining of dissent to secure oil frontiers. All of these are largely a 
function of state’s coercive capacities and ability to enforce laws and rules. Therefore, the 
concept of the petro-state for purposes of this dissertation refers specifically to governments 
that have, to a large degree, turned over their administrative, legislative, and law enforcement 
capacities to supporting the oil industry. Petro-states are ultimately prepared to extend their 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force to protect, enforce, and advance the industry’s 
interests.31  
 
To delineate the petro-states field I bring together authors articulating the nexus of state and 
capital within the oil assemblage and the political influence of fossil fuel companies in and 
on governments, as well as those writing on the inherent, often state-sanctioned, violence, 
and regulatory and enforcement mechanisms through which fossil fuel extraction, 
 
31 Here I’m calling on Max Weber’s famous formulation of the state defined as the entity within a social 
formation that has the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (See Politics as Vocation, 1919 – The 
Vocation Lectures, 2004). The state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, not to mention its increasing 
propensity towards contracting out that monopoly on violence to private companies, makes coercion the 
primary relation of power the industry exploits through the petro-state. Coercion needn’t just mean violence, 
however. With regards to the petro-state it can apply to situations wherever laws, legality, or legislation, are 
ultimately enforced through violence, surveillance, or direct repression. To complicate matters, coercive 
measures may be deployed by state and non-state actors alike without the necessary backing of violence. Non-
violent direct action is a coercive tactic, for example. Moreover, while the state may have the monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence, this is not necessarily true of the legitimacy of coercion. 
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transportation, refining and emissions are facilitated. Following Adkin (2016) and Watts 
(2014) I’ve broadened the conceptual category of petro-states to include regions of, and 
indeed the current governing administrations of, the United States and Canada. In doing so, 
I’ve shifted the meaning of the term somewhat, such that we are not describing states that are 
exclusively dependent on oil for economic development. In this rendition, petro-states are all 
governing bureaucracies that find their interests inextricably aligned with those of the oil 
industry and use their enforcement capabilities to advance those interests. 
 
I’m borrowing from Timothy Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy to articulate this shift (2011). 
Mitchell explains that, through his study of the relationship between fossil fuels and 
democracy, “it became increasingly clear that carbon energy and modern democratic politics 
were tied intricately together.” In the process, “rather than a study of democracy and oil” his 
research became a study of “democracy as oil” (2011, 5 original emphasis). Democracy and 
oil are fused in his concept of “Carbon Democracy.” Fossil fuels have made contemporary 
power relations, and particularly the things modern democracies are expected to do, possible.  
As he extends this logic, therefore, “the leading industrialised countries are also oil states. 
Without the energy they derive from oil their current forms of political and economic life 
would not exist” (2011, 6). Contemporary democracies have come to “count on” oil, have 
taken fossil fuels for granted, in order to make promises and fulfil the expectations of their 
citizenry. Securing fossil fuel access is thus a strategically vital component of both domestic 
and geo-politics.  
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When modern democracies are unable to fulfil their citizens’ expectations because of 
pressures on the fossil fuel economy, they face authority and legitimacy challenges that must 
be overcome. Fossil fuel infrastructures and their supply chains form an important part of a 
governments’ ability to maintain the expectations of their citizens. As such, the interests of 
the state and of fossil fuel companies tend to align because the legitimacy of the state, and the 
ability of the state to manage its citizens’ expectations, depends upon unlimited fossil fuel 
extraction (2011). The shared interests of states and industry therefore justify state-
sanctioned coercion to attain and secure this “strategic asset.” We can think of petro-
hegemony often existing within and responding to the context of carbon democracy. It is, 
therefore, in conditions of carbon democracy that the fossil fuel industry’s interventions in 
the workings of the state gain legitimacy. This helps explain how fossil fuel companies are 
able to capture institutions of the state and advance their interests in purportedly democratic 
governance systems. 
 
The United States and Canada have become two examples of what Adkin calls “First World 
Petro-States” (2016). Yves Engler has documented the close collaboration between the 
Canadian government and tar sands representatives as they have tried to sell Alberta’s oil 
abroad and decrease environmental regulations on oil imports to the European Union (Engler 
2014). Haluza-DeLay, meanwhile, has described the collusion between the Canadian state 
and the industry as they seek to construct “positive representations of the tar sands in 
Alberta” (2014, 39). Moreover, throughout the oil assemblage and particularly in oil 
frontiers, when the industry is unable to establish or maintain consent to extraction, and 
compliance constrains only those directly dependent upon it, companies can often call upon 
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allies in government to coercively repress dissent (Klein 2014; Zalik 2016). While the state’s 
legitimizing narrative, bureaucracy, and administrative and legislative capacities all facilitate 
extraction and production, they are all, ultimately, legally enforceable by the threat, or the 
actuality of, violence and coercion. As such, it is the threat, and actuality of, coercion and the 
state’s ability to enforce rules favorable to the industry that defines the petro-state. 
 
Liam Downey argues that “violence is one of several overlapping mechanisms that provide 
powerful actors with the means to prevail over others in conflicts over natural resources” 
(2015, 179). As sites of dispossession and exclusion, oil frontiers are characterized by 
conflict and coercion. They are spaces in which, according to Michael Watts, “formal rules 
are often elastic, and where states typically exercise a mix of despotic and coercive rather 
than wholly infrastructural power” (2014, 216). Oil frontiers are where the industry’s 
coercive capabilities become most visible. The violence of the frontier is deeply inscribed in 
the history of colonialism in Norther America. Adkin writes that oil and gas development in 
Alberta “required the forcible imposition of a British colonial system of property rights and 
political institutions – including the reserve system – upon the indigenous inhabitants of the 
Dominion” (Adkin 2016, 31). Historically, and still today, frontiers are shaped by colonial 
discourses and the violence of dispossession. As Watts writes: 
  
Frontiers have been associated with imperial or state-led commercial advance 
typically into geographical border zones in which populations are presumed (or 
constructed) to be scant or “primitive,” property rights absent or unformed, and 
resources (land, minerals, forests) uncommericalized – in short, a zone of contact 
between “barbarism” and “civilization.”” (2014, 215) 
 
The development of oil and gas economies is often combined with the violence of 
colonialism and dispossession, carried out, enforced, and legitimized through the petro-state 
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(Adkin 2016). Contestation and protest at the oil frontier is met with (often racialized and 
gendered) criminalization, violence and securitization (Willson 2014; Zalik 2015; McNeish 
and Logan 2012). The state enforces oil extraction, providing support from law enforcement 
and authorizing private security contractors in the name of “national security” (Zalik 2011). 
Monaghan and Wallby have documented the increasing surveillance and infiltration to which 
those opposing the development of oil infrastructure are being subjected. They demonstrate 
how the collaboration between governments and the oil industry is justified through 
discourses of “critical infrastructure” and appealing to the “national interest” (2017). 
Similarly, David Pellow identifies the deep co-dependence existing between state and capital 
through his study of the repression and surveillance of environmental activists in what he 
calls the “Green Scare” (2014). With increasing frequency, throughout the oil assemblage, 
and particularly in oil frontiers, we are seeing how those seeking to keep fossil fuels in the 
ground are being met with the violent repression that so defines what Naomi Klein’s calls 
Blockadia (2014).  
 
Petro-hegemony  
 
Petro-hegemony combines, synthesizes and organizes strategic interventions through petro-
culture, petro-capitalism, and the petro-state to engage with relations of consent, coercion, 
and compliance which consolidates, maintains, and advances the interests of the fossil fuel 
industry. The industry’s strategies to produce consent include gaining footholds in culturally 
significant institutions, reinforcing favorable discourses, and embedding fossil fuels and 
fossil fuel development in our identities, habits, and life ways. It manufactures or exploits 
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conditions of compliance by fostering a dynamic of dependency upon both the product and 
the industry, requiring neither our consent nor coercion to manage potential dissent. In 
situations where it has failed to wholly secure either consent or compliance, the industry 
enforces its interests through the petro-state which may ultimately deploy coercive strategies 
to discipline and repress dissent. Together the petro-state, petro-culture, and petro-capitalism 
form a mutually reinforcing support structure upon which the industry’s hegemony is upheld.  
 
Climate justice activists may counter petro-hegemony by devising and deploying strategies 
that intervene in each of the relations power through which the industry’s hegemony 
operates.  Crucially, it is not enough for activists to deploy strategies that engage with just 
one or even two of these power relations. For as long as the industry has the broad consent of 
society, political and economic victories will be short-lived. For as long as the industry is 
able to effectively deploy coercion and the full force of the state, our movements will be 
curtailed and repressed. And for as long the vast majority of people depend upon the industry 
for lives and livelihoods, it will need neither to win our consent nor to coerce us into 
submission. Finally, we must always be looking at how each of these power relations 
influences the other; they do not exist in silos. To theorize the combined counter hegemonic 
strategies with which climate justice activists might address all three of these relations of 
power, I have developed a concept called the Carbon Rebellion. 
 
Theorizing the Carbon Rebellion 
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A great deal has now been written about power and the fossil fuel industry. Far less has been 
written about counter power and the fossil fuel industry. In their edited volume, Ending the 
Fossil Fuel Era, Princen, Manno, and Martin write: 
 
A politically sufficient approach [to ending the fossil fuel era], one attuned to the 
realities of the twenty-first century, begins… with explicit attention to multiple 
sources of power, some material (natural resources, weaponry, financial capital, for 
example), some ideational (growth is necessary and good), some overt (military and 
economic), some hidden (in writing the rules of the game and gaining access and 
dumping externalities on the marginalized). (2015, 334)  
 
Developing a political strategy for keeping fossil fuels in the ground does indeed require us 
to pay close attention to multiple configurations of power – the material, the discursive, the 
hidden, and the overt that are simultaneously and continuously in play. Translated into 
Gramscian terms of hegemony, the carbon rebellion is an attempt at building a counter 
hegemonic strategic framework advancing exactly this analysis and praxis. As a counter 
hegemonic strategic framework, the carbon rebellion organizes our thinking and strategic 
action along the same three relations of power upon which petro-hegemony depends: 
consent, coercion, and compliance. These may be material and discursive, hidden, or overt 
configurations.  
 
The carbon rebellion is the climate justice movement’s counter hegemonic response to petro-
hegemony. The carbon rebellion organizes the strategies, narratives, and tactics climate 
justice activists might deploy to intervene in relations of consent, coercion, compliance. Like 
petro-hegemony these interventions are organized by three mediators: the political culture of 
opposition and creation (consent), the economics of a just transition (compliance), and 
regimes of climate justice (coercion). Intervening in the relation of consent, the carbon 
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rebellion organizes strategies, narratives, and tactics for the war of position through what 
Foran, Grosse and Gray have called a political culture of opposition and creation for climate 
justice, or PCOC (2017). The economics of a just transition organizes and develops strategies 
to alter relations of compliance through the war of economies. Strategies organized to 
challenge relations of coercion are implemented through what I call regimes of climate 
justice to wage the war of maneuver.  
 
Carbon rebellion exists in nascent forms in many fights to keep fossil fuels in the ground. 
Most campaigns will, to varying degrees and extents, seek to wrest consent from the fossil 
fuel industry, challenge and gain coercive capabilities to deploy against the industry, and 
intervene in relations of compliance. However, the deliberate and coordinated organization of 
interventions in all three relations of power has yet to emerge as a coherent strategic 
framework within the climate justice movement. Carbon rebellion may offer one such 
framework. Moreover, movement scholars and strategists have already made helpful inroads 
examining one or more of these three mediators of counter hegemonic intervention.  
 
War of position: Political Culture of Opposition and Creation for Climate Justice 
 
David Pellow writes that “many movements begin with a grievance or a critique, but what 
sustains them and pushes people out into the streets (or underground) is often a vision, a 
dream of something better” (2014, 1). According to Foran, Grosse and Gray, a political 
culture of opposition and creation does both. The concept “explores how people make 
political sense of the social settings that constrict and enable their lives, in ways that can 
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sometimes lead to the formation of strong social movements” but also how they articulate 
and cohere around “a positive vision of a better world, and an alternative to strive towards 
that might improve or replace what exists” (2017, 357). Forging a “historic bloc” for the 21st 
century, the PCOC can organize a collective, discursive articulation of what Smucker calls 
“the We in politics” when it deploys narratives and strategies that join wide ranging and 
diverse groups of people together in solidarity and common cause (2017).  
 
Pushing the concept further, I argue the PCOC provides the foundation of social movements’ 
shared narratives and organizes the forging of a new “common sense” by linking chains of 
equivalence across social struggles. As such it articulates a counter hegemonic alignment of 
alliances opposed to the hegemonic order and advancing visions of alternatives. Yet, 
diverging from Gramsci, a PCOC for the 21st century must also be “pluriversal” rather than 
universal in its articulations of the possible and a “world of many worlds” (Escobar 
forthcoming). Through the PCOC movements may development coalitions large and diverse 
enough to mount a significant assault on the industry’s legitimacy. This requires strategies 
that intervene in and change public discourse. Reinsborough and Canning’s story-based 
strategy that dismantles the stories through which consent to fossil fuel companies is 
produced would be organizes through the PCOC. More than this, however, new stories and 
discursive strategy must reconstitute consent around climate justice and its visions of 
alternatives. In this way the PCOC can force a crisis of legitimacy on the fossil fuel industry 
and opens up new political opportunities for climate justice activists. 
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The highly influential fossil fuel divestment movement articulated their discursive strategy in 
terms of removing the industry’s “social license to operate” (McKibben 2012; Cheon and 
Urpelainen 2018). It was a narrative intervention that sought to delegitimize the industry and 
remove consent to it (LeQuesne 2016). The discourse of social license originally developed 
by extractive companies to persuade communities to accept fossil fuel infrastructure, “to get 
to yes,” has been turned against the industry (Bowles and Veltmeyer 2014). Undermining the 
industry’s social license, activists have targeted museums, industry donations to universities, 
and other public institutions the industry sponsors, to draw attention to new narratives that 
contest the industry’s interventions in relations of consent. Greenpeace famously targeted the 
toy company LEGO for its relationship with Shell through a viral video campaign that 
ultimately saw LEGO publicly break ties with the oil company (Vaughan 2014).  
 
What Kevin DeLuca calls “image politics” has become an increasingly important tactic to 
make discursive interventions that target the industry’s social license and revoke public 
acceptance of its operations (1999). Garth Lenz’s photographs of the destruction wrought in 
Alberta’s tar sands, for example, have played a significant role in delegitimizing extraction 
there, particularly amongst those who do not live in Alberta (Davidson and Gismondi 2015). 
The spread of these images on social media saw the tar sands framed “Alberta’s Mordor,” a 
popular culture comparison to Sauron’s hellscape in the Lord of the Rings trilogy (ibid). 
Marches, occupations, direct action and civil disobedience can also be powerful tactics with 
which to reframe and disseminate narratives to wrest consent away from the industry and 
align constituents through a PCOC (Reinsborough and Canning 2017). 
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In most cases, however, the legitimacy of fossil fuels, and the inevitably of their existence, is 
embedded in our very identities and value systems, facilitating and facilitated by 
neoliberalism, consumerism, and individualism (Huber 2013). Of course, then, 
communicating climate justice must delve much deeper into the discourses that shape 
common sense than public relations campaigns are necessarily able to achieve. Gaining 
influence within institutions that help mediate these value systems, like churches, schools, 
media outlets and so on, is an important part of the war of position. Yet on the frontlines of 
Blockadia, keep-it-in-the-ground campaigns’ discursive interventions and narratives have to 
connect communities in their opposition to extraction and also their vision for alternatives 
(Steger and Milicevic 2014). These narratives play a crucial role in drawing together 
disparate and politically divergent social groups across lines that commonly divide them, 
creating newly blended political identities as they do so (ibid). Stories framing a 
community’s connection to place, to home, against unsolicited intrusion from the industry 
can often help transcend these social divides (ibid; Grossman 2017). The discourses of the 
Green New Deal and a just transition are compelling ones, with similar potential to bridge 
social struggles and values. As populist, unifying framing narratives, they project progress, 
hope, and possibility all while centering a critique of the systems that produced the climate 
crisis (Brecher 2017). 
 
Meanwhile, many Indigenous-led campaigns emphasize sovereignty, self-determination and 
rights in narratives that are connected to the continuing colonizing dynamics accompanying 
fossil fuel development on their territories (Powys Whyte 2016). Decolonizing narratives 
draw upon their originators’ own life ways, values and experiences. One such narrative, 
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exemplified in the Lakota saying Mitakuye-Oyasin, translatable to “all our relations,” or we 
are all related and all beings are related, refuses the colonial logic of categorical distinction 
and seeks to renew Indigenous peoples’ relationships to land, place, and each other (LaDuke 
1999). Similarly, discourses originating in some Indigenous epistemologies, particularly 
those of Ecuador and Bolivia, like buen vivir related to the Quechua concept sumak kawsay, 
or the good life, are being popularized amongst Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars and 
activists alike to articulate very different relationships to each other, the world, and the very 
notion of “resources” (Escobar 2015; Manno and Martin 2015). Narratives such as these are 
deliberately open-ended, providing more than one direction with which to reimagine ways of 
life beyond resource extraction, capitalism, colonialism, racism and patriarchy. The Standing 
Rock Sioux’s viral meme Mni Wiconi, “Water is Life,” captured a similar narrative. This 
viral meme framed the Water Protectors’ struggle incredibly effectively against colonialism, 
oil extraction, and impending ecosystem collapse (Dhillon and Estes 2017). 
 
Despite important innovation in narrative strategy, neither the CJM nor its contingent of 
keep-it-in-the-ground campaigns have yet developed a PCOC that can organize a movement 
large, diverse, or strong enough to counter the fossil fuel industry’s hegemony. Many social 
struggles remain isolated from the movement. Crucially, the narratives organized through the 
CJM’s PCOC have, until recently, excluded the unions representing workers who depend 
upon the fossil fuel industry. The rhetoric of the just transition in which workers play a 
central role in developing the next energy economy has only just started to win some 
discursive ground amongst unions (Haluza DeLay and Carter 2016). For as long as rhetoric is 
unaccompanied by the material realization of this promise, however, the relation of 
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compliance will continue to stymie efforts to build the bigger political We. Therefore, a war 
of economies is also necessary.32 
 
A War of Economies: The Economics of a Just transition 
 
Haluza DeLay and Carter affirm the importance of cultural intervention while recognizing, 
again in the Albertan context, that “effectively countering Alberta’s petro-capitalism will 
require rethinking the material processes of production and social reproduction as well as 
reimagining the cultural foundations and collective identities of Albertans beyond producers 
of energy” (2016, 457). In other words, the climate justice movement must seek to break 
dynamics of dependency all together to intervene in the relation of compliance. This means 
materializing, and not only promising, the economics of a just transition at far more 
ambitious scales. The policies packaged under the “Green New Deal” program that have so 
excited American politics in recent months are on the scale of ambition that could intervene 
in relation of compliance. Unless we are careful, however, a Green New Deal for all its 
potential, could end up reconstituting a dynamic of dependency away from the fossil fuel 
industry and onto the state. A truly liberating just transition must dramatically transform the 
dynamic of dependency away from institutions and organizations and into one of co-
dependency on one another. Strategies developed through the economics of a just transition, 
therefore, need to wholly transform the dynamic of dependency and this is one of the reasons 
 
32 In Chapters Five and Eight I will problematize the universalizing tendency of populist hegemonic alliance 
building by synthesizing it with particularism and Arturo Escobar’s pluriverse ideas to develop and 
problematize what I call intersectional populism. 
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why energy transition that simply replaces fossil fuels with wind and solar but leaves 
contemporary dynamics of dependency intact cannot be just. 
 
Just transition can mean different things to different people and indeed it is supposed to. In 
fact, it may be unnecessary to think of just transitions in the plural precisely because any just 
transition must imply this plurality. The materialization of the concept will manifest itself 
differently in different geographic and socio-economic conjunctures. If it is not inclusive of a 
multiplicity of possibilities, then it is unlikely to be just. That said, a just transition must also 
contain within it some fixed meaning.  According to the Climate Justice Alliance and the Our 
Power campaign, the just transition framework first arose out of collaboration between labor 
unions and environmental justice groups who recognized “the need to phase out the 
industries that were harming workers, community health and the planet; and at the same time 
provide just pathways for workers to transition to other jobs.” The idea has been developed 
further to mean a transition that is “just and equitable; redressing past harms and creating 
new relationships of power for the future through reparations” (Climate Justice Alliance 
2019a). The Our Power campaign itself developed out of a coalition brought together through 
the Climate Justice Alliance and its understanding of a just transition necessarily reflects the 
multiple and divergent interests and stakes contained within that alliance. Democratizing, 
decentralizing, decolonizing, and decarbonizing our energy systems helpfully summarizes 
the concept. The just transition, if its rhetorical promises begin materializing, could well 
realize not only the red-green alliance between organized labor and environmentalists so 
many on the left long for, but also align these with Indigenous struggles and campaigns 
against environmental racism (Abramsky 2010; Princen, Manno, and Martin 2015). We 
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might also compare this framework to the revolutionary manifesto put forward in the Red 
Deal (Red Nation 2019).   
 
The strategic orientation driving the war of economies is simple: Undermine the relation of 
compliance through which petro-hegemony maintains its status by changing the 
material/economic relations that condition communities’ dependence upon the fossil fuel 
industry. The tactics, however, are much harder to realize. One of the tactical priorities must 
be wresting union support away from the fossil fuel industry. Another is surely socio-
technical. Community Choice Energy in which communities can gain more direct control 
over energy supply and costs, for example, has the potential to advance a just transition. 
Harnessing the decentralizing potential of renewable energy to democratize its use and 
distribution helps transform the dependency dynamic. Transition Towns in the United 
Kingdom and the Our Power campaign in the US have both experimented with harnessing 
this socio-technical potential.  Exploring examples of community-led energy projects in 
Scotland, Haggett and Aitken identify some of obstacles this approach has encountered and 
suggest at how they may be overcome (2015). Barriers often include startup costs and 
mobilization of resources, scaling projects up, and an unequal distribution of power, 
expertise, and commitment already existing within communities that undermine social 
cohesion, (ibid). There are, however, important success stories in which communities like the 
Black Mesa Water Coalition in the Navajo Nation has prevented the expansion of coal 
mining on their reservation and instead are developing a community controlled, employee 
owned, solar energy cooperative. 
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The question of just transition raises an important temporal conundrum: Does it come before 
or after petro-hegemony has been dismantled? On the one hand, a just transition is a 
necessary precursor to dismantling petro-hegemony because it is crucial to undoing the 
relation of compliance that so effectively upholds the industry’s position. On the other, it is 
hard to imagine a just energy transition taking place at the scale necessary to undo the 
relation of compliance without first breaking the influence of the fossil fuel industry. 
Furthermore, achieving a just transition would suggest that there is no longer any need to 
break the industry’s hegemony.  Miya Yoshitani, Executive Director of the Asian Pacific 
Environmental Network, explained to me that the just transition is simultaneously a 
movement goal and a strategy, and, as the word transition suggests, it is a process (personal 
communication, July 12th, 2018). It is a goal in so far as democratizing, decentralizing, 
decolonizing, and decarbonizing our energy systems is crucial part of achieving climate 
justice. It is a strategy in so far as striving towards these connects a whole range of interests 
and stakes and grows the movement. It is a process in that it needs to start as part of the war 
of economies, but its work will be far from over even after petro-hegemony has been 
dismantled.  
 
Finally, the fossil fuel industry itself is also subject to a dynamic of dependency upon finance 
and capital. Climate justice activists can, and are, exploiting this vulnerability by targeting 
the flows of finance and investment that fossil fuel companies depend upon to expand their 
operations. Targeting banks and financial institutions, around the world, climate justice 
activists have met with some success convincing financiers to halt their investments in fossil 
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fuel projects. Direct action, secondary targeting33, and divestment can all eventually run 
down the industry’s access to capital as activists intensify conditions of risk and uncertainty 
associated with fossil fuel projects. This kind of activism drives potential investors away 
from investment in the industry and can have serious consequences for companies’ ability to 
continue their projects (Healy and Barry 2018). As Stephen D’Arcy explains, however, these 
tactics must be deployed relentlessly, in an escalating trajectory, and grow the base of 
participation, if they are to be successful (2014).  
 
War of Maneuver: Regimes of Climate Justice  
 
Materializing the just transition and engaging in discursive interventions against the fossil 
fuel industry are pivotal forms of intervention. However, the industry’s position as a vital 
support structure of global capitalism and state legitimacy means that if the climate justice 
movement poses a significant enough threat to it, its allies in the petro-state will unleash their 
coercive capacities to enforce their interests and to criminalize, discipline and repress dissent. 
Coercive state intervention is not a certainty but occurs with particular frequency where 
marginalized communities are resisting and when avenues for preventing infrastructure 
development through the “legitimate” state mechanisms, for example Environmental Impact 
Reviews and permitting processes, have been exhausted. Moreover, the state’s ability to 
enforce rules and laws favorable to the industry make it an important target for climate 
justice activists. Where systematic coercion and violence is deployed, the CJM’s campaigns 
will often, though not always, disintegrate. This does not mean, however, that our movement 
 
33 Secondary targeting means “attacking an adversary indirectly by trying to penalize businesses or politicians 
that support or collaborate with it” (D’Arcy 2014 original emphasis). 
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can abandon the state and coercive power as a terrain of struggle. It means it must turn 
coercion to its advantage, gain footholds within governing institutions, institutionalize 
political space for the movement to flourish, and curtail the state’s ability to effectively 
deploy coercion against keep-it-in-the-ground campaigns.34 Regimes of climate justice 
invoke the idea of “dual power” in which the movement is both orientated towards capturing 
and influencing the current institutions of the state while also developing counter institutions 
that may eventually replace the authority of the dominant ones (McKee 2014). 
 
Reflecting on the violence and failure of 20th Century revolutions, the early 21st Century saw 
many radical activists and movement scholars cede the state as a terrain of struggle, 
emphasizing its inherent violence and corrupting influence on movements for emancipation 
(Foran 1997; Holloway 2002; Graeber 2009). Some turned to the ability of the growing alter-
globalization movement to organize translocal and transnational resistance to global 
capitalism without positioning the state as a vehicle of change, or otherwise argued that non-
capitalist, anti-authoritarian life ways had to be “prefigured” through collectively refusing to 
participate in capitalist accumulation, and enacting other life ways instead (Holloway 2010).  
Many also experimented with horizontal, consent-based, non-hierarchical decision-making 
structures and rejected other modes of governance in their own organizations as inherently 
corrupting and coercive (Smucker 2017; Day 2005). Abandoning structure and the state at 
this critical juncture was a mistake, even for those in our movement who mobilize for the 
ultimate dissolution of the state altogether. Pointing to the failure of Occupy Wall Street 
 
34 Here again I make a deliberate distinction between coercion and violence. Coercion applies to the whole 
range of tactics the petro-state can deploy to discipline dissent including surveillance, blackmail, courts, 
legislation, law enforcement, surveillance, incarceration (which arguably is a form of violence), and the threat 
of violence. 
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movement to institutionalize the discursive victories it won, Smucker argues the movement 
needed a clearer leadership structure and a plan to turn its values into an implementable 
program to make more substantial political inroads that could have paved the way for further 
gains with larger mobilizations (ibid). 
 
I define coercion as forcing a party or social actor into taking position they would not take of 
their own volition along with the ability to enforce “the rules” to advance one’s own 
interests. There are those within the movement who conflate non-violence with opposition to 
all forms of coercion. Opposing violence as a political strategy is not the same as opposing 
coercion as a political strategy.35 Indeed, deploying coercive tactics, including winning 
political office, may actually help climate justice activists curtail the state’s sanctioning of 
violent intervention on behalf of the fossil fuel industry.36 Coercion is a relation of power the 
CJM must intervene in, and the state, and governance institutions more broadly, are arenas in 
which it must struggle. Capturing state institutions and turning their enforcement 
mechanisms on the fossil fuel industry is one way climate activists can intervene in relations 
of coercion. The state, and coercion as a terrain of struggle, is far from the only terrain must 
take place, and those within the movement who believe electoral politics, the court system, 
lobbying decision makers and so on, to be a corrupting influence can choose to wage their 
 
35 I will return to the question of non-violence as political strategy, and more broadly to the question of a 
diversity of tactics in the climate justice movement, in greater detail in Chapter Seven. Suffice it to say here that 
I think the conflation of coercion and violence needs to be undone and that while the state may have the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence it does not necessarily have the same monopoly on coercion. 
Strategic decisions involving the merits of non-violence versus violence, what may hegemonically be 
considered violence, and what forms of violence the movement considers unacceptable, are all contextual and 
subject to specific social, political and geographic conjunctures. How these decisions are made and debated 
matters a great deal to the cohesion of social movements.  
36 I consider winning political office a tactic that engages coercion because the authority of politicians 
ultimately rests upon coercion. 
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struggles on other, equally as important, terrains. However, preempting and responding to 
state sanctioned violence when it is deployed must be part of what our campaigns do. So too 
is deploying the coercive capabilities at climate justice movement’s disposal against the 
fossil fuel industry.  
 
Tactics that intervene in the relation of coercion includes forms of direct action like 
blockades of fossil fuel infrastructure, reclaiming Indigenous territory, sit-ins, and 
occupations. These all use coercion to get activists closer to their goals. These are coercive 
because they are forcing the opposition to take positions they would not otherwise take. 
Tactics responding to state sanctioned repression might include the critical development of 
organizational security culture (Pellow 2014), pleading the necessity defense in court 
(Brecher 2017), non-violent civil disobedience and the forcing of what Dr. King called a 
“moral crisis” (Kauffman 2017). It may also include, where necessary, physical defense 
against assaults by the police, or organizing community self-defense lessons. But coercive 
tactics can also include the imposition of legislation forcing companies to abide by particular 
regulations. Asserting rights or the use of the court system to hold fossil fuel companies 
accountable to the state’s own laws is another form of coercion available to CJM activists 
(Brecher 2017; Thomas-Muller 2014).  
 
Winning key elections and gaining footholds in political parties, city councils, in state and 
federal legislature, or appointing allies to planning and development commissions and 
departments, are all capabilities that ultimately rest upon coercion because they force the 
opposition into taking positions they would not otherwise take. These tactics take advantage 
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of specific political opportunity structures to advance and institutionalize discursive gains 
and enforce rules favorable to our own cause (Cheon and Urpelainen 2018). They can also be 
used to curtail state-violence and create space for campaigns to make political, cultural, and 
economic gains against the industry. The expansion of our notion of coercion brings all of 
these arenas into play in counter hegemonic struggles. Regimes of climate justice, therefore, 
include all the different modes by which the climate justice movement’s agenda may be 
enforced democratically, accountability, and according to the movement’s fundamental 
principles of dignity, solidarity, and equity. Regimes of climate justice may eventually offer 
the foundations for new politico-legal and judicial systems premised upon the principles of 
climate justice. By simultaneously challenging the fossil fuel industry’s coercive capacities 
through the dominant, state institutions, while also developing counter institutions of 
governance and sovereignty that may one day replace the authority and legitimacy of the 
dominant ones, climate justice activists can operate according to a logic of dual power to 
develop new regimes governance that advance climate justice and hold fossil fuel companies 
to account.  
 
Above I have described elements of a war of maneuver, war of position, and war of 
economies separately. In reality, these strategic interventions all rely on each other’s success. 
Here I depart from Gramsci’s assertion that they must be waged sequentially. As I will show 
empirically, for example, the war of maneuver relies upon simultaneous wars of position and 
economies. Similarly, strategic elements of the war of economies depend on a successful war 
of maneuver and also help fight the war of position. The movement’s war of position can 
help legitimize tactics deployed in the war of maneuver but rely on promises materialized 
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through the war of economies. In addition, tactics like direct action or divestment, for 
example, can be deployed to intervene in more than one relation of power at the same time. 
No one organization or group needs to, or perhaps even can, intervene in all three relations of 
power, but the campaign or the coalition of organizations comprising the campaign, do need 
to make interventions on all three terrains. Placing petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion 
into this theoretical framework, below I have developed a schematic to demonstrate how 
these strategies and tactics might be organized and deployed to different terrains of struggle.  
 
Terrains of Struggle and Points of Intervention 
 
When petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion are positioned against each other as 
mirroring antagonistic forces, it becomes clear that the three domains or mediators of strategy 
pertaining to petro-hegemony correspond to the three mediators of strategy contained within 
the carbon rebellion. In other words, petro-culture corresponds to the PCOC, the petro-state 
corresponds to regimes of climate justice, and petro-capitalism corresponds to the economics 
of a just transition. Between each exists a terrain of struggle primarily defined by one of the 
three relations of power. These terrains are fought over either through the war of maneuver, 
the war of economies, or the war of position. Relations of coercion primarily define the 
terrain between the petro-state and the regimes of climate justice so here a war of maneuver 
is necessary; the relation of consent defines the terrain between petro-culture and the PCOC, 
necessitating a war of position; and the relation of compliance defines the terrain existing 
between petro-capitalism and the economics of a just transition, upon which the war of 
economies is advanced. While heuristically helpful to think of them as separated from one 
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another, these terrains of struggle are not actually isolated but exist in a highly dynamic and 
interwoven relationship with each other. Each terrain and corresponding relation of power 
have their own distinct characteristics and are irreducible to one another. Yet they are also all 
deeply entwined and porous such that tactical victories and defeats in the war of position will 
inevitably affect the strategy and tactics being advanced through the wars of economies and 
maneuver as well. 
 
On each terrain of struggle there exist many different points of intervention. It is at these 
points of intervention that specific tactical interventions are deployed. For example, the 
British Museum accepting sponsorship from the oil company BP and in return posting BP’s 
logo all over its exhibitions could be a point of intervention in petro-culture on the terrain 
defined by consent. The industry sponsors exhibitions to gain public acceptance and 
ultimately consent, and if climate justice activists want to challenge the industry’s cultural 
acceptance, they can mount a discursive and cultural intervention, publicly demanding that 
the British Museum drop BP’s sponsorship (as, indeed, they have). Because hegemony is 
inherently pervasive but never complete, a vast array of social spaces can be considered sites 
in which counter hegemonic struggle can take place. Defining hegemony as constituted by 
these three relations of power allows activists and academics alike to expand our notion of 
what might be considered a point of intervention, thereby multiplying the number of points 
of intervention upon which struggle can take place. This requires us to organize and innovate 
with a vast diversity of tactics and a multiplicity of strategies. Activists and campaigns can 
map out points of intervention across all these terrains of struggle to make strategic decisions 
about which tactics to deploy to engage with a specific relation of power. Different points of 
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intervention may be more or less significant, depending on local geographic, political, socio-
economic and historical conjunctures as well as on the target’s position within the oil 
assemblage. By mapping them out, however, campaigners can make strategic decisions about 
which points are most significant, how to tailor tactics to points of intervention on a specific 
terrain of struggle, and indeed, what victory or success on that terrain might mean and how it 
could be achieved.  
 
Theoretical Limitations 
 
Does hegemony work in colonial contexts? Can it be used to advance decolonization?  
 
Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony in a specific geographic and historical 
conjuncture. Specifically, he was describing political shifts in the European early modern 
period (roughly the 17th to early 20th century), and responding to the 1930s crisis in global 
capitalism, the failure of the Communists and worker’s movement to take advantage of it, 
and the rise of Italian fascism (Ekers and Loftus 2013). Yet the 21st Century struggles on the 
frontlines of Blockadia are more often than not defined by enduring dynamics of colonialism 
and dispossession and Indigenous movements to resist them (Powys Whyte 2016). 
Ostensibly this conjuncture appears somewhat detached from the context in which Gramsci 
was writing. How then, might we understand hegemony in the context of climate justice 
struggles led by Indigenous peoples involving movements for decolonization and Indigenous 
sovereignty?   
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In Dominance Without Hegemony, subaltern scholar, Ranajit Guha, famously rejected 
attempts to understand British Colonial India and anti-colonial resistance in terms of 
hegemony (1997). As he argued, contrary to the development of liberal bourgeois rule in 
Europe, the British colonialists made no attempt to assimilate or change Indian civil society 
or universalize a ruling culture through which consent to their leadership could be 
reproduced. Guha suggests the British had no need to gain the consent of colonial subjects 
and instead they ruled with violence and coercion alone. Guha argues that unlike the 
development of the liberal bourgeois state in Europe which relied on consent, the colonial 
state is not hegemonic because its rule relies upon violence rather than persuasion (ibid). 
Colonialism is inherently violent so we should question what role, if any, may exist for 
consent-building projects in colonial contexts. Yet discourses and the apparatuses of civil 
society may not only maintain and extend colonialism but also justify its ideologies and its 
violence (Lezra 2014). Moreover, Guha’s articulation of hegemony describes it as purely a 
relation of consent rather than a balancing of power relations, including violence. In adopting 
hegemony simply as a relation of consent, Guha also ignores how coercion was necessary to 
secure even the metropolitan Bourgeoisie’s rule in 18th century Europe (Chibber 2013; Ali 
2015; Crane 2013). Hegemony is required in both contexts while different proportions of 
consent and coercive strategies will likely be deployed in each. Violence under the colonial 
state is a more normal situation than under the liberal bourgeois state, but even that violence 
requires legitimacy and discursive structuring. If we understand hegemony as the balancing 
of consent and coercion (and compliance), then Guha’s suggestion that hegemony does not 
exist in colonial contexts should be challenged.37 
 
37 Guha’s broader argument that it is violence that primarily defines colonial power relations remains a robust 
one. 
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Frantz Fanon is well known for articulating the extent to which violence is the colonizer’s 
preferred tool of social control. Yet in Black Skins, White Masks, Fanon describes how 
colonial subjects psychologically internalized their position as seen through the eyes of the 
colonizer and not only consent to, but also carry out, their own subordination (1986). The 
development of this colonial consciousness could and should be considered a hegemonizing 
project that is deployed through the synthesizing of relations of consent and coercion. This 
has implications for counter hegemonic anti-colonial struggle. Indeed, reading Frantz Fanon 
and Gramsci together, Noaman Ali argues that anti-colonial, subaltern groups must break 
colonial consciousness through waging a war of position and gaining leadership even as they 
seek to take state power from the colonizers through a war of maneuver (2015). Contrary to 
Guha’s assertion, Ali argues that hegemonic and counter hegemonic politics can be 
understood in anti-colonial struggle. Colonialism can be exerted hegemonically and 
challenged with counter hegemonic strategies. Meanwhile, colonialism can be hegemonic 
and can also be a context that shapes other hegemonic relations. For example, petro-
hegemony exists within, thrives upon, shapes and is shaped by, a broader system of colonial 
dispossession in the United States and Canada. Thus, decolonization in Blockadia is not a 
metaphor but a material and a discursive process that also undermines petro-hegemony. It 
may also be advanced through the counter hegemonic wars of position, maneuver and 
economies against petro-hegemony. 
 
The question of synthesizing consent coercion and compliance is further complicated in 
contemporary settler-colonial dynamics, for example in the United States and Canada. 
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Gramscian conceptions of consent must be deployed carefully when addressing Indigenous 
and Indigenous-led struggles because the term should not be conflated with the assertion of 
Indigenous sovereignty, resurgence, and the demand that Free Prior and Informed Consent 
(FPIC) be sought from Indigenous peoples in questions concerning their territory, land, 
culture, and life ways. Consent here is understood more in terms of legal rights or 
jurisdictional mandates than the colonized subject’s willing acceptance of an authority’s rule. 
Petro-hegemony often operates through existing relations of colonialism that facilitate the 
extraction of fossil fuel resources on Indigenous territories, particularly when Indigenous 
peoples living on that land do not provide their consent to extraction. The court system and 
recourse to legal rights, however, can be used against colonizers as Indigenous peoples assert 
their rights and title or sovereignty.  For example, Indigenous peoples right’ to FPIC, 
recognized in the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP), is invoked to coercively force extractive industries off of Indigenous peoples 
land or to seek restitution where those rights have been violated.38 Contrarily, consent in 
these terms has more to do with a war of maneuver and engagement with the state than it 
does with a war of position.  
 
Revisiting many of Fanon’s insights in Red Skins White Masks, Glen Coulthard challenges 
Indigenous activists and scholars and allies to reject the “politics of recognition,” or the legal, 
state-legitimized avenues through which Indigenous peoples may assert rights and 
recognition, as reinforcing settler-colonial oppression. He suggests that by accepting settler-
 
38 The Canadian Parliament voted in favor a bill to align Canadian law with UNDRIP in 2018 but it died in the 
senate in June 2019 (Brake 2019). British Columbia became the first province to align provincial laws with 
UNDRIP in November 2019 (Little 2019). 
 136 
colonial legal structures as strategic terrains to advance their interests Indigenous peoples 
continue to participate in their own domination and that a more revolutionary strategy would 
start with the returning to and developing their own systems of governance. Indigenous 
activist and 350.org campaigner, Clayton Thomas Müller on the other hand, argues that a 
rights-based intervention is one of the most successful strategies Indigenous peoples can 
deploy, at least in Canada, to force fossil fuel companies off their land (2014). Petro-
hegemony can be vulnerable to legal action even as strategies are deployed through the petro-
state to structure the legal and regulatory system in the industry’s favor. As such a war of 
maneuver to curtail and shift coercive power will necessarily involve action through the 
courts and the state. Meanwhile Coulthard’s case remains a compelling one providing a 
sobering example of why Indigenous-led struggles in Blockadia can never truly be won 
through the courts alone.39 The conflict over strategies and how they might reproduce 
hegemonic relations, even as activists seek to overturn those relations, is a theme that recurs 
throughout this dissertation. 
 
Hegemony’s Universalizing and Authoritarian Tendencies  
 
Some anarchist theorists and activists like David Graber (2004) and Richard Day (2005) have 
argued against engaging with the politics of counter hegemony. They suggest that hegemony, 
regardless of its political composition, is an inherently coercive and hierarchical 
configuration of power. They critique what they regard as its tendency towards universalism 
 
39 Of course, decolonization and indigenization go far beyond fights against the fossil fuel industry, but when 
these fights are led by Indigenous peoples as they assert their governance over their land they can and are 
advancing the cause of decolonization. 
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over plurality. Graeber suggests counter hegemony reproduces top-down hierarchical politics 
that erases differences between us for the sake of “unity” and so can only replicate 
authoritarian power dynamics (2005; 2009).  In Gramsci is Dead (2005), Day identifies in 
contemporary social movement theories of change a mode of thought that he calls “the 
hegemony of hegemony.” Accordingly, counter hegemonic forces challenging the hegemonic 
order, even those with intentions of replacing the established “hegemony from above” with 
an alternative “hegemony from below,” unconsciously resubmit themselves to the logic of 
domination and authority (2005, 8). As Day puts it, the hegemony of hegemony takes as 
given “the assumption that effective social change can only be achieved simultaneously and 
en masse, across an entire national or supranational space” (ibid). Day studies elements of 
contemporary radical social movements that operate “non-hegemonically rather than counter 
hegemonically” (ibid). He looks at the social movements of the early 21st Century which 
have operated without hierarchy and prefigure the politics they want to achieve. These 
movements refuse engagement with the state and explicitly reject the logic of hegemony. 
They condemn it as a universalizing, totalitarian power structure that refuses particularity, 
difference, and thus emancipation for all. Thinking “outside the logic of integration,” Day 
argues these movements call for the proliferation of autonomous “minoritarian” spaces, 
embracing plurality and multiplicity over hegemony (2005, 206). 
Jonathan Smucker’s Hegemony How-To is a vehement critique of this political outlook and 
one I am particularly drawn to. While he shares some sympathy with anarchism and was a 
prominent organizer with Occupy Wall Street, Smucker critiques prefigurative politics40 as 
 
40 According to John Holloway prefigurative politics is “the idea that the struggle for a different society must 
create that society through its forms of struggle” (2010, 45). Inspired by the rise of prefigurative politics in 
global anti-capitalist movements, Holloway writes that prefigurative politics is where “instead of focusing our 
attention on the destruction of capitalism, we concentrate on building something else” (2010, 50). Smucker 
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politics without strategy. He argues that the anarchist tendency towards minoritarian spaces 
excludes potentially revolutionary agents from political activity because they are expected to 
know the codes, idioms and symbols of the in-group or be cast as unwelcome outsiders. 
Moreover, he argues, non-hierarchical organizing is fundamentally disorganized, incapable 
of articulating political demands, creates unaccountable leadership structures and is often 
undemocratic. 41 
 
Occupy activist, Micah White, concurs. Reflecting on Occupy’s prefigurative politics he 
argues that the movement was a strategic failure because it could offer no coherent demands, 
the decision making processes became incredibly inefficient and, as a result, the movement 
could never “move toward legitimate sovereignty, political negotiation, and a transfer of 
power” (2016, 38). For Smucker, disengaging with the structures of the state doesn’t make 
coercive power go away, it just cedes a terrain of struggle to the adversary. Additionally, the 
argument that effective social change is most easily achievable through mass movement 
building is hardly an unfounded assumption amongst social movements but is empirically 
observable in episodes of radical social change throughout history. Giving up on consent 
building projects makes it much harder to build resistance to neoliberal capitalism on 
anything like the scale necessary for its undoing.  
I will return to these particular arguments in Chapter Eight. 
 
argues that there is a place for prefigurative politics in social movements but it cannot be allowed to replace 
strategic politics. The distinction between prefigurative and strategic politics is one first articulated in Wini 
Breins’ Community Organizing in the New Left (1982).  
41  See also Jo Freeman’s Tyranny of Structurlessness essay for an excellent critique of the ways horizontalist 
social movement spaces make invisible, and so reproduce, existing power dynamics internal to the group, 
especially patriarchy, classism and racism, rather than dismantle them (1970). 
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Conclusion  
 
The arguments made in this chapter, combined with the empirical observations throughout 
my case study research, raise three critical concerns facing the climate justice movement; 
namely, the politics of alliance building, the actual process of embracing a diversity of 
strategy and tactics, and the contradictions inherent to addressing the problem of scale. In this 
chapter I’ve argued that the conflicts occurring in Blockadia should be understood in 
hegemonic terms. I’ve argued for a rereading of hegemony in which the term serves us with 
an analysis of three relations of power, rather than simply privileging consent. Strategic 
engagement in relations of consent, compliance, and coercion is necessary if counter 
hegemonic climate justice activism is to keep fossil fuels in the ground and advance a just 
transition. The concept petro-hegemony is intended to draw our attention to the ways that the 
fossil fuel industry’s interests are advanced and maintained through shaping and intervening 
in these power relations. Carbon rebellion, meanwhile, helps us consider how climate justice 
activists could organize and develop strategies to make interventions in the power relations 
upon which the industry depends. Together, these concepts build a framework which focuses 
our attention on the terrains of struggle and points of intervention activists and industry 
agents alike must engage with to advance their respective hegemonic aspirations. The radical 
synthesizing of power relations under hegemony makes visible the strengths and weaknesses 
of both the industry and its challengers. It also allows us to think differently about questions 
that social movement theorists and activists have asked for as long as there have been social 
movements. Finally, this chapter’s intervention and contributions in the theory and practice 
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of hegemonic politics compels us to critically consider the fundamental questions of scale, 
alliances, and strategies.  
 
The construction of a PCOC able to align different social struggles around consent to a new 
hegemony from below, while forcing a crisis of legitimacy on the fossil fuel industry, obliges 
us to tackle the question of alliance-building and winning consent directly. How do we build 
a social movement that is radically inclusive of a plurality of worldviews, theories of change, 
and peoples while simultaneously focused on breaking the fossil fuel industry legitimacy, 
removing its consent and forging consent around alternatives instead? I am hardly the first to 
engage with this question and I certainly won’t be the last. However, the petro-
hegemony/carbon rebellion framework may shine new light upon it. If we are able to 
synthesize activists’ insights on alliance building with Gramscian theories of populism, 
alongside intersectionality theory’s critiques of populism, we may be on the path towards 
developing alliances based upon a seemingly paradoxical hybrid of universalism and 
particularism (Grossman 2017). I call this intersectional populism (LeQuesne 2019). 
Drawing upon case study research and movement theory Chapter Five of this dissertation 
explores the extent to which campaigns in Blockadia are already developing intersectional 
populist interventions. 
 
Closely tied to the question of alliance building, is that of the range of strategies and tactics 
our movement is willing and able to deploy.  Because we must engage with all three terrains 
of struggle defined by the three relations of hegemonic power, I argue for a multiplicity of 
strategy and a vast diversity of tactics. Discussion of a diversity of tactics must mean a 
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willingness to use every tool available in the right combination, in the right place, and at the 
right time. However, some activists in Blockadia remain skeptical of one another’s’ strategic 
orientations and tactical decisions. Some may be too willing to work within state institutions, 
others may be fundamentally opposed to electoral politics. Some may define violence as 
property damage and property damage as a necessary strategic decision, while still others 
may decry all forms of violence as counterproductive. This skepticism is often constructive 
because it may force critical self-examination and assessment amongst activists. 
Nevertheless, it can also divide movements into hopelessly small cliques that are unwillingly 
to work with one another. Accusations of reformism, dogmatism, conformism and purism 
create schisms in our movement and dissolve solidarity between us. Far too often these 
divisions can be exploited and the foundations of the movement begin to crumble. Embracing 
a diversity of tactics means developing within the movement an orientation towards strategy 
that can be inclusive of many different tactical and strategic approaches. This also requires 
movement leaders to commit to managing and coordinating these strategies together while 
also creating space for constructive critique. To this end I develop a concept called the 
spectrum of strategy in Chapter Seven. 
 
As we confront the industry and find ourselves surrounded by, even complicit in, the oil 
assemblage, we must critically examine the appropriate scales at which counter hegemony 
can take place. There are different types of scale that need to be addressed here. As 
theorizing of petro-cultures, petro-state, and petro-capitalism all demonstrate, petro-
hegemony infiltrates everything from our epistemologies to our museums, our governments 
to law enforcement agencies, our toothbrushes to our livelihoods. We must ask, therefore, 
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whether the movement has the capacity and resources to wage wars of position, economies, 
and maneuver not just simultaneously but at these multiple scales. Moreover, we must also 
confront cases where petro-hegemony may have been defeated at one scale but remains intact 
at another. This leads us to ask how counter hegemonic intervention may be successful at one 
scale but not another. In other words, how might activists exploit victory on one scale to gain 
victories on another? In addition, scale should be considered in terms of the size of the 
movement itself, particularly through problematizing whether the size of the movement is 
inherently linked to the likelihood of its ultimate victory. Questioning the modes by which 
local climate justice campaigns might scale up and out of Blockadia forces us to examine the 
extent to which they can do so while remaining democratic and accountable to the local 
frontlines from which this movement is forged.  
 
Finally, questions of scale also lead to consideration of how activism in Blockadia might be 
cultivating critiques of the broader matrix of domination in which petro-hegemony operates. 
In other words, we should ask how fighting the fossil fuel industry might lay the groundwork 
for more revolutionary impetuses in the name of climate justice. This means exploring the 
ways that critiques of the fossil fuel industry may be mobilized into revolutionary action 
towards the kind of fundamental socioenvironmental transformation climate justice deems 
necessary. These are complicated questions with open-ended answers but, as Chapter Eight 
illustrates, mapping the terrains of struggle and points of intervention between petro-
hegemony and the carbon rebellion allows us to imaginatively engage with all of them.  
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To summarize, then, if we are to keep fossil fuels in the ground and advance a just transition 
in response to the climate crisis, then we must accept that we are engaged in a counter 
hegemonic struggle.  Doing so in the terms I have argued for in this chapter means 
understanding how hegemony synthesizes and balances relations of consent, compliance, and 
coercion.  Petro-hegemony intervenes in these relations with strategies operating through 
three distinct but interlocking mediators: the petro-state, petro-culture, and petro-capitalism. 
Meanwhile, the climate justice movement can, and is, organizing counter hegemonic 
responses through what I’ve called the carbon rebellion. These strategies require 
coordination. The carbon rebellion organizes counter hegemonic strategies and tactics 
through its own three corresponding mediators: regimes of climate justice, a PCOC for 
climate justice, and the economics of a just transition. Positioning petro-hegemony and the 
carbon rebellion as antagonistic forces highlights the terrains of struggle and points of 
intervention which animate this theoretical framework. The task of the climate justice 
movement in its assault on the fossil fuel industry is to win struggles over these points of 
intervention to shift relations of consent, coercion and compliance in its favor. As these 
interventions are developed, we are forced to grapple with questions that have, and will 
continue to, challenge social movements for generations. These are the questions to which 
Parts Three and Four of this dissertation are dedicated. 
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PART 2: CASE STUDIES 
 
 
Chapter 3 – The Climate Justice Movement in Burnaby, Coast Salish Territory, British 
Columbia, Canada 
 
Prelude 
 
I first learned of the climate justice movement’s resistance to the Kinder Morgan Trans 
Mountain pipeline expansion project (TMX) in late 2014. The confrontation with the pipeline 
company has been geographically focused in Coast Salish Territory, and specifically in 
Burnaby – a formerly industrial city of roughly 232,000 people, adjacent to the city of 
Vancouver, in the greater region of metropolitan Vancouver, in what is now called British 
Columbia. Coast Salish Territory is the traditional homeland of numerous culturally 
connected but distinct First Nations that have lived there for thousands of years. The territory 
encompasses the coastal Puget Sound and Georgia Basin of Northwest Washington in the 
United States and Southwest British Columbia in Canada. In the fall of 2014, images and 
videos from the Battle of Burnaby Mountain, as it was later dubbed, started showing up on 
my Facebook news stream with increasing frequency and, as the confrontation intensified, 
increasing poignancy. At the time I knew next to nothing about the region, nor its history of 
social struggle, nor the emergence of a well-organized urban contingent of the climate justice 
movement. Yet, as the Battle of Burnaby Mountain intensified between September and late 
November, I learned a great deal about the region’s legacy of colonial dispossession, it’s 
strategic importance in the growing network of tar sands transport infrastructure, and the 
efforts of climate justice activists and First Nations campaigners to shut this infrastructure 
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down. This particularly dramatic episode in the conflict with Kinder Morgan’s Trans 
Mountain pipeline started with lawsuits and counter lawsuits and culminated in mass arrests, 
numerous incidents of police violence and intimidation, and the deployment of the infamous 
$5.6 million SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) lawsuits that the 
company filed against prominent community members and campaigners opposed to the 
project.  
 
Officially proposing the project in 2013, Kinder Morgan sought permits from Canada’s 
National Energy Board (NEB)42 to twin its existing pipeline with a newer, larger one, along 
(what they suggested) was the same route as the original. The $7.4 billion pipeline stretches 
from Edmonton in Alberta to the company’s storage tank farm and marine terminal on 
Burnaby Mountain and the Burrard Inlet in Coast Salish Territory. After approval, 
construction was scheduled to begin in early 2017, with the pipeline coming online in 2019. 
The new pipeline would triple export capacity of diluted bitumen from the Alberta tars sands 
to the Pacific Coast and involve a seven-fold increase oil tanker traffic from the coast 
through the Burrard Inlet. It would also require the company to bore a tunnel beneath 
Burnaby Mountain and includes plans to expand the tank farm storage facility in a residential 
neighborhood on the Mountain. A the time, the Trans Mountain pipeline was “the company's 
most important project on the continent” according to the Kinder Morgan’s chief executive in 
2014 (Prystupa 2014). By 2018, however, the company had abandoned the project, selling it 
to the federal Canadian government for $4.5 billion Canadian dollars.  
 
42 The National Energy Board was renamed the Canadian Energy Regulator after the passage of Bill C69 in 
June 2019. Most activists still refer to it as the NEB and it plays an important role throughout this case study. It 
is responsible for regulating federal energy projects, especially pipelines, and particularly those that cross 
provincial borders.  
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As the size and implications of the pipeline became clear, groups of First Nations, grassroots 
activists, community organizations, and Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations 
(ENGOs) began coalescing along the pipeline route to challenge the proposal. While the 
project worked its way through the permitting process and public hearings at the NEB (the 
NEB is a federal agency responsible for regulating and permitting energy infrastructure 
projects like pipelines), Kinder Morgan began cutting down trees near its tank farm and 
drilling boreholes to test the geology of the Mountain in the late summer and early fall of 
2014. This sparked outrage amongst the growing opposition to the pipeline, particularly in 
Burnaby where 68% of residents opposed the project and the mayor argued the company had 
no right to begin construction work (Brugge and Embree 2018; Moreau 2014). While the city 
council appealed to the NEB and pursued legal action against the company, activists who had 
little reason to believe either of these would do much to stop Kinder Morgan, instead 
converged on the Mountain and set up a protest camp. From here, small groups of protestors 
frustrated company worker’s attempts to cut down more trees and continue with their 
geological survey. These tactics forced workers to halt their activities and slowed down 
Kinder Morgan’s progress throughout November 2014. 
 
Ultimately, these disruptions lead Kinder Morgan to seek a court injunction against any 
protest occurring on or in close proximity to worksites. As the National Observer43 reported, 
“the company claimed the protesters' snarls and intimidation tactics represented a form of 
 
43 The National Observer is a well-respected online newspaper that has published over 240 articles on the 
ongoing struggle against the Trans Mountain Pipeline and is highly regarded amongst many of the people on 
Burnaby’s frontlines. 
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“assault”” and used this as evidence in court to argue for the injunction (Prystupa 2014). A 
viral social media campaign ridiculed this characterization of protestors with pipeline 
opponents sharing pictures of their best snarls under the hashtag #KMface (Hornick 2015). 
Nevertheless, the courts granted Kinder Morgan the injunction on November 17th. 
Immediately afterwards, up to 800 people rallied on the Mountain in defiance of the court 
order and many joined the protest camp (Prystupa 2014). For two days neither the police nor 
the company tried to enforce the injunction. Then, on the third day, beginning with an early 
morning police raid on the camp, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) began 
arresting all those violating the court order and intimidating those who refused to leave 
(Hornick 2015).  This did not stop people from attending the protests or crossing the 
injunction zone. Kinder Morgan then filed a $5.6 million lawsuit claiming damages against 
five of its most vocal opponents, including Simon Fraser University professors Stephen 
Collis and Lynne Quarmby.44 Yet, the perception of the company’s outrageous misuse of 
legal action to stifle dissent only emboldened their opposition further.  
 
Over the next week, up to 100 people, including Indigenous leaders, grassroots activists, 
local residents, university professors, families, and community members from the very young 
to very old, were arrested in acts of civil disobedience. The actions culminated with Grand 
Chief Stewart Philip of the Union of British Columbian Indian Chiefs crossing the injunction 
zone and being arrested on November 27th. On the day of his arrest, however, the court 
dropped all 100 charges against the protestors, on the grounds that Kinder Morgan had 
provided judges with the wrong geographic data delineating the boundaries of their desired 
 
44 Simon Fraser University sits atop Burnaby Mountain and, according to Burnaby’s fire chief, a fire at the tank 
farm could pose serious risks to its students and staff while cutting off the university’s only evacuation route. 
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injunction zone. The injunction was overturned, and the SLAPP suits later dropped. The 
company, no longer able to prevent protestors from interrupting its activities, gave up work 
on the Mountain stating it had got all the preliminary survey results it needed. The groups 
coalescing in opposition to the project declared a small victory and set their sights upon 
organizing their communities in preparation for the company’s return. 
 
After that, events seemed to go quiet and, at least from a social media perspective, the 
confrontation disappeared into a protracted regulatory permitting process.  For two years I 
heard very little about the case. My academic and activist attentions turned back to the fossil 
fuel divestment movement at my university, to assessing the impacts of the upswelling of 
climate action following the People’s Climate March of September 2014, to the victories 
being won by the Richmond Progressive Alliance and the city’s community of climate justice 
activists, to the impending defeat of the Keystone XL pipeline, and to the upcoming Paris 
Climate Talks in late 2015. Then, during the uprising at Standing Rock in 2016, I began 
learning more about the many other Indigenous-led resistances to pipeline projects across the 
continent and, inspired by the incredible mobilization  Standing Rock’s Water Protectors had 
unleashed, I turned my attention specifically to resistance on the frontlines of the fossil fuel 
economy.  
 
In December 2016, I travelled to the Unist’ot’en territory of the Wet’suwet’en Nation in 
Northern British Columbia to learn more about clan members’ recent victory over the 
Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline.  There, members of the Unist’ot’en clan have built a 
blockade preventing access to their lands to all visitors without the blockaders first granting 
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their free, prior, and informed consent. Enbridge’s pipeline was proposed to transport tar 
sands oil from Alberta, through unceded Unist’ot’en territory, to an export hub in Kitimat on 
the Northwest coast of the province. The Unist’ot’en blockade, now more of a well-
established cluster of houses and a healing center than what we would conventionally think 
of as blockade, is built on the path of four proposed oil and gas pipeline routes that would cut 
deep into their lands. These do not have the consent of the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs. 
It was while I was at the Unist’ot’en blockade that activists informed me about the state of 
struggle unfolding around the Trans Mountain pipeline to the south in Coast Salish Territory 
where the conflict appeared to be heating up again. 
 
I learned that in November 2016, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau had cancelled the 
Northern Gateway pipeline, following a powerful campaign involving a province-wide 
solidarity network, a strong coalition of grassroots activists, ENGOs, and First Nations 
campaigners, the Unist’ot’en blockade, and an ultimately successful First Nations led lawsuit 
in the Canadian Supreme Court. 45  While cancelling the Northern Gateway pipeline, 
however, the Prime Minister also approved two other tar sands pipelines: Enbridge’s Line 3 
Pipeline and Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain Expansion pipeline.  Disregarding years of 
community and First Nations’ opposition throughout all the regulatory hearings, the NEB 
had approved permits for the Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion’s construction earlier in 
2016. The Trudeau government followed the NEB’s recommendation and gave Kinder 
Morgan federal approval. However, in the interlude between the Battle of Burnaby Mountain 
and the federal government’s approval, communities along the path of the pipeline, and 
 
45 The court found that consultation with First Nations and the Environmental Impact Assessment had been 
inadequate. 
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especially in Burnaby, were organizing themselves to fight the company’s construction plans. 
Meanwhile, ENGOs, municipalities and First Nations launched a lawsuit appealing the 
government’s decision to approve pipeline permits. All of this set the stage for the intensity 
of the struggle I would come to observe and participate in as it developed in Burnaby in the 
spring and summer of 2018. 
 
Introduction 
 
The fight against the Trans Mountain pipeline is, as Bill McKibben described it at a gathering 
I attended in Vancouver, “one of the three or four most important struggles to keep fossil 
fuels in the world right now.” The Alberta tar sands are home to the world’s third largest oil 
reserves and the extraction and processing of tar sands oil is one of the most carbon and 
pollution intensive in the global oil economy (Adkin 2016). Canadian climate justice activists 
have developed a strategy to prevent the expansion of the world’s third largest reserves by 
besieging the tar sands region, ensuring its oil remains landlocked, blockading its access to 
international markets, and starving the tar sands industry of capital and resources  (Hoberg 
2018; Haluza DeLay and Carter 2016). This has entailed blocking the construction of any 
new pipelines that could facilitate the expansion of the tar sands. As of writing, not a single 
one of the five major pipeline projects permitted since 2012 has been built46 and, according 
 
46 Of the five interprovincial tar sands pipelines approved since 2012 (Keystone XL, Energy East, Trans 
Mountain Expansion, Northern Gateway and Line 3) not one has yet been built (Hoberg 2018). Trans Canada 
abandoned its Energy East pipeline project after it met firm resistance in Quebec in 2017. Northern Gateway’s 
permits were overturned in court and later rejected by Trudeau. Keystone XL’s permits were rejected by 
President Obama in 2015 only to be resuscitated by President Trump in 2017. It remains in a regulatory limbo. 
Line 3 stagnates and still has a number of regulatory hurdles to overcome as well as grassroots opposition to 
contend with. Trans Mountain has been kept on life support since the Canadian government bought it but is 
threatened by legal challenges and its future remains uncertain. 
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to conservative commentators, like former Canadian Finance Minister Joe Oliver, the tar 
sands industry itself now appears to be in dire peril (Oliver 2019). The climate justice 
movement’s basic strategy seems to be taking a significant toll. This case study’s exploration 
of the battle against the Trans Mountain pipeline is, therefore, an exceedingly valuable 
conjuncture through which to identify and analyze the relations of power and interventions 
on the terrains of struggle existing between petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion.  
 
The following chapter situates my research in the particular conjuncture of struggle in 
Burnaby and narrativizes my own perspective on the timeline of struggle that unfolded over a 
seven-year period. It introduces some of the major dynamics, relationships, and actors that 
will appear throughout the dissertation and offers examples of petro-hegemony functioning 
in practice and the different terrains of struggle upon which it operates. Finally, it draws 
attention to the specific questions being asked on the frontlines, and reflects on how all of 
this shapes and is shaped by the specificities of the context in which they are taking place.  
Illustrating the operations of petro-hegemony is the theoretical emphasis of this chapter, 
while the emergence of the carbon rebellion framework occupies the rest of the dissertation. 
As such I leave it to the following chapters to theorize carbon rebellion in the conjunctures of 
my case studies and allow this chapter to focus on petro-hegemony.  
 
As I suggested in the introduction to this dissertation, neither this case study nor the next 
seek to prove the existence of either petro-hegemony or the carbon rebellion. Rather I hope to 
illustrate the value of imposing this theoretical framework upon conjunctures of social 
struggle and demonstrate how doing so might lead us to, and through, questions of social 
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movement praxis, strategy, and radical social change. My methodological orientation 
throughout my field work has always been to understand myself and my interlocuters as 
situated in, and responsive to, our specific and respective subjectivities. Different people will 
tell different stories from different perspectives with different omissions, emphases, actors, 
and agendas. I do not pretend for a moment that the way I develop the story of what 
happened, and is happening, on this frontline is necessarily the right story or the only story. It 
is, however, an account that I believe is as honest, reflexive, and critical as I am able to 
produce. What follows, then, is a situated and partial perspective amongst many other 
situated and partial perspectives. It is one, however, that I hope can shine a unique and 
valuable, light upon power, strategy, alignment, and conjuncture, as I analyze them 
throughout these pages.  
 
Situating the Site of Struggle in its Conjuncture 
 
Of course, as we study conjunctures, we must remember there is no real beginning nor end to 
a case study and so the delineations of time in which the events I’m about to recount are 
circumscribed are almost entirely artificial. From the perspective of decolonial struggle, 
moreover, we might view this particular conflict as just one more battle in a long line of 
battles since colonizers settled the region, murdered, enclosed, and dispossessed its original 
inhabitants, and sought to erase their culture, governments, and identity. Coast Salish 
Territory has been continuously inhabited for at least 8000 years and, despite settlers’ best 
efforts over the last century and half, the identity and culture of First Nations is indelible as it 
continues to inscribe the landscape, the politics, and the identity of the region. Moreover, the 
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recent resurgence in First Nations’ assertions of cultural, economic and political self-
determination through decolonial struggle, particularly since the Idle No More movement in 
2013, has seen First Nations and Indigenous agency reshape Canadian political discourse (if 
not praxis). This resurgence is testimony to the resilience and ethic of resistance cultivated 
amongst many First Nations leaders and families across the country and which is particularly 
prominent in British Columbia.  The Nations upon whose specific unceded territories this 
study took place are the Tsleil-Waututh Nation, the Musqueam Nation and Squamish Nation. 
For thousands of years they have maintained a profound, economic, cultural and spiritual 
relationship with, and responsibility to, this land, to the coast, and to the flora and fauna that 
inhabit them.  It is the members of these Nations, along with members of the Coldwater 
Indian Band, Kwantlen First Nation, and many members of the bands of the Secwepemc 
Nation in the province’s interior, that have led the resistance to the pipeline.   
 
The official colonization of British Columbia’s lower mainland began with the installation of 
military fortifications near what became the city of Victoria, on what is now called 
Vancouver Island, in 1843. Prior to contact with colonizers in 1773, First Nations traded up 
and down the coast sharing a rich and diverse cultural and political heritage across Coast 
Salish Territory and further afield. The Burrard Inlet, around which the Tsleil-Waututh, 
Squamish, and Musqueam Nations made their homes for millennia, is of particular economic 
and cultural significance. The Tsleil-Waututh Nation, or “the people of the inlet” for 
example, take their name and their origin stories from this body of water. These lands, like 
much of British Columbia, were never ceded to the British Empire or to the Canadian 
government through treaties or war. While all land settled upon by colonizers is stolen land, 
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the fact that this region is unceded is of particular importance with regards to the legal and 
jurisdictional rulings that inflect this case study. 47 Nevertheless, colonial encroachment 
proceeded in the following centuries, dispossessing First Nations of their land and carving it 
up to sell off to settlers, industrialists and agriculturalists. From this vantage point, then, the 
infiltration of the Trans Mountain pipeline into unceded First Nations territory without their 
consent can be understood as another instance of settler colonial dispossession and resistance 
to it. 
 
Shortly after, and in some cases while, the region was settled by Europeans, migrants from 
India, South Asia, and China developed the cities of Vancouver and Burnaby, establishing a 
complicated, sometimes fraught, sometimes highly cosmopolitan, milieu of diverse cultures, 
ethnicities, ontologies, ethics, and identities. The population of the greater metropolitan 
Vancouver region, which includes the Vancouver, Burnaby, and three adjacent cities now 
numbers nearly 2.5 million people. 
 
In situating ourselves, the question is not just when to start, but where to start. I hardly need 
to spend precious pages here with an account of Canadian history, political economy, or 
political culture, revisionist or otherwise. However, we cannot pretend that Burnaby and the 
broader metropolitan Vancouver region are abstracted from these either. As a hub of 
migration, a financial and industrial center, and a focal point of culture, tourism, and natural 
 
47 A landmark legal case, Delgamuukw v The Queen, at Canada’s Supreme Court ruled that aboriginal title, and 
legal rights to the occupying their land, is not extinguished on territories that have never been ceded to the 
Canadian government or the British Empire. As Gallagher argues, the ruling “foretold the legal grounds by 
which natives [sic] would win time and time again throughout the next decade in the Canadian resources 
sector…” (2012, 37). It is on the legal basis set out by this ruling that opponents of Kinder Morgan won their 
own case at the Federal Court of Appeals in 2018. 
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beauty, this is a region that is deeply entwined with ongoing dynamics shaping Canada’s 
identity, politics and national economy. Vancouver is also a hub for the headquarters and 
major offices of some of Canada’s most lucrative forestry, mining, and resource extraction 
firms. Meanwhile, the industrialized urban centers of this region are strategically positioned 
in commodity chains that specialize in extracting raw material from the country’s interior, as 
cheaply as possible, and exporting these to be refined, developed, and processed as value-
added products abroad (much to the chagrin of many labor unions who would rather increase 
local jobs from adding value to Canada’s raw materials domestically). In close proximity to 
industrial ports, the city of Burnaby developed as an export terminus for raw products, 
traditionally coal and lumber, but now oil and gas as well, and is the former site of five oil 
refineries. As these refineries closed down and processing raw products moved to countries 
with lower labor and environmental costs, Burnaby’s economic drivers have shifted and the 
city now has little direct dependence on oil jobs and revenue. Nevertheless, home to several 
oil and gas companies’ export terminal and storage facilities, the city retains an important 
strategic position within the Canadian, and indeed global, oil assemblage. 
 
Both the cities of Vancouver and Burnaby are experiencing an affordable housing crisis and 
low-income communities are experiencing further marginalization from the racialized 
consequences of gentrification. Vancouver’s community of homeless people, a large 
proportion of whom are Indigenous, is the largest in Canada. Successive city administrations 
have not been able to halt the rising costs of housing, nor stem the rising numbers of 
homeless people who have been forced out of their homes in the city or are otherwise drawn 
to the region for its welfare programs and more temperate climate. Affordable housing was 
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voter’s number one priority in the both Burnaby and Vancouver’s municipal elections in 
2018 (Fumano and Culbert 2018). Candidates for city council and mayor all sought to out 
compete one another with their affordable housing plans. Kennedy Stewart, formerly a 
Member of Parliament, and who was arrested protesting the pipeline, was elected mayor of 
Vancouver running on a pledge to build more homes for low income communities. Many 
activists work on both issues of extractivism and affordable housing in the city. However, 
while offering vague references to these issues being rooted in the same systems of 
oppression, I did not observe activists articulating the intersections between climate justice, 
resource extraction, gentrification and affordable housing explicitly.  I raise this parallel issue 
here because it is also shaping regional politics in a profound way and, particularly where 
climate solutions and fossil fuel alternatives are concerned, energy, health, transport and 
housing policy are all intimately linked. 
 
We cannot disaggregate this case study from the context of oil extraction in the oil sands or 
“tar sands” of the neighboring province of Alberta. Alberta is home to the world’s third 
largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia and Venezuela (Bridge and LeBillon 2017). Though 
something of an uncomfortable and problematic stereotype, British Columbia is often 
discursively positioned as an equivalent to California’s liberal, progressive and 
environmentalist image in the United States, while Alberta, in current premier Jason 
Kenney’s own words, might be considered “the Texas of Canada.” Alberta is predominantly 
conservative and is the epicenter of Canada’s oil economy. Alberta, and particularly its oil 
industry, contribute up to 17% of Canadian GDP (Levinson-King 2019). Yet, with just 10% 
of the share of seats in the Canadian Parliament, many Albertans feel their resource wealth is 
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exploited by the federal government while they are politically underrepresented in the 
national parliament (Adkin 2016). 
 
Alberta and British Columbia are separated by the Rocky Mountains and a great deal of 
sometimes playful, often harmful, animosity is lobbed from one side of the mountain range to 
the other. Offering a suitable metaphor for the difficulties negotiating political differences 
between the two provinces, it is these mountains that the Trans Mountain pipeline would 
have to negotiate and traverse on its route from Edmonton to Burnaby.48 Since the 1950s, 
successive Canadian governments have poured millions of dollars into subsidizing 
technological advances, tax incentives, and favorable royalty rates in an effort to develop 
Alberta’s oil sands into economically attractive investment for private international oil 
companies. In the early 2000’s and up until 2014, with the price of oil often fluctuating 
between $70 and well over $100 a barrel (peaking in 2008 and crashing in late 2014), 
international and Canadian oil companies flooded the tar sands with investment and boom 
towns like Fort McMurray exploded with an influx of thousands of workers seeking their 
fortune (Adkin 2016). Through all this, Alberta retains an image of itself as a “resource 
frontier” desiring self-determination but being plundered by federal government overreach 
(Appel, Mason and Watts 2015; Adkin and Carter 2016). 
 
Seeking to stimulate the growth of the tar sands industry even further and turn Canada into 
“an energy superpower” (Taber 2006), former conservative Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, 
 
48 Edmonton is Alberta’s capital city and its second largest after Calgary. Although located some 270 miles to 
the south of Fort McMurray and the epicenter of the tar sands, Edmonton is a hub of tar sands transport and 
storage infrastructure. Before being shipped through the Trans Mountain pipeline, tar sands oil must be 
transported from the Fort McMurray to Edmonton.   
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introduced legislation to gut environmental and regulatory standards, in what became the 
infamous passage of 2012’s Bill C38. With the loosening of regulations, the decline of 
sources of conventional crude, and the price of oil finally making bitumen mining 
economically viable, it very much seemed that the era of the tar sands had arrived. 
Nevertheless, as with every boom there comes a bust. The price of oil descended from an all-
time high of $150 per barrel before the recession in 2008 to a still reasonable $100 in early 
2014 and then crashed to $50 by the end of that year. Investment slowed, workers (many of 
whom ended up in enormous debt) were laid off, and oil companies have slowly been 
abandoning the tar sands ever since. As tar sands oil prices rallied in the following years, 
many of these workers remained without jobs, while the industry itself preferred to contract 
with cheaper, ununionized migrant laborers on vulnerable work visa status49. In October 
2019, the price of Albertan oil, under the West Canadian Crude index, was just $38.8 per 
barrel (Levinson-King 2019). While tar sands development has remained just about 
economically viable since 2016 (thanks largely to continued government subsidies), the 
product itself is landlocked and of an inferior quality to more desirable lighter sweet crude.50  
 
A combination of a lack of pipeline capacity, complications and costs of refining it, 
oversupply at the site of extraction and its inferior quality, means that dilbit is sold at a 
 
49 Rather than unite environmentalists with oil workers and migrants against tar sands companies, this dynamic 
has seen the emergence of, often quite thinly veiled, racist discourses about migrant communities “stealing 
Canadian jobs” in the oil sands (Walia 2014). 
50 Tar sands oil, or bitumen, is filled with impurities, contains a great deal of sulfur, and as the name suggests, 
has a particularly high viscosity (resistance to flow). To make it flow through pipelines, it must be chemically 
diluted to form a synthetic oil called dilbit.  Processing dilbut and removing impurities requires refineries to 
upgrade their technology and equipment. Heavy sour crude is unrefined oil that has a higher density, is more 
viscous, tends to contain larger quantities of heavy metals and other impurities, and has high contents of sulfur. 
Light sweet crude is unrefined oil that is less sulfurous, less dense, and easier to refine. For more on the 
political, cultural and economic significance of the different chemical characteristics of oil and infrastructure 
see Matt Huber’s Lifeblood (2013) and Bridge and LeBillon’s Oil (2017). 
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discount to refineries in the United States (Allan 2018). As such, a driving narrative behind 
the importance of completing the Trans Mountain pipeline is that it must be built to get 
Canadian oil to international markets so it can be sold at a better price. This renders it a 
project of critical significance to the “national interest.” Meanwhile, industry representatives 
with the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) position Canadian oil as 
ethically superior to “foreign” oil and its extraction as adhering to the strictest environmental 
standards anywhere in the world. To emphasize the importance of building the pipeline, 
Canadian oil sands workers are characterized as victims of an unfair price discount with the 
US. 
 
It is in this context then, that the construction of the Trans Mountain pipeline has come to 
symbolize a promise of a return to Alberta’s boomtimes, a lifeline to Canadian oil workers, 
the Albertan economy, and Canada’s aspirations of becoming “an energy superpower.” As 
former Albertan premier, Rachel Notley, said in her criticism of new federal environmental 
legislation (Bill C 69) in 2018, “Albertans manage energy; that is an Albertan's birthright” 
(CBC News 2018a). Collectively, these narratives discursively align proud Canadians, 
beleaguered Albertan oil workers, and the oil industry together against intrusive, elitist and 
“anti-Canadian” environmentalists. They obscure, amongst other things, the fact that the 
price discount has little to do with where the oil is sold, that most oil sands workers are not 
originally from the oil sands region or even Alberta, that the oil industry is still earning 
massive profits while it lays off workers, that without First Nation’s consent and genuine 
consultation pipeline projects cannot be built, and that if Canada were to achieve its 
aspirations of becoming an “energy superpower” through developing the tar sands, any hope 
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of maintaining a stable climate can be waved goodbye. Nevertheless, these are compelling 
discourses and, if we are to trust polls as a proxy, they are shoring up the pipeline and the oil 
industry’s social license across much of Canada. National polling over the past six years has 
seen support for the pipeline increase and opposition decline across the country.51 
 
Back in Burnaby, where the pipeline terminates, these narratives hold less sway. On the one 
hand, Burnaby’s economy has diversified since the closure of four of its five refineries. As 
such, direct dependency on jobs and revenue from the oil industry is not nearly as strong a 
pressure as it is in Alberta. Moreover, one reason these refineries closed was because oil 
companies prefer to transport tar sands abroad, particularly to the US, where it can be bought 
and refined at lower costs. This is one of the reasons the local chapter of UNIFOR, Canada’s 
largest private sector union which includes many oil workers in its membership, publicly 
opposed the pipeline’s construction. They argued it would bring few benefits to the local 
economy while certainly posing a threat to economic activity along the coast that many local 
jobs actually do depend upon (UNIFOR 2016). Indeed, according to former Mayor Corrigan, 
the city administration courted tar sands upstream producers and tried to persuade them to 
sell their oil to Burnaby’s last remaining refinery (personal communication, June 12th, 2018). 
 
51 According to Angus Reid polling, in February 2018 49% of Canadians supported the pipeline and 33% 
opposed it, while 48% of British Columbians supported and 40% opposed it (Angus Reid 2018). By June 2019, 
the number of pipeline supporters increased to 56%. 85% of Albertans supported it and 52% in British 
Columbia (Gul 2019). Meanwhile, in September 2019, 53% of Canadians supported the pipeline but 52% also 
said they would rather their provinces invest in renewable energy over non-renewables (Angus Reid 2019).  It is 
important that we do not take these polls entirely at face value. As Dogwood Communications Director, Kai 
Nagata, told me, a much larger percentage of those polled oppose the pipeline when, for example, the polling 
questions emphasizes the increase of oil tankers and risks to the coast (personal communication, May 17th, 
2018). Meanwhile another poll carried out in September ahead of the Canadian General Election in October 
found that climate change is amongst the top election concerns of most Canadians (Wood 2019). While this 
may seem to contradict polls indicating a majority of Canadians support the pipeline, it may also suggest that 
Trudeau’s narrative of balancing the economy with the environment is a convincing one, or otherwise that the 
connection between climate change and building tar sands pipelines simply isn’t very strong in most Canadian’s 
minds.  
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The producers refused. Amongst some local unions, this has bred a good deal of resentment 
towards upstream tar sands companies and the midstream companies that facilitate the 
transport of oil through, but not to, the city.  
 
Meanwhile, residents of Burnaby Mountain, where Kinder Morgan’s storage tank farm is 
located, have not forgotten the consequences of a rupture of the original Trans Mountain 
pipeline in 2007 in their backyards. 250,000 liters of crude (66,000 gallons) spilled onto the 
streets, coating their neighborhood in noxious oil leading to the evacuation of 250 residents. 
70,000 liters (18,500 gallons) poured into the Burrard Inlet posing a severe threat to the 
marine ecosystem (Hager 2012). Many residents fear that tripling the amount of oil being 
transported through the city would intensify the risk of further spills and their exposure to 
toxins. The tank farm itself would also have to be expanded to store this increased crude 
capacity before it gets loaded onto oil tankers at the marine terminal. The tank farm is 
already a source of air pollution, an expansion would see a large increase in air quality 
contaminants. According to Burnaby’s fire department, this poses an unacceptable risk to 
residents, the conservation park, and the university that are all located on the Mountain 
(Moreau 2015).  
 
In addition, the seven-fold increase in oil tankers shipping tar sands from Kinder Morgan’s 
Westridge Marine Terminal would see up to 400 more ships a year navigating the intricate 
route through the Burrard Inlet and the Salish Sea. Not only would this increase the risk of 
tanker accidents and oil spills, it would also likely wipe out the already endangered Orca 
population. Coast Salish First Nations view the Orcas as relatives, and they are foundational 
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figures in their creation stories connecting First Peoples to the land and the sea. For most of 
the people living in closest proximity to the pipeline and its terminus, the economic, cultural, 
and health risks massively outweigh potential benefits of the pipeline. Moreover, benefits are 
perceived to accrue only to Albertans and particularly oil companies in the tar sands, while 
the costs are born by those living in the pipelines path. Many are concerned about the 
pipeline’s climate impacts, but the more immediate pressures framed in local narratives 
opposing the pipeline are public health, flawed consultation with First Nations, and the 
cultural and economic consequences of oil spills off the coast and in the Inlet.  These 
concerns have given rise to grassroots community organizations like Burnaby Residents 
Opposed to Kinder Morgan Expansion (BROKE) and Pipe Up as well as the growth of 
organizations like Climate Convergence and 350 Vancouver. 
 
Vancouver and Burnaby are also home to headquarters and major regional offices of several 
medium-sized to large ENGOs. These include offices of the Suzuki Foundation, Greenpeace, 
Stand.earth, Dogwood, West Coast Environmental Law, amongst several others. Many of 
these organizations have deep roots in the region and some, like Stand.earth, emerged out of 
fights with logging companies, particularly during the Battle of Clayoquot Sound in the 
1990s.52 The legacy of the protests at Clayoquot Sound on Vancouver Island remains strong 
 
52 The Battle of Clayoquot Sound was an intense 15-year conflict between First Nations, environmentalists, the 
BC provincial government and logging companies in the Clayoquot Sound on West Coast of Vancouver Island. 
Logging companies wanted to clear cut an old growth forest in the region and were supported with considerable 
resources from the provincial government. Meanwhile the local community, environmentalists, and local First 
Nations opposed this style of logging. Their protests against it gained international media attention. 
Environmentalists built close allegiances with the Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation and Ahousaht First Nation. Over 
900 people were arrested in what remains the largest instance of Civil Disobedience in Canadian history. 
Blockading logging roads and setting up camp in the forest, many of the tactics being deployed against Kinder 
Morgan were also practiced in the Clayoquot Sound nearly 30 years ago. The protests ended with a compromise 
between all sides in 1994 which gave local First Nations greater control over forest management but also saw 
parts of the forest environmentalists were protecting being cut down. Many activists describe Clayoquot Sound 
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both in a regional ethic of environmental consciousness and also in activists’ strategic 
repertoires. The latter includes the use of blockades and development of alliances between 
First Nations and settler activists. It is not difficult, therefore, to also imagine why the 
Canadian Green Party finds its stronghold on Vancouver Island and the lower mainland. 
Furthermore, the Union of British Columbian Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) is headquartered in 
Vancouver and has also been a significant leader in opposing to the pipeline. Led by Grand 
Chief Stewart Philip, UBCIC has set up an organization called the Coast Protectors through 
which they develop their strategies and align with others in their resistance to the pipeline. 
The cultural legacy of environmental activism and First Nations struggle in the region has 
helped formalize a professional cadre of environmental and social justice organizations 
which are intensely involved in coordinating resistance to Kinder Morgan. 
  
Resistance to the pipeline is profoundly shaped by the influence of the Tsleil-Waututh, 
Musqueam and Squamish First Nations. The Burrard Inlet, Burnaby, Vancouver, and the 
broader metropolitan lower mainland region are their original homes and their culture is 
inextricably intertwined with their relationships to this place. This is not a fetishism of the 
“ecologically noble savage” genre (Hames 2007), but rather an alive, dynamic, relational and 
consequential engagement with the land and sea that has significant implications for the 
reasons for, and modes of, resistance found in the region. Following a referendum amongst 
the almost 600 strong membership of the Tsleil-Waututh Nation, declaring their opposition to 
 
protest in almost mythic terms as a golden age of activism. Others are critical of the role big ENGOs played in 
negotiating a compromise without grassroots activists’ input (Vasey 2014). This is a dynamic that also plays out 
in Kinder Morgan protests. Tzeporah Burman, a lead organizer and architect of the Clayoquot Sound Protests is 
an influential player in the struggle against Kinder Morgan and helped co-found Stand.earth (Formerly 
ForestEthics). 
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the pipeline, the Nation’s council set up the Sacred Trust Initiative to develop the strategies 
through which their administration would fight the pipeline. Meanwhile, the George family, 
prominent members of the Tsleil-Waututh Nation, has a long history of anti-colonial 
resistance. Will George and Ta’ah Amy George set up Kwekwecnewtxw (pronounced Kwu-
kwe-ow-tukh and which roughly translates to “a place to watch from”), or the Watch House, 
on Burnaby Mountain just outside Kinder Morgan’s tank farm and directly on top of the 
pipeline’s route.53 Cedar George and Reuben George, also prominent members of the 
pipeline resistance, are more closely affiliated with the Tsleil-Waututh administration’s 
strategy. Protect the Inlet was the name of the campsite and also of the coalitions of 
organizations that emerged alongside the Watch House to coordinate their strategy. Run by 
Coast Salish Indigenous leaders, including Will George, and with institutional support and 
resources from Greenpeace and Stand.earth organizers, the Protect the Inlet camp became a 
visible, physical and symbolic hub of anti-pipeline resistance in the city.  
 
Before we finish situating ourselves, I want to outline the current political climate in which 
this struggle is positioned. After ten years of government under Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper’s Conservative Party, Canada elected Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in 2015. 
Trudeau was the star of a surprise underdog campaign which saw the Liberal Party move 
from third place before the race started to winning an overwhelming majority of seats for the 
Liberal Party by the election’s end. The year before, Alberta had elected its first ever premier 
from the New Democratic Party (NDP) after decades of Conservative rule (think of a 
provincial premier in Canada as of similar status to a state governor in the US). This has been 
 
53 While good relations existed between the Watch House and the Tsleil-Waututh government, the Watch House 
was not officially a project of the Tsleil-Waututh Nation. 
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perceived as foreshadowing the tumultuous political shift away from the Conservative Party 
that would play out federally in the 2015 federal elections. The Liberals won 39% of the vote 
and 184 seats, the Conservatives came in second with 31% and 99 seats, the NDP which had 
been the second largest party came 3rd with 19% and 44 seats, the Bloc Québécois won 4% 
and gained 10 seats, and the Green Party garnered 3% of the vote and won one seat. At the 
time, the election signaled a dramatic shift in Canada’s political trajectory. 
 
In 2015, the Liberal Party ran to the left of the NDP, promising sweeping change on a range 
of progressive issues including bold action on climate change and environmental regulations  
(the Conservative government had not only gutted environmental regulation, but had also 
taken Canada out of the Kyoto Protocol and played an obstructionist role in climate talks at 
the UN). They also pledged to renew relationships with First Nations governments and to 
enshrine Indigenous peoples’ right to free, prior, and informed consent in Canadian law. A 
third significant pledge was on voting reform. The Liberals promised that the next election 
would shift Canada’s voting system away from a First Passed the Post where parties winning 
less than 40% of the popular vote can win a majority of seats, to a system of Proportional 
Representation where parties are allocated the number of seats in Parliament proportional to 
their share of the popular vote. 
 
There is a perception amongst some of the activists I interviewed that the Liberals always 
“run from the left but govern from the right.” While many progressive and left-wing voters 
were inspired by Trudeau’s promise of change, others voted for the Liberal Party 
strategically to force the Conservatives out of office. Rather like President Obama’s tenure in 
the US, however, many progressive voters now feel betrayed, believing Prime Minister 
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Trudeau to have broken each one of his promises on voting reform, relationships with First 
Nations, and climate change. The Trans Mountain pipeline has reinforced the perception of 
Trudeau’s duplicity and come to symbolize his betrayal of his voting base of young 
progressives.  
 
Similar to the liberal mainstream of the US Democratic Party, the Canadian Liberal Party 
tends to take up moderate, centrist political positions, and promotes social and cultural 
freedoms, some social welfare, free markets, and a balanced economy. The NDP vacillates 
between socialist, leftwing and progressive political platforms to centrist ones often 
mirroring the Liberals. These are internal tensions within the party that often undermine its 
broader appeal. Jagmeet Singh, the NDP’s new leader, has sought to shift the party to the left 
and diversify the constituencies to whom it appeals. The federal NDP officially opposes the 
pipeline expansion while Alberta’s provincial NDP supports it. The Green Party, which 
surged in the polls from three to ten percent in the run up to the General Election, sought to 
take advantage of the NDP’s divisions. However it is also subject a somewhat politically 
ambiguous agenda. Running under the slogan “not left, not right, forward,” the Green Party 
under Elizabeth May’s leadership has sought to appeal to more moderate voters disillusioned 
with Trudeau but unwilling to embrace the NDP. It must balance a younger, more left-wing, 
and racially diverse core of political operatives, with an overwhelmingly white, older, and 
liberal environmentalist base. Finally, in the past, the Conservative Party positioned itself as 
the party of fiscal responsibility, free markets, “traditional Canadian values,” and stable 
governance. This began to change under Stephen Harper as the Party flirted with a more 
populist authoritarian agenda. Recently, under Andrew Scheer’s new leadership, several 
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prominent members of the Party have wholeheartedly embraced populist conservative 
rhetoric. Provincial premiers like Jason Kenney (Alberta) and Doug Ford (Ontario) received 
a great deal of support as they moved the Party further to right, mimicking the political 
strategy advanced by President Donald Trump in the US. 
 
Political ground has shifted in British Columbia since 2015 as well. In the 2017 provincial 
elections the Liberal Party led by Christy Clark won the largest share of votes but failed to 
maintain their majority of seats. Their minority government was brought down in a vote of 
no confidence which saw the John Horgan of NDP installed as premier and his 
administration propped up in an agreement with the Green Party. This Green Party-backed 
provincial NDP government opposes the Trans Mountain pipeline, while under Premier 
Rachel Notley’s tenure in Alberta the NDP government was vehemently in favor of the 
pipeline.  Premier Horgan came to power saying the government would use “every tool in the 
toolbox” to stop the pipeline.  
 
Despite their fervent support for the pipeline, Notley’s NDP lost the 2019 Alberta provincial 
election to the Conservatives under Jason Kenney. Premier Kenney ran on a rightwing 
populist agenda through which he targeted pipeline opponents and repeated conspiracy 
theories about “foreign funded radicals” and “anti-Canadian energy activists” inhibiting 
Alberta’s prosperity. Many of these talking points are reflected in oil industry’s own 
propaganda that it develops through the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers and 
organizations CAPP uses to boost favorable tar sands discourses. During the election 
campaign, Notley and Kenney competed to outdo one another’s public displays of support 
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for the industry. Kenney’s willingness to rile up his base with populist attacks on 
environmentalists and peddling in conspiracy theories was clearly better received. 
Throughout the campaign Kenney promised to change the global narrative about the tar 
sands pushed rightwing pundit, Ezra Klein’s, argument that Canada’s oil is the most ethical 
in the world (Turner 2019).   
 
Days after winning the Alberta provincial election, Kenney announced his administration 
would fulfill its election pledge and resource a government run “Energy War Room” to target 
“misinformation” from “anti-Albertan” and foreign funded interests (Heydari 2019). He 
promised to devote $30 million to the project and it has been well received amongst the 
Albertan Conservative base. Some suggest the initiative is just political theater, others have 
pointed to the chilling effect could have on public participation and protest (Amnesty 
International 2019).  
While making this announcement he was introduced to the stage by Robbie Picard, a self-
appointed oil industry propagandist. Picard’s, apparently grassroots organization, “Oilsands 
Strong,” operates primarily on social media but also organizes rallies and marches in support 
of tar sands development along with other oil industry groups like Canada Action and Rally 
for Resources. These groups are some of the most vocal in spreading misinformation and 
targeting environmental activists. Their messages are amplified by corporate media and 
Conservative politicians like Kenney in Alberta, but they are also forging a discourse of 
conservative “energy populism” with significant implications for the broader Canadian 
political landscape. 
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I have described the federal and interprovincial political environments here to indicate that 
the Trans Mountain pipeline has become an issue of national significance, shifting political 
alignments, and representative of broader trends in Canadian political discourse and action. 
The pipeline’s significance is not limited to Burnaby, or even the provincial dispute between 
Alberta and British Columbia, but rather to the trajectory of energy politics and its 
intersection with climate politics, First Nations rights and title, and workers concerns across 
Canada. These are the conditions in which petro-hegemony has thrived and through which 
the climate justice movement must navigate. 
 
A Narrativized Timeline 2012 - 2019 
 
I have circumscribed the unfolding trajectory of the pipeline fight in a specific set of dates to 
distill and communicate the most significant moments, relationships, and events that emerged 
out of, and continue to define, the conflict between climate justice activists and the 
proponents of the Trans Mountain pipeline. I’ve placed the story in the period between the 
passage of Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Bill C38 in 2012 and the Canadian 
general election of October 2019. The case is very much a living archive and, as I suggested 
in this chapter’s introduction, historicizing social struggle in a specific period is always a 
somewhat artificial and problematic process. However, I have deliberately chosen to 
narrativize this specific period because I think it allows us to view how developments in 
Canadian energy politics, First Nations relations, and federal elections direct, and are 
directed by, the conjunctures of this particular conflict. Moreover, this a period that is being 
significantly inscribed by Indigenous resurgence and the coalescing and realization of the 
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climate justice movement in North America.  As such, placing the struggle in this period 
allows us to move between, and make sense of, the situated conjuncture, and the national and 
global context in which it is embedded, with greater ease than would a singular attention to 
the most dramatic moments of the struggle. While this dissertation devotes most attention to 
the spring and summer of 2018 when the conflict was at its most intense, the timeline this 
chapter narrates offers an important opportunity for us to understand how those moments of 
drama relate to prior events and shaped future ones. 
 
I begin this story in 2012 for two reasons. The first, and most obvious, is that this was year 
that Kinder Morgan first floated its plan to twin its existing pipeline with a new one that 
would triple export capacity of tar sands off the Pacific Coast. The second reason, however, 
is that the incentive to build this pipeline was likely connected to the passage of Bill C38 in 
that same year, when the price of oil remained at well over $100 a barrel. While we can’t be 
certain that Kinder Morgan would have decided to build the pipeline without the bill’s 
passage, it is true that this controversial omnibus legislation was intended to facilitate energy 
infrastructure permitting and turbocharge the already booming oil sands economy in Canada. 
Decided in a single vote, the bill made sweeping changes to a large number of Canadian laws 
including reducing oversight over the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), 
overhauling labor standards, and undermining environmental regulations. One of its most 
significant interventions was to place federal environmental impact assessments directly 
under the jurisdiction of the National Energy Board, to expedite pipeline permitting, and to 
reduce public participation in the process.54 Bill C38 helped set the scene for the impending 
 
54 Paradoxically, however, the bill’s passage may also have been one of the major reasons why Kinder Morgan 
ended up abandoning the project and why the pipeline permits were quashed by the Federal Court of Appeals in 
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confrontation between Kinder Morgan and climate justice activists by gutting environmental 
regulations and fast-tracking consultation with First Nations. In the legal battle against 
Kinder Morgan and the NEB, the implications of this bill would prove significant. 
 
The following year, in early 2013, Kinder Morgan officially applied to the NEB for permits 
to begin work on the Trans Mountain pipeline. The NEB began the review process, but it 
wasn’t long before the implications of Bill C38 for environmental regulation became clear. 
Green Party MP, Elizabeth May, who was an expert intervener at the NEB’s public hearings, 
told me that while the regulatory agency was always going to greenlight pipelines, prior to 
the 2012 it had worked with at least a veneer of legitimacy and respect for due process 
(personal communication, May 15th, 2018). In these hearings, according to May and many of 
the other activists who participated in them, the NEB wouldn’t allow evidence to be cross 
examined, narrowly defined those who were considered “directly affected” and thus those 
who were allowed to provide evidence, and imposed strict time limits on the consultation and 
evidence gathering period of the review. The agency has long been accused of being entirely 
captured by the fossil fuel industry. However, May explained that the agency is not just 
subject to “corporate capture” but “corporate culture” where regulators see it as their job and 
duty to approve pipelines to stimulate economic growth. Deeply frustrated with the lack of 
adequate consultation throughout the process, the Tsleil-Waututh Nation contracted their 
own independent environmental review of the project. The report was published in 2015 and 
documents the risks the pipeline posed to the coast, the increase in tanker traffic, the 
 
2018. The FCA quashed the pipeline permits citing failures in the consultation and environmental assessment 
process. By undercutting public participation, further neglecting First Nations rights and title, and limiting what 
constituted evidence that the NEB’s review had to include, Bill 38 created the regulatory conditions the FCA 
ultimately deemed inadequate. 
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existential threat to the Orca population, community exposure to toxins, and rising 
greenhouse gas emissions. The Tsleil-Waututh government deemed these an unacceptable 
threat to their home, culture, community, and way of life (Sacred Trust 2015a).  
 
2013 was also the year that the Idle No More movement gained national and international 
attention. Emerging in late 2012, led by Indigenous women, and originally forming in 
response to Prime Minister Harper’s series of omnibus bills eroding Indigenous and First 
Nations rights and title, the movement became a broader expression of anti-colonial 
resistance and Indigenous and First Nations’ resurgence. Through a series of direct actions 
that combined protest with ceremony and prayer (Fiskio 2017), Idle No More has played a 
significant role in shifting the discursive terrain and cultural narratives through which many 
Canadians made sense of colonial relations with First Nations. Idle No More helped draw 
mainstream attention to the ways in which resource extraction in Canada dispossesses native 
peoples of their land and disproportionately exposes them, particularly Indigenous women 
and girls, to violence and toxicity. In the following years, the resurgence and development of 
these frames would prove powerful tools in contesting pipeline infrastructure projects across 
the country.  
 
Meanwhile, the NEB’s review of Trans Mountain continued through 2014. It was during this 
review that Battle of Burnaby Mountain broke out. This skirmish was one the first instances 
in the confrontation with Kinder Morgan where grassroots activists, Indigenous activists, 
ENGOs and community members intervened together in the struggle outside of the 
“legitimate” channels of challenging the pipeline. The fight saw many of Idle No More’s 
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frames invoked and placed First Nations’ rights and title at the forefront of the pipeline 
opposition’s narrative. 
 
A series of significant political shifts moved attention away from Burnaby Mountain in 2015. 
Foreshadowing the Conservative Party’s decisive defeat in the impending general election, 
Albertans forced the Conservatives out of office for the first time in 44 years and elected the 
NDP’s Rachel Notley as premier of the province in 2015. Notley’s election indicated that 
Albertans might, for the first time, be convinced to embrace federal climate legislation. 
Several months later, the Liberal Party, led by Justin Trudeau, ousted Stephen Harper’s 
Conservative federal administration from government with promises of sweeping progressive 
reform. Following the Idle No More uprising, these reforms included an overhaul of federal 
government relations with First Nations governments and a Truth and Reconciliation Tour 
through which First Nations could bring to light centuries of colonial exploitation and settler 
Canadians could come to terms with the legacy and perpetuation of settler colonialism. 
Meanwhile, the Liberals also promised fundamental changes in environmental policy and 
pledged to undo Harper’s assault on environmental regulation. Many ENGOs and 
progressives believed that these shifts would drastically alter Canada’s political landscape, 
ushering in a post-Harper era of progressive, democratic governance.  Even then, Elizabeth 
May believed they were being far too optimistic (personal communication, May 15th, 2018). 
She, and many others, would be proved right all too soon. 
 
Reflecting on a meeting she had had with the Prime Minister just three days after his election 
in October 2015, May told me that during that early stage of his tenure, Trudeau’s position 
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on energy and climate had not solidified and that he could have been convinced to make 
more ambitious commitments. Ahead of the Paris Climate Talks in December of that year, 
May urged ENGOs to intensify public pressure on Trudeau to make bolder pledges on energy 
and climate policy. She told me that in late 2015 ENGOs should have, and could have, 
pushed Trudeau much further on environmental legislation, energy policy and ambitious 
emissions targets. However, these large ENGOs were apparently unwilling to criticize the 
Liberal Party directly following their election victory. On the election trail, Trudeau had 
pledged to overhaul the regulatory process through which the Trans Mountain was being 
reviewed. In addition, many ENGOs lauded his leadership at the Paris Climate Talks, his 
declaration that “Canada is back,” and his administration’s push for a 1.5 degree rather than 2 
degree Celsius global heating temperature threshold (Fitz-Morris 2015). However, May 
argues that their refusal to criticize Trudeau, who she knows reasonably well and still 
considers a friend (albeit one who made very bad decisions), led the Prime Minister to 
believe he could approve expansion of energy infrastructure without opposition from 
Canada’s largest environmental organizations. Her fears were confirmed when Trudeau 
ultimately did approve the Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion following the NEB’s review 
and recommendation in 2016.  
 
While announcing that his administration would reject permits for Enbridge’s Northern 
Gateway pipeline (following the Federal Court of Appeals finding that the NEB review and 
consultation with first Nations was inadequate), Trudeau approved both the Enbridge Line 3 
pipeline and Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain expansion pipeline, arguing that his 
administration could balance the environment and the economy (Tasker 2016). Later, 
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doubling down on this claim, Trudeau’s administration argued that the only way to impose a 
federal carbon tax that Alberta could sign on to was to approve the pipeline (CBC News 
2018b; McSheffrey 2018). May argues this is untrue because even if Alberta did not sign on 
to a carbon tax, the federal government could still impose one on the province.55 Moreover, 
she told me that Kinder Morgan’s pipeline approval in 2016 was almost certainly the result 
of closed-door deals between the Prime Minister, the Liberal British Columbian Premier, 
Christy Clark, and NDP Albertan Premier Rachel Notley. In further meetings with the 
Trudeau administration in the months leading to the pipeline’s approval, May learned that the 
actual reason that Kinder Morgan got the Trans Mountain expansion approved was “Rachel 
needs a pipeline.”  
 
The apparent reason Premier Notley needed a pipeline was to keep the Conservatives out of 
office in Alberta. The thinking here was that if Notley could get a pipeline built for Alberta 
where the Conservative Party had failed, she could bolster her chances of winning re-election 
– something that would benefit both the Liberals and NDP.  Meanwhile, Premier Clark was 
in the process of making her decision on whether British Columbia would provide pipeline 
permits and a certificate of environmental approval. According to May, Clark announced her 
administration’s support for the pipeline following assurances that she could get federal 
support behind the controversial Site C hydroelectric dam in Northern British Columbia and 
two LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) installations: the Woodfibre processing and export facility 
on the Southwest coast and the Petronas export terminal in Kitimat, on the province’s 
Northwest coast. Apparently ignored in these backroom deals was the fact that even the 
 
55 Although the risks of doing so and inflaming latent separationist fantasies in Alberta would be great. 
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Trudeau administration had condemned the NEB review process as unable to adequately 
assess environmental impacts and carry out consultations with First Nations along the 
pipeline route. The NEB’s failure to adequately consult, the Board’s clear bias towards 
getting the project build, and its unwillingness to hear evidence from experts and directly 
affected communities led First Nations, municipalities, and ENGOs to launch a total of 14 
appeals against the NEB’s permits at the Federal Court of Appeals in late 2016 and early 
2017. 
 
In 2017, the story shifts away from federal politicking and instead depicts the growing 
movement in British Columbia and Burnaby. The British Columbian provincial elections in 
May 2017 mark one important turning point in the fight against the pipeline. Following 
Premier Clark’s approval of the pipeline, the NDP, the Green Party, and many ENGOs and 
activists helped turn the project into an election “wedge issue” and mobilized voters against 
politicians who supported it.  Campaigners drew attention to the Liberal’s broken promises 
concerning environmental protections and First Nations relations after 15 years in 
government. Clark’s Liberal Party lost their majority in the legislature but still won the most 
seats (43). While the NDP and Liberals gained roughly 40% of the vote share each, the NDP 
won 41 seats, 3 seats short of majority. The Green Party won 16% of the vote and gained 3 
seats. Clark sought to form a minority government but lost a vote of no confidence. Shortly 
afterwards, the NDP and Greens forged a governing agreement and formed the next 
provincial government. NDP premier, John Horgan, and the Green Party came to power 
promising to “use every tool in the toolbox” to stop the pipeline (Kane 2017). In the 
meantime, the NEB had accepted Kinder Morgan’s application to begin construction despite 
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the company not having had all the necessary permits approved. Enraging Burnaby locals 
and particularly the city council, the NEB also allowed Kinder Morgan to bypass Burnaby’s 
municipal laws and start construction within the city limits. This was one of the first times 
the NEB’s jurisdiction had been allowed to override municipal legislation.  
 
In October 2017, the FCA amalgamated all 14 of the appeals against Kinder Morgan’s 
permits into one case and heard the respective legal team’s arguments throughout the 
following month. While the court cases were ongoing, construction began on Burnaby 
Mountain with Kinder Morgan clearing more trees and making preparations for the tank 
farm’s expansion. During this period, organizations like Dogwood had been building a 
network of pipeline opposition and educating communities across British Columbia to hold a 
referendum against the pipeline. However, they changed their strategy to focus on peeling 
Liberal support away from the pipeline after the shock election of the Greens and NDP. 
Grassroots organizations like BROKE, 350 Vancouver, Climate Convergence and Pipe-Up 
were also educating and organizing their communities and had built up a significant base of 
supporters and activists, many of whom were prepared to participate in civil disobedience 
and direct action to stop the pipeline. 
 
Other organizations focused on fundraising and resourcing the legal battle. Then, starting in 
November 2017, activists began setting up sporadic blockades at the Burnaby Mountain tank 
farm and its marine terminal. They have also targeted Trudeau, protesting at townhalls, 
speeches and his hotel on the occasions when he has visited the province. In the province’s 
interior, Kanahus Manuel, an Indigenous leader in the pipeline resistance and member of the 
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Secwepemc Nation, was working with the Women’s Warrior Society and a team of First 
Nations women to develop a strategic intervention that would become known as the Tiny 
House Warriors. Manuel says the Tiny House Warriors idea came to her when she was 
participating in the uprising at Standing Rock. Building tiny homes on top of the pipeline 
route, reclaiming First Nations territory, using the houses to provide homes for vulnerable 
indigenous women and children, and powering these homes on renewable energy, the Tiny 
House Warriors and have captured observers’ attentions all around the world (Beaumont 
2018a).  
 
Early 2018 saw hostilities between pipeline proponents and opponents intensify. In January 
2018, Horgan’s administration announced it would explore and introduce legislation to 
implement a moratorium on increased transportation of diluted bitumen through the province. 
Rachel Notley responded saying that Alberta would sue British Columbia if this legislation 
were passed and argued that provincial governments had no authority to impede flows of 
goods between provincial borders. Somewhat undermining her point, she also introduced a 
ban on imports on British Columbian wine into Alberta in February 2018. Apparently, this 
resulted in a small surge in local wine consumption amongst British Columbia’s pipeline 
opponents along with satirical social media commentary. Satire aside, the mounting hostility 
between the NDP premiers of Alberta and British Columbia had begun to threaten a 
constitutional crisis over provincial jurisdiction and federal mandate. Horgan softened his 
tone a little and instead launched a reference case in the British Columbian courts to explore 
whether a moratorium would be constitutionally legal. Notley quietly reversed the ban on 
wine imports. The modest ceasefire did not last long. 
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As activists set up the Mountain’s first protest camp in early 2018, which they called Camp 
Cloud, directly outside Kinder Morgan’s gates, and threatened an intensification of their 
blockades and direct action on the Mountain, Kinder Morgan once again requested an 
injunction against protestors interference at the tank farm and Westridge Marine Terminal 
sites. Kinder Morgan argued protestors had been causing the company financial harm and 
delays “nearly every day” since November (Bains 2018). While this is something of an 
exaggeration, the steady trickle of activists participating in blocking the facility gates 
certainly grew between November and March. The court granted the injunction in early 
March 2018. This gave Kinder Morgan police protection from any protestors who came 
within 50 meters of either site. The injunction zone was later revised down to five rather than 
50 meters (Waisman 2018a). Just as it had in 2014, the injunction provoked a backlash in 
Burnaby with activists citing it as another example of a SLAPP suit to silence and intimidate 
protestors (Stand.earth 2018a).  
 
The following day, on March 10th, up to 10,000 residents, Indigenous leaders, and activists 
marched to Burnaby Mountain pledging to “Protect the Inlet” and “Stop Kinder Morgan.”56 
The march was led by members of the Tsleil-Waututh and Squamish First Nations and they 
addressed the crowd condemning the company’s failure to gain their consent, the NEB’s lack 
of transparency, the risks the project poses, and the ongoing relations of colonialism that 
produced the conflict. Meanwhile, starting at 10am, Will George, and members of Protect the 
 
56 Protect the Inlet claimed up to 10,000 people participated in the march, while corporate media outlets rounded 
numbers down to 8,000 or  5,000 (Eagland 2018; Waisman 2018b; CBC News 2018e). As Kai Nagata told me, 
corporate news media was also keen to devote almost half their coverage of the demonstration over to a counter 
protest of 200 pro-pipeline activists in downtown Vancouver (personal communication, May 17th, 2018). 
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Inlet, built the Watch House, Kwekweknewtxw, in a day long ceremony, directly outside the 
tank farm’s fence line, and on top of the pipeline route. It became the symbol of Indigenous-
led resistance to the pipeline. At the same time, a second camp, the Protect the Inlet camp, 
was built alongside the Watch House on a soccer pitch about 20 meters away from the tank 
farm fence.  
 
In the following weeks activists initially flocked to the camp where organizers from 
Greenpeace and Stand.earth and Indigenous activists helped coordinate volunteers and 
maintain the campsite’s upkeep. While the number of permeant residents at the camp quickly 
dwindled, dozens of community members, city residents, and activists continued journeying 
up the Mountain to blockade the tank farm gates in defiance of the injunction. Between 
March 17th and 24th over 170 people were arrested in daily acts of civil disobedience (Protect 
the Inlet 2018). On March 23rd MPs Elizabeth May and Kennedy Stewart were amongst 
those arrested, drawing a great deal of media attention back to the struggle (Duran and Lye 
2018). These demonstrations continued with growing intensity and frequency. Then, on April 
7th, the entire executive team of the Union of British Columbian Indian Chiefs, along with 
other First Nations leaders including Elder Ta’ah Amy George of the Tsleil-Waututh Nation, 
as well as writer and activist Naomi Klein, and hundreds of protestors, carried out a day-long 
blockade of the gates (Canadian Press 2018a). This time Kinder Morgan refused to enforce 
the injunction and the blockaders eventually left without being arrested. 
 
The next day, Kinder Morgan issued a pivotal ultimatum. Company officials announced that 
they would halt all “non-essential activities and related spending” on the pipeline 
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construction until May 31st 2018 (Kinder Morgan 2018). If they could not provide their 
shareholders with confidence that the project would be completed and that their investments 
would be rewarded, the company threatened to abandon the project altogether on May 31st. 
Richard Kean, CEO of Kinder Morgan Canada, said that the company needed more certainty 
and security from the federal government before it could commit further shareholder 
resources to the project. They attributed the lack of certainty to the British Columbian 
government’s hostility towards the project and their inability to negotiate tensions between 
Horgan and Notley. Directly following the ultimatum, Rachel Notley said she would explore 
options to place sanctions on British Columbian goods and shut down all exports of Albertan 
oil to the province.  However, many activists, as well as MP Kennedy Stewart, argued that it 
was protest and direct action rather than the provincial government that had forced Kinder 
Morgan shareholders to flinch (City News 2018). 
 
Kinder Morgan officials argued the company’s shareholders needed greater political certainty 
in the province and that only the federal government could offer such certainty. Thus, Kinder 
Morgan’s ultimatum was largely directed towards the federal government. The May 31st date 
was ultimately threatening the Canadian government that if it could not provide Kinder 
Morgan with assurance that the pipeline would get built, then the company would walk away 
from a project that the Prime Minister had by this point, more or less, staked his political 
career on. The threat worked. Immediately after the announcement, Prime Minister Trudeau 
instructed his cabinet to begin negotiations with the company. Trudeau instructed his natural 
resources minister, Jim Carr to manage negotiations along with support from finance 
minister, Bill Morneau. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister cut short a diplomatic trip to Peru to 
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set up a meeting with John Horgan and Rachel Notley, presumably to see if they could cut a 
deal. Apparently Horgan wouldn’t budge.  
 
Speculation about the negotiations and the reasons for Kinder Morgan’s announcement 
exploded and Premier Notley indicated interest in Alberta buying a stake in the pipeline to 
shore up investor confidence. Media interest shifted away from the protests and focused more 
attention on the negotiations and the hostilities between the British Columbian and Albertan 
premiers. However, demonstrations and arrests continued throughout April and the Watch 
House and Protect the Inlet remained a rallying point for climate justice activists. During this 
period, journalists at the National Observer uncovered evidence that the government had 
entered into consultations with First Nations in bad faith and that government ministers had 
put pressure on staff to “find a legally sound reason to say yes” to the pipeline before the 
consultations were concluded (De Souza 2018a). The Tsleil-Waututh legal team called for 
October’s court hearings to be reopened so this evidence could be added to the record. This 
increased the widely held belief that the NEB hearings had been a “sham” and that First 
Nations rights’ and title were being ignored. 
 
While negotiations continued throughout the month of May, activists sought to intensify 
conditions of “risk and uncertainty,” believing they could shake company shareholders’ 
confidence and convince the them to abandon the project. Judge Affleck was appointed to 
oversee Crown prosecutions of activists who participated in civil disobedience. Despite 
Affleck’s court handing down harsher and harsher sentences for those breaking the 
injunction, by the end of the month the number of people arrested in civil disobedience had 
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reached well over 200. Blockades led in “peace and prayer” by First Nations activists at the 
marine terminal and tank farm took place twice a week, while direct action targeting the 
company’s other vulnerabilities occurred in a less regular pattern. Early in the month, 
Greenpeace activists scaled an enormous boring drill Kinder Morgan intended to use to bore 
a tunnel for the pipeline beneath the Mountain, drawing attention to the presence of drilling 
infrastructure in the city (Greenpeace 2018a).57 Later in the month, activists carried out a 
blockade on the marine terminal from both land and sea to coincide with the Kinder 
Morgan’s Annual General Meeting in Texas. At the same time, First Nations leaders, 
including Reuben George of the Tsleil-Waututh and Chief Judy Wilson of the Neskonlith 
Indian Band and treasurer/secretary of UBCIC, traveled to Texas to address shareholders at 
the General Meeting and assured them that the pipeline would never get built (Zussman 
2018). Their presence succeeded in convincing shareholder to demand greater transparency 
from the company’s executives on their environmental and human rights standards 
(Beaumont 2018b).  
 
Back in Canada, halfway through the negotiations Trudeau’s administration offered to 
“indemnify” the company, or any company, against any politically-incurred risks it might 
sustain throughout the pipeline’s construction (Reuters 2018). In other words, the Canadian 
government would cover the costs of any delays that the company incurred as a result of the 
British Columbian government’s opposition. It appeared Kinder Morgan was not interested 
in indemnity. They wanted certainty that the pipeline would be completed. Certainty meant 
 
57 This direct action tactic was publicized across the campaign’s social media platforms and the presence of the 
drill in the city helped set the tone for the urgency of the protests that would continue through the following 
month. 
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security, and possibly physical coercive security, to keep pipeline opponents at bay. If the 
government was unwilling to provide that security, the company would walk. Negotiations 
between the company and the government continued without either making much headway. 
Protests and arrests continued throughout the month too and it seemed that not a day went by 
that the pipeline struggle wasn’t in the media headlines. Finally, on May 28th, the parties 
came to an agreement. Kinder Morgan would abandon the pipeline (Ip and Shaw 2018). The 
Canadian government had agreed to buy it and all existing Trans Mountain infrastructure 
(including the original pipeline) from Kinder Morgan for $4.5 billion (Rabson 2018).58 
Activists organized an emergency rally for the following day. Organizing the rally overnight, 
hundreds of protestors gathered in downtown Vancouver to celebrate their victory over 
Kinder Morgan and condemn the government’s decision to buy the pipeline (Lupick 2018a). 
Despite their fury that the government would use public funds to bailout Kinder Morgan and 
complete the pipeline, First Nations leaders and activists declared that it did not matter who 
owned the pipeline, it still did not have their consent (McKeen and Li 2018). Campaigners 
defiantly pledged that the fight would continue until the pipeline was defeated. 
 
Protests did indeed continue late into the summer and the Watch House and Protect the Inlet 
camp remained a hub around which resistance was organized. Throughout that summer, the 
Trudeau administration and Kinder Morgan officials finalized the bailout deal. Responsibility 
for the pipeline’s construction was transferred over to a Crown Corporation: the Trans 
Mountain Corporation. With no other private company willing to take on the risks associated 
with finishing the project, the government announced it intended to sell the pipeline once 
 
58 Economist Robyn Allan (2018b) has argued that building the pipeline could cost the Canadian government as 
much as $12 or even $15 billion. 
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construction has been completed (Ip and Shaw 2018).  Meanwhile, activists who had been 
arrested during protests in the spring started receiving their sentences handed down by Judge 
Affleck (Fraser 2018).59 Sentences intensified as protests continued with some activists 
sentenced to between seven and thirty days in jail and others receiving fines of thousands of 
dollars (Muma 2018). While this only deepened resentment of the pipeline, media interest in 
the conflict seemed to be waning.  To counteract this, in early July, twelve pipeline 
opponents, including Greenpeace organizers and Will George, climbed the Ironworkers 
Memorial Bridge spanning the Burrard Inlet. They rappelled off the bridge and suspended 
themselves in hammocks directly over the Inlet for more than 35 hours (Lupick 2018b). 
Suspended beneath the bridge, the activists prevented oil tankers leaving or reaching the 
marine terminal for two days.   
 
A week later in the province’s interior, in Secwepemc territory, Kanuhus Manuel and the 
Women’s Warrior Society tested their Tiny House strategy. Moving the tiny homes onto a 
site that had once been a Secwepemc village, in what is now the North Thompson Provincial 
Park, the Tiny House Warriors occupied and began to reestablish the village and reclaimed 
their ancestral Secwepemc land on July 11th. Three Tiny Homes were placed on top of the 
pipeline’s proposed route with a plan to construct more on site.60 The Tiny House Warriors 
tied “red cloth all along the nearby highway to call attention to the danger of gender-based 
 
59 Affleck was widely perceived amongst activists as a conservative judge who was biased against protesters. 
60 In a press release the Women’s Warrior Society, out of which the Tiny House Warriors emerges, wrote: “This 
pipeline violates our rights and endangers our lands and waters. To stop it, we’re reclaiming our ancestral 
village and bringing our traditions back to life. If Trudeau wants to build this pipeline, he will need to empty 
this village a second time; in doing so, he would make continued colonization and cultural genocide part of his 
legacy of so-called reconciliation. Trudeau may have agreed to purchase this pipeline to make sure it gets built, 
but we’re here to make sure that it doesn’t.” (2018) The Manuel family, like the Georges, have a long history of 
resisting settler colonialism and asserting First Nations’ rights and title. 
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and sexual violence associated with pipeline construction “man camps”” (Tiny House 
Warriors 2018). One such man camp was planned to be built just a short away from the 
village (Brake 2018). Three days later the RCMP evicted the Tiny House Warriors, arrested 
Manuel and her sister, and took them into custody (Canadian Press 2018b). Their civil 
disobedience forced the Canadian government to publicly and physically (re)enact their 
colonial heritage of forcing First Nations peoples off of their "unceded, unsurrendered, 
Secwepemc territory" and revealed its continued complicity in reinforcing settler colonial 
domination (CBC News 2018c). 
 
Kinder Morgan shareholders finalized the sale of the pipeline on August 30th in an almost 
unanimous vote to release control of their Canadian assets to the Canadian government 
(Gibson 2018). Then, later that same day, in a tremendous victory for all those opposing the 
pipeline, the Federal Court of Appeals quashed the pipeline permits. The FCA found that the 
NEB had failed in its duty to adequately consult First Nations along the pipeline route and 
that it had not carried out a full investigation into the impacts of oil spills on the coast 
(Bryden 2018). The FCA judges unanimously agreed that the NEB review had been so 
flawed that the Canadian government could not use it as grounds to approve the pipeline and 
so quashed the permits. All construction work was immediately, though only temporarily, 
suspended. As a result, the Canadian government was left on the hook for a multibillion-
dollar pipeline that it could not build because its permits had been revoked. Meanwhile, 
Kinder Morgan’s Canadian offices closed down but not before its executives who had 
executed the deal were paid $1.5 million each in bonuses (CBC News 2018d).61 In 
 
61 It is worth mentioning here that Kinder Morgan is owned by former Enron executives who managed to get 
out of the company before the Enron scandal was exposed. They took Enron’s pipeline assets with them and 
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September 2018, the Trudeau administration announced it would redo the permitting review 
through an expedited NEB process rather than appealing the FCA’s decision at the Supreme 
Court (Canadian Press 2018c). The pipeline was forced back into a review stage. Only then 
did activists on the Mountain dismantle the Protect the Inlet camp, readying themselves for 
the next stage of confrontation. 
 
Prime Minister Trudeau instructed his newly appointed Resources minister, Amerjeet Sohi, 
to oversee the pipeline’s progress. In the months that followed the NEB carried out a new 
review of the pipeline’s impact, focusing on new consultations with First Nations and 
studying the impacts on marine ecology and coastal economy. The Board finished its review 
in February 2019 recommending the government reapprove the pipeline because it was “in 
the national interest” but acknowledging that it was “likely to cause significant adverse 
environmental effects” and would have detrimental impacts on First Nations cultural 
relations with the land (Smith 2019). Citing examples like the Board only accepting written 
public comments in the form of fax messages, opponents argued that the NEB’s second 
review and consultation process had been just as flawed, inaccessible, and lacking in 
transparency as its previous iteration (Kung 2018).  
 
In Alberta, frustrated by the pipeline’s slow progress and facing an upcoming provincial 
election, Rachel Notley negotiated $3.7 billion contracts with Canadian National Rail and 
Canadian Pacific Rail to lease 4400 railcars to reduce the backlog of oil building up in the tar 
 
formed Kinder Morgan. As a result, there was a great deal of speculation that once they realized they couldn’t 
get the pipeline built, Kinder Morgan executives essentially scammed the Canadian government into buying a 
pipeline the company knew it couldn’t get built. 
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sands and ship more of it out of the province by rail (Bellefontaine 2019). The move was not 
enough to counter Jason Kenney’s populist vitriol and claims that she had failed to protect 
Albertan’s interests. He won the provincial election in April 2019 with 55% of the vote and 
immediately doubled down on his attacks on environmentalists.  
 
At about the same time that the NEB announced its reapproval of the pipeline, a scandal that 
has since dogged the Trudeau administration broke into media spotlight. The SNC-Lavalin 
affair, as it became known, saw the Prime Minister’s former Justice Minister and Attorney 
General, Jody Wilson-Raybould (and the first Indigenous person to hold that office), resign 
from Cabinet amidst allegations that Trudeau had pressured her into abandoning the 
prosecution of corruption charges against the engineering firm SNC-Livalan (Gollom 
2019).62 The scandal pushed news of the pipeline out of the media headlines and for the next 
few months the pipeline struggle went relatively quiet. 
 
In the meantime, although still largely eclipsed by the affair, the Liberal Party passed two 
pieces of legislation that sought to undo some of Stephen Harper’s most egregious attacks on 
Canada’s environmental regulations: Bill C69 and Bill C48. The former overhauled the 
regulatory system, again, and addressed several of the NEB’s major failings (for example by 
renaming it the Canadian Energy Regulator), while the latter reaffirmed the federal 
government’s commitment to a moratorium on oil tankers off British Columbia’s Northwest 
coast. The legislation was almost hysterically resisted by CAPP and the industry’s lobbyists, 
 
62 For a full timeline of the SNC-Lavalin Affair see Global News’ Timeline: What’s happened so far in the 
SNC-Lavalin affair  (2019): https://globalnews.ca/news/5764442/snc-lavalin-timeline-breakdown/ 
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despite the new regulations remaining far weaker than they had been prior to Harper’s 
administration (Elliot 2019). On June 18, 2019, in the same week that these bills passed 
Parliament and the Senate and the day after the Liberal government declared a national 
“Climate Emergency,” Trudeau announced his government would again follow the NEB’s 
recommendation and reapprove federal permits for the pipeline (Tasker 2019a). 
 
In July, pipeline opponents (including the same First Nations, environmental organizations, 
and municipalities as before), launched their appeal of the pipeline’s reapproval and, in early 
September 2019, the FCA agreed to hear First Nations cases while dismissing the 
environmental and municipal appeals (MacMahon 2019). Later in September, the Squamish 
Nation won a significant ruling at the British Columbian Supreme Court which overturned 
the former British Columbian Liberal administration’s 2017 approval of pipeline permits and 
its environmental certificate (Canadian Press 2019). The current Green-NDP provincial 
government, which remains hostile to the pipeline, is now obliged to reconsider the previous 
Liberal administration’s approval and review provincial permits for the pipeline. If the 
provincial government is willing to use this opportunity against the pipeline, this could hand 
pipeline opponents a significant political advantage and indicates yet more delay for the 
pipeline ahead. Since the fall 2019 General Election, however, Premier John Horgan has 
softened his tone on the Trans Mountain pipeline, reneging on his own election promises, and 
now seems to suggest the project is more or less inevitable (Mason 2019) 
 
The General Election was held on October 21st, 2019. Throughout the election campaign the 
Liberals and Conservatives were polling at roughly 34% and 33% each. The NDP were 
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predicted to win 15% and the Green Party up to 10% (CBC News 2019a). Justin Trudeau 
was caught up in another scandal, this time for wearing blackface make-up on numerous 
occasions (BBC 2019a). Meanwhile, climate change emerged as one of voters’ top priorities 
across the nation. This can largely be attributed to a response to the millions of young people 
across the world joining the global climate strikes earlier in the fall (Taylor and Watts 2019; 
Wood 2019). The youth climate activist, Greta Thunberg, toured Canada during the election 
campaign, helping draw national media attention to the climate crisis and successfully 
framing the general election as a “climate election.” Just three days before the polls opened, 
her presence at a rally in Edmonton, Alberta drew a crowd of up to 10,000 supporters (Boles 
2019). This number of people  rallying around climate change is unprecedented in Alberta 
(Junker 2019).63  
 
Organizations like 350 Canada and their #OurTime campaign supported parliamentary 
candidates in several key races who pledged to legislate for a Green New Deal if elected. 
Despite this, a broader climate justice strategy to take advantage of the election’s climate 
framing did not avail itself in time. In the run up to voting day, all major political parties 
pledged to reduce or end subsidies for fossil fuel companies (Rabson 2019). During the 
campaign, the Liberal Party unveiled plans to pass a Just transition Act if reelected, while the 
federal NDP pledged $15 billion for emissions reductions measures and investment in 
300,000 “green jobs,” (Harris 2019; Hoye 2019). The Liberal Party also said it will use the 
revenue it gains from the pipeline to plant more trees, to which activists quickly pointed out 
 
63 The rally was met with a small counter protest organized by pro-oil and gas organizations in Alberta. 
Thunberg also joined the Fridays for the Future school strike in Vancouver a few days after the election. In a 
rally of up to 15,000 people, she spoke alongside First Nations’ campaigners leading the fight against TMX. 
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that ending deforestation associated with the expansion of the tar sands would achieve the 
same goal with a lot less trouble (Lowrie 2019). With more focus on climate change than any 
previous election, the Trudeau government’s purchase of the pipeline came under greater 
scrutiny. Nevertheless, the Liberals and the Canadian oil industry have successfully obscured 
the connection between the pipeline and climate emergency with assertions that tar sands can 
be extracted and transported sustainably, that Canada’s oil is the most responsibly produced 
in the world, and that building the pipeline can balance economic concerns with 
environmental ones. As such, despite climate change emerging as amongst Canadian voters’ 
top priorities, nationally pipeline politics seemed to have little bearing on how Canadians 
voted in the General Election. It remains unclear what climate justice campaigner could have 
done differently to change this outcome. 
 
Ultimately, the election saw Prime Minister Trudeau and the Liberal Party return to office 
although in a minority government (BBC 2019b). The Liberals won 157 seats on 33% of the 
vote, the Conservatives won 121 seats on 34% of the vote, the Bloc Quebecois saw a 
surprising surge in support and won 32 seats on 7% of the vote (the Bloc Quebecois only 
runs candidates in Quebec and swept the province), the NDP won 24 seats on 16%, and the 
Greens won three seats on 6.5%. While Trudeau’s approval of the pipeline came under 
greater scrutiny because of the election’s focus on climate change, the connection between 
the pipeline and its climate consequences did not seem to sway a relevant number of voters 
away from the Liberals. In the last weeks prior to the election, there had been hopes amongst 
pipeline opponents that the vote would result in a minority Liberal government, forcing 
Trudeau to forge a governing agreement or coalition government with the NDP or Green 
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Party. The Greens said they would not support any minority government that would build the 
pipeline and Jagmeet Singh had told reporters that whether the NDP remained in opposition 
or in government they would continue to oppose the pipeline (Thurton 2019). A Liberal-
Green or Liberal-NDP coalition government could well have spelled the end for the Trans 
Mountain pipeline. Following the election result, however, Prime Minister Trudeau made it 
clear that he would not seek any such alliance and that the completion of the pipeline would 
remain one of his administration’s top priorities (Curry and Walsh 2019). 
 
The General Election results in Alberta saw the Conservative Party regain enormous support 
across the province. Almost every Albertan riding is now represented in Parliament by a 
member of the Conservative Party. This is significant because it has rekindled longstanding 
resentment and feelings of Albertan cultural alienation and political isolation from the rest of 
Canada, particularly in the federal legislature. Since the election, some on the far right have 
been stoking these resentments and a great deal of media attention has been devoted to 
growing support for the Wexit, Western States Exit, movement which threatens Albertan 
secession from Canada (Zhou 2019; Bartko 2019). Albertan Premier Jason Kenney has also 
flirted with growing resentment concerning the federal government’s detachment from 
Albertan values and politics exploiting (Levinson-King 2019).  Meanwhile, the Albertan 
Conservatives administration are imposing budget cuts arguing that the flagging oil economy 
in Alberta and federal overreach are to blame (Leggett 2019). We could read this as a tactic 
to rile up Albertans against an outside enemy that’s hindering their oil economy. This allows 
the oil industry and the Conservatives to blame the Liberals for policies that have slowed 
development in the oil sands and limited pipeline capacity.  
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The oil industry itself has seized upon the opportunity. Indeed, following the election, 
Trudeau promised TMX would be built as a commitment to bridge the divides in the county. 
After this, CBC published an article entitled Trudeau extends olive branch to Western 
Canada, vows to build Trans Mountain despite opposition (Tasker 2019b). Another opinion 
piece published in the Globe and Mail accompanies the headline The Trans Mountain 
Expansion is Nation-Building, Pure and Simple (Dodig 2019).64 As these headlines suggest, 
pro-pipeline discourses are increasingly framing its construction as a national unity project 
that can heal the divides revealed through the election. 
 
Shortly after the election, activists renewed direct action tactics against the project. On 
November 5th, 2019, a group of youth climate activists, Greenpeace activists, Portland Rising 
Tide members, Mosquito Fleet, and First Nations campaigners, sailed out on kayaks to block 
shipments of pipeline equipment arriving into Washington (from where it will be transported 
by rail to Canada). They chained themselves to a pier on the Columbia River between 
Oregon and Port preventing the ship carrying equipment from docking, before being arrested 
(Van der Voo 2019). The Tsleil-Waututh nation, meanwhile, has appealed their case to the 
Supreme Court. They have argued that the Federal Court of Appeals’ ruling on September 
4th, which allowed six First Nations’ appeals to proceed, nonetheless severely curtailed the 
grounds on which they would be allowed to present their case. They have argued these 
limitations are illegal and will take the case to the Canadian Supreme Court while continuing 
their lawsuit in the FCA (Sacred Trust Initiative 2019). 
 
64 The first line of this article reads; ““Canada’s energy sector is our country’s ‘family business.’” 
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As of writing, the Trans Mountain pipeline has not been defeated, although it has certainly 
suffered defeats. Moreover, as we’ve seen with the Trump administration offering Keystone 
XL a second lease on life, pipelines have a way of coming back from the dead. Pipeline 
opponents’ attempts to rout shareholder confidence through a variety of tactics have proved 
successful. Yet attempts at delaying the pipeline to death have become less feasible since the 
government bought the pipeline. On the whole, governments are more vulnerable to the 
losing the electorate’s confidence than to losing shareholders’ confidence. The state’s 
ownership of the project complicates the movement’s interventions. On the other hand, First 
Nations’ legal teams are quietly confident that the NEB’s review and inadequate consultation 
process can be overturned again, regardless of who owns the pipeline (Kung 2018). On the 
other hand, the state’s ownership of the pipeline provides the project with a great deal more 
coercive resources and support and is less suspectable to the regulatory delay tactics activists 
deployed against Kinder Morgan. Meanwhile, it seems certain that should construction begin 
in earnest on Burnaby Mountain or anywhere near the Tiny House Warriors, communities 
across the pipeline route will not hesitate to take direct action with the potential of First 
Nations-led protest camps and civil disobedience on a scale the campaign has not yet seen. 
 
There was, and continues to be, a great deal of speculation as to why Kinder Morgan issued 
its pivotal ultimatum. It seems likely, however, that the company was all too aware that its 
project was running over budget and out of time.  Following the legal hearings, executives 
may well have realized they would likely lose the lawsuit. The threat of already having sunk 
billions of dollars into a pipeline they couldn’t build was very real. They needed an exit 
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strategy that wouldn’t lose the company billions of dollars and that could maintain 
shareholder confidence. Meanwhile, continuously repeating the narrative that the pipeline 
had to be built because it was “in the national interest,” the Trudeau administration backed 
itself into a position where any perceived failure to support the pipeline amounted to a 
betrayal of Canadian workers and the economy.  Kinder Morgan and the oil industry took 
advantage of, and in many ways reinforced, these discursive conditions by framing a 
narrative in which hard working Albertans were the victims of an elite, foreign-funded, 
environmental lobby seeking to undermine their way of life.  
 
The power of this narrative ensured two things: firstly, that the pipeline would continue to 
have a sponsor even if Kinder Morgan abandoned it; and secondly, that Kinder Morgan’s exit 
could be blamed on the government’s failure to resolve tensions between Notley and Horgan, 
rather than illustrating the company’s own failure to gain First Nations consent, to recognize 
the costs involved in building a pipeline across the Rocky Mountains, and to submit itself to 
a rigorous review process. The pipeline, meanwhile, shifted from an economic concern to a 
political one. Thus, when Kinder Morgan’s ultimatum came, short of the government 
agreeing to deploy military intervention to provide the security the company requested (this 
may sound drastic but mainstream conversations at the time certainly countenanced it), the 
government found itself in a position where, politically, it had little choice but to buy the 
pipeline.  
 
Petro-Hegemony and the Trans Mountain Pipeline 
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In the following section, I illustrate how the theory of petro-hegemony I developed in 
Chapter Two helps us make sense of the power relations and terrains of struggle engrained in 
the empirical events I have recounted above. The three elements of petro-hegemony – petro-
culture, petro-capitalism, and the petro-state – are all on full display in the Trans Mountain 
conflict. Moreover, the case study teaches us a great deal about how relations of consent, 
coercion and compliance are manipulated and intervened upon by the fossil fuel industry, as 
well as the importance of contextual specificity to understanding these interventions. The 
case study also illustrates some of the aspects of petro-hegemony that the theory on its own 
was unable to explain. Confronting these limitations has helped me develop the concept. For 
example, as the Canadian government ultimately nationalized the pipeline project, I had to 
extend the idea beyond its original application to individual private companies and instead 
understand it as a set of conditions produced, manipulated, and reinforced by an industry that 
is almost always simultaneously public and private. Moreover, observing petro-hegemony’s 
empirical interaction with the conditions in which it operates, like settler colonialism, I had to 
develop upon the relationship between the hegemonic relations of power contained under the 
term and those contained by the broader matrix of domination in which the concept is 
deployed. In turn, both these insights help us understand how the conditions arose in which 
the Canadian government was compelled to purchase the pipeline and claim it was doing so 
“in the national interest.” Below, I identify the means by which the industry operationalized 
interventions in relations of consent, coercion, and compliance, and how petro-hegemony 
was manifested in the case study. 
 
Petro-culture and Consent 
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I identified three major narratives through which petro-culture produces consent to the 
industry’s projects. These are petro-nationalism, petro-liberalism, and narratives of division, 
diversion and distraction. Each of these narrative categories has its own set of sub-narratives, 
some of which intersect and overlap with those belonging to other categories and some of 
which contradict or distract from them. The co-existence of complimentary and contradictory 
narratives actually helps maintain consent across a broader spectrum of social groupings as 
each is targeted at a different audience. These are discourses founded upon arguments that 
often fall apart when subjected to even the most cursory interrogation. Their factual accuracy 
does not matter, it is not the source of their potency. What matters is that they are packaged 
as stories, that they resonate with deeply engrained underlying values and belief-systems like 
fair play, racism, or national pride, and that they are repeated over and over again until they 
become common sense. Lastly, in terms of the venues from which they are issued, all of 
these discourses tended to operate at a national and provincial scale rather than locally in 
Burnaby or the metropolitan Vancouver region. 
 
Petro-nationalist discourses position the pipeline as “critical infrastructure” that is in “the 
national interest.” Throughout the pipeline struggle, this sentiment and the term “national 
interest” has been repeated ad infinitum by Conservative and Liberal politicians (Aiello 2018; 
Austen 2019), by corporate news media pundits (Carmichael 2019), by the NEB (Morgan 
2019), by pro-oil industry campaigners (Canada Action 2019a), and by almost everyone in 
the comments sections of Twitter and Facebook feeds arguing in favor of the pipeline. It is a 
populist claim-making strategy which conflates the construction of the pipeline with national 
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prosperity, identity, and pride. The pipeline comes to symbolize these things. Claims on what 
constitutes the national interest narrativizes pipeline proponents as acting for the good of all 
Canadians and positions the pipeline as boon to all Canadians. Oil and resource extraction 
are articulated as activities Canadians should be proud to support as Canadians. The pipeline, 
therefore, is a piece of infrastructure that facilitates an awakening of Canadian pride and 
identity. However, it is not enough for Canadians to be proud of extraction, they must also be 
proud of the product itself and proud that the pipeline is transporting Canadian oil. Domestic, 
Canadian, oil, in contrasted against “inferior,” “dirty,” “foreign” oil extracted in abusive 
dictatorships like “Venezuela and Saudi Arabia” (See updates shared on the Oil Sands Strong 
Facebook page for example). Canada’s oil is “ethical oil.” 65  The implication, then, is that 
any attempt to prevent oil extraction in Canada is an endorsement of the despotic regimes 
from which Canada must otherwise import oil.66 Accordingly, it is not just economically 
imperative that Canada develops its oil industry and associated infrastructure, it is ethically 
imperative too. Moreover, those opposing oil development in Alberta are discursively 
positioned as anti-Canadian hypocrites who would rather see Canada remain hooked on oil 
from places with lower regulations and rife with human rights abuses.  
 
When Trudeau told a room full of oil executives that “No country would find 173 billion 
barrels of oil in the ground and leave them there”, he was invoking petro-nationalism (CBC 
2017); when Canada’s Energy Citizens declares “Energy keeps Canada strong” they are 
 
65 Nevertheless, the economist Robyn Allan has written a series of excellent articles explaining why the Asian 
market narrative is a fantasy and why the oil industry benefits from the price discount because they tend to be 
transnational oil companies with offices in Canada and the US. See, for example, Allan’s articles What massive 
increase in crude oil exports to China from B.C.? (2019) and Debunking the $15 billion benefit myth around the 
Trans Mountain pipeline expansion (2018c). 
66 Right wing talk show host, Ezra Levant, wrote a book called Ethical Oil (2010) detailing this argument and 
out of which many pipeline supporters have developed their talking points. 
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invoking petro-nationalism (Energy Citizens 2019); when Canada Action runs a social media 
ad campaign promoting resource extraction under the slogan “the world needs more Canada” 
they are invoking petro-nationalism (Canada Action 2019b); and when the NEB declares the 
pipeline must be built because it is “in the national interest” it is invoking petro-nationalism.  
 
In addition to invocations of national pride, however, petro-nationalist discourses also frame 
a victim narrative depicting hard working Canadians as threatened by outside elites 
contriving to exploit “the people” out of a fair price for their resources.  The often cited 
“price discount” exemplifies this. According to this story, Albertan oil is sold at a discount to 
American companies because Canada is unable to export its oil to markets abroad where it 
could fetch a higher price. Therefore, the pipeline must be built so that Canada can diversify 
its markets and get a better price for its oil in Asia. Those impeding the delivery of Canadian 
oil to those markets are again positioned as enemies of all Canadians and colluding with 
American elites, like the Rockefeller family, and American companies who apparently stand 
to gain from ensuring Alberta’s oil remains on the continent. (Again, the factual accuracy of 
this claims does not matter to their intended audiences). This is reminiscent of what Adkin 
and Stares identifies as “neoliberal nativism” (2016, 220). Referring to CAPP’s “Alberta is 
energy” ad campaign, meanwhile, Haluza DeLay and Carter have explained how the oil 
industry has engaged in a deliberate strategy of connecting notions of what it means to be an 
Albertan to the extraction and production of oil (2016). When Rachel Notley declared 
“Energy is an Albertan’s birthright” in a speech defending her support for the pipeline, she 
was participating in an industry-led strategy to tie the oil economy to Albertan identity. 
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When climate justice groups confront the oil economy, they are positioned as attacking the 
identity of all Albertans.  
 
These narratives have coercive, and potentially violent, consequences. As Monaghan and 
Walby have pointed out, the “critical infrastructure discourse,” in which oil pipelines are 
deemed “critical” to the national interest, legitimize surveillance, dispossession, and the 
disciplining of dissent for “the good of the nation” (2017).  It is an argument intended to end 
argument. For example, conservative Canadian senators urged Parliament to pass a bill 
officially declaring the “pipeline in the national interest” so that the government could apply 
more coercive pressure to get the pipeline built (Aiello 2018). Parallel to claiming what is in 
the national interest, the discourse also frames what is, and moreover who is, acting against 
the national interest. This dangerous rhetoric has established a populist “you’re either with us 
or against us” framing of Canadian energy politics. It positions all those opposed to the 
pipeline as “enemies” of the Canadian people. Out of this framing, conspiracy theories and 
spurious distortions of half-truths emerged. For example, the narrative that pipeline 
opponents are all “foreign-funded extremists” which took root in social media forums was 
provided with a veneer of legitimacy by the journalist Vivian Krause after her 
“investigations” found that American foundations had funded organizations like Greenpeace 
and Stand.earth (Krause 2019). While her so-called investigation could have turned up the 
same information with little more than a some cursory Google searches and a few phone calls 
(most of the organizations she targets post where they get their funding from online), 
Krause’s grandiose extrapolations based on her “findings” have been published widely across 
many centrist and conservative newspapers (Krause 2016; The Narwhal 2019).  
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As half-truths collapsed into widely shared conspiracy theory, pipeline opponents have 
increasingly been depicted as the pawns of American elite institutions who are intent upon 
destroying Canada’s resource economy for their own economic gain. Throughout his election 
campaign in Alberta, Jason Kenney fanned the flames of this narrative promising to “spend 
$30 million in taxpayer money to build what he described as a “fully staffed rapid response 
war room.” The proposed energy war room would help Alberta’s oil and gas industry counter 
what Kenney called lies from the “green left”” (Owen 2019). Online, in the print media, and 
even in Parliament, pipeline opponents are called “anti-Canadian energy activists” funded by 
foreign interests and hypocritical elites instigating discord in Canada (De Souza 2018b). 
Meanwhile, the war room is now operational and one of its first interventions has been to 
create an online platform for loyal Canadians to report “Anti-Canadian” activities and 
activists (Turner 2019; Kutney 2019). While the war room may be housed in Alberta, it was 
provoked by the rhetoric developed in the Trans Mountain fight which transcends provincial 
boarders. Moreover, lobbyists from the national news media conglomerate Postmedia, which 
operates the country’s largest chain of newspapers, have indicated the company’s willingness 
to work with the war room and facilitate its advertising campaigns (Owen 2019). As such, 
this war room and the rhetoric out of which it emerged has significant discursive implications 
for protest and the right to dissent in British Columbia too. 
 
But the narrative does deeper damage still. It renders invisible the existence of First Nations 
anti-pipeline campaigners who are categorically not “foreign” and who, more often than not, 
are far less funded than wealthy NGOs. Taken all together, these discourses legitimize not 
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only state violence but also threats of racialized and misogynist violence against pipeline 
opponents carried out by rightwing militia-like thugs. Describing the discursive shift from 
fringe to mainstream conservative rhetoric around the pipeline protests, Kai Nagata writes 
“this toxic blend of racism, violent misogyny and death threats appears to be intensifying as 
the Trans Mountain pipeline debate drags on.” Those targeted by this volley of (mostly 
online) hate and harassment, which has been whipped up by Kenney’s Conservatives and 
those parroting the oil industry talking points, launch their death threats with particular 
viciousness at women and First Nations peoples (2019). This vitriol is deeply rooted in a 
matrix of white supremacy, colonial and masculinist fantasies of extraction on the frontier, 
alongside profound economic insecurity in Alberta’s oil sands (Adkin and Stares 2016; 
Wilson 2014). Playing upon very real fears and racial prejudice, it also provides a convenient 
narrative through which to make sense of the pipeline protests while maintaining consent to 
the industry as a protector of Albertan and Canadian identity.  Industry front groups, and 
politicians like Kenney, are complicit in stoking these tensions. In this way petro-hegemony 
both exploits and reinforces a broader set of social conditions which include white 
supremacy and settler colonialism.67 
 
A secondary narrative, not quite as prominent amongst the Conservative talking points, but 
certainly a favorite within the Liberal Party and “moderate,” centrist corporate media outlets, 
is petro-liberalism. Petro-liberalism is couched in the language of reasonable compromise. It 
is most clearly articulated in the two sentences that directly followed Trudeau’s declaration 
that “No country would find 173 billion barrels of oil in the ground and leave them there.” As 
 
67 Drawing on examples like this, Chapter Eight explores how petro-hegemony shapes and shaped by the 
colonial contexts in which it operates. 
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he went on to say, “The resource will be developed. Our job is to ensure that this will be 
done responsibly, safely, and sustainably” (CBC 2017). In contrast to building pipelines “the 
Harper way” which overtly overrode First Nations’ treaties, rights and title, and ignored or 
dismantled environmental regulations, Trudeau and the Liberals promise to build pipelines 
“the liberal way” (which does roughly the same thing but pretends not to). According to the 
Liberal Party however, building pipelines the liberal way means doing so according to a strict 
regulatory framework with First Nations buy-in and in return for provincial support for 
federal climate policy.  
 
Describing the project in terms of “the most exhaustive review of any pipeline in Canadian 
history,” petro-liberal discourses emphasize the notion that Canada’s regulatory framework is 
doing the job it needs to do in order to ensure the pipeline gets built but is built “responsibly, 
safely and sustainably” (Brown and Parrish 2018). The Liberal administration seeks to 
“balance the environment with the economy” by building out the Alberta tar sands while 
simultaneously investing in clean technology, green jobs, and emissions reductions through 
market instruments like carbon pricing. Prime Minister Trudeau has increasingly used the 
argument that in order to get Alberta to sign on to federal carbon pricing scheme, they 
needed a pipeline in return (Kirby 2019).  The discursive compromise is understandably 
appealing. It suggests Canadians can have the best of both worlds: economic development at 
no environmental or social cost. Of course, this is just as much a fantasy as the myths 
contrived by Krause and Kenney. Nevertheless, it serves to align liberal and conservative 
political orientations around continued support for fossil fuel development across the 
country. 
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Running parallel to these narratives are liberal settlers’ invocations of First Nations support 
for the pipeline. Pipeline supporters will cite the 33 bands and nations along the pipeline 
route that have declared their support for the pipeline (Hopper 2018). In addition, some 
members of First Nations are active in sharing the narrative that the pipeline can be built with 
First Nations’ consent and that they have been adequately consulted (Cattaneo 2018). Others 
have themselves declared an interest in building their own pipeline. The recently proposed 
Eagle Spirit Pipeline, for example, would be owned by First Nations’ business leaders and a 
large share of the profits would be reinvested in First Nations communities (Morgan 2019b). 
Other First Nations leaders and supporters of the Trans Mountain pipeline, like Chief Ernie 
Crey of the Cheam First Nation and Chief Nathan Matthew of the Simcw First Nation, have 
condemned environmental groups for “redwashing” pipeline opposition and engaging in 
“eco-colonialism” by conveniently ignoring the First Nations who have declared they want to 
see the pipeline built and believe their communities would benefit from it (Cattaneo 2018; 
Shore 2018; Henderson 2019).  
 
Under the guise of balance, corporate media commentators from newspapers like the 
National Post and the Vancouver Sun amplify these differences to depict First Nations as 
evenly divided over the pipeline. While it is certainly true that, for a variety of reasons, many 
First Nations have declared support for the pipeline, and we must not deny their agency in 
having made those decisions, it is also true that the oil industry exploits these examples to 
illustrate their social license and demonstrate the hyperbole and hypocrisy of their opponents. 
This both undermines the pipeline opponents, who can then be accused of tokenizing First 
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Nations, and bolsters the industry’s claims that the project can be built “responsibly, safely 
and sustainably” with “social license” from “key stakeholders.” 
 
Finally, there are a range of subnarratives that I categorize under the genre of “division, 
diversion, and distraction.” These narratives helped shift discourse onto a terrain more 
friendly to the industry’s terms and distract audiences from the claims made by pipeline 
opponents. Online, instances of diversion included climate change denial and recitations of 
all the products and comforts, and indeed ways of life, oil makes possible. Others emphasize 
the importance of tax revenue from the oil sands in maintaining the comforts and services 
Canadians have grown used to. For example, one of CAPP’s front groups masking itself as a 
grassroots organization, Canada Energy Citizens, declares “Contributing more than $105 
billion to the provincial government over the past 10 years, the energy industry helps fund 
essential public services and build Alberta’s communities” (Energy Citizens 2019). 
Arguments that place a conditionality on welfare and government programs where public 
services to which Canadians are entitled could only be guaranteed in exchange for the 
development of the tar sands were also particular favorites of the Notley administration. 
Accordingly, industry-friendly spokespeople will often imply that without the tax revenue the 
oil industry generates for Canada and Alberta, there would be no funding for public 
education, public safety, or welfare provisions. Provincial governments can continue earning 
revenue and rents from fossil fuel extraction but only if the pipeline is able to get the product 
to markets abroad.68 This is a divisive narrative that also informs relations of compliance, and 
 
68 This is reminiscent of what Watts call “petropopulism,” whereby politicians make promises of public services 
to their citizens, but these promises can only be upheld through maintaining the flow of oil revenue into 
government coffers (2014, 202). In this vein, Premier Jason Kenney introduced heavy budget cuts in Alberta 
following the 2019 General Election, arguing that continued federal hostility to Alberta’s fossil fuel industry 
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positions pipeline opponents against people who depend upon public services, from fire and 
police departments to healthcare, to public schools, to welfare, to parks and recreation. It also 
distracts from the fact that the industry is one of the largest beneficiaries of government 
welfare in the form of subsidies, free advertising, and policing of dissent. 
 
Meanwhile, the corporate media increasingly framing of the issue as “Notley versus Horgan” 
provides another example of division and distraction that suited Kinder Morgan’s interests. It 
divided the NDP and NDP supporters, it distracted from the other, arguably more serious, 
threats to the pipeline (including the lawsuits and civil disruption), and it allowed the 
company to blame the British Columbian government for the company’s own failure to get 
the pipeline built. In fact, Horgan’s administration became a very useful scapegoat as Kinder 
Morgan sought an exit strategy. They were able to place responsibility solely on the dispute 
between provincial governments and call upon Trudeau to resolve it. If he could not resolve 
it, which of course he couldn’t, the company could then claim the “political insecurity” in 
British Columbia made continued investment in the pipeline an unacceptable risk. Then, 
thanks to the narrative that the pipeline was in the national interest having been reinforced 
and repeated over and over again in the previous months, the broader industry had created the 
political cover, and indeed political pressure, necessary for Trudeau to bailout the Kinder 
Morgan and keep the pipeline project alive for industry’s needs at taxpayers’ expense. The 
combination of the distraction and the national interest narratives that both produced, and 
 
meant Alberta was losing oil revenue and so the provincial government could no longer afford certain public 
services. The move was likely intended to stoke Albertan anger at federal overreach (Global and Mail Editorial 
2019). At this time, Kenney also signed legislation introducing further corporate tax cuts (Sanger 2019).  
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were reproduced by, petro-culture, have maintained consent to the fossil fuel industry and its 
infrastructure even as Kinder Morgan itself failed to get the pipeline built. 
 
The three narrative genres I identified in Canada – petro-nationalism, petro-liberalism, and 
diversion and distraction – are communicated through different venues, messengers, and 
institutions, and target different audiences. In this way they articulate into alignment a broad 
range of political ideologies, identities, and cultural constituents. Alongside politicians, one 
of the major venues through which petro-nationalism was communicated is through online 
astroturf groups (Suzuki 2018). The prominent Canadian environmentalist, David Suzuki, 
has been particularly outspoken about the dangers of astroturf organizations. According to 
him the term refers to “purported “grassroots” efforts that are actually funded and supported 
by industry and political entities” (ibid).  Many will claim to be volunteer-run, politically 
independent, and only interested in combatting “the lies and misinformation against 
Alberta’s/Canada’s energy industry (See Robbie Picard’s Oil Sands Strong Facebook page, 
for example). Their independence or relationship with formal industry groups is often 
deliberately obscured. While some genuinely are volunteer-run, they maintain deep ties to the 
industry with shared frames, narratives and talking points which industry operatives amplify 
(Linnitt and Gutstein 2015). In this case study, astroturf organizations like Oil Sands Strong, 
Rally for Resources, Canada Energy Citizens, and Canada Action have been some of the 
most vocal proponents of the pipeline, as well as sharing some of the most egregious 
distortions of “the facts” and peddling in outright conspiracy theory online. They have close 
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connections both to industry and Conservative party operatives (ibid; Gutstein 2018).69 
Together the groups have amassed hundreds of thousands of social media followers. 
 
In addition to astroturfing, the industry’s messages are broadcast through a friendly media 
environment largely shaped by the consolidation of media institutions into just a handful of 
Canadian media corporations. When asked about obstacles to their own narratives, the 
consolidation of media in Canada was one of the themes activists raised in interviews many 
times over. The industry also seeks to embed its image as a benevolent neighbor upon which 
“the Canadian way of life depends” through more conventional means like sponsorships and 
ad campaigns too. This strategy revealed itself when it backfired in Kinder Morgan’s attempt 
to sponsor Kwantlen polytechnic in the British Columbian lower mainland. Its move was met 
with outrage and the college was forced to reject the money. Meanwhile, the Tyee revealed 
that Rachel Notley’s administration spent more $23 million on ad campaigns in support of 
the pipeline and targeting British Columbians with messages that their government was an 
impediment to Canadian progress (Carney 2019; CBC News 2019b).  
 
As these discourses are mediated through these points of intervention they infiltrate public 
discourses, they are picked up and repeated in public conversations, and as they are repeated 
they form part of the common sense through which the industry maintains consent. In this 
way petro-culture becomes entrenched, embodied, and taken for granted. It is true that 
Notley’s ad campaigns, oil friendly corporate media, and astroturf groups do more to give 
 
69 For a more detailed account of the role think tanks and astroturf organizations have shaped Canadian energy 
and climate change narratives see Donald Gutstein’s book, The Big Stall: How Big Oil and Think Tanks are 
Blocking Action on Climate Change in Canada (2018) 
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meaning to, direct, and reinforce petro-culture rather than directly produce it themselves. Yet, 
in the case study context, the impacts of all of these have been to reshape discursive 
conditions to the extent the federal government was obliged to buy the pipeline, that amongst 
many audiences the pipeline is divorced from the questions of climate change and First 
Nations consent, that dissent has been silenced and stigmatized, and the pipeline is itself 
perceived to be a “nation-building” project for the good of all Canadians (Smith 2019). These 
are the narratives climate justice activists have had to subvert and circumnavigate in their 
own efforts to wrest consent away from the fossil fuel industry. 
 
Petro-State and Coercion 
 
While in this case study the industry has poured a great deal of resources into securing 
“social license” and producing consent through petro-culture, there is also much evidence 
illustrating the mechanics by which it has infiltrated and manipulated coercive relations 
pertaining to the petro-state. I have grouped the different genres of coercive relations I 
identified into three categories for the sake of analysis and ease of communication. These 
three genres are the industry’s access to state institutions whose authority is ultimately 
enforceable through coercion; the industry’s ability to call directly upon the state’s coercive 
capacities through policing, surveillance, and physical repression; and online organizations 
with ties to the industry creating forums that incite (the threat of) violence against pipeline 
opponents to intimidate and silence them, and which representatives of the state either do 
little to curtail or tacitly endorse.  
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One way the industry has intervened in relations of coercion to get the pipeline built is 
through infiltrating and capturing state institutions that are able to enforce their rules through 
the state’s “monopoly on the legitimate use of force.” Its infiltration and influence over these 
institutions dates much further back than period circumscribed in timeline narrativized above. 
However, this pipeline conflict, and the period between 2012 and 2019, does illustrate some 
of most convincing examples of the industry’s access to coercive resources through the 
petro-state. In the four years leading to the passage of Bill C38 in 2012, for example, industry 
lobbyists met with government officials on 2733 occasions (Livesey 2018). Not only did the 
legislation gut environmental regulations and oversight over government surveillance of 
protestors, it also gave the industry unprecedented access to the composition of the NEB. 
According to Elizabeth May, it was through this legislation that the industry’s capture of the 
NEB was completed, (and, of course, the NEB is the federal regulatory agency responsible 
for permitting pipelines) (personal communication, May 15th, 2018). Extending its influence 
through lobbying, elections spending, and think tanks, Canada’s oil industry has 
demonstrated its ability to shape legislation in its interests and block legislation against its 
interests. The legislation the industry is then able to shape is enforceable through the state’s 
coercive resources and in this way the industry uses the state to enforce rules that advance its 
interests. Bill C38 and the corporate capture of the NEB are significant examples of this but 
are hardly outliers. 
 
A more recent example evincing the extent to which the federal Canadian government is 
beholden to the oil industry was in its response to Kinder Morgan’s spring ultimatum in 
2018. Kinder Morgan executives called both Premier Notley and Resource Minister, Jim 
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Carr, on the phone directly to deliver the news. Upon hearing the company’s announcement, 
Prime Minister Trudeau immediately set up meetings between the company and members of 
his cabinet to the negotiate terms on which the company would be willing to continue its 
project. Similarly, immediately after being told of the ultimatum, Notley cancelled a trip to 
New York (to attend the New Energy Finance conference ironically enough) so she could 
provide Kinder Morgan with her full attention. A week later, as tensions escalated, Trudeau 
cut short a diplomatic trip to Peru so that he could demonstrate the government’s 
commitment to getting the pipeline built by hosting a meeting between premiers Notley and 
Horgan (Morgan 2018). The ultimatum was received as though it were a national crisis 
requiring Canada’s leaders to remain at home and devote all their attentions to it.  
 
These governments’ willingness to drop everything else in response to the call of a Texas 
based pipeline company illustrates the industry’s influence over the state. Moreover, in its 
immediate willingness to negotiate on Kinder Morgan’s terms, the federal government was 
prepared to override provincial mandate and jurisdiction, indemnify the company against any 
politically incurred risk, and, ultimately buy the pipeline outright. The federal government 
bailing out Kinder Morgan to ensure the pipeline would still be built indicates the extent to 
which the industry is able to rely on the state to support its projects even when individual 
companies no longer want, or are unable, to build them (De Souza 2018c). It also illustrates 
the enduring relationship between the state and capital and the porous boundaries that often 
exist between governments and industry where extraction of strategic resources is concerned. 
With the state now directly in control of the pipeline in order to prop up Alberta’s tar sands 
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industry, we might also expect it to use more direct tactics of coercion as the government 
itself struggles to get the project built. 
 
The deployment of physical repression, intimidation, and surveillance were not as overt as I 
had expected after witnessing the extent of their use on both the Standing Rock and 
Unist’ot’en frontlines. Policing of dissent was comparatively restrained, muted and, for the 
most part, remained de-escalated. In Gramscian terms, this may be because the pipeline 
continues to enjoy a degree of consent that Standing Rock’s Water Protectors quickly eroded 
in the case of the Dakota Access Pipeline. As such, in this case for as long as the perception 
of the pipeline’s social license and legitimacy remains relatively intact across the country, 
there may be little need for the petro-state to deploy overt violence against dissenters. 
Therefore, violent escalation on the part of the state could also have been perceived as an 
admission of weakness and uncertainty in the pipeline’s social license. Moreover, the direct 
action tactics themselves have remained deescalated and have done little to provoke or 
legitimize a violent response. Restrained policing may also be a manifestation of building 
pipelines “the Liberal way,” as opposed to the perception of “the Harper way” which 
included greater willingness to use force. None of this is to say, however, that dissent went 
undisciplined. Policing, intimidation and surveillance of dissent are certainly evinced in the 
struggle against the Trans Mountain pipeline.  
 
One technique Kinder Morgan tried to use to intimidate and silence protest was requesting 
injunctions against activists through the court system. As a set of institutions that has been 
designed to protect private property, the law and the legal system are already predisposed 
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towards protecting industry over the rights of people to protect their homes. As such, Kinder 
Morgan was quite easily able to use court orders and injunctions to try to intimidate activists 
and prevent them from disrupting construction. The 2014 and 2018 injunctions were a 
coercive tool, ultimately enforceable through state violence, and deployed to protect the 
industry from pipeline opponents. The use of injunctions in this way is also legitimized and 
normalized to the extent that it appears entirely fair that the company would want protect its 
property from protestors. However, this tool kept the police at Kinder Morgan’s side and 
allowed the company’s operatives to deploy police and arrest or detain activists whenever 
they physically threatened the company’s operations or entered the injunction zones. The 
police functioned as a wall between protestors and their target. However, through civil 
disobedience and the discursive interventions it afforded them, protestors used the police 
presence against the company by illustrating the extent to which Kinder Morgan relied upon 
law enforcement to defend itself from people who simply wanted to protect the land, water, 
and their homes.70  
 
Along with the injunction, Kinder Morgan used the court system to issue SLAPP suits 
against prominent activists. This was particularly the case on Burnaby Mountain in 2014. 
SLAPP suits tie activists up in legal bureaucracy, wasting their time and costing them 
enormous resources. Claiming $5.4 million in damages from five local residents who helped 
organize protests on Kinder Morgan’s worksites, SLAPP suits also work as a deterrent by 
threatening others who would engage in protest to stay away should they be caught up in 
 
70 As Chapter Six discusses, images of police forcing native peoples off their ancestral lands, and arresting 
elderly local residents and young climate activists, so that the pipeline company could continue its work helped 
expose the colonial and extractivist violence inherent to the project. 
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multi-million-dollar damages claims. As several interviewees suggested, the costs of the suits 
alone would be enough to make even the most committed activists think twice before 
organizing a protest. We must read this too as a form of intimidation deployed through the 
coercive institutions of the state to advance the industry’s interests.   
 
In addition to the courts and physical policing, surveillance has been a ubiquitous method of 
control and coercion used against pipeline protesters. Stephen Harper’s sweeping reforms to 
the criminal justice system in 2012 made it much easier for intelligence agencies to target 
opponents of “critical infrastructure” like pipelines (Monaghan and Walby 2017).  Since 
then, Monaghan and Walby have documented how the discourse of “critical infrastructure” 
has been used by CSIS and other intelligence agencies to legitimatize an intensification of 
policing and surveillance of tar sands and pipeline opponents (ibid). Meanwhile, several 
Canadian politicians, especially Senator Doug Black, have sought to use the language of 
critical infrastructure and national interest in legislation that would force the federal 
government to deploy more repressive and coercive procedures against the Trans Mountain 
pipeline’s opponents (Aiello 2018). Jason Kenney’s energy war room which targets 
environmentalists on behalf of the oil industry has begun its attack on dissenters by using 
surveillance to gather names of prominent anti-Canadian and “Anti-Alberta” activists and 
publicly denouncing them. According to its online profile the war room will begin by 
investigating any group deemed to have “disseminated incomplete, misleading or false 
information about the Alberta oil and gas industry” and will host “public inquiries” if 
accusations prove fruitful (Alberta.ca 2019). While the war room is one of the most overt 
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examples of how the oil industry’s ties to the state gains it access to the state’s coercive 
resources, surveillance tends to operate in the shadows. 
 
Referring to Canada’s pipeline politics, Monaghan and Walby have demonstrated how 
intelligence agency reports are shared through a network of police, NEB, government and 
industry operatives. The RCMP has itself set up a Critical Infrastructure Intelligence Team to 
target opponents of tar sands infrastructure and anyone it deems a threat to that infrastructure. 
At the same time, the British Columbian police have established a new unit of police officers 
“dressed in grey wind breakers and polo shirts,” called the Division Liaison Team who attend 
protests and whose purpose is to keep events de-escalated while gaining information from 
protestors by engaging them in seemingly polite conversation (Fenton 2017). I saw this team 
in action at several of the blockades I attended and whenever they were present, the protest 
organizers told us not to talk to them. These officers would engage in friendly conversation 
but could later use what they learned in casual conversation against protestors. To the extent 
that security culture was encouraged here, only trained and designated organizers would 
communicate with law enforcement. Surveillance and information gathering can be used 
against pipeline opponents in a number of ways, from keeping their names on registers of 
potential troublemakers to making indictments and securing convictions against them. These 
are all forms of coercion and activists were encouraged not to make the police’s job any 
easier by accidently sharing valuable information with them. 
 
One of the main techniques surveillance agencies use is infiltration. They will send 
informants into activist spaces to gather information that can be used to indict activists and 
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increase sentences against them if they are arrested. Judge Affleck used evidence that Kinder 
Morgan had procured through private informers that had infiltrated anti-pipeline blockades to 
increase penalties for those breaking the court injunction and to justify strengthening the 
terms of the injunction (Waisman 2018c). Additionally, the police themselves were always 
accompanied by units whose sole purpose was to record with cameras, film and 
microphones, everything protestors said and did while participating in the blockades outside 
Kinder Morgan’s gates. Some activists also told me that police had tried to bug the Watch 
House but were discovered in the midst of doing so and left before they could finish. Sheena 
Wilson has argued that the surveillance of tar sands opponents across Canada is a form of 
racialized and gendered violence where the targets are very often young Indigenous men 
(2014). This was also true of the targeting of the Watch House and Indigenous protestors 
who stayed there. The use of surveillance can help silence protest by intimidating those who 
would otherwise want to be involved but it can also sow discord and paranoia in activist 
spaces which paralyzes their work (Pellow 2014).  In all its forms, surveillance is a genre of 
coercion that fossil fuel companies have access to through the petro-state and that can be 
used to intimidate, silence, and repress dissent. 
 
Finally, as frustrations about the pipeline’s delay are whipped up in conservative populist 
outrage, targeting of individual activists through misogynist and racialized hate speech 
online, and depictions of pipeline opponent’s as “anti-Canadian extremists” in the corporate 
media, has seen a rise death threats and physical threats being made against activists on 
Facebook and Twitter. This is a dangerous development that many activists fear could 
escalate into rightwing thugs attacking pipeline activists. In an email to supporters, Dogwood 
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accused Kenney of leading a witch hunt through his war room: “Feeding his so-called 
investigation is a snitch line, where every Internet troll and conspiracy theorist can report 
their most-hated environmental and Indigenous activists for suspected “anti-oil” activities.” 
As they went on to explain “This may be political theatre, but it’s going to have real 
consequences for our friends and allies.” Needless to say, misogynist and racialized violence 
targeting outspoken pipeline opponents can also have a silencing effect on dissent. 
 
When activists are facing physical threats to their safety from angry citizens for their 
opposition to the pipeline, and thus moderate or mediate their language, this can be 
considered a coercive tool in the industry’s toolbox as well. It is well known that extraction 
and mining companies linked to local militia and thugs operate with near impunity in the 
repression and assassination of environmental activists around the world (Watts 2015). 
Indeed, politically motivated assassinations of environmental activists have been on the rise 
worldwide, with number doubling over the last 15 years (Watts 2019b). While maintaining a 
distance so as to ensure plausible deniability, the outrage and hate speech oil companies are 
complicit in inciting is poses a physical threat to climate justice activists in Canada too. It is 
important to add here, that the violence inherent to colonial dispossession and extractivism 
are not new to Canada and have been experience by First Nations since colonizers arrived. 
Nevertheless, Amnesty International deemed the Alberta’s escalation of policing dissent to 
be a threat to human rights so egregious that it wrote to Jason Kenney publicly to call on him 
to ramp down the rhetoric and abandon his investigations (Amnesty International 2019). 
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Civil disobedience is a tactic that activists have used to reveal the violence implicit in the 
process of colonial dispossession. This is not revealed to those most impacted by that 
violence, they know all too well that forcing extractive infrastructure onto Indigenous lands 
is an inherently violent process. Instead, civil disobedience frames this violence to audiences 
who do not usually see or experience it, or who would otherwise take it for granted. As 
Chapter Six illustrates, activists have used the injunction, the threats to their physical safety, 
and the intimidation and surveillance they’ve experienced, to try to undermine the industry’s 
social license and force it into a legitimacy crisis. Ultimately, however, the federal Liberal 
government’s approach to pipeline building has given the pipeline protestors fewer instances 
of morally outrageous violence to frame. Thus, some activists I spoke with characterized the 
Liberal approach as one where pipeline opponents are allowed to protest, (and indeed their 
inalienable right to do so is coopted into the Liberal Party’s rhetoric), so long as that protest 
doesn’t actually disrupt business as usual. In other words, as soon as protest starts making an 
impact, that’s when the movement will be met with repressive responses. This may help 
explain why policing of protestors has escalated even while the kind of police brutality we 
witnessed at Standing Rock has not yet been deployed. 
 
Petro-Capitalism and Compliance 
 
Relations of compliance and their reproduction through petro-capitalism were the hardest of 
petro-hegemony’s three power relations to identify in British Columbia. This was partly 
because the British Columbian economy, while certainly an extraction-oriented one, is not 
directly dependent upon the production of tar sands. Meanwhile, Burnaby and Vancouver, 
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where the conflict has been most intense, are much more diversified economies than the 
traditional company towns that authors like John Gaventa describe (1980). These cities’ 
economic wellbeing does not rely upon the tar sands or oil extraction companies, and 
certainly not on Kinder Morgan’s pipeline. This is why local chapters of UNIFOR, Canada’s 
largest private sector union, publicly denounced the pipeline. Nevertheless, where all out 
consent was not forthcoming, compliance certainly became a driving force in Alberta’s 
pipeline politics.  
 
The pipeline’s representation as promise of a return to the boom times in a province whose 
political economy has been deliberately reconstructed around oil, and which has now been 
devasted by the boom and bust cycles of the oil economy, is enticing for those who have 
been out of work or suffered wage cuts since the crash in oil prices in 2015. Steve Bramwell, 
a former electrician who worked in the tar sands, told me about his former colleagues who 
were steeped in debt and “mortgaged to the hilt.” Debt, he told me, creates a compliant 
population in Alberta (S. Bramwell, personal communication, May 24th, 2018). It is one that 
is unwilling to challenge the oil industry even after it laid off thousands of workers during the 
2015 bust.71 Moreover, the lines between compliance and consent quickly blur as the oil 
industry, and pipeline companies in particular, position themselves as Alberta’s only lifeline 
and route back to prosperity. The choice is a limited one, and circumscribed by the way oil 
industry has ensured it remains the only viable business in town, but it has also translated 
compliance and apathy into public support for pipeline building.  
 
 
71 A combination of oversupply and price collapse led to over Albertan 100,000 workers losing their jobs and a 
severe economic recession ensued in the province. 
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Economic circumstances produced by colonial dispossession and extraction have created a 
dynamic of dependency amongst some First Nations governments as well (not dependency 
on the state as racist discourses often cast it, but rather dependency on the industry). There 
are roughly 120 First Nations along the route of the Trans Mountain pipeline. 33 of those in 
British Columbia have signed benefits agreements with Kinder Morgan and are represented 
by governments who are supportive of the pipeline (Zussman 2018).72 Benefits agreements 
are an instrument of compliance and Kinder Morgan has signed over $300 million in 
contracts with First Nations along the pipeline route (Hopper 2018). Yet, one must be careful 
when arguing that all the First Nations governments that signed these benefits agreements did 
so simply out of dependency. It would be racist and paternalizing to depict these 
governments as operating without their own agency and simply responsive to economic need. 
They have made their calculations and came to their own decisions for which they take 
ownership.  However, just like the Albertan workers steeped in debt, we cannot ignore the 
conditions in which these governments’ decisions were made.  
 
These are economic conditions produced by colonial dispossession and environmental 
degradation which make the oil industry, and a share in the pipeline’s profits, the only 
business in town. Let us not forget, too, that the Chief and Council system is itself a colonial 
institution imposed on First Nations through the Indian Act and designed to make it easier for 
settlers to dispossess native peoples of their land. By replacing their hereditary chiefs and 
 
72 A benefits agreement is an agreement between a company or government and an affected community where 
that community will receive a percentage of the profits and financial support from the company’s project if they 
agree to allow that project to operate on their land and in their community. These tend to be negotiated behind 
closed doors and the details of each differs from agreement to agreement, but they can often include clauses that 
prohibit signatories from speaking out against the company publicly. 
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traditional systems of government with elected chiefs and council, settlers sought to 
streamline negotiations over land acquisition, dispossession, and encroachment (Coulthard 
2014). As Kanahus Manuel argues, the chief and council system often ignores the fact that in 
the traditional laws of many First Nations the land and title is held in common trust amongst 
all members of the Nation, not elected representatives (Beaumont 2018a). In this way, 
however, colonialism, extractivism and dispossession are combined to produce conditions 
through which a dynamic of dependency upon oil revenue arises. Meanwhile, individual First 
Nations’ governments operate in response to those conditions but also make their decisions 
according to their own political, economic and ideological orientations. 
 
Eriel Deranger of the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, and Executive Director of 
Indigenous Climate Action, wrote an important article exploring the contradictions and 
complications of First Nations governments signing up to support for the pipeline. In it she 
reflects upon being asked whether she felt betrayed by her Nation’s Chief, Allan Adam, a 
formerly vocal opponent of tar sands expansion, and his statement in support of the pipeline. 
She answers with a “resounding no”: 
I said no because I didn’t want to be baited into fighting my own people. This is 
bigger than what Chief Adam has just said or done. This is a symptom of the neo-
colonial agenda. My community, just like the other Cree, Dene and Métis 
communities that have stepped up in support of this atrocious industry, have been 
forced into a corner through years of concerted pressure by oil and gas companies in 
collusion with government to accept the tar sands as our fate. (Deranger 2018) 
Her response invokes the conditions that colonialism has produced, and which have led her 
community’s leaders, and many like them, to resign themselves to the expansion of the tar 
sands. The pressure from oil companies “in collusion with government” is one that produces 
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compliance. Her arguments are evocative of what calls Al Gedicks calls “the psychology of 
inevitability” in which communities resign themselves to the inevitability of extraction and 
seek to glean what benefits they can from it (1993). Deranger’s article reminds us that First 
Nations’ decisions about whether to support the pipeline are very much operating in the 
context of colonized lands in communities where economic desperation is real and where the 
choice between oil revenue and poverty is often an unambiguous one. She describes the 
situation succinctly: “We are economic hostages in our homeland.” This example illustrates 
another situation where the distinctions between compliance, coercion, and consent are 
blurred through the choices available to those decision makers being circumscribed and 
limited by the industry’s participation in colonial extraction. Together we can think of these 
conditions as a stark example of petro-capitalism. 
 
Finally, I also observed examples of a dependency dynamic existing between Kinder Morgan 
and its access to capital. Indeed, like almost all publicly tradeable companies, maintaining 
shareholder confidence was a driving force behind many of the decisions Kinder Morgan 
executives ultimately made. Kinder Morgan executives were particularly concerned that they 
had sunk over a billion dollars of their shareholders’ money into a project that could not be 
built. They’re reputation as company that is perceived to be a secure and dependable 
investment was on the line. This proved far more important than whether or not the company 
got the pipeline project finished. Its reputation amongst shareholders is what ensures its 
access to capital, and thus its longevity. Moreover, if the project were starved of the capital 
necessary to complete it, it would fail anyway. The pipeline and the company depend upon 
access to investors’ capital, without which neither can survive. We can quite safely assume 
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this was critical to informing the company’s ultimatum and its desperation to sell the pipeline 
to the government.  
 
Activists sought to exploit this dependency dynamic by producing conditions of “risk and 
uncertainty” with a variety of tactics to scare off investors and starve the project of its life 
source.  In one sense, they succeeded. Hostility towards the pipeline in British Columbia, the 
lawsuits, and the protests certainly provided more than enough reason for Kinder Morgan’s 
shareholders to waiver. On the other hand, however, the government’s subsequent purchase 
and nationalization of the pipeline as a result, means the pipeline is now less suspectable to 
the temperaments of private investors. To a large degree, state ownership has removed the 
pipeline’s vulnerability to dependency on capital and thus activists’ ability to target its 
sources of funding. As such, this example also illustrates the extent to which the category of 
compliance is always a somewhat indistinct or nebulous one. As the state has bought the 
pipeline, relations of compliance may soon become ones of coercion. 
 
Conclusion: Questions for the Climate Justice Movement 
 
This chapter’s objective has been to situate the struggle against the Trans Mountain pipeline 
politically, temporally and geographically. In doing so, it has illustrated the operations of 
petro-hegemony as it functions in the midst of these conjunctures. By way of concluding this 
chapter, I explore the questions that situating petro-hegemony in the practical specifics of this 
struggle has raised for the climate justice movement, and I explain how these questions will 
be engaged with throughout the rest of the dissertation. In these last few paragraphs, then, I 
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will reflect upon how the events and theoretical analysis that this chapter has developed urge 
deeper investigation into a number of questions concerning the climate justice movement’s 
strategies, tactics, and narratives. These are questions and challenges, along with those 
explored in the following case study in Richmond, that animate the remainder of this 
dissertation and I preview them below to demonstrate the process by which I encountered 
them through my case study research. 
 
Using the master’s tools 
 
Audre Lorde famously said, “The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house.” 
Less well known is the sentence that directly followed this statement: “They [the master’s 
tools] may allow us to temporarily beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to 
bring about genuine change.” I met several activists in Burnaby who viewed the courts and 
legal system, electoral politics, and the state as constituting “the master’s tools” which should 
be refused and rejected. Others suggested that these are neither the tools of the oppressor nor 
the oppressed, they are neutral tools that both side can use to advance their respective 
agendas. Still others argue that these are indeed tools of the oppressor and yet may, 
nonetheless, be used to “temporarily beat him at his own game.” This case study illustrates 
some of the tensions between these strategic orientations and offers insights into how they 
may be worked through amongst activists. The prominence of the Canadian legal system in 
this case study introduces us to this process. The court system has been strategically 
leveraged by both sides to defend or undermine First Nations’ rights and title, but First 
Nations-led legal cases have been amongst the most powerful interventions against the 
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industry and incursions of the pipeline.  Thus, many climate justice activists are having to 
contend with whether their engagement with the legal system is ultimately legitimizing 
settler colonial domination even while their legal victories are holding back the incursions of 
the fossil fuel industry.   
 
Similarly, provincial electoral politics seemingly shifted the political landscape in climate 
justice activists’ favor and provided them with powerful, if fickle, allies in the provincial 
government. But it also drew attention away from the climate justice narrative, emphasizing 
instead the hostilities between Alberta, British Columbia and the federal government. The 
movement’s opponents have been able to reframe the pipeline narrative as one that helps 
pitch Canadians, and even Canadian politicians of the same party, against one another across 
provincial borders. Undoubtedly, the state, courts, and electoral politics proved themselves 
important points of intervention for the climate justice movement. Questions remain, 
however, about role of the elections, the state and the courts in the movement’s broader 
envisionings of emancipatory radical social change. In other words, how can and should 
climate justice activists engage with these points of intervention in ways that win tangible 
victories in the present without undermining longer term revolutionary and emancipatory 
struggle? These questions are developed, explored and challenged in Chapter Seven. 
 
Engaging petro-hegemony in specificity and at scale 
 
Petro-hegemony does not exist in a vacuum. As this case study illustrates, it operates within, 
shapes, and adapts to, the specific configurations of the oil assemblage and the broader 
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social, cultural, geographic, and historical conditions in which both exist.  The populist 
discourse of petro-nationalism, for example, exploits and reinforces pre-existing nationalist 
sentiments to embed petro-culture in Canadian common sense. Engraining petro-culture in 
Canadian and particularly Albertan identity is thus facilitated by appeals to national pride, 
fantasies of “energy supremacy,” and indeed the stark reality of white supremacy, while 
simultaneously erasing the country’s history of colonial domination. Interventions in 
relations of compliance, meanwhile, are aided by the legacy and continuation of colonial 
dispossession and extractivist degradation of Indigenous people’s lands. Thus, benefits 
agreements became a tool by which Kinder Morgan mediated compliance. Furthermore, the 
company’s ability to discount consultation with First Nations, ignore their concerns, and win 
court injunctions to coerce dissenters, are all assisted by the intersection of extractivist, 
capitalist, and colonial logics that infiltrate most of Canada’s state institutions. The passage 
of Bill C38 in 2012 exemplifies the intersection of these logics and how they both produce, 
and are reproduced by, petro-hegemony. Canada is a settler colonial state, and this is a 
condition to which petro-hegemony has adapted, that it emerges out of, that it has come to 
shape, and upon which it thrives. 
 
Understanding both the conjunctural specificity of conditions in which petro-hegemony 
operates and also the magnitude of the global flows, processes, and dynamics in which it is 
embedded, requires climate justice activists to vigorously interrogate the question of scale. 
For example, we cannot abstract the pipeline from its strategic position within the global 
political economy of oil, nor, indeed, may we divorce Kinder Morgan from its position 
within the global oil assemblage.  This means we must consider the scales at which 
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hegemony operates and the scales at which it should be intervened against. Scale here refers 
to the wider intersections of conditions of domination, what Collins a matrix of domination, 
that petro-hegemony exists within. It also includes the scale of the global oil assemblage and 
the scale of the commodity chains in which this particular oil source is embedded. But 
questions of scale also involve the scale to which the movement may be required to grow in 
order to address the respective magnitudes of the conditions upon which petro-hegemony 
thrives. 
 
The details of this case study lead us to address scale through the following questions: If 
private infrastructure ventures can simply be nationalized by the federal government when 
they fail, then at what scale is it appropriate for activists to intervene?  If an oil company is 
just one small part of the large oil assemblage, does it not make more sense for activists to 
target points of intervention within the broader assemblage? If the fossil fuel industry and 
petro-hegemony are just products of a broader matrix of domination, should not this matrix 
be the focus of our revolutionary attentions instead of individual oil companies, or indeed the 
fossil fuel industry? If we must intervene against the industry, the oil economy, and matrix of 
domination in which these are embedded, all at once, then to what scale is the movement 
required to grow if its interventions are to be commensurate with the scale of that which it 
intervenes against?  In sum, at what scale is intervention desirable, appropriate or even 
possible for the climate justice movement? I take up these questions in Chapter Eight, 
devoting the entire chapter to exploring the different dimensions of scale. 
 
Expanding the notion and purpose of the blockade 
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Blockades are becoming favorite tools of the climate justice movement and Indigenous-led 
campaigns to keep fossil fuels in the ground (Canning 2018). Naomi Klein’s coining of the 
term Blockadia invokes this explicitly. In the confrontation with Kinder Morgan, however, 
one might be forgiven for thinking that blockades and escalation of direct action has played 
only a minor role in the pipeline saga. Indeed, when Klein and the leadership of the UBCIC 
stood together blocking the entrance to the tank farm, the company refused to enforce their 
injunction and clearly hoped to keep protests de-escalated and out of the news. In some ways 
they were successful. Policing rarely involved physical brutality and the blockades 
themselves, which only lasted for a few hours once or twice a week, often on weekends, 
functioned more as symbolic expression of resistance than a material impediment to Kinder 
Morgan’s operations. At best, the direct material implications of the blockades seemed to be 
ones of minor inconvenience to the company. However, it is worth thinking about the 
strategic efficacy of the blockade in a broader sense too. This reveals more about the tactic 
and why activists have found it a useful tool in contesting petro-hegemony. 
 
The blockades outside Kinder Morgan’s gates can be thought of as a microcosmic 
representation of what the movement is doing on a march larger scale. They are besieging the 
tar sands industry at its most vulnerable points, finding chokeholds and bottlenecks in its 
supply chain, and thus limiting the industry’s ability to get its product to markets. The 
movement’s siege of the tar sands has been fundamental to preventing the construction of all 
five of the major tar sands pipeline permitted in the last seven years. Recognizing the 
strategically vital role pipelines play within the oil economy as well as their vulnerability to 
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intervention, climate justice activists have targeted these midstream operations in provinces 
where political opportunity structures are more favorable in order to halt upstream expansion 
of the tar sands in Alberta where those opportunity structures are less favorable (Hoberg 
2018). These blockades have involved a strategy of intensifying conditions of risk and 
uncertainty to make investments in the oil economy less attractive. Meanwhile, the acts of 
civil disobedience outside Kinder Morgan’s gates have sought to focus media attention on 
the climate justice movement’s narrative and demonstrate the profound depths of resistance 
to the pipeline existing in the city. Despite all this, many activists did share concerns with me 
about the efficacy of the blockades when they didn’t escalate and didn’t disrupt business as 
usual for the company. Others, on the other hand, suggested the blockades were already 
going too far and were alienating potential supporters at a time when other strategies were 
proving more effective. These strategic differences animate climate justice interventions. I 
address the tensions over strategic purpose of the blockade and broader strategic differences 
within the movement in Chapters Six and Seven. 
 
Alignment and narrative across difference 
 
From First Nations, to ENGOs, to grassroots activists, this chapter identified a range of 
different actors working together and playing important roles within the campaign to stop 
Kinder Morgan’s pipeline. The real differences between these groups, however, should 
encourage us to inquire into the process of constituting the relationships that were forged 
between Indigenous activists and setters who considered themselves allies. This exploration 
leads us to question like, how, and to what extent, were ENGOs, grassroots climate justice 
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activists and First Nations campaigners able to work through histories of distrust and 
exploitation to operate in an alliance against Kinder Morgan? Alignment across difference is, 
at least in part, a question of narrative. The relationships and narratives I observed while 
investigating this case study raised questions about how narrative is used to align diverse 
constituents of a movement across their different experiences, degrees of privilege, identities, 
and positionalities. Just as the universalizing discourses of petro-nationalism developed 
alignment and consent to the industry, the movement also uses populist narratives to 
universalize its claims across a diverse array of social groups and identities. However, it must 
also pay close attention to the differences that universalizing and populist discourses ignore 
or erase. They must negotiate a complicated relationship between difference and unity in the 
narratives that build their movement. Narrative strategy is vital to intervening in and shifting 
discursive conditions that provide the fossil fuel industry with consent. How the movement 
constructs and broadcasts these narratives is a concern discussed throughout this dissertation. 
Chapter Five, in particular, explores the different narrative strategies climate justice activists 
have used to align their movement across difference and shift discursive conditions against 
the industry.  
  
Points of intervention  
 
Finally, assessment of petro-hegemony in this case study has illustrated how consent, 
coercion and compliance form a mutually reinforcing set of power relations. This shows us 
why climate justice activists must confront the industry on all three terrains of struggle.  
Moreover, the conjunctures in which these relations of power became observable also leads 
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us to consider the different ways specific points of intervention may be engaged. Points of 
intervention can be captured and coopted, manipulated and exploited, subverted and 
undermined, reinforced and empowered, removed and destroyed, or ignored and diverted. 
Points of intervention can be material (like the physical sites activists chose to blockade), 
they can be institutional (like the industry’s capture of the NEB), they can be economic (like 
specific vulnerabilities in the oil commodity chain), they can be discursive (like the 
narratives both industry and activists use to shift relations of consent), they can be corporeal 
(as in the specific people and agents who have populated the narrative in this chapter), they 
can be political (like the legislation the oil industry sought to influence), and they can be 
social (like the relationships both sides seek to develop with shareholders, politicians, unions, 
journalists and so on). This chapter has indicated that activists and industry operatives choose 
to engage each point of intervention according to the specific characteristics of that point of 
intervention, the resources available to them, and the different theories of change they bring 
to their strategies.  
 
Terrains of struggle are comprised of innumerable points of intervention. Depending on the 
specificities of the conjuncture and particular context of struggle, some of them are pivotal 
while others may be less relevant. In the context of combatting Kinder Morgan’s pipeline, 
institutions, discourses, specific people, relationships, legislation, courts, regulatory agencies, 
have all proved important points of intervention distributed across terrains of struggle 
characterized by relations of consent, coercion, or compliance. How to judge between points 
of intervention, and moreover how to shape interventions such that they take on particular 
relevance or decisiveness is the art of the strategist. Yet, despite operating in the same 
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context of struggle, different activists perceived different points of intervention as more or 
less significant in their confrontations with the industry. These were based on different 
experiences, subjectivities, political orientations, and tactical preferences. These differences 
in strategic orientation lead to questions about how, and to what extent, interventions through 
the legal system, elections, and direct action could be synthesized to complement one 
another. The last question this case study raises, then, is how do movements comprised of 
numerous theories of change, political actors, and strategic orientations work across these 
differences to target all the decisive and pivotal points of intervention on all three of the 
terrains of struggle to topple petro-hegemony?  This is a question of critical importance but 
one that a single chapter alone cannot hope to address and, as such, it is explored throughout 
each of the subsequent chapters in this dissertation. 
 
To conclude, then, this chapter has placed petro-hegemony in the conjunctures of Canadian 
climate justice activists’ confrontation with the Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain Expansion 
Pipeline. It first situated this struggle historically, geographically and politically, in the 
context of Canadian energy politics, ongoing settler colonialism, and the specificities of the 
focal point of grassroots struggle in Burnaby and Coast Salish Territory.  It then illustrated 
the conditions in which petro-hegemony has operated and through which the pipeline was 
ultimately abandoned by Kinder Morgan, only to be nationalized by the Canadian 
government in 2018. It went on to narrate my own perspective on the seven-year period 
between 2012 and 2019 in which the struggle has so far played out. This narration offered 
insight into the ways that the industry and activists adapted and developed narratives, 
strategy and tactics to advance their respective agendas. This illustrated patterns and 
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dynamics that have shaped the pipeline fight throughout its duration. Finally, I explored the 
anatomy of petro-hegemony as a concept by placing it direct conversation with my empirical 
case study observations. Here I demonstrated the different ways the industry intervened in 
relations consent, coercion, and compliance and indicated the respective points of 
intervention upon which it deployed different strategies and tactics. Placing theory and 
practice in conversation has shaped the arguments made in both this case study chapter and 
the theorical framework presented in Chapter Two. This process ultimately led me to a series 
of critical questions for the climate justice movement concerning strategy, scale, narrative 
and alliances in the context of counter hegemonic intervention. It is to the investigation and 
analysis of these questions that this dissertation will turn in the chapters to follow. 
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Chapter 4 – Case Study 2: The Climate Justice Movement in Richmond, Contra Costa 
County, Ohlone Territory, California, The United States 
 
Introduction 
 
For over 100 years the city of Richmond, situated on the East Bay in the San Francisco Bay 
Area, has born witness to class struggle, movements for racial liberation, and environmental 
justice activism. However, since at least the 1970s the city has been primarily known for 
industrial decay, pollution, disinvestment, administrative corruption and neglect, poverty, 
drug and gang related violence, police brutality, and for having one of the highest rates of 
homicide in the United States. Together, the consequences of decades of neoliberalization, 
extractivism, and white supremacy, ravaged the city’s communities, unraveling its social 
fabric and sowing alienation and despair. It is this story of the city, however, that the city’s 
dynamic network of climate and social justice organizations are now seeking to change 
forever. 
 
Over the last 15 years, grassroots activists in Richmond have been fundamentally reshaping 
the city’s political landscape. City hall, once a passionless, administrative space, dominated 
by corrupt bureaucrats and corporate-backed city councilors, has been transformed into a 
vibrant political arena where solutions to the city’s many problems are furiously debated. 
Here, hopeless cynicism has given way to animated confrontations between those calling for 
radical systemic change and reformist pragmatism. 2003 saw the formation of the Richmond 
Progressive Alliance (RPA) constituting a coalition of local residents to take on corporate 
power in city hall and run slates of city council candidates committed to empowering social 
movements and the city’s inhabitants. Gayle McLaughlin was the first of the RPA candidates 
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to win office, in 2005, and went on to serve as city mayor between 2006 and 2014. In the 
years that followed, the RPA would win a majority of seats, and then a supermajority, on the 
city council, ousting decades of soulless corporate bureaucrats and ushering in an era of 
optimism and community empowerment.  Meanwhile, the city’s grassroots community 
organizations have forged a truly intersectional movement that bridges climate justice, food 
justice, racial justice, workers’ rights, prison abolition, affordable housing and more, to 
challenge a matrix of domination that has privileged corporations over people and the 
environments upon which they depend since the city’s conception. Transforming the city, 
this movement, in partnership with city council representatives, has a won a series of 
stunning victories against corporate rule and is prefiguring community-led alternatives and 
solutions to the intersectional social crises facing the city. 
 
Richmond grew up around, and in the shadow of, an oil refinery that would come to 
dominate its politics, economy, and culture for over a century. Standard Oil, John D. 
Rockefeller’s historic oil monopoly, built the refinery in 1902. Following the monopoly’s 
break up, Standard Oil California, later named Socal, took ownership of the refinery in 1911. 
After a series of mergers, Socal changed its name to Chevron in the 1980s and the refinery 
has been owned and operated by the Chevron Corporation ever since.73 When it was built, 
the refinery was the largest in California and it remains amongst the largest in the United 
 
73 By the early 1900s, John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil held a monopoly over 91% of US oil production and 
85% of oil sales. The monopoly was broken up into seven regional companies under the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act in 1911. These new companies were Standard Oil California (later Socal), Standard Oil Kentucky, Standard 
Oil of New York, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of Indiana, The Standard Oil Company (Ohio), and 
the Ohio Oil Company. Several of these companies have since remerged, or were bought by other oil majors, to 
become constituents of Saudi Aramco, Shell, ExxonMobil, BP, and Chevron (Bridge and LeBillon 2017). 
Chevron was born out of Standard Oil California (Socal changed its name to Chevron in 1984) and came to 
operate Standard Oil’s first Californian oil refinery, which was located in the city of Richmond (Chevron 2018). 
For a compelling account of Standard Oil’s history see Daniel Yergin’s The Prize (1992). 
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States to this day. Processing up to 250,000 barrels a day, it is also the state’s single largest 
stationary source of greenhouse gas emissions. Making up to $20 billion a year, the refinery 
accounted for 10% of Chevron’s annual earnings in 2013 (Early 2017). 88% of greenhouse 
gas emissions in the city can be attributed to heavy industry, and “nearly all of that from the 
refinery” (McLaughlin 2018, 143). Meanwhile, grassroots environmental justice activists 
have long accused Chevron of degrading the health of local residents through emissions of 
localized toxic pollutants. Industrial pollution in the city has disproportionately impacted the 
city’s low-income communities of color (Choy and Orozco 2009).  
 
Echoing a common refrain amongst Richmond’s climate and environmental justice activists, 
Gayle McLaughlin says that “for over 100 years Richmond was Chevron’s company town.” 
Its representatives dominated city council and the company funded churches, community 
organizations, schools and local public services. Occupying nearly 3000 acres, or 13% of 
Richmond’s land (Rein 2012), and, employing 3,456 people in 2016,74 Chevron remains the 
city’s largest employer and contributes millions to the city’s tax base (City Facts 2019). 
Thus, much of Richmond came to depend upon Chevron for everything from fixing church 
rooves to local employment to school funding. This afforded Chevron tremendous influence 
over the city, producing a corporate friendly business environment of deregulation and low 
taxation. Where the city rolled back public services to cut corporate tax rates and attract 
investment (often at Chevron’s behest), Chevron’s philanthropy came to replace them, 
 
74 Permanently employed workers at the refinery more likely number 1200 but the refinery contracted many 
more during its upgrade project between 2016 and 2018. Chevron does not publicize exactly how many people 
the refinery employs. It is also important to note here that just 5-10% of the refinery’s employees are Richmond 
residents. Most others commute from the wealthier suburbs (McLaughlin 2018). 
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cementing its image as a benevolent and necessary neighbor. This dynamic only entrenched 
Chevron’s hegemonic status in the city further. 
 
Recently, however, as the RPA and grassroots campaigns have grown in strength, Chevron’s 
local influence has been severely challenged. Since at least the 1980s, grassroots 
environmental justice organizations like West County Toxics Coalition (WCTC) and 
Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) organized Richmond residents to hold 
Chevron accountable for its toxic pollution of the city’s primarily low-income, primarily 
black and brown, population. They slowly gained ground, winning small concessions from 
the company but arguably doing most to lay the foundations for the upswelling of a city-wide 
movement that would take on Chevron and win some 30 years later. Out of the ground that 
these organizations had cultivated, a local, powerful, and intersectional movement, 
demanding radical social change, emerged to confront Chevron when it proposed a one 
billion dollar “refinery modernization project” in 2006, and again in 2014. The still corporate 
dominated city council obligingly provided permits for the project in 2008 but these were 
later overturned after activists challenged them in court. The grassroots contestation of the 
refinery modernization or, as local activists see it “refinery expansion,” that ensued sets the 
scene for the period of struggle described in this case study. Recounting the events during 
which Chevron’s hegemony was undone, and a new intersectional political agenda with deep 
roots in climate justice, emerged to challenge it, this chapter explores the process by which 
petro-hegemony was won and lost in Richmond.  
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Choy and Orozco write that “Refinery towns, like other oil-affected communities, are classic 
battlegrounds for corporate control and environmental justice” (Choy and Orozco 2009, 45). 
Such battlegrounds make assertions and contestations of hegemony visible and render 
Richmond a significant site within the climate justice movement’s confrontation with petro-
hegemony. Indeed, Richmond’s story has fascinated me since I first learned about it at a 
convergence of fossil fuel divestment student activists in Berkeley (just south of Richmond) 
in 2013. Since then, two questions have driven me to, and through, this research: How did 
Chevron remain so dominant for so long? And, moreover, how did a racially and 
economically marginalized company town, dominated by Big Oil for over 100 years, thrust 
itself into a social and economic resurgence premised upon environmental and climate 
justice? Two years ago, I wrote my master’s thesis examining one aspect of this question: 
namely, the communication strategies climate justice activists deployed to build alliances and 
shift discourses and relations of consent in the city. This dissertation returns to Richmond 
because I wanted to learn more about the community’s narrative interventions, but also to 
investigate all the other strategies and tactics climate justice activists have used to challenge 
the deeply entrenched hegemony of the fossil fuel industry in the city. 
 
As did Chapter Three, this chapter situates Richmond in temporal, political and geographic 
conjunctures. It depicts a partial, unique, and situated perspective amongst many other 
perspectives on the elements of the story I personally have learned about and believe are 
relevant to understanding the assertions and contestations of power here. Situating 
Richmond, this chapter places Chevron and the fossil fuel industry’s hegemony in a broader 
context of racial capitalism (Robinson 1983), neoliberal austerity, industrial decline, and 
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environmental racism, as well as the identifying the decades-old roots from which resistance 
to all of these has emerged. I go on to narrativize a more specific timeline of struggle which 
sees the climate justice movement come of age as it intersects with a whole host of other 
movements and campaigns and develops along the trajectory of the Richmond Progressive 
Alliance’s development. It also illustrates the timeline over which Chevron’s hegemonic 
status in the city has been contested, and throughout which its influence has endured. I then 
explicitly identify the operations of petro-hegemony in the city and depict the industry’s 
interventions in relations of consent, coercion and compliance. I conclude with the driving 
questions this case study raises and which the rest of the dissertation explores through its 
development and evaluation of the carbon rebellion. 
 
Situating Richmond75 
 
Richmond, like much of the urbanized East Bay in Contra Costa County, was built on the 
Chochenyo territory of the Indigenous Ohlone tribe who have lived in the region for 
thousands of years. Although the Chochenyo language went extinct and it is only recently 
that efforts are being made to revitalize it, many of the Indigenous people native to this 
region are engaged in the resurgence and reclamation of their culture after centuries of 
dispossession, erasure, and genocide. According to historian, Gray Brechin, the Ohlone 
found the land upon which Richmond now sits “so rich in food that they had, over thousands 
of years, built a gigantic pile of mussel shells at the mouth of a creek there” (cited in Early 
 
75 One important account of the city’s history that I draw upon throughout this section is developed in the book, 
Refinery Town: Big Oil, Big Money, and the Remaking of an American City (2017). It tells the story of the 
Richmond Progressive Alliance and Chevron’s influence in the city from the perspective of RPA activist and 
labor historian, Steve Early.  
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2017, 14). Spanish colonial dispossession forced the Ohlone off their land in a process that 
would make way for the industrialization and urbanization of the region that followed a 
century later. Spanish colonists coerced the Ohlone into the mission system in the 18th 
century. The Bay Area was densely populated for this period with over 15,000 native peoples 
speaking several distinct languages, and “living in more than 40 communities with well-
defined territories” (Byrd and DeArmond 2019). The Spanish invaders built Mission Dolores 
in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1776 and garrisoned it with troops and missionaries to 
subdue local Native resistance around the Bay and force them into labor for the mission 
system (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014). Nevertheless, California’s Indigenous peoples long resisted 
Spanish imperialism and organized multiple rebellions against the missions. As Roxanne 
Dunbar-Ortiz writes “without this resistance, there would be no descendants of the California 
Native peoples of the area colonized by the Spanish” (2014, 129).  
 
Despite Spanish attempts at cultural extermination and genocide, Indigenous peoples in 
California hardly faired any better under the early years of US rule, after the Americans 
invaded and annexed the state from the Republic of Mexico in 1846.76 The United States’ 
own colonialism promoted dispossession of the land and extermination of the people 
originally living upon it through the reservation system. This facilitated intensive resource 
extraction and a burgeoning export economy in the region. The industrialization of extraction 
and the dispossession of Indigenous people’s land would ultimately produce the conditions in 
which the city of Richmond emerged in the early 20th century. Through all this, Ohlone 
 
76 Indeed, the US settlement and occupation of California during what Dunbar-Ortiz calls “a true reign of terror” 
bore witness to the murder of over 100,000 California Native people over 25 years (2014, 129). By 1870, many 
of the remaining families were being rounded up and transported to reservations in Oklahoma and Oregon. 
Relatively few have since made their way back to the region. 
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culture and language persisted in the Bay Area and today Indigenous activists have sought to 
shape the regional climate justice movement’s orientation towards decolonization in 
important ways.  
 
Richmond is a working-class city of roughly 107,000 people and, despite the looming threat 
of gentrification, remains one of the last metropolitan hubs in the Bay Area where housing is 
(relatively) affordable. Median household income in the city is $55,000. The city emerged 
with the introduction of two important industrialization projects to the region: Standard Oil’s 
refinery which opened in 1905, and the terminus of the Santa Fe Railway line completed 
around the same time. Its location on the San Francisco Bay soon made Richmond an 
important hub of industrial activity, particularly manufacturing and import and export 
services. Richmond’s history museum attests to the city’s early industrial past and potential. 
Exhibits include a history of Chevron’s refinery in Richmond and Art Nouveau posters from 
the early 20th century promoting investment in Richmond, advertising the emerging town as 
the “Pittsburgh of the West.”  
 
Capitalizing on its strategic location with an already established railway terminal and 
industrial ports, manufacturing and chemical companies flocked to the town (Early 2017). 
World War One saw the refinery’s strategic importance grow through its contributions to the 
war effort. The region continued to develop throughout the early 20th century, as laborers 
from across the United States were enticed by the prospect of jobs in the rapidly 
industrializing city. The Great Depression did not hit Richmond quite as hard as it did many 
other industrial hubs across the US and, in the history Chevron tells about its refinery on its 
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own website, “the refinery made a significant contribution to the economic well-being of its 
employees and the City of Richmond by instituting a job-sharing program under which more 
than 3,000 workers, by sharing their work with others, were able to retain their jobs during 
the worst years of the Depression” (Chevron 2019). Ford built a motor vehicle assembly 
plant in the city in 1930 which also helped maintain employment throughout the Depression, 
but it had packed up shop by the late 1950s.77 
 
The New Deal and Second World War era saw the city’s population explode to 133,000. 
During the Second World War, the federal government contracted with the industrialist, 
Henry Kaiser, to build four naval shipyards in Richmond. Thousands of workers, many of 
whom were African Americans escaping Jim Crow laws and post-Depression poverty of the 
American South, were recruited into Kaiser’s labor force in Richmond. The workers in 
Kaiser’s shipyards built 747 warships and cargo vessels in less than four years (Early 
2017).78 These ships were fueled by the refinery’s oil, and, as exhibits in Richmond’s history 
museum can attest, much of Socal’s propaganda at the time reflected the company’s 
contribution to the war effort. Meanwhile, the oil industry at large argued, not without some 
evidence, that it was oil that won the war for the Allies (Chevron 2019). By 1945 the city was 
home to 55 military-related factories and companies (Early 2017). The iconic symbol of 
women’s empowerment, Rosie the Riveter, originates from the burgeoning wartime factories 
in Richmond where women and African Americans were brought into blue collar factory 
 
77 According to Early, when Ford moved production to San Jose its white employees were able to transfer with 
the company, but its African American employees were forced to stay in Richmond because they were not 
allowed to buy or rent homes near the new factory. 
78 During this time Kaiser pioneered a group health coverage model and a healthcare plan for all its workers 
deducted from monthly pay. The model proved so successful that the company developed a whole new area of 
business in health insurance and became one of the largest Californian health insurance providers, Kaiser 
Permanente. Kaiser Permanente remains an important employer in the city (Early 2017). 
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jobs traditionally limited to white men. 79  Rosie remains an important symbol in Richmond’s 
cultural landscape and has been appropriated to serve both Chevron and environmental 
justice activists’ differing agendas. The refinery’s influence over the city intensified in the 
post-war period and city officials eagerly cut corporate taxes and regulations to attract more 
industry to employ the city’s burgeoning population. Its wartime image, and its ability to 
maintain employment rates throughout the Depression, won the refinery a great deal of social 
license. The company’s contributions to philanthropy secured this social license. Meanwhile 
the company’s control over city council grew and one Socal employee was even elected 
mayor of the city four times in a row (Wenkert et al. 1967). 
 
In the years following the war, four more refineries were built around the Northeast Bay 
Area: the Philipps 66 refinery in Rodeo, Shell’s refinery in Martinez, the Andeavor refinery 
also near Martinez, and Valero’s refinery in Benicia. Along with Chevron’s refinery in 
Richmond, together these five refineries can process up to 825,000 barrels of oil per day.  
More recently, Richmond and Oakland have become sites of other fossil fuel storage and 
export projects. The Levin train terminal in Richmond has stored and exported petcoke80 
from the Bay Area refineries for some time. It has recently started receiving rail shipments of 
coal from Utah and Colorado for export to Asia and up to one million metric tons of coal was 
shipped through Richmond in 2018 (Cagle 2019). Kinder Morgan also operates a rail depot 
in the city and trains carrying volatile fracked crude oil from the Bakken Shale formation in 
 
79 For a detailed account of the labor struggles that occurred against Chevron’s management and other industrial 
workplaces in the city see Steve Early’s Refinery Town (2017). These were often led by African Americans who 
had been excluded from local white-only unions. 
80 Petcoke is a byproduct of oil refining that can be burned like coal for fuel. It is a particularly carbon intensive 
and toxic pollutant and burning it is banned in the US. Refineries export it to Asian countries where regulations 
on burning petcoke are less stringent. 
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North Dakota through the city to this depot met with considerable community resistance in 
2014 and 2015. As the United States has become the one of world’s largest producers and 
exporters of oil and gas, (and fracking for natural gas has undercut the price of US coal), 
American fossil fuel companies are seeking markets abroad, particularly in Asia. This has 
opened up the Bay Area, and much of the Pacific Coast, to the development of fossil fuel 
export facilities. 
 
Prior to the Second World War, Richmond was a majority white working-class community. 
Demographics shifted, however, as thousands of African Americans from across the United 
States were recruited to the city by the burgeoning war industry, especially Kaiser. Despite 
relatively better living and working conditions, discrimination, segregation and racist housing 
and employment policies in California maintained black Americans’ status as an underclass 
until the Civil Rights era. White hostility towards black neighbors intensified in the years 
following the war and many whites protested when black families tried to move into all white 
neighborhoods. This racist hostility was legalized through battles over Richmond’s public 
housing policy which forced African Americans out of public housing. The legacies of these 
racist policies continue to impact the city’s now majority communities of color today. Racist 
housing policies of the 1950s ensured most of the city’s black population lived in closest 
proximity to heavy industry. Many were confined to a neighborhood known as the “Iron 
Triangle.” The area was named for the three railway lines that roughly demarcate the 
residential zone in the form of a triangle and which separates residential from industrial 
zones. During the 1980s, this neighborhood became infamous for some of the highest rates of 
impoverishment and crime in the city. The incorporated North Richmond area is also directly 
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downwind of many industrial projects including the refinery and remains home to much of 
the city’s black community.  
 
This pollution and its legacy come at a tremendous cost to public health and livelihoods. 
Despite winning some regulatory concessions from the Bay Area’s five refineries over the 
last 30 years, “refinery communities are still at a significantly higher risk of dying from heart 
disease and strokes. The largest disparity is felt by the African-American populations” who 
are 150% more likely to die from these diseases than the Contra Costa County average 
(Casanova, Diemoz, Lifshay, McKetney 2010; Ferrar and Jalbert 2016). In the city itself, the 
refinery and other industrial projects have been linked to rates of asthma amongst children 
and long-term residents well above the national average and disproportionally impacting 
Richmond’s communities of color (Lopez et al. 2009). Exposure to toxins associated with oil 
refineries, like benzene, is also correlated with higher rates of cancer and threats to 
reproductive health. Environmental racism has produced a public health crisis in the city and 
saw the emergence of environmental justice community organizers in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Dr. Henry Clark’s West County Toxics Coalition was one of the first 
environmental justice groups in the region to hold heavy industry, and especially Chevron, 
accountable for the consequences of their pollution.81 This early iteration of the city’s 
 
81 Now an environmental justice veteran, Clark told me about growing up in North Richmond in the shadow of 
the refinery: “I grew up in the primarily Afro-American community of North Richmond which is adjacent to the 
Chevron refinery and other industrial operations. And just growing up as a kid and a teenager I was aware of the 
ways that the refinery and the industrial operations impacted me and my family, and my community, by 
experiencing these periodic fires and explosions…that would rock our house and community like we were 
caught in an earthquake – and in seeing the flowers and leaves on the trees burned to a crisp overnight from 
chemical exposure” (personal communication, July 6th, 2018). His desire to protect his community and hold 
those responsible to account led him to form the West County Toxics Coalition in the early 1980s. 
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environmental justice movement laid the foundations for the climate justice campaigns to 
come, and the RPA’s victories on city council. 
 
Systematic exclusion from decent housing, education, and employment saw racial tensions 
intensify in Richmond during the height of the Civil Rights era. These tensions escalated to 
their peak in 1968 after a series of riots destroyed much of the downtown area, which never 
recovered. Following these riots (which were instigated when a white police officer shot and 
nearly killed an unarmed black teenager), whites fled the city for housing in the suburbs. 
White flight led to capital flight gutting economic activity in downtown Richmond along 
MacDonald Avenue. Steve Early recounts how, following the destruction of the retail district 
in the midst of these riots, Chevron decided to build the Hilltop Shopping Mall on the site of 
a former Standard Oil storage tank farm (2017). The local shops that did reopen downtown 
couldn’t compete with the low prices and convenience that the chain-stores at the mall 
offered. They shuttered their windows for good in the early 1970s.  
 
Seeing an opportunity to mobilize black communities against white supremacy and 
particularly police brutality in Richmond, the Black Panthers had made Richmond an 
important stronghold in their struggle for black liberation in the 1960s. By the 1980s, as the 
white exodus continued, African Americans became the city’s largest population. By 2002, 
Richmond “had a black mayor (and city manager)… every department head in the city, and 
so was the city council majority” (Early 2017, 28). Those hoping this would bring 
progressive, even emancipatory governance to the city after the optimism of the Civil Rights 
movement were disappointed. As Early puts it “a corporate backed African American 
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political machine, aligned with conservative, self-serving, and predominantly white police 
and firefighter unions, dominated city government” (ibid). The radicalism of the Black 
Panther Party was marginalized as many of the leaders in Richmond’s black community were 
co-opted by corporate interests.82  
 
In the last 20 years, demographics have radically shifted again. Today, roughly 80% of 
Richmond’s residents are people of color and 20% are first generation immigrants. Almost 
40% of Richmond’s residents are Latinx, 26.5% are black or African American, and 14% are 
Asian and Pacific Islanders – represented in large part by the Laotian community (City Facts 
2019). These shifting demographics have also seen a shift in political power within the city 
(Schafran and Feldstein 2013). The resurgence of black political progressivism alongside a 
multiracial alliance for environmental and climate justice, involving strong leadership from 
the city’s Laotian community, has produced a significant challenge to Richmond’s corporate 
friendly African American establishment (ibid; Shah 2011). 
 
Demographics alone, however, do not explain the significant shifts in Richmond’s political 
landscape. From the 1980s to the early 2000s, Richmond was subjected to systematic 
disinvestment, industrial decline, capital flight, austerity, and administrative corruption. 
During this period “cronyism, corruption, and bureaucratic incompetence became deeply 
entrenched and much intertwined” (Early 2017, 28-29). Current city mayor, Tom Butt, says 
 
82 It is important that we refuse essentialist or reductive narratives when exploring the demographic shifts of 
Richmond as a whole here. Richmond’s communities of color are not a united or homogenized entity, and they 
certainty do not act or speak with one voice. Indeed, deep ideological and experiential schisms exist, 
particularly between the wealthier, business-oriented residents and those living on the frontlines of poverty and 
environmental racism. 
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that at this time “the city was pretty much run by the business interests Chevron cultivated” 
(cited in Early 2017, 29). The consequences of corporate friendly tax and regulatory 
environment, the neoliberal rollback of government services across the country, and the 
legacy of toxic pollution led to widespread poverty, decaying social fabric, soaring rates of 
crime, and drug and gang related violence. The rate of AIDS transmission in Richmond was 
the highest in the Bay Area and decimated the community. Homicides took an annual death 
toll of 50 per year in the 1980s and peaked at 62 in 1991 (Early 2017, 38). The response of 
successive city councils was not to invest in the city’s residents and public services but rather 
to intensify policing of the very communities they were underserving. This led to police 
disproportionally targeting the city’s black and brown community and growing distrust 
between communities of color and the city’s police force. Allegations of police corruption 
and coverups throughout this time did little to instill much faith in the rule of law.  
 
Administrative corruption and incompetence at city government came to a head in 2003 
when then city manager, Isiah Turner “suddenly retired for “health reasons,” followed out the 
door by his financial director” (Early 2017, 39). Their departure revealed nearly two decades 
of financial mismanagement that took Richmond to the brink of bankruptcy when the city 
discovered that it had racked up a $35million budget deficit. The immediate response to the 
city’s dire financial situation was austerity. What few government programs remained open 
were slashed and city employees were laid off. As Early writes “The city’s full-blown 
financial meltdown led to two hundred layoffs and budget cuts, which closed libraries, parks, 
some fire stations, and senior services” (ibid). While certainty a time of near despair, it was 
this moment of wretchedness that gave the city’s progressives and radicals the political 
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opening they required. Responding to these conditions, they would dramatically alter 
Richmond’s political landscape, shift the dominant narratives that had maintained consent to 
Chevron and corporate interests for decades, and inspire a generation of activists to take 
power, democratize it, and redistribute it across the city.  
 
The city’s outrage, despair, hopes and a desire for radical political change would coalesce in 
the emergence of a multi-racial and ideologically diverse grassroots organization called the 
Richmond Progressive Alliance. Formed in 2003, the RPA “is simultaneously an electoral 
formation, a membership organization, a coalition of community groups, and a key 
coordinator of grassroots education and citizen mobilization” (Early 2017, 3). In many ways, 
its political form mirrors that of traditionally European and South American leftist hybrid of 
social-movement and political party. Its emergence as a political entity and strategy in 
Richmond is largely credited to the Argentinean political exile, and social and environmental 
justice activist, Juan Reardon. Reardon was largely responsible for bringing together some of 
the city’s most prominent community organizers and activists, including Henry Clark, 
Andrés Soto, and Gayle McLaughlin, to found the RPA and develop its political program. 
With the support of local community organizations, the RPA would run progressive 
candidates to break up the Chevron-backed establishment on city council. It would also 
organize the community and building social movement pressure year-round to hold the 
council accountable to city residents’ most pressing concerns. Moreover, in running a 
progressive slate of candidates, the Alliance would seek to minimize the chances of splitting 
the leftwing and progressive vote, thus thwarting conservative establishment councilors’ 
attempts to divide and conquer their opponents.  
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As Early writes “RPA candidates have distinguished themselves by their refusal to accept 
business donations, while welcoming the support of progressive unions…RPA work with 
labor and community allies has created strong synergy between city hall leadership and 
grassroots organizations” (ibid). The movement-party form combines issue-based community 
organizing, education, and empowerment with mass mobilization around electoral politics. 
Though new to Richmond (perhaps with the exception of the Black Panther Party), and in 
recent decades something of a rarity in the United States, the movement-party formation has 
its roots in 20th communist and socialist politics, and in early 21st century Indigenous-leftist 
strategy in South America. The innovation of this model in Richmond has been its ability to 
hold together a multi-racial and ideologically diverse alliance of residents who nonetheless 
share a fundamental set of values across very different identities, strategic orientations, and 
distributions of wealth, power, and privilege. From its position as a counter hegemonic 
challenger to Chevron’s corporate hegemony, this alliance has helped shape much of the 
city’s changing political landscape. Gayle McLaughlin was elected mayor in 2006 and RPA 
slates of candidates went to form a city council majority in 2014 and a supermajority in 2016. 
The organization’s dual commitment to grassroots organizing and infiltrating city council 
with a progressive political agenda has made the RPA a significant political force in the city. 
 
Despite, its significance, however, we should also recognize that the political situation that 
the RPA and Richmond’s grassroots climate and environmental justice organization have 
produced in the last decade are deeply rooted in the city’s history of social justice activism, 
as well as in the progressive and radical politics of the Bay Area more broadly. There is a 
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narrative amongst some of the city’s activists which suggests that the progressive political 
trajectory Richmond seems set upon was instigated endogenously as a result of progressive 
activists migrating to the city in search of affordable housing in the Bay Area.83 While it is 
certainly true that recent migration to the city has altered its political landscape, this narrative 
may also do a disservice to the decades of community organizing that cultivated the soil and 
sowed the seeds which ultimately made more recent political interventions possible. 
Furthermore, the RPA, often quite justifiably, tends to occupy the forefront of narratives 
recounting the political shifts that have occurred in Richmond. However, its primary role in 
countering Chevron’s hegemonic status has been to open up political opportunities and 
avenues of action through which other local climate and environmental justice campaigners 
are then themselves able to intervene in the relations of power upon which Chevron has 
depended. With links to the RPA’s leadership, organizations like the Asian Pacific 
Environmental Network (APEN), CBE, Sunflower Alliance, WCTC, and initiatives like the 
Climate Justice Alliance’s (CJA) Our Power campaign, have formed the backbone of 
 
83 This narrative was referenced by several prominent RPA activists in interviews and emerges in Steve Early’s 
history and Gayle McLaughlin’s memoir recounting the rise of the RPA. While certainly providing a partial 
explanation, this narrative is problematic on two fronts: firstly, (and neither McLaughlin nor Early necessarily 
do this), it threatens to erase decades of local community organizing which laid the groundwork for the 
interventions of activists to come. Secondly, with notable exceptions, many of these progressive newcomers in 
the last couple of decades have been white. Indeed, we cannot ignore the fact that forcing Chevron’s influence 
out of city council has also entailed forcing conservative and corporate-friendly African American 
establishment councilors out of office (Schafran and Feldstein 2013). Schafran and Feldstein discuss the 
shifting racial politics of Richmond and its intersections with environmental justice. They argue that in the past 
decade the conservative black political establishment in Richmond was challenged by a multi-racial coalition 
reflecting the shifting demographics of the city and emergence of a younger generation of black political 
progressives and leftists. Bindi Shah, meanwhile, has demonstrated the particularly high political involvement 
of second-generation Laotian women in environmental justice activism. These women have played a significant 
role organizing their community and influencing the politics of environmental justice in the city. See Laotian 
Daughters: Working toward Community, Belonging, and Environmental Justice (2011). Together, these 
authors’ arguments are helpful because they lead us away from a potentially problematic narrative positioning 
white progressives as “saviors” of the city, and instead illustrate political shifts that are both endogenous and 
exogenous. Moreover, it reminds us that the vast majority of migration to the city which help account for 
Richmond’s current political trajectory has not been comprised of white Americans but of migrants from Laos, 
Mexico, and South America. 
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community organizing for a just transition and campaigning against fossil fuel infrastructure 
expansion. 
  
As Schafran and Feldstein write, “political actors in the city are often part of larger county 
and regional organizations” (2013, 158). Similarly, Richmond’s most prominent 
environmental justice organizations and activists are not necessarily confined to the city but 
are often distributed across the Bay Area and the state. Indeed, many of these organizations 
run campaigns in regional and state-wide coalitions that spill out of the city’s boarders. 
Moreover, just as the influence of climate justice organizations in the city is not confined to 
Richmond, neither is the fossil fuel industry in California. With fossil fuel export terminals, 
railway terminals, large storage facilities, deep water wharfs, and five refineries, Richmond 
and the Bay Area form a highly strategic node within the Californian, US, and continental oil 
assemblage.  
 
President Obama’s reversal of the US crude export ban in 2015, President Trump’s 
administrative support for fossil fuel development and withdrawal from the Paris Climate 
Agreement, the fracking boom and associated price depression in coal, all saw the US 
become the largest producer of fossil fuels in the world in 2017 (it remains in the top three) 
as well as one of the largest net exporters of coal and value-added refined petroleum products 
(Bridge and LeBillon 2017). This increase in supply in the United States has incentivized 
industry efforts to get coal and oil products exported to Asian markets from the Pacific Coast. 
Meanwhile, despite its environmentalist image, and former Governor Brown’s aspirations 
towards climate leadership, California was the third highest oil producing state in the country 
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for decades, only falling to sixth highest in 2018 with over 169 million barrels produced in 
that year (Nikolewski 2018; Garside 2019). Governor Brown permitted over 21,000 new oil 
wells in California during his administration’s tenure, the majority of which were sited in low 
income migrant communities and communities of color (Last Chance Alliance 2018). Oil 
production has been a dominant force in California’s economy, culture and politics for 
almost as long as the state has been a member of the Union. 
 
The legacy of the oil industry’s dominance throughout California’s history continues to this 
day. This was most recently evinced in 2017 with the passage of Governor Brown’s 
landmark climate legislation, AB 398. The bill extended and expanded the state’s cap and 
trade program while gutting local regulatory agencies’ mandate to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions. Climate justice activists condemned the legislation as a wish list for the oil 
industry. Refining and shipping fossil fuel products to and from markets around the world, 
the Bay Area is embedded in a statewide, national and global fossil fuel commodity chain. 
Recognizing the limitations of municipal activism against an opponent that operates globally, 
climate justice interventions in petro-hegemony in the Bay Area take place in Richmond but 
have also expanded to the Bay Area’s other refineries and export facilities. Through regional 
and statewide coalitions, climate justice activists in the Bay Area are helping lead the fight 
for a just transition and against the fossil industry in Richmond and across California. 
 
Narrativized timeline 2005 – 2019 
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In the following section I have delineated a period of roughly 15 years during which time 
Chevron and the fossil fuel industry saw their influence decline in Richmond. This timeline 
is noticeably longer than the one circumscribed in the previous case study, and also develops 
at a relatively slower pace. This period also depicts the rise of the RPA and its consolidation 
of power in the city. It also illustrates the RPA’s recent defeats and challenges it has 
confronted as the organization has evolved. Alongside Chevron, city councilors, and the 
RPA, grassroots climate justice activists and their respective organizations are also key 
characters throughout this story. While much of their community organizing work has 
occurred quietly and unfolds in the background, ignoring its influence would be a mistake. 
As such, I highlight moments at which the city’s vibrant culture of community organizing 
has erupted in mobilizations of hundreds of activists and residents to bring Chevron and the 
council to justice. 
 
Inevitably, the story I narrate below overlooks details others might deem crucial, briskly 
outlines moments many in these campaigns believe might deserve more attention, and 
perhaps spends far too many words on events some may consider irrelevant. I do this in part 
because many others have told more detailed and comprehensive versions of the story before 
me (see for example Steve Early’s Refinery Town (2017) and Gayle McLaughlin’s Winning 
Richmond (2018)) and because I am recounting these events with a specific agenda. My 
agenda here is to draw reader’s attention to what I argue are some of the most significant 
moments that illustrate Chevron’s declining power in the city. Throughout the rest of the 
dissertation I refer back to these moments and demonstrate the mechanics by which the fossil 
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fuel industry’s opponents were able to intervene in challenge the relations of power upon 
which Chevron has depended.  
 
I start this story in late 2004 with the election of Gayle McLaughlin to city council. 
McLaughlin and Andrés Soto were the first city activists to run on the RPA’s slate. Juan 
Reardon managed McLaughlin’s campaign following the formation of the RPA in 2003. 
Soto, who is also a long-term community organizer with CBE and helped found the RPA, 
told me he had got involved after he and his son had been beaten and verbally abused by 
Richmond police officers. Alongside environmental justice activism, Soto has organized 
around ending police corruption and violence and advocating for more stringent gun control 
laws. He had been viciously attacked in mailers and ads distributed by the Richmond Police 
Officer’s Association and narrowly lost his election bid. McLaughlin, meanwhile, seemed to 
fly under the radar of the city establishment. Running on a platform of refusing corporate 
financing and ending Chevron’s control over city politics, McLaughlin found that her 
message resonated with residents who were deeply frustrated with incompetence, corruption, 
and austerity politics promoted on the city council. Seeing the election as an opportunity to 
organize the community, McLaughlin hosted town halls and community gatherings where 
she crowdsourced policies directly from the city’s residents. This approach further ingratiated 
her with the community, and she was able to position herself and the RPA as genuinely 
fighting for community empowerment and standing up for residents’ concerns. 
 
McLaughlin won her seat in November 2004. With her help, the city council moved swiftly 
to make some important administrative changes. Namely, they hired a new city manager and, 
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shortly afterwards, a new police chief. These two hires drastically altered the city’s 
administrative culture. Though hardly radicals, both could be considered liberal reformers 
who made important progressive changes to the way the city was run and policed. Police 
Chief Chris Magnus institutionalized an ethic of community service and respect amongst his 
officers and sought to root out corruption in their ranks. Bill Lindsey, the new city manager, 
inherited the financial meltdown and deficits the former city administrators had left behind. 
Rather than pursuing austerity policies, however, he worked with the council to keep services 
open while bringing the city budget back under control. Working with RPA councilors and 
environmental justice activists, he would go on to play a crucial role in updating the city’s 
General Plan. The Plan would guide all new land use policy with greater attention to public 
health, climate, energy, and environmental justice. 
 
Throughout 2005, however, McLaughlin found herself ignored and sidelined by the majority 
of establishment, corporate-friendly councilmembers sitting alongside her. Arguing that she 
could more effectively set the tone for the city’s political agenda in the position of city 
mayor, Reardon and early members of the RPA persuaded McLaughlin to run against the 
incumbent mayor, Irma Anderson, at the next election. Drawing upon the lessons of her 2004 
bid, and continuing her community organizing approach to elections, McLaughlin defeated 
Anderson in 2006.  Meanwhile, with McLaughlin’s support climate justice organizers and 
activists rallied around a ballot measure, Measure T, that would have forced Chevron and 
other local heavy industries to increase their contribution to the tax city’s base to help 
manage the city’s financial crisis. The bill was poorly written, however, and included 
language that would also have impacted smaller local businesses more vulnerable to 
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increasing tax rates. The ballot measure was defeated in the same election that saw 
McLaughlin elected mayor, but the support both received indicated residents’ growing 
frustration with Chevron and constituted an opening salvo in a new phase of the city’s 
confrontation with the company. In late 2006 and early 2007 Chevron began its application 
to the city for permits to “modernize” its refinery. It’s modernization plan constituted 
building a new hydrogen plant and upgrading its hyrdocracking equipment that would allow 
the refinery to process heavier crude oil with higher contents of sulfur and other impurities. 
 
Throughout the next two years the scale and consequences of Chevron’s refinery upgrade 
would reveal themselves as organizations like CBE, APEN, the Bay Area chapter of the 
Sierra Club, and many others, challenged the project throughout its Environmental Impact 
Review (EIR) process and public meetings. Together with the RPA, these organizations 
helped organize and mobilize the community against the refinery expansion, arguing it would 
intensify the community’s exposure to toxic air pollution, vastly increase the refinery’s 
greenhouse gas emissions, and that the EIR itself was misleading and inadequate. Packing 
city council meetings and public hearings, Richmond’s residents voiced their overwhelming 
disapproval of the project. This period saw organizers with APEN successfully mobilize a 
particularly large number of Richmond’s Laotian community against the project (Shah 2011). 
Investigations supported by CBE’s senior scientist, Greg Karras, revealed that the refinery 
plans would increase greenhouse gas emissions by one million tons a year and that 
particulate matter associated with the heavier sour crude oil that the upgrades would allow 
the refinery to process had higher toxicity levels (Egelko 2014; Vignet 2013). Chevron, on 
the other hand, argued that the project would make the refinery safer, more efficient, and 
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would contribute over 1000 jobs to the local economy. The council, most of whom still 
received funding from Chevron, were swayed by the argument and, ignoring large public 
opposition, voted five to four in favor of refinery permits in 2008. 
 
Having successfully mobilized much of the community against the project, organizers with 
CBE and other local environmental justice groups believed they had built enough political 
capital locally to launch and sustain a lawsuit to appeal the refinery permits. Arguing that 
Chevron had failed to produce an adequate EIR which honestly and thoroughly identified the 
consequences of the project (and that the city had therefore approved permits on the basis of 
a fundamentally flawed EIR), they filed an appeal in the county high court in September 
2008 (Earthjustice 2008). Meanwhile, capitalizing on the rising animosity towards Chevron 
and its refinery “expansion” that had intensified in the months of public comment before the 
council approved permits, local organizers and the RPA decided to relaunch the Measure T 
ballot for November’s 2008 election. This time the measure avoided its previous iteration’s 
clumsy language and would have forced Chevron to increase its land use tax payments to the 
city. The city voted in favor of the measure as well as electing another member of the RPA, 
Jeff Ritterman, to city council. With two out seven councilmembers now representing the 
RPA, one of whom was the city mayor,84 and a successful ballot measure victory under their 
belt, it seemed as though the city’s anti-Chevron progressives were gaining momentum 
(McLaughlin 2018). Chevron, however, refused to accept the ballot results and appealed the 
Measure T in court. A regional court found the measure to be illegal and overturned it as it 
 
84 In 2008 the total number of council seats was reduced from nine to seven. 
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did not align with California’s statewide tax codes. Richmond’s organizers appealed the 
decision to a higher court (Early 2017). 
 
In the summer of 2009, Richmond’s climate justice activists won their biggest victory yet 
against Chevron. Contra Costa Superior Court judge, Barbara Zuniga, found that the 
refinery’s EIR was indeed inadequate and gave the company 60 days to stop work on the 
modernization project. In retaliation, Chevron refused to pay up the $61 million in 
community benefits it had promised the city in return for the refinery upgrade, and it cut 
short contracts with construction workers it had employed to carry out the plans (Baker 
2009). It also appealed the court’s decision to California First District Court of Appeals. 
However, in April 2010, the court of appeals upheld the lower court’s ruling (Tam 2010). 
The court agreed that “Chevron’s environmental impact report for the expansion was 
unlawful because it failed to adequately analyze the oil company’s likely plan to refine 
heavier, dirtier crude oil in Richmond” (Gammon 2010). Temporarily defeated and 
recognizing that the city council’s new composition had become decidedly less favorable to 
its interests, Chevron was forced to abandon its modernization plans.  
 
Simultaneously, and opening up another front of struggle, environmental justice activists had 
also appealed the court’s overturning of Measure T and Chevron was fighting this battle in 
the courts at the same time. Tensions between Chevron, the city council, and the city 
organizers and activists intensified over the following months. The lawsuits, accompanied by 
months of tireless community organizing, were starting to erode the image of Chevron as a 
benevolent neighbor that the company had worked so hard to cultivate. As hostilities 
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escalated, and the city became increasingly polarized, activists mounted pressure on the 
council to force Chevron to pay a fairer share of taxes to the city. The political environment 
activists had created brought the council and Chevron officials to the negotiating table. 
However, the deal that was ultimately struck was a compromise many of the city’s 
organizer’s felt was far too favorable to Chevron. In exchange for dropping the city dropping 
the Measure T appeal and the city council agreeing to no new tax increases on Chevron for 
the next fifteen years, the company would agree pay the city $114 million over those fifteen 
years. In addition, much of the revenue these additional payments would raise would be 
ringfenced for environmental, public health, and social mobility programs. While certainty 
not the kind of restitution most activists had been demanding, it was a compromise that 
ameliorated tensions, allowing organizers to regroup and take satisfaction in the fact that, for 
the first time in the city’s history, citizens had won significant concessions form Chevron.  
 
Riding high on anti-Chevron sentiment and what they framed as a victory for the power of 
local people against Chevron’s greed, the RPA’s Jovanka Beckles was elected to city council 
in late 2010. While the RPA’s leadership, founders, and much of its base were a racially 
diverse group, the organization’s public representatives had been overwhelmingly white. 
This was particularly problematic in a city where 80% of residents are people of color and 
establishment corporate backed councilmembers against which the RPA was pitted were 
almost all African Americans. Beckles became the RPA’s first non-white elected 
representative and helped diversify the RPA’s base of support. Today, all the of RPA’s 
representatives on council are people of color and, as Mike Parker explained to me, its voter 
base is increasingly constituted by working class people of color (personal communication, 
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July 11th, 2018).  Meanwhile, despite a “Chevron-funded smear campaign,” a concerted 
effort by her establishment opponents, and hit pieces written by her many enemies in the 
police and firefighter’s unions, McLaughlin was returned to the position of city mayor with 
40% of the vote in a three-way race (Early 2017). With Beckles’ election, three of the seven 
city councilmembers represented the RPA. A fourth, Tom Butt, was an outspoken critic of 
Chevron but positioned himself as more moderate than the RPA slate and continues to accept 
corporate donations. This meant that in just five years (between 2005 and 2010), Chevron’s 
influence on council had plummeted and a majority of councilmembers were now aligned 
against the company’s interests. 
 
The shift in the balance of power on council reflected broader trends in Richmond’s political 
culture and, over the next two years, the council and community organizers would work 
closely together. The local movement consolidated the influence it had gained with many 
movement members being appointed to city commissions and boards. Others were invited to 
participate in the development of the city’s new General Plan alongside the city manager. 
The General Plan was published in 2012 and was one of the first in the country to include a 
section on climate change and greenhouse gas emissions as they relate to city zoning and 
land use policy. It also included a “health in all policies” component which directed the city 
council to consider “health equity,” a bureaucratic codeword for environmental justice, in all 
its decision-making. Meanwhile, with the promise of the first installments of Chevron’s new 
payments, the council was able to begin supporting and incentivizing a whole range of 
community led, social justice initiatives. These included using eminent domain to prevent 
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banks foreclosing homes, keeping public spaces open, promoting food sovereignty, and 
investing in public transportation.  
 
Another initiative that emerged at this time was the RPA’s promotion of Measure N, which 
became known as the soda tax, and would have placed a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages. 
Along with diseases related to industrial pollution, obesity related illnesses, including type 
two diabetes, take a significant toll on Richmond’s public health. Measure N would have 
raised money for local hospitals to more effectively address what was becoming a public 
health crisis, while disincentivizing the consumption of one its leading causes: sugar-
intensive drinks. As RPA strategist, Mike Parker told me, “we thought it was a no brainer.” 
As he would later acknowledge, however, in the RPA’s promotion of Measure N, they “made 
some big errors” (personal communication, July 11th, 2018).  From these errors, the RPA’s 
opponents were able to frame the tax as an overreach of the nanny-state and a racist and 
elitist attack on the city’s low-income communities of color. As perennial RPA opponent and 
Chevron advocate, councilman Nat Bates, told the New York Times, the RPA were “using the 
black community to pass a measure for us without consulting us… We’re tired of this 
Progressive Alliance coming in and telling us what to do. I’ve renamed them ‘the Plantation 
Alliance’” (cited in Early 2017, 56). The tax became the 2012 election’s “wedge issue” and, 
just as the RPA was in a position to route Chevron’s influence from council, it had made an 
unforced error that would prove profoundly consequential.  
 
On August 2012, Chevron’s refinery erupted in fire and smoke. The explosion, as it was later 
discovered, was caused by a leak resulting from eroded pipes that had not been replaced 
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since the refinery was built over 100 years ago. The refinery was processing more sulfurous, 
heavy crude oil without the equipment despite not being granted permits to upgrade its pipes. 
Heavier sour crude is a more corrosive substance than the lighter sweet crude the refinery 
pipes had been designed to process. 19 refineries workers were almost killed in the explosion 
and toxic smoke blew downwind over the city, sending up to 15,000 people to hospital in 
need of medical attention. The city issued a “shelter in place” order and suggested residents 
tape shut their doors and windows (Early 2017). Two other major fires have occurred at the 
refinery in the last 20 years, one in 1999 and one in 2007, but 2012’s was by far the largest 
and most severe. As well as its adverse impacts on public health, Early reports the fire 
“caused a $1.86 billion drop in the city’s assessed property values, reducing tax revenues 
from Chevron itself, other business, and homeowners.” The health and economic damages 
combined left Richmond reeling and reignited conflict between Chevron workers and the 
company bosses.  
 
Chevron’s public relations response kicked into overdrive. As the city entered the 2012 
election season, the company hired Sam Singer, a public relations damage control expert, to 
manage Chevron’s local image following the explosion. Apparently believing the best 
defense is an aggressive offense, Chevron and its allies went on the attack against the RPA. 
Measure N proved a gift they could not have anticipated. Between them Big Soda and Big 
Oil spent a combined $3.7 million on the election. The soda companies, along with the police 
and fire unions, used their considerable resources to target and defame RPA candidates as 
racist elitists. Meanwhile, Chevron bolstered their own image as the city’s benevolent 
provider with philanthropic donations and thousands of glossy mailers, television ads, and 
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buying up almost all the city’s billboards. The offensive worked. Despite the company being 
responsible for one of the worst environmental disasters the city has ever experienced, 
Chevron-backed candidates regained seats on the council while RPA candidates suffered 
heavy defeats. At a moment when anti-Chevron sentiment should have been at an all-time 
high, and those opposing Chevron’s influence on city council could have won a landslide 
victory following the refinery fire, the movement’s representation on city council was 
reduced to just two out of seven councilmembers. The overreach and mistakes of Measure N 
and its proponents had cost the RPA a crucial opportunity, with consequences that would 
play out over the next five years. 
 
With momentum now on their side, throughout 2013, Chevron and its allies maintained their 
public relations blitz and sought to prime the community to accept updated and scaled down 
plans for the refinery’s modernization before submitting renewed applications for permits to 
the council in 2014. With the help of Sam Singer’s well-crafted and well-resourced 
propaganda campaign called Richmond Proud, Chevron argued its modernization plans 
would make the refinery “newer, safer, cleaner” (Singer Associates 2017).85 Indeed they 
were even able to use the fire as a reason why the refinery needed to be upgraded. This was a 
compelling case even for those opposed to the refinery expansion – it was abundantly clear 
that the refinery’s pipes needed replacing and Chevron’s officials claimed the modernization 
plan would allow the company to upgrade some of the oldest pipes.  Meanwhile, Richmond’s 
climate justice organizations and the RPA were regrouping and rebuilding together.  
 
 
85 Singer Associates, Sam Singer’s PR firm, continues to host several of their Richmond Proud ads and videos 
on their website under their “case studies” section. See Singer Associates (2017). 
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After much deliberation and good deal of pressure from organizations like CBE, the city 
council eventually agreed to sue Chevron for damages related to the fire in 2013 in a five-to-
two vote (Kanhema 2013). In court Chevron pled no contest and agreed to pay the city $2 
million in damages (CBS local 2013). A Chemicals Safety Board report investigating the fire 
later found that Chevron had been processing heavier sour crude oil like tar sands which had 
rapidly corroded the pipes. Chevron was thus responsible for negligence in the upkeep and 
maintenance of pipes it knew were unfit for purpose (NRDC 2014; Chemical Safety Board 
2015).86 The city filed another lawsuit claiming greater restitution in 2015. Lawsuits 
following the fire forced Chevron back to the negotiating table. This was the first time the 
city council sued Chevron and, despite the RPA’s 2012 defeat, indicated a shifting political 
culture concerning Richmond’s largest employer. 
 
Learning from their electoral setbacks, 2013 saw the RPA and the local movement grow in 
sophistication and numbers. On August 6th, on the one-year anniversary of the refinery fire, 
climate justice activists organized the largest protests the city had even seen outside 
Chevron’s gates. 2500 residents and Bay Area locals were in attendance (Early 2017). 
Elevating 350.org’s “Summer Heat” campaign, hundreds of protesters blockaded the refinery 
gates and 210 were arrested engaging in civil disobedience. Mayor McLaughlin, Andrés 
Soto, and Henry Clark, and Bill McKibben were amongst the event’s keynote speakers and 
all of them condemned Chevron’s corruption, pollution of frontline communities, and the 
moral obscenity of expanding the refinery during a time of climate crisis. By 2013 it had 
 
86 Based on this evidence and the costs of the fire on the city far exceeding $2 million Richmond had won from 
Chevron previously, a newly installed progressive city council launched another lawsuit against Chevron in 
2015 in a unanimous vote. Again the company settled, this time agreeing to an additional $5 million transfer of 
funds to the city (Gartrell 2018). 
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become quite clear that the company intended to submit a new application for its 
modernization project following its earlier defeat in the courts (Rogers 2013; Connolly 
2011). The protest at Chevron’s gates galvanized the city’s climate justice movement, 
infusing grassroots activists with renewed vigor, and instigated a year and half long 
campaign to take back city council, advance a just transition, and halt the refinery expansion. 
The protest also saw new climate justice grassroots organizations emerge. For example, the 
Bay Area-wide Sunflower Alliance was conceived at the refinery protest and has become an 
important grassroots organization targeting the fossil fuel industry in the Bay Area.  
 
Chevron officially resubmitted its application for permits for an, apparently, scaled down 
version of its $1 billion refinery modernization project in the spring of 2014 (Samuel 2014). 
Despite Chevron’s electoral gains in 2012, the city council could not be guaranteed on to 
provide the votes the company needed. Moreover, with mounting pressure from the city’s 
increasingly well-organized climate justice organizations, the company faced an uphill battle. 
With the Climate Justice Alliance choosing Richmond for one of its Our Power campaign 
pilot projects in 2013, Richmond’s climate justice activists received (relatively) more 
national attention, organizational support and resources. Bringing the idea of a “just 
transition” to the forefront of movement activity, APEN and CBE became the anchor 
organizations of the Our Power campaign in Richmond and led the grassroots mobilization 
against Chevron through 2013 and 2014.  
 
Moreover, evidence coming to light in 2014 that Kinder Morgan (the same Kinder Morgan 
building the pipeline in British Columbia) had been illegally transporting highly volatile 
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fracked crude from the North Dakota Bakken shale region into the city by railway further 
enraged city residents. The dangers involved in shipping crude-by-rail were well 
communicated and turned many against not just Chevron but the oil industry more generally 
(Lim 2014). A secondary climate justice campaign to ban so-called “bomb trains” from 
entering the city limits gained a great deal of traction. In September 2014, 100 residents 
rallied with CBE, APEN, and Gayle McLaughlin outside Kinder Morgan’s gates, with 
several risking arrest, to draw attention to the illegitimacy of the permits the company had 
received and to condemn the oil industry’s outsized influence over the regulatory system.  
 
As anti-fossil fuel sentiment was again on the rise by mid 2014, CBE filed two suits in spring 
and early summer against Chevron, Kinder Morgan, and Bay Area Air Quality Management 
District (BAAQMD). The first accused the regulatory agency, BAAQMD, of having 
approved preliminary permits for Chevron to start work on the refinery modernization 
without the company having publicly submitted a draft EIR. The second accused the agency 
of quietly providing Kinder Morgan with permits to switch the product it was transporting 
into the city from ethanol to crude oil without announcing their application to the public or 
requiring a period of public comment (Lin 2014; Bay Area News Group 2014; Rogers 
2014a). In the former case, Chevron and BAAQMD settled a deal in which the company 
agreed to submit to a public EIR before continuing with any more construction. The court 
dismissed the latter case on the grounds that the complaint had been submitted too late. The 
settlement under the former ruling ensured Richmond’s residents could participate in public 
oversight of the modernization permit applications. In the meantime, city organizers were 
pressuring the council to subject Chevron to numerous conditions in return for any permits 
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they might issue. (Surprisingly few activists lobbied for the refinery modernization to be 
rejected outright and fewer still have argued the refinery must be closed down). Throughout 
her tenure as mayor, McLaughlin had appointed many movement allies and RPA members to 
local boards and commissions, including the Planning Commission. The Planning 
Commission was tasked with initial oversight of the refinery permitting procedure and, with 
RPA members at the helm, incorporated many climate justice activists’ suggestions into the 
conditions Chevron would be required to meet. 
 
The planning commission voted on the conditions it would impose at a contentious meeting 
on July 9th, 2014. Included in its recommendations were provisions demanding the project 
contributed to an overall reduction in the refinery’s greenhouse emissions achieved through 
onsite mitigation rather than the original proposal of no net increase on the refinery’s 2010 
emissions baseline achieved through offsite carbon offsets. In addition, the Commission 
recommended that any Community Benefits Agreement between Chevron and the council 
should include financing for a local hospital that was on the brink of closure and that had 
been heavily impacted by cases of respiratory and pollution-related diseases. 
 
Chevron project managers balked at the stringent conditions that would have been imposed 
in the Planning Commission’s recommendations to city council. They lobbied, negotiated 
with, and cajoled the five non-RPA councilmembers to water down the conditions before 
approval. Vice Mayor Beckles and Mayor McLaughlin were sidelined in these negotiations. 
McLaughlin believed the decision to approve the project had been agreed to in closed-door 
negotiations before the recommendations had been voted on by council, possibly in violation 
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of the Brown Act (personal communication, July 18th, 2018).87 On July 30th, the city council 
voted five-to-zero in favor of the project. McLaughlin and Beckles abstained from the vote, 
arguing that debate had been cut short. They believed many of the conditions ultimately 
agreed to significantly improved the project’s impact on emissions and community welfare, 
but they also disapproved of the curtailment of debate on the issue and claimed that many of 
the more stringent conditions that the council had voted against were necessary amendments. 
Over 600 proponents and opponents of the project packed the council room for several hours 
during the debate and vote. 
 
Ultimately, the council voted against the commission’s most stringent conditions including 
an additional $27 million for funding the hospital, commitments to contributing $8 million 
every year until 2050 for community investments in green energy, demands that emissions be 
reduced onsite, a proposal to mitigate emissions of associated oil tanker tug boats, place 
covers on the refinery’s storage tanks, and a radical overhaul the refinery’s piping. However, 
in order to get Tom Butt and the two other decisive councilmembers, Jim Rogers and Jael 
Myrick, on board, Chevron had to agree to some important concessions. These included a 
$90 million community benefits agreement up from the $60 million Chevron had proposed 
(with $35 million ringfenced for a scholarship program and several million more contributing 
to green jobs training programs), a commitment to upgrade a larger number of the refinery’s 
oldest pipes, an independent refinery inspection program, and that the company would 
provide Richmond with land to build one of the largest urban solar installations in the state. 
Conditions also included limits on the amount of high sulfur crude the refinery can process 
 
87 The Brown Act is a California law intended to ensure that any ““congregation by a majority of a legislative 
body”  is open to the public (FAC 2019). 
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and a cap on its greenhouse gas emissions. While reductions in some toxins associated with 
the project were addressed in the negotiations, others, like increasing levels of arsenic and 
hydrogen sulfide, were not.  
 
Reflecting on the result, Mike Parker, who was the RPA’s candidate for mayor at the time, 
echoed many environmental justice activists and the Planning Commission’s 
recommendations, arguing that “While this project is far better for the residents of Richmond 
than the original project because of community pressure, the council lost an important 
opportunity to actually win a reduction of emissions and a safer refinery” (Rogers 2014b). 
Both opponents and detractors of the project claimed a partial victory and acknowledged 
partial defeat (ibid).  
 
The vote cleared the major obstacles to Chevron’s refinery upgrade, however it still had to 
convince the court to lift the injunction against further construction imposed by the judge’s 
ruling in the 2008 and 2010 appeals against the project’s permits. In fall of 2014, 
McLaughlin termed out as mayor and Mike Parker was the RPA’s choice to replace her. 
Activists successfully framed the election as a referendum on Chevron’s role in the city. 
However, after Tom Butt entered the race at the last minute and threatened to split the anti-
Chevron vote, Parker dropped out of the race. (The RPA voted internally for Parker to stand 
down and keep the election’s focus on Chevron). Despite disagreeing on numerous issues 
and Butt’s refusal to reject corporate donations, the RPA ultimately rallied behind him 
against “Chevron’s candidate,” councilman Nat Bates.  
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The election drew national attention with Chevron alone spending over $3 million on the city 
council race. Teaming up with their usual allies, the Richmond Police Officer’s Associate, 
Chevron and the city’s political establishment unleashed vicious attack ads and mailers 
against the RPA’s candidates. Chevron had been in campaign mode since the 2012 refinery 
fire and had rolled out a two-year propaganda effort before 2014’s election. During 2014’s 
election season, however, Chevron ramped its efforts into overdrive. According to activist 
accounts, Chevron bought up every billboard in the city, intensified its philanthropic giving 
(even promoting the concessions it had been forced to make in the Community Benefits 
Agreement as indications of its generosity to the city), mobilized the building trade unions, 
and bombarded the city with television ads and mailers.  
 
The RPA were massively outgunned and outspent. With considerable support from the city’s 
climate justice organizers, they capitalized on the momentum they had mobilized during their 
confrontations with Chevron over the past four years. The RPA carried out an impressive 
ground game, motivating a large number of volunteers, knocking on thousands of doors, 
hosting community town halls, and broadcasting a powerful narrative that resonated across 
the city. Despite the enormous resources it poured into their campaigns, all of the candidates 
Chevron backed lost their races. Meanwhile the RPA won three seats and Butt was elected 
mayor. A clear anti-Chevron majority had been elected to Richmond’s city council. In their 
post-election analysis, most activists argued that Chevron’s media blitz had backfired 
spectacularly. The millions it had spent on glossy mailers, billboards and attack ads, and the 
size of its presence in the campaign, only proved the point Richmond’s community 
organizers were making to the electorate: that corporate money had corrupted democratic 
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decision-making and needed to be ousted from office. In addition, activists noted the sheer 
motivation and size of their base of volunteers that they were able to mobilize in support of 
the RPA as a crucial counterweight to Chevron’s money and the Police Association’s 
slanderous allegations. 
 
Throughout 2015 and 2016, the RPA worked with local organizers to legislate and 
implement a new progressive agenda in the city. The RPA’s presence on council created 
political opportunities for city organizers to intensifying efforts towards building their own 
radical solutions to the many ills that had plagued the city for so long. The city council 
agreed, unanimously, to sue Chevron again for further damages and lost taxes due to the 
refinery fire and won a $5 million settlement in 2015. Around the same time, however, the 
Contra Costa County Superior Court lifted the injunction on upgrade projects at Chevron’s 
refinery and the last obstacle in between Chevron and its modernization program was 
removed. Construction started in 2016 and finished in 2018. With the struggle having been 
fought to its local limits in the city council, climate justice activists set their sights on further 
battles against Chevron at the regional level and specifically through the regional air quality 
regulator, BAAQMD. Forming a Bay Area-wide coalition, Richmond’s climate justice 
activists joined activists from San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley, Rodeo, Martinez and 
elsewhere to try to impose further greenhouse gas and air contaminant restrictions on the Bay 
Area’s five refineries. Specifically, they argued that BAAQMD should have to include 
greenhouse gases in its review of new permits and impose emissions caps in line with climate 
science. This was an ambitious, multi-year campaign that came very close to severely 
limiting Chevron’s operations in Richmond.  
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Chevron retreated from city elections and slowly worked to repair its local image in the city. 
In 2016, the RPA won a supermajority on council, gaining five of the seven council seats. 
The priority issue for the community that year was affordable housing. As Richmond’s 
residents and organizers have cleaned up their city and its image as a haven for crime, 
violence and pollution has dissipated, a new threat looms: gentrification. Spillover from the 
Bay Area tech boom which has seen housing prices across the Bay Area skyrocket. This has 
forced low income communities and communities of color out of their neighborhoods and 
now threatens one the Bay’s last relatively affordable communities. Mirroring a dynamic 
across urban California, communities that have devoted years of work into making the 
neighborhoods livable and healthy have also made their neighborhoods more attractive to 
developers and gentrifiers. As Los Angeles environmental justice organizer, mark! Lopez, 
puts it “we did not clean up our neighborhood just so you could gentrify it.” In response, the 
RPA has sought to implement rent control across the city but has met with concerted 
resistance from the current mayor, Tom Butt, landlord associations, and the housing 
developers’ lobby. Housing organizer, RPA member and current Vice Mayor, Melvin Willis, 
has led the charge on council. Meanwhile, the relationship between Butt and the RPA has 
deteriorated significantly. In what appeared to be a messy compromise, the city council 
ultimately passed a somewhat convoluted form of rent control that has proved unpopular. 
While the council may be aligned in its opposition to Chevron, disputes over the relationship 
between development, land use policy, and affordable housing continue to divide the city. 
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In 2017, these divisions threatened even the internal coherence of the RPA itself (Geluardi 
2018a). Plans for the development of Richmond’s Point Molate has proved particularly 
divisive. A younger generation of primarily black and brown activists have been arguing in 
favor of a development project on one of Richmond’s last green public spaces because it 
included provisions for socialized affordable, housing. The organization’s older, white 
membership have pushed back saying that the space should be preserved with only the most 
sensitive development being allowed to take place. Citywide debates, particularly over rent 
control, have also divided the RPA’s base of support with many of its former retired whiter 
voters now rejecting the organization. These tensions may be deliberately overstated in the 
local media, but they were certainly at the forefront of the minds of many of the activists I 
interviewed in 2018. These fights seemed to have distracted the RPA from its broader 
legislative agenda and the organization found it difficult to counter the narrative that despite 
RPA representatives holding the supermajority on council it was unable to actually 
implement much of the policy initiatives it had promised (ibid).  It also faced accusations of 
having mishandled renewed allegations of police corruption, sexual abuse, and 
incompetence. Entering the city council election of 2018, the RPA found itself defending a 
record of relative inactivity and internal division. 
 
Meanwhile, climate justice activists were on the verge of winning an important victory 
through BAAQMD. By the summer of 2017, they had successfully convinced the agency to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions and impose emissions caps on refineries and industrial 
emitters across the Bay Area. This would have dealt a significant blow to Chevron’s 
operations in the city but would have significantly reigned in on-site emissions. In July 2017, 
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however, then-Governor Brown’s landmark climate change bill, AB 398, passed the 
California State Legislature with a two-thirds majority. The bill extended California’s cap 
and trade system and its two-thirds majority ensured immunity from possible lawsuits 
claiming it constituted an illegal tax. Gaining two-thirds of the legislature’s consent meant 
the bill included significant compromises at the behest of California’s many oil industry-
backed legislators. One such concession was that local regulatory agencies would no longer 
be allowed to regulate refinery greenhouse gas emissions and that most greenhouse gas 
emissions regulation would now be carried out through statewide the cap and trade and 
offsets program housed under the California Air Resources Board. As CBE’s Julia May 
explained at the time: 
 
The Cap & Trade extension was written by the oil industry, is even worse than the 
current failed program, includes preemptions from local action, gives away so many 
free credits we will never meet climate goals, and allows oil refineries to expand 
indefinitely with no program for Just transition to clean energy that is so desperately 
needed in EJ [environmental justice] communities.” (Climate Hawks Vote 2017) 
 
In what climate justice activists said was a direct response to their organizing in the Bay 
Area, AB 398 consisted of an oil industry-backed “wish list” that undermined more than 
three years of climate justice activism.  
 
Additionally, at this time, climate justice activists, led in part by local Indigenous women, 
were putting pressure on BAAQMD and the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors to introduce 
regulation that would effectively ban the refining of tar sands in any one of the Bay’s five 
refineries. Kicking off this initiative in 2016 with a healing walk to each of the refineries, 
Idle No More SF Bay, CBE, Stand.earth and local climate justice organizations have 
explicitly carried out this campaign in solidarity with the First Nations-led resistance to tar 
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sands mining in Canada, and particularly those fighting the Trans Mountain pipeline. 
Engaging in direct action outside Kinder Morgan’s gates in Richmond in September 2017, 
local activist drew attention to the conditions in which tar sands is produced, the 
consequences of its transportation, and the impacts refining this heavy sour crude would have 
on public health in the Bay Area’s refinery communities (Diablo Rising Tide 2017). Climate 
justice activists have also been targeting the Levin coal terminal in Richmond and are trying 
to halt emissions of toxic coal dust by urging the city council to regulate the transportation of 
coal-by-rail through the city. Finally, in early 2018, the city council voted to join a growing 
number of cities across California and the US in lawsuits against the fossil fuel industry’s 
largest greenhouse gas contributors, including Chevron, claiming climate change related 
damages. The suit has been appealed to the US ninth circuit court (Cagle 2019). 
 
The RPA’s growing pains extended into 2018 and they were ultimately unable to maintain 
their majority on the city council in 2018’s November election. Beckles gave up her council 
seat to run an ultimately unsuccessful campaign for State Assembly representing the East 
Bay. McLaughlin gave up her seat in 2017 to run for Lieutenant governor to bring 
Richmond’s story to communities across California. Voting against McLaughlin long-term 
ally, Marylyn Langlois, the council nominated a younger Latina RPA member, Ada Recinos 
to take McLaughlin’s seat. With one of their most prominent and popular members no longer 
representing the RPA on council and Beckles looking towards the state legislature, along 
with a growing perception of unhelpful intransigence on a range of issues, the RPA lost two 
seats and Melvin Willis lost his bid to replace Butt as Mayor.  
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The lack of any election wedge issues against or around which to unite the city’s 
progressives also hurt the growing movement. The election thus became a referendum on the 
RPA’s two-year performance, and they were punished for it. East Bay Times journalist, John 
Geluardi, also suggests that the internal divisions within the RPA produced somewhat 
lackluster support for its candidates amongst the organization and that RPA strategists 
overstretched their resources trying to run Beckles’ campaign as well as the city council 
campaigns (Geluardi 2018a). With three out of seven councilors and a far more hostile 
environment on council, the RPA’s ability to further consolidate the local movement’s gains 
has been thrown into question. In particular, the future of the Levin-Richmond coal terminal 
which would have been all but inevitably cut short under the previous council appears to 
have been thrown a lifeline by 2019’s council composition. 
 
Nevertheless, the organization and local organizers from many of the city’s grassroots groups 
are resilient and they have suffered setbacks before. The March for Climate Jobs and Justice 
in San Francisco over the summer of 2018, organized by the People’s Climate Movement 
and hosted by a coalition of Bay Area-based climate justice organizations, infused the local 
climate justice movement with renewed and much needed vigor. It has set the tone for 
California’s climate justice movement and their strategies for keeping fossil fuels in the 
ground, centering frontline community’s solutions, and advancing a just transition under 
California’s new governor Gavin Newsom. At the time of writing, Newsome appears 
somewhat more open to addressing climate change at both supply and demand sides of the 
equation. The era of his predecessor’s emphatic focus on demand side policies while 
increasing supply by greenlighting thousands of new oil wells in the state seems at an end. 
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In 2019, the climate justice movement has consolidated at the regional level in the Bay Area. 
With the formation of the Protect the Bay Coalition, these organizations’ focus has shifted to 
the Phillip’s 66 refinery just North of Richmond in Rodeo. Like Chevron, Phillip’s has 
submitted permit applications to expand its refinery to process heavier sour crude, most 
likely from the Canadian tar sands. The Protect the Bay Coalition is organizing residents 
across the Bay Area and is targeting BAAQMD to reject Phillip’s permit application and to 
ban imports of tar sands into region. This is an exciting development that illustrates how the 
local movement is beginning to transcend the limits of the local and scale their activism up to 
match local, regional, national and global scales at which the fossil fuel industry’s hegemony 
operates. 
 
Petro-Hegemony in Richmond and the Bay Area 
 
The last decade and a half of social struggle have exposed the operations of petro-hegemony 
in Richmond. This is, in part, why Richmond is such a productive site in which to determine 
and identify some of the specific mechanics by which petro-hegemony maintains and extends 
the agenda and influence of the fossil fuel industry. Examples of industry interventions in the 
relations of consent, coercion, and compliance are all demonstratable through this case study. 
Moreover, the extent to which the industry’s hegemony has been challenged in Richmond, 
given the 100-year timespan during which petro-hegemony was embedded in the community, 
makes this case all the more remarkable. In the following section, I illustrate the different 
ways the fossil fuel industry, and particularly Chevron, intervened in relations of consent, 
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coercion, and compliance to establish its hegemony and then to defend it against social 
movement incursions. 
 
This section reflects on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two, elucidating its 
arguments by way of empirical example and demonstrating how those empirical examples 
demanded further reflection and development of theory.  As I did in Chapter Three, I also 
examine the ways petro-hegemony interacts with, shapes, and is shaped by the specificities 
of the context in which it operates. The intersections of institutionalized racism, capitalism, 
community disempowerment, centralized state power, and extraction are all conditions 
interwoven with the relations of consent, coercion, and compliance upon which Chevron 
came to depend. Climate justice activism in Richmond thus demonstrates how the 
inextricable entwinement of petro-hegemony with a broader matrix of domination requires 
climate justice activist to develop strategies that not only counter the hegemonic status of the 
fossil fuel industry but that also, necessarily, engage with the broader intersections of 
domination in which petro-hegemony thrives. 
 
Petro-culture and consent  
 
“Chevron has its tentacles all over this city,” RPA strategist, Mike Parker, told me (personal 
communication, July 11th, 2018). He was referring to the many ways Chevron has sought to 
intervene in relations of consent and maintain social license to its operation in Richmond. For 
decades, Chevron and Standard Oil’s presence and benevolence has been taken for granted 
and engrained as common sense amongst much of (although certainly not all) the city’s 
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population. As the timeline narrated above suggests, despite it having been engrained for 
over a century, consent has radically shifted away from Chevron in a relatively short period. 
However, it is important that we investigate how and why Chevron was able to maintain 
consent to its operations for so long despite the damage it was doing to the community. Steve 
Early writes that “For much of the twentieth century, Richmond refinery bosses and lobbyists 
were skillful in winning local hearts and minds… Chevron has employed more than a 
century’s worth of corporate paternalism, targeted philanthropy, slick publicity, and political 
patronage” (2017, 12). Documenting and identifying the specifics of these strategies, below I 
describe how Chevron, and Standard Oil/Socal before it, have entrenched consent in the city 
and sought to reinforce it when it was challenged. 
 
While Chapter Three provided a macro perspective on the many different narrative 
interventions of petro-hegemony across two Canadian provinces, Chevron’s discursive 
strategy in Richmond is necessarily narrower and more targeted to the specificities of the city 
context. Indeed, it has really relied on just one discourse, what I call “the benevolent 
neighbor” discourse. While this discourse is shared, repeated, and reinforced in a multiplicity 
of forms, its argument remains the same: Chevron is a necessary, compassionate, and 
altruistic neighbor without which Richmond would not be Richmond, and without which 
there would be no Richmond. Thus, Richmond’s identity and city pride are tied to the 
benevolence and patronage of the refinery’s owner and city’s largest employer, Chevron. 
From the city’s museum of history, to the refinery website, to Richmond High School’s 
mascot, to long-term Chevron allies, and to its most vehement opponents, it is almost 
impossible to avoid the narrative that the refinery and the city grew up together, that their 
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fates are entwined, and that without the Chevron’s goodwill Richmond would collapse. The 
ubiquity of this narrative is partly because it is absolutely true; the refinery became 
operational the same year Richmond was incorporated and the city has historically been an 
industrial powerhouse fuelled by the refinery. But it is also because, for over 100 years, 
Chevron and Socal worked hard to sow and cultivate these ideas in community 
consciousness. With repetition in different discursive forms and reinforcement through 
different techniques of intervention, the discourse that without the refinery there would be no 
Richmond becomes common sense. 
 
The city’s history museum, both as a cultural artifact and mediator of discourse itself, and as 
a place where the history Chevron tells about its relation to the town is on full display, is a 
helpful place to begin unraveling this 100-year-old narrative. One early 20th century Socal 
flyer in the history museum proudly declares “Richmond is our middle name” and wishes the 
local newspaper, the Richmond Independent, a happy 30th birthday. Using the newspaper’s 
birthday as an opportunity to remind audiences of the company’s contributions to “better 
living for everybody,” Socal states its pleasure in sharing “with the Richmond Independent 
its satisfaction in having reached another milestone in its service to the community” 
(Richmond History Museum, Wall Exhibit). Close ties between the company and local 
journalists would continue to develop throughout the 20th century. Industry propaganda from 
the 1940s and 50s in the museum proudly implies that oil produced in Richmond’s refinery 
helped win the Second World War for the Allies. Oil, leadership of the free world, and pride 
in the city’s participation in the war effort are brought together here under Socal’s banner. In 
later promotional material I found in the museum’s archives, Chevron advertises its 
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commitment to community safety publicizing its $25,000 donation to the Richmond Police 
Department to purchase new security cameras for the city in 2012 (Rogers 2012).88 Most 
recently, I noted examples of Chevron’s “pinkwashing” where it flies the Rainbow flag just 
below its own logo at the refinery during Pride week and advertises its commitment to its 
LGBT refinery workers.89 Framing the consistency in Chevron’s service and contribution to 
the community, these examples illustrate the continuity in the oil company’s narrative in 
Richmond over one hundred years of change. 
 
We must also consider the vehicles through which Chevron’s operatives have intervened in 
and shaped relations of consent to their advantage. Much of Chevron’s narrative is shared 
and reinforced through what Early calls “calculated community mindedness” (2017, 15). 
Chevron strategically deploys corporate philanthropy, sponsorships, creates astroturf 
organizations, and infiltrates local media, to reinforce their “benevolent neighbor” discourse. 
The vehicles through which Chevron amplifies its narrative matter. When Chevron donates 
to the police department, it is reinforcing a narrative that it cares about the community’s 
safety and wellbeing; when it sponsors school programs or scholarships it says it cares about 
the community’s education and social mobility; when it provides donations for a church roof 
or a faith group, it demonstrate that it is invested in the community’s spiritual welfare; and 
 
88 This example also indicates the close relationship between the Richmond Police Department and Chevron, as 
well as the surveillance state and the oil industry, that I will explore in greater detail in the following section. 
89 Perhaps illustrating the calculated nature of Chevron Pride, a Chevron-backed councilmember and one the 
company’s most vehement supporters on city council, Corky Boozé, consistently launched homophobic attacks 
against his fellow councilmember and Chevron opponent, Jovanka Beckles. Chevron appears to have paid these 
incidents little attention (Early 2017). Indeed, Early quotes Mayor Tom Butt’s as having said that “virtually all 
the local organizations that routinely and repeatedly legitimize what Boozé and Bates do are beneficiaries of 
Chevron, as are Bates and Booze themselves… What all of these individuals who disrupt city council meetings 
and spew homophobic and xenophobic hate have in common is that they routinely criticize the RPA, the mayor, 
and Jovanka Beckles while extolling the virtues of Chevron” (quoted in Early 2017, 100). 
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when it funds a “breath mobile” to provide children with free asthma checks it says it cares 
the community’s health.90 Activists were keen to add that organizations receiving funding are 
expected to keep any criticisms they may have of the company to themselves. As John 
Gaventa illustrates in his assessment of company towns (1980), all of this “calculated 
community mindedness” advances the notion that Chevron is a benefactor while silencing 
potential criticism. 
 
The 4Richmond Coalition is a nonprofit organization which includes “officials from the West 
Contra Costa School District, Richmond Chamber of Commerce and police union” and is 
funded by Chevron. Chevron’s officer for policy, Government and Public Affairs, Joe 
Lorenz, sits on 4Richmond’s board of directors while its membership is comprised of local 
community philanthropists and leaders. The organization declares that it is “dedicated to 
promoting jobs, health, safety and educational opportunities for Richmond residents” and 
that “Working together with all community members, we seek to actively transform the city 
we call home.” 4Richmond is almost entirely funded by Chevron. As evinced on their, now-
defunct, website, 4Richmond extends “it’s sincere gratitude to Chevron for continuing its 
longstanding, generous support of [their] work” (4Richmond, 2016). According to journalist, 
Robert Rogers, Chevron-backed councilman, Nat Bates, hoped that the coalition would not 
only be a “ philanthropic force, but a “watchdog” that could “counter” the direction of City 
 
90 Of course, as RPA member Diana Wear explained to me, “Chevron gives a fair amount of money to the 
community and many of us do appreciate it. At the same time, they do it in dribs and drabs… it doesn't cure or 
really resolve a situation…One example was when they did the breath mobiles for the kids with asthma. It was 
just enough money to give them their posters, and billboards, and their publicity, but it was never enough to 
really address the issues…They weren't willing to do what was required of cleaning up their refinery for cleaner 
air” (personal communication, July 6th, 2018). The irony embedded in this last example is particularly cruel but 
seems lost on the company. 
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Hall, which has been led in recent years by progressives who take a hardline against the oil 
giant” (Rogers 2012). Meanwhile, Andrés Soto told me that through 4Richmond, Chevron 
has “created a permanent presence in Richmond for distributing cash and organizing events.” 
4Richmond not only amplifies Chevron’s narrative across a citywide platform but also brings 
together, what we might call, the representatives of the community’s moral compass. Faith 
leaders, police officers, philanthropists, and the directors of different charities are all brought 
together by the coalition and so become a community that shares and repeat the narrative of 
Chevron’s benevolence to their own diverse sets of audiences. 
 
As well as 4Richmond, Chevron has funded many other mediators of community discourse 
and common sense, including the Richmond Standard and Radio Free Richmond. The 
Richmond Standard is an online community news website edited and staffed by Mike Aldax, 
who, according to Steve Early, is a “senior account manager at Singer Associates” – the same 
Singer Associates that Chevron hired to manage the public relations fallout following the 
2012 refinery explosion (2017, 114). The direct ties between Chevron and the news site are 
not necessarily obscured. A disclaimer on their About page says “This news website is 
brought to you by Chevron Richmond. We aim to provide Richmond residents with 
important information about what’s going on in the community, and to provide a voice for 
Chevron Richmond on civic issues” (Richmond Standard 2016). Doing just that, one of their 
pages, entitled “Richmond Refinery Speaks” is intended “for the Chevron Richmond 
Refinery to share its news and views on issues important to the company and the Richmond, 
CA community” (ibid.).  
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Scrolling through the website, the benevolent neighbor narrative is interwoven with other 
local news relevant to the community including sports updates, profiles of public personas, 
feel-good volunteering efforts, upcoming social events, and lifestyle tips. A quick read 
through archived news articles yields, for example, a piece entitled “Why the Election 
Mattered” – referring to the 2014 local election in which all the Chevron backed candidates 
were defeated – where Chevron defends its unprecedented political spending on Richmond’s 
election (Richmond Standard 2014). In a rather revealing piece, another article, entitled 
“Chevron and Richmond: a century of partnership” written by Chevron’s company historian 
exclaims that “For the past century, Chevron has been part of Richmond’s social and 
economic fabric” (Harper 2018). Indeed, this is precisely the point of these strategies. 
Chevron doesn’t just want to be seen as a local employer but as part of the community deeply 
embedded in Richmond’s very identity. 
 
Admittedly, the Richmond Standard actually fills an important niche that was abandoned at a 
time when local newsrooms have been losing readers and have had to make budget cuts. The 
Richmond Standard has come to replace the role of local news sources as small local 
newspaper outlets have closed shop (Carroll 2014). It provides the community with local 
information you can’t necessarily find elsewhere in the local news milieu. However, Early 
argues that both the Richmond Standard and Radio Free Richmond are “designed to look like 
independent sources of information about municipal affairs” while being criticized “as an 
audacious attempt to disguise propaganda as news and manipulate public opinion” (2017, 
113; Carroll 2014). It is not clear whether the Standard is a widely read resource. Despite 
being an essentially “one-man operation,” however, it is certainly well resourced and a 
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prolific publisher. Clearly Chevron’s public relations advisors believe the outlet remains a 
valuable investment. 
 
Chevron’s interventions into what constituted common sense in Richmond, and which 
shaped the discourses through which residents have made meaning out of their surroundings, 
were seeded over a long period of time. Election seasons, on the other hand, have 
increasingly been defined by fast-paced media blasts where the city is blanketed in corporate 
propaganda as Chevron fires off dozens of carefully framed messages intended to target the 
deep-rooted narratives it has cultivated for over a century. As such, the frames that are 
intended to bring the industry’s “benevolent neighbor” narrative to the forefront of 
audiences’ minds are most visible during election seasons. This is particularly so when 
Chevron has felt its interests are threatened. The Richmond Proud campaign, following the 
2012 refinery explosion, and leading into the company’s renewed efforts to get its 
modernization project permitted, illustrates the content of some of these frames.  
 
Richmond Proud was a public relations campaign run by Singer Associates that tied 
residents’ pride in their community to the modernization project for a “newer, cleaner, safer” 
refinery. In one televised ad the campaign ran in 2013 and 2014 the gravelly voice of a 
confident male narrator reassures viewers over images of Richmond’s diverse neighborhoods 
and smiling community members, cast in an array of charming domestic and social 
situations:  
 
We might have different backgrounds, we might have different points of view, but 
whoever we are, whichever of Richmond’s neighborhoods we live in, we have two 
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things in common: we’re all proud of the city that we share and we’ll all share in the 
benefits of a newer, safer, cleaner refinery. (Singer Associates 2017) 
 
Emphasizing safety and security, the clip closes with a scene of firefighter standing proudly 
at the fire station in front of his emergency vehicle.  According to Singer Associates, these 
ads were intended to “showcase why residents are Richmond Proud and to build support for a 
newer, safer and cleaner refinery.” These ads “aired on television and generated community 
pride in Richmond, where Chevron has operated a refinery for over 100 years” (ibid). 
Framing variants of the same message, Chevron bought up all of the city billboards, ran 
television ads, sent out thousands of mailers. All of this was carried out with the objective of 
building pride in the city and connecting that sense of pride to what the refinery has made 
possible. Many of the leaders of community organizations Chevron has funded had their 
faces posted up on Chevron’s billboards too, endorsing this message. All of them encouraged 
the whole city, across their differences, to share in what a “newer, safer, cleaner” refinery 
could offer them. Implying the necessity of modernizing the refinery following the 2012 fire, 
Chevron appeals to values such as safety, clean air, and newness held across the city. The 
images of the firefighter, a church group, and kids playing soccer invoke the many aspects of 
community life the refinery has made possible through Chevron’s generosity. Chevron’s 
video clips thank the thousands of community members who have already endorsed the 
modernization “newer, cleaner, safer” project, again reinforcing its images as a courteous, 
benevolent neighbor. 
 
Meanwhile, following the tense negotiations over the terms upon which the refinery project 
would be accepted by the council, Chevron turned its attention to ensuring that the next time 
it would have to negotiate with the city it would do so with councilmembers more favorable 
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to the company’s interests. In association with Moving Forward, Chevron’s campaign 
expenditure committee, the company spent $3 million dollars in the election campaign of fall 
2014. Together with the police and firefighters’ unions, Moving Forward poured money into 
bolstering pro-Chevron candidates’ campaigns and spent heavily on attack ads against the 
RPA’s candidates. Candidates running with the help of Chevron’s money extolled the virtues 
of the company, again reminding potential voters of Chevron’s generosity, its community 
service, and its contribution to the local economy, all without which Richmond would suffer 
greatly. Attack ads and mailers depicted the RPA’s candidates as radical and unhinged, 
potentially dangerous threats to the city, to its identity, and to its way of doing things. While 
Chevron was able to build just enough support for its modernization project to be approved 
in the summer of 2014, the RPA successfully made the election about Chevron’s inordinate 
influence over the city’s politics. It’s political spending only reinforced this argument and 
every candidate it supported lost their campaigns. 
 
Despite these compelling examples, the mechanisms by which consent to the industry was 
developed over time go deeper than slick public relations campaigns and targeted 
philanthropy. Perhaps the most poignant illustration of the depths to which petro-culture is 
embedded in community consciousness is Richmond High’s School team mascot: The Oilers. 
As Soto describes it “the mascot on the side of the football field or in the gym for basketball 
games is a guy dressed up as an oil can, a funnel on top and painted in the school colors of 
red and navy blue.” A mascot, of course, is a source of pride, affinity and charm. The 
necessity, inevitability, and benevolence of oil and the ways of life it makes possible are 
realized in the refinery and in Chevron’s service to the community. These virtues are 
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explicitly recognized in the high school mascot. Entrenched discourses and consent are 
mediated through the different institutions and mechanisms described above but, as Raymond 
Williams reminds us, they are also embodied and arise in feelings and affect as much as they 
may be identified in explicit argument (1971). This has ultimately been the source of 
Chevron’s discursive hegemony and the strength of petro-culture in the city. The narrative 
that without the refinery there would be no Richmond triggers an affective response amongst 
its audiences based on a sense that values and lifeways stand to be defended and won. 
Finally, the “benevolent neighbor discourse” is not just compelling because it can be 
demonstrated with clear evidence of Chevron’s community service and generosity, but also 
because of its ubiquity. As Mayor Butt puts it “there’s no where you can go to escape the 
Chevron logo… they just infiltrate everything that is going on in the community” (quoted in 
Early 2017; Rowan and Tobias 2014). Repetition is an important tool Chevron has used to 
entrench its narrative in the city. The narrative that the refinery has been good for Richmond 
wins hearts and minds by framing Chevron’s long historical relationship with the city, and 
thus the seeming inevitability of its presence in the city into the future. As a symbol of 
continuity in the community and framing itself as a part of Richmond’s identity, the refinery 
becomes a source of community pride and a reliable benefactor that supported the 
community throughout its city’s difficult past.  
This narrative’s corollary is that those who oppose Chevron must also be opposed to the 
betterment of the community and ethic of community service for which the company so 
clearly stands.91 Those who oppose Chevron and its refinery, therefore, are not really part of 
 
91 This discourse seems to be more convincing when the refinery isn’t on fire and threatening to cover the entire 
city in toxic smoke. In all seriousness though, it’s a narrative that works in the context of what Rob Nixon calls 
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the Richmond because they don’t understand what Chevron has done for them. This is a 
sentiment that has been explicitly invoked by councilman Nat Bates and other Chevron allies 
(Early 2017). As such, those who would ungratefully attack Chevron are also attacking 
everything Chevron has made possible in the city. Chevron’s opponents may then be cast as 
dangerous threats to the city’s social fabric and social services. This final example was a 
trope the city’s fire and police unions deployed in their own attack ads on Martinez and 
McLaughlin. Thus, the benevolent neighbor narrative, and its “dangerous ingrates” corollary, 
may appear in different forms and are mediated by different actors and institutions, but in all 
its forms the underlying features have remained consistent and compelling for decades. 
The petro-state and coercion 
 
While Chevron’s narrative interventions have certainly resonated with a large swathe of 
Richmond’s residents and discursive conditions favored the company’s interests for over a 
century, there have been plenty of people (particularly those living in closest proximity to the 
refinery’s pollution), who were, and remain, unconvinced. Indeed, with the rise of the RPA 
and the growing potency of climate justice organizations’ own narrative interventions, 
Chevron has also relied upon relations of coercion to maintain its hegemonic status. This is 
most clearly demonstratable in Chevron’s control, and later its attempts to retain control 
over, city council. The company’s relationship, and tacit alliance, with the police officer’s 
union in Richmond has been crucial to this project. The fossil fuel industry’s coercive 
capabilities are also bolstered throughout the region in its capture of other state institutions 
 
“slow violence” (2011) where the effects of racialized toxicity and community poisoning are gradual and the 
refinery is able to cast doubt on any implication it may have had in the cause of such violence. 
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and regulatory agencies. Traditionally, with tremendous influence over the California state 
legislature and the Governor’s office, the industry has also been able to exert pressure on 
state legislators to approve or reject legislation to enshrine its interests in legally enforceable 
laws. In these four ways, then, the industry’s coercive capabilities are observable in 
Richmond. 
 
While the threat of force exists, and the industry has certainly sought to maintain control over 
state institutions that can deploy violence, the direct use of violence for coercive purposes 
was more or less absent in this case study. This is partly because the tactics deployed by 
Chevron’s opponents cannot be framed to legitimize a violent response (and probably even 
by the industry’s standards do not merit violence). But it is also because the industry’s 
control over city council and other state institutions have been enough to force the 
community into accepting particular conditions without explicit recourse to violence.92 This 
case study illustrates quite powerfully, therefore, that the absence of violence does not 
necessarily imply the absence of coercion. The industry’s ability to capture institutions that 
can enforce its interests if necessary, tends to be sufficiently coercive. The industry’s 
interventions in relations of coercion are documented below. 
 
The relationship between Chevron and state institutions with coercive capabilities is most 
clearly observable in the company’s decades-long control over city council. According to 
Gayle Mclaughlin, and indeed all of the climate justice activists I talked to in Richmond, 
 
92 In other words, the industry certainly retains the capabilities of violence through its influence over state 
institutions but this capacity, or the mere threat of violence, is usually enough to exert its force. Nevertheless, 
this remains, to my mind, a coercive relationship. 
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Chevron “controlled council for 100 years.” As McLaughlin explains, this is evident in the 
fact that “in the past, all of the candidates and office holders were funded by Chevron” 
(personal communication, July 18th, 2018). Throughout the city’s history, leftists and 
progressives did contest Chevron’s control of the council, both in public protest and 
elections, but were almost always defeated or coopted (McLaughlin 2018). These defeats 
bred a sentiment of bitter resignation and cynicism amongst the city’s activists. As 
McLaughlin argues, “they thought… [there was] nothing we could do, you know, you can't 
fight City Hall” (personal communication, July 18th, 2018). Submission to the simple belief 
that “you can’t fight City Hall,” enshrined even amongst those who vehemently dissented 
from Chevron’s rule, was enough for the company to force its will on the city’s residents for 
decades. Once City Hall had decided on Chevron’s behalf and in the interests of the city’s 
corporate establishment, residents and dissenters felt there was little more that could be done 
in the city. According to this narrative, moreover, with a notoriously brutal and racist police 
force to enforce whatever the city council decided, most dissenters would harbor their 
disempowered resentments quietly and impotently. In other words, with the enforcement of 
local institutions of the state rallied behind it, the company’s overwhelming dominance 
appeared so obvious and inevitable that resistance seemed futile. Preclusive submission to 
the insurmountable force of one’s adversary is absolutely a relation of coercion and, indeed, 
is the most common form in which the functioning of the petro-state is observable. 
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By 2005, however, cynicism, resignation and the belief that Chevron was an insurmountable 
force in the city’s politics had begun to thaw.93 This was partly because shifting 
demographics in the city meant Chevron’s cooptation of much of the city’s black 
establishment and community leaders held less potency. They failed to gain the same kind of 
influence over the Latinx and Laotian community leadership. Meanwhile, the election of 
Gayle McLaughlin to city council, who had cultivated support across a diverse constituency 
of frustrated residents in the city, inspired Chevron’s opponents with cautious optimism. The 
growing threat to its control of city council over the next ten years would see Chevron 
employ more aggressive strategies to try to regain its hegemonic position. 
Increasingly, especially while fighting off proposed tax hikes and advancing its 
modernization project, it would spend heavily on influencing election results and provide 
support for city council candidates who shared its interests. Indicating the extent to which 
company officials understood the significance of their control of city council, Chevron 
considerably increased its political spending in response to the growing threat of its 
opposition. As Soto told me, Chevron “used to spend $100,000 to $150,000 on an election, 
but over time that went up. By 2010 they were spending $1 million dollars then $1.25 million 
in 2012.”  In the 2014 election it more than doubled its spending, pouring up to $3 million 
into regaining its influence on council. This amounted to the company spending the 
equivalent of $180 per ballot cast in 2014. These numbers attracted national and international 
 
93 This is perhaps where the new migrations to Richmond did make an important difference and has some 
explanatory power. People like Gayle McLaughlin and Juan Reardon, and indeed many of the first and second 
generation migrant families who had moved to the city in the 1990s and 2000s, had not experienced Chevron’s 
dominance or the defeats progressives had suffered in the city for nearly as long as Richmond’s lifelong 
residents (Shah 2011). They brought with them a cautious optimism that many radicals in the city had long 
abandoned. 
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attention as they are almost unprecedented in city council races, let alone ones in a city the 
size of Richmond (Rowan and Tobias 2014).  
One of the company’s most outspoken supporters, and one of the RPA’s most vehement 
critics, is councilman Nat Bates. Bates has been mayor of the city twice (in 1971 and again in 
1976) and ran for mayor again in 2014 and again in 2018, though he lost both bids. A 
stalwart on city council, he was first elected in 1967 and has served as a councilmember in 
most of the intervening years. In his own words, Bates believes “heavy industry and 
Richmond are bound together in marriage” (quoted in McLaughlin 2018,130).  According to 
Steve Early “Bates has always been a firm believer in the city’s largest taxpayer and 
employer. What’s good for Chevron is, in his view, good for the community” (2017, 101-
102). Bates has defended this relationship with the company pointing to the funding that 
Chevron has devoted to “youth sports, programs for seniors and nonprofit organizations that 
operate in the city” (Johnson 2014). Bates further asserted his close ties with the company, 
telling Early that “Chevron has been under attack by the RPA… and they going to protect 
their turf… You better bet Chevron is going to favor someone with more sensitivity and 
compassion for what they’re trying to do” (2017, 103). Accordingly, “Local refinery 
management reciprocated with generous financial backing for Bates’ many successful 
campaigns for city council since 1967” (ibid). Investing in relationship with councilmembers 
like Bates used to be enough for Chevron to ensure its interests were shared by the city 
council. In this way it shored up access to the coercive enforcement capacities of local state 
institutions. 
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Meanwhile, Chevron also dominated the “Council of Industries and the Chamber of 
Commerce, two old-guard establishments that are at the center of the conservative black-
white pro-business coalition” (Schafran and Feldstein 2013, 164). These institutions are often 
able to place a great deal of pressure on the city council and the administration of City Hall. 
Through a network of influential community leaders, economic interest groups, the police 
and firefighters’ unions, and city councilors themselves, Chevron has sought to maintain its 
access to the coercive apparatuses of local state institutions as challenger groups have gained 
greater influence in Richmond. 
One vehicle through which Chevron has funneled its campaign spending is Moving Forward. 
While individual donations to election campaigns may not exceed $2500 in Richmond, the 
Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling in 2010 certainly reminds us that corporate interests 
can spend unlimited money on influencing election outcomes without donating to a specific 
candidate. Moving Forward was essentially a Chevron funded Political Action Committee 
operating under the guise of a coalition of concerned community members and leaders.  Of 
Moving Forward’s $3 million budget, $5000 came from the police and firefighters’ union 
each and the rest was funded by Chevron (Rowan 2014). Through this organization, Chevron 
and its public safety union allies sponsored election campaigns in 2012 and 2014. In 2014, 
they sponsored four election candidates: Nat Bates, Donna Powers, Charles Ramsey, and Al 
Martinez. They also funded a campaign of defamation and opposition to RPA candidates, 
Gayle Martinez, Jovanka Beckles, and Eduardo Martinez. Their increased campaigns 
spending following the fire in 2012, combined with the finances provided by soda companies 
opposing the soda tax, reached $3.5 million. This was enough to reduce the anti-Chevron 
caucus, with the RPA winning just two seats in 2012. Thus, when Chevron came to the 
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council’s negotiating table in the summer of 2014 to get its modernization project approved, 
it was able to negotiate with representatives more favorable to its cause. Despite massive 
political spending in November’s 2014 election, however, Chevron was not able to repeat the 
success of 2012 and all the candidates it sponsored lost their races. 
 
Chevron’s close relationship with the Richmond Police Officer’s Association (RPOA) is 
another source of its coercive capabilities. “The police are attack dogs for Chevron” is a 
sentiment Andrés Soto is fond of reciting in interviews and, as he went on to tell me, in his 
estimation “police departments are paramilitary organizations” (personal communication, 
July 11th, 2018). Meanwhile, alongside their “calculated community mindedness,” Early 
notes that throughout the refinery’s history, and particularly during past labor conflicts in the 
city, refinery owners have found “a little picket line repression was helpful too” (2017, 12). 
While, Chevron has not had to unleash their so-called attack dogs to deploy physical violence 
against dissenters, it has used them and their status as heroic defenders of public safety to 
viciously attack its opponents in the council chamber and throughout election campaigns. 
The RPOA is an important ally as it has traditionally held a great deal of influence over city 
council and is able to use its social license and reputation against its opponents. Moreover, 
Chevron is able to provide for the police and not just through philanthropic donations. As 
Soto explains, “they worked on behalf of Chevron because Chevron’s people [on council] 
then gave them what they wanted on their pension salaries.” Thus, both the police and fire 
associations worked with Chevron because Chevron-backed candidates would give them 
what they wanted in terms of pension and salary. 
 
 297 
As Soto went on to explain “we always expect them [The RPOA] to do the dirty work” for 
Chevron. Indeed, McLaughlin believes that during her 2010 reelection bid, the RPOA even 
hired private investigators to look into her past and used her record of mental health related 
illnesses and former bankruptcy to tell the community she was not fit to govern (McLaughlin 
2018). While I was in Richmond, the RPOA seemed to have been caught orchestrating a hit 
piece against RPA councilmember Eduardo Martinez claiming he had been suspected of 
driving under the influence after he reported having been robbed at gunpoint (Geluardi 
2018b).94 As Martinez later told me, “Chevron and the Richmond Officers Police Association 
work hand in hand, they’re like twin brothers” (personal communication, July 9th, 2018). In 
coordination with the RPOA, Chevron has mastered the use of intimidation tactics and uses 
these to attack their opponents and align the council with their interests.  
 
Despite their common interests, however, Mike Parker argues the relationship between the 
police and the Chevron officials is not the result of some grand conspiracy to keep Richmond 
under control - and it would be disingenuous, or at least naïve, to suggest otherwise (personal 
communication, July 11th, 2018). Rather, Chevron and the police union share a common 
enemy in the RPA, and in the left more broadly. While the relationship between the police 
department and Gayle McLaughlin was friendly under police chief Chris Magnus’ tenure, the 
same could not be said for the relationship between the RPOA and the RPA. They perceive 
the city’s progressive as having gone too far in holding police officers accountable, following 
up on accusations corruptions, racism, and attempts to reduce officer’s pensions. As such it is 
 
94 In an article investigating the claims against Martinez, Geluardi suggests that since Chief Magnus’ departure, 
the RPOA has been working to reassert its authority over the police department, attacking Magnus’ allies and 
undoing many of the former Chief’s progressive reforms (2018b). 
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the existence of a shared enemy that has reinforced the police union’s role as Chevron’s 
attack dogs. Moreover, to draw on Bourdieu here, police officers share in an establishment 
“habitus” of which community leaders, police union officials, and Chevron managers are all 
a part (1977). Soto suggested that because they operate in the same circles, attend the same 
functions, and, crucially have a shared set of values, they made natural allies. This, more than 
the possible existence of a covert agreement between law enforcement and Chevron, helps 
explain why the oil company and the RPOA tend to work “hand in hand.” It also helps us 
better understand that the petro-state is just as much constituted by a set of informal 
relationships, unspoken understanding, shared values, social networks, and tacit agreements 
as it is by any direct expressions of allegiance between state and capital.95  
 
Where Chevron has lost influence on city council, and its relationship with law enforcement 
officials are unable to intimidate city councilors and other opponents into taking up positions 
advantageous to Chevron’s interests, the company has also worked through the courts at the 
regional scale. It primarily uses the court system and lawsuits as a form of intimidation to 
ward off its opponent’s more ambitious assaults. It is not afraid to deploy these against the 
 
95 I would add here that this is an instance where the work of Pierre Bourdieu is complementary to Gramsci’s 
and applies a helpful corrective to the Gramscian tendency to see conspiracy and collusion in all relationships 
between state and capital. Bourdieu’s theory of habitus, a “socially constituted system of cognitive and 
motivating structures,” that organically reproduces social relationships, interests, values and domination, helps 
us understand these relationships (1977, 76). Habitus, as Bourdieu writes, is the “source of strategies without 
being the product of genuine strategic intention” (1977, 73). Representatives of the RPOA, of Chevron, of city 
council, and of local charities may all sit on the same boards or attend the same social functions and events. The 
alignment of Chevron and the RPOA’s interests is not a conspiracy or even a premeditated strategic relationship 
but rather a product of a habitus developed through relationships between people who share social spaces and so 
come to share common frames of reference, values, and perspectives - what Bourdieu calls social and cultural 
capital. These shape their common “dispositions.” The relationship performs the function of a strategy through 
which the company has controlled the city but, as Bourdieu puts it, the alignment of their interests may also 
represent a form of “conductorless orchestration,” emerging out of a set of dispositions that happen to mesh 
together (1977, 80). On the relationship between Bourdieu and Gramsci’s contributions, see also Michael 
Buroway (2008). 
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city council either. As Parker told me, filing suits and threatening to file suits against the city, 
tying up officials with administration and bureaucracy, Chevron has used its “army of 
lawyers” to try to intimidate city officials into submission (personal communication, July 
11th, 2018). Activists, and even the city council, are almost always out resourced and 
outgunned up against the enormous resources of litigation Chevron is able deploy should it 
need. For example, throughout Chevron’s negotiations with city council over refinery 
permits in 2014, the company maintained the threat of filing a cumbersome lawsuit against 
the city for overreaching its mandate (Early 2017). This intimidation tactic kept negotiators at 
the table and willing to work with the company. 
 
Parker provided another example of this strategy, explaining that during the 2008 and 2010 
Measure T fights with Chevron through which community organizer were trying to get 
Chevron to pay a fairer share of city taxes, Chevron avoided doing so by overwhelming the 
County Tax Assessor’s office with litigation. As Parker understood it, Chevron officials 
appealed to the tax assessors’ office to halt the city’s new tax laws. The assessors’ office 
carried out the hearing and found that “not only did Chevron not deserve a [tax] reduction, 
they actually should be paying much more [in taxes]” so they recommended that Chevron 
owed more and should pay the city a larger amount in taxes. According Parker, “Chevron 
went ballistic and went to court and essentially totally tied up the assessor's office” (personal 
communication, July 11th, 2018).  In 2012 Chevron appealed the recommendation in court. 
However, the office stood little chance against the resources and number of lawyers Chevron 
brought to the hearings and ultimately capitulated. Instead, the tax assessor’s office worked 
out a settlement with Chevron. As Parker concludes, “the assessor's office felt…it had no 
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choice. You can't use all your lawyers and then still be outmatched and do nothing else about 
the rest of the county…”  (personal communication, July 11th, 2018). Chevron’s tax 
avoidance strategy here was simply to overwhelm its opponents with a lawsuit that would 
take up all their time and resources and so force them into capitulation out of court. A pattern 
is discernable here where Chevron has no need of recourse to overt coercion because most of 
its opponents simply capitulate in the face of what seems an overwhelmingly better resourced 
adversary. Thus, the threat of this overwhelming force tends to be more than enough for 
Chevron to advance its interests through less obviously coercive means.96 
 
If not overwhelming understaffed and under resourced regulatory agencies and tax offices, 
Chevron, and the fossil fuel industry more generally in the region, have sought to capture 
them and staff them with officials more friendly to their interests. One such example is 
BAAQMD.  As Janet Johnson of Sunflower Alliance told me, BAAQMD is “another captive 
agency, in that the membership are elected officials but … [it] actually ends up being very 
tightly controlled” (personal communication, July 18th, 2018). Bay Area climate justice 
activists have been targeting BAAQMD on a variety of issues for more than a decade. Before 
the passage of AB 398, BAAQMD had more regulatory teeth and authority over the Bay 
Area’s refineries, particularly their emissions that impact air quality. In earlier campaigns, 
activists tried to get the agency to impose flaring restrictions on refineries and more stringent 
regulations on emissions of toxins. Their successes were limited. In 2014 CBE sued 
BAAQMD on two counts, firstly claiming that the agency had permitted the transportation of 
 
96 In Rules for Radicals, the first of Saul Alinsky thirteen rules is that “power is not only what you have, but 
what the enemy thinks you have” (1970). Where the opponents’ power is perceived as overwhelmingly, it is 
unlikely to meet with much resistance. 
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oil by rail into the city without a public hearing and secondly for allowing Chevron to start 
work on the refinery modernization without appropriate permits. Both instances illustrated 
the extent to which BAAQMD was prepared to work in the industry’s interests, despite 
clearly operating in defiance of California’s environmental laws 
 
Then, following the city council’s approval of the refinery’s modernization permits, climate 
justice activists shifted their strategic focus away from the council almost entirely. Instead, 
they focused on pressuring BAAQMD into imposing stricter emissions caps on particulate 
matter and greenhouse gases from the Bay Area’s refineries. For years, despite a 
sophisticated campaign and a large coalition of groups bringing evidence of the refinery 
emissions’ impacts on public health to public hearings, BAAQMD refused to be persuaded. 
They eventually agreed to cap greenhouse gas emissions in 2017 but this was thwarted 
following the passage of AB 398. More recently, the newly formed Protect the Bay coalition 
has tried to persuade BAAQMD to reject permits for Phillip’s refinery application to expand 
its wharf – part of what activists are calling a “piecemeal” refinery upgrade. Again, 
BAAQMD officials have been deeply resistant to imposing the necessary regulations and 
fulfilling their own mandate of regulating air quality in the Bay Area. Activists argued that 
the industry’s influence over regulatory agencies and state institutions like BAAQMD is 
illustrated in the constant delaying of taking regulatory action through these institutions. As 
Janet told me “They are masters at kicking the can down the road. I mean, this is there, this is 
their total MO” (personal communication, July 18th, 2018). Thus, another way the fossil fuel 
companies operate through the petro-state is to limit the implementation and enforcement of 
regulations that would otherwise coerce the industry into taking action contrary to its 
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interests. Meanwhile, it may also use these agencies to implement and enforce legal 
standards that advance its interests. 
 
Finally, where regional regulatory agencies act in defiance of the industry’s interests, as 
BAAQMD ultimately did in 2017, the industry may fall back upon statewide or national 
institutions to enforce its interests. In this case, the fossil fuel industry’s advocacy group in 
California, the Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA), successfully lobbied for 
provisions to be included in Governor Brown’s Cap and Trade Bill which would “Give ARB 
[the Air Resources Board] exclusive jurisdiction over GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions in 
the state” (Aronoff 2017). In other words, the California Air Resources Board would become 
the only regulator of greenhouse gas emissions through the California wide cap and trade 
program, removing the power of regional agencies to regulate emissions on their own terms. 
The passage of AB 398 undermined more than three years of advocacy and campaigning for 
BAAQMD to regulate greenhouse gas emissions at the precise moment that the agency was 
prepared to do so.  
 
The oil industry’s influence in California has been enshrined over decades in ways very 
similar to how it gained hegemonic status in Richmond. Its ability to gut regulatory agencies 
enforcement mechanisms to its advantage is just one example of the implications of its 
statewide influence. Moreover, as California has indeed promoted climate leadership, the 
industry has ensured such leadership does little to challenge its operations in the state. In the 
months leading up to the passage of Brown’s cap and trade bill for example, the oil industry 
spent more than $16 million lobbying in Sacramento, most of this was spent by WSPA and 
 303 
Chevron. During the 2015-2016 legislative session, the oil industry spent $36 million, more 
than it ever has before, lobbying in California (Bacher 2017; Malkern 2017). The return on 
its political investments were high and have afforded the industry tremendous scope to shape 
Californian environmental and climate policy across the state. 
 
The industry’s coercive capabilities may have been curtailed at the municipal scale in 
Richmond but they remain potent at regional and statewide scales. This suggests we must 
pay close attention to the operations of the industry at multiple scales of petro-state. Under 
Governor Jerry Brown and most legislative assemblies prior to 2018, the petro-state in 
California flourished. It remains to be seen whether Governor Newsom and a new set of state 
legislators will defy this trend. Nevertheless, in so far as state institutions responsible for 
holding the fossil fuel industry accountable are concerned, whether they are regulatory 
agencies municipal governments, or indeed the Governor’s office, these have all failed to 
protect Californians from the industry’s excesses. The ability of the industry to enforce its 
interests across multiple scales of state institutions remains more or less unchallenged. 
Meanwhile, despite (and perhaps because of) the absence of overt violence deployed by the 
industry, this case illustrates the more subtle and banal forms of coercion by which the 
industry enforces and advances its interests through the petro-state. 
 
Petro-capitalism and compliance 
 
More than coercion and consent, compliance has been the most prevalent relation of power 
observable in Richmond. As Chapters Two and Three have demonstrated, compliance is an 
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economic relation of power that rests upon a dynamic of dependency. It exists between, and 
often blends with, relations of consent and coercion. Compliance in Richmond, however, is 
more potent and distinguishable than either coercion or consent because the dependency 
dynamic is so palpably a constraint on what is deemed possible in the city. Historically, the 
refinery was, and remains, the city’s largest employer and the refinery’s contributions to the 
city’s tax base has helped make City Hall’s provision of essential public services possible. 
This dependency on jobs and revenue places constrains on the ambition of the city council 
and local activists in their dealings with the refinery. Similarly, Chevron’s philanthropy and 
community service is not just a tool for shoring up consent. These resources have historically 
played a significant role in providing and funding services that local government has 
neglected.  Finally, the Community Benefits Agreement that Chevron and city 
councilmembers ultimately negotiated in return for modernization permits was clearly an 
instrument used to intervene in relations of compliance to advance the refinery upgrade. 
Through its provisions of jobs and revenue, the strategic deployment of Community Benefits 
Agreements, and the replacement of municipal services with Chevron-funded services, the 
oil company has helped develop a dynamic of dependency on the refinery, fostering relations 
of compliance in Richmond. 
 
Threatening to hold jobs and taxes hostage is Chevron’s most potent weapon in the city. 
Chevron’s refinery in Richmond currently employs about 1600 people and about 25% of 
Richmond’s city budget is dependent on the tax revenue Chevron contributes. Chevron 
refuses to publicize exactly how many people the refinery permanently employs but, by its 
own estimates, from 2016 – 2018 it employed another 1200 temporary construction workers 
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and contractors to carry out the modernization project (McLaughlin 2018). A City Hall 
factsheet suggests that the refinery employed up to 3,456 people in 2016 (City Facts 2019). 
Through taxes, employment, and charitable giving, Chevron claims to have contributed $500 
million to the city economy and services between 2009 and 2012 alone (Early 2017). 
Although these numbers are likely something of an exaggeration, Chevron’s presence 
certainly does contribute vital resources to the city’s economy. The company’s perceived 
importance to the local economy is one reason why city decision-makers did so little to hold 
Chevron accountable for so long. Indeed, as McLaughlin puts, it: 
 
While most people in our Richmond community were aware of the health and 
environmental damage caused by Chevron’s refinery, a majority of the City Council, 
along with some sectors of the community, held tight to the idea that they would 
overlook the environmental impact, because this mega-corporation is central to our 
local economy. (personal communication, July 18th, 2018) 
 
Despite, knowing about the consequences of the refinery on public health, its contributions to 
the economy were deemed far more significant. These are the kind of calculations a 
dependency dynamic will foster within a community.  
 
While Chevron’s threats to pack up the refinery and move elsewhere should the city’s 
business environment become overwhelmingly hostile are mostly hollow,97 the company can 
and has held current jobs, new employment opportunities and tax revenue hostage to advance 
its interests. For example, following the court’s decision to overturn the project permits in 
2010, Chevron slashed jobs and cancelled contracts with construction workers it had 
 
97  These threats are hollow because, despite regulations and conditions applied by the council, the refinery 
remains profitable, the costs of relocation are enormous, the refinery’s current location highly strategic and 
makes it competitive, and there a very few cities in California today that would welcome a new refinery in their 
neighborhoods.  
 306 
employed to carry out the project (in fairness, without permits there is little these workers 
could have been employed to do anyway). This provoked anger amongst local unions and 
labor associations, but this anger was directed against Chevron’s opponents not Chevron 
itself. Perceptions of Chevron’s historical importance to the city’s economic development are 
deliberately exaggerated by the company and its supporters. However, it would be a mistake 
to underestimate the significance of both the reality and perceptions of its contributions to the 
local economy and relations of compliance. Chevron remains the city’s largest employer, 
although most of its employees no longer live in Richmond (McLaughlin 2018).  
 
McLaughlin explains that the promises of jobs divided local building trade unions, some of 
whom wanted the company to file a more complete EIR and comply with safer regulatory 
standards for workers, and others who were enticed by the promise of employment. 
Historically, many of these unions have had a somewhat fraught relationship with the 
company, particularly in disputes over wages and safety standards. During the modernization 
project’s first iteration McLaughlin says that many of the refinery’s union members and local 
building trade unions worked closely with local environmental justice activists forming a 
“Blue-Green Alliance.” Together they opposed the project, calling for a more thorough 
environmental impact assessment and more stringent safety standards.  
 
However, Chevron and the national leadership of these local union chapters cut a deal where 
the national unions agreed “not to oppose the project in return for a guarantee of union jobs 
throughout the project’s construction” (McLaughlin 2018, 139). This maneuver successfully 
broke up the early alliance and divisions returned to the well-worn “jobs versus the 
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environment” framing that so benefits the industry. McLaughlin, who comes from a union 
background, recalls this being the first time she was pitted against unionists and describes the 
discomfort of having former allies turn on her in the public hearings and city council 
meetings. Clearly most of the unions knew the risks associated with the refinery and yet felt 
compelled to side with Chevron’s project when the company offered employment and a 
means of making a living. The potency of communities’ dependency on jobs to make a living 
is one of the easiest ways the industry intervenes in relations of compliance.  
 
Along with employment, the community has developed a dependency on Chevron for tax 
revenue. Previous city councils had “proved unable to provide any real solutions for 
Richmond, precisely because they lacked the political independence required to put the 
interests of the community first. The councils instead built up a financial dependency on 
Chevron over the decades” (McLaughlin 2018, 34). Public safety services like the police and 
fire departments, local schools, the municipal library, public swimming pools and so on, all 
depend upon tax revenue to which Chevron is an overwhelming contributor (despite many 
legitimate arguments that it does not pay enough in taxes). Whenever Chevron’s interests are 
challenged, however, its representatives and its supporters will remind opponents of the 
services the company’s contribution to the city tax base make possible. Without Chevron’s 
contributions to the city’s tax base, Richmond could not offer any such services and would be 
forced to make painful budget cuts or otherwise privatize the few remaining public 
institutions in the city. Nat Bates and his allies on council will urge the company’s detractors 
not to scare away the company, but rather to be grateful for what it has made possible. 
Chevron’s officials, meanwhile, may not really be willing to leave the city, but as it 
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demonstrated when it overwhelmed the tax assessors’ office in litigation, it is more than 
capable of bringing enormous legal resources down upon the city to resist paying its share of 
taxes.  
 
In addition to friendly city councilmembers extolling its virtues, Chevron’s contribution to 
city taxes genuinely constrains the demands and ambition of the local climate justice 
activists. At a time when much of climate justice movement would be calling for a refinery 
of this scale to be rapidly phased out and closed down due to its considerable contribution to 
greenhouse gases, most activists in Richmond are begrudgingly resigned to accepting the 
refinery’s presence in the city. The city may be diversifying its economy but without 
alternative sources of revenue on the scale of what Chevron is able to provide most activists 
have had to recognize that, at least for the present, the refinery isn’t going anywhere.98 
 
Similarly, Chevron cultivates and feeds this dynamic of dependency by directly contributing 
resources to services people in Richmond depend upon but that the municipal government 
has withdrawn from after decades of privatization and budget cuts. Providing funding for 
community centers, for example, Chevron is perceived as a contributor to, rather than a threat 
to, the city’s social fabric. Supporting scholarships and afterschool programs, Chevron is 
perceived as working with the local government to care for young people at risk of social 
alienation and economic stagnation. Resourcing homelessness charities like the Bay Area 
 
98 I had an interesting conversation with Andrés Soto about this and he was one of the few climate justice 
activists in the city who is seriously thinking about what it would like to just the refinery down through a just 
transition (personal communication, July 11th, 2018). He suggested that with support from local organizers, the 
city could force Chevron to pay into closure bonds to pay for the decommissioning and cleanup of the refinery 
site. He argued that weaning the city off Chevron would require even greater to commitment to a just transition 
which Chevron would have to pay for (and I would add, considerable external resources).  
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Rescue Mission, supporting housing charities, and funding lunches for children who cannot 
afford them through the Greater Richmond Interfaith Program, Chevron is providing services 
that after decades of neoliberal cuts and privatization local governments are not providing 
themselves (Chevron 2012). These are services residents come to depend upon and without 
which life would be much harder. Over decades of neoliberal cuts, rollback and privatization 
of government services, Chevron has taken over the role government is supposed to play 
with charitable giving and corporate philanthropy.  
 
It is crucial to remember here, that much of the rollback of government services in Richmond 
has been a result of the domination of municipal, statewide and national legislatures by 
corporate interests. Additionally, the crumbling social fabric and economic blight to which 
Richmond was subjected were exacerbated by Chevron’s decision to build a shopping mall 
just as Richmond’s downtown shopping area was recovering from a series of riots and white 
flight. Competition with this mall proved near impossible and much of the downtown 
economy dried up as a result. This further impoverished the community and created the 
conditions in which dependency would thrive. Thus Chevron, Chevron-backed councilors 
and establishment elites helped legislate the very policies which led to the rollback of 
government services and economic desperation in the first place. They could then take 
advantage of these conditions to take over the services previously provided by local 
government and foster dependency on the company’s goodwill. This is an important part of 
how the fossil fuel industry creates situations of dependency on its benevolence and how the 
relation of compliance gets conditioned. 
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Finally, one of the tools Chevron has used to intervene in and exploit relations of compliance 
is the Community Benefits Agreement. In return for the modernization permits, Chevron 
ultimately agreed to pay the city $90 million in community benefits. $35 million was 
ringfenced for a scholarship program to provide all graduating high school seniors with a 
$1000 grant to help pay for college tuition. The rest of the money is being directed towards 
city led sustainability and decarbonization projects. These have included programs to train 
young people in the renewable energy sector and to develop a renewable energy economy in 
the city. In the agreement Chevron also donated several acres of land for a solar farm run by 
the Community Choice Energy Aggregate, Marin County Energy.  
 
Just like the services people come to depend upon, these agreements become tools of 
compliance because decades of corporate rule has dispossessed the city of a great deal of 
community wealth. Bankrupting the city and its residents through years of neoliberalism and 
then offering to pay a small amount of that wealth back only when it is advantageous to a 
corporation’s interests may be a flagrant instance of injustice, but it also a significant 
assertion of hegemonic power through the relation of compliance. This is because the 
conditions of underfunding it has partially helped create constrain the choices available to the 
city’s residents and the company’s opponents. Thus, when Chevron offers millions of dollars 
to improve living conditions in the city, it is very difficult for residents to turn them down. 
As this case illustrates, members of the city council capitulated to Chevron over the 
modernization program, in part, because Chevron had first reduced the city into a situation of 
dependency so that it had little choice but to accept the benefits Chevron offers. As 
conditions are constrained by the company, benefits agreements are used to intervene in 
 311 
relations of compliance by providing dependent communities with a source of desperately 
needed revenue. 
 
In sum, Chevron’s long history as Richmond’s economic powerhouse and primary benefactor 
has made it very difficult for some residents to imagine a Richmond without Chevron. This 
reinforces what Gedicks calls a “psychology of inevitability” (1993). This is a disposition 
where even most climate justice activists cannot countenance the possibility of closing down 
the refinery any time soon. Compliance thrives in situations of economic desperation where 
few other economic opportunities exist. This has very much been the case in Richmond 
(although it is changing now). Thus, a combination of neoliberalism, white supremacy, and 
austerity politics at the turn of the millennia, which gutted the city’s economic base and 
unraveled social fabric, have given rise to a dynamic of dependency. Along with dependency 
on jobs and tax revenue, the Community Benefits Agreement reinforced relations of 
compliance even when the community is fully aware of the risks the refinery poses. 
Nevertheless, with Chevron now paying a fairer share of taxes and with the support of the 
benefits agreement, the city is investing in diversifying its economy and perhaps, in this way, 
is finding a way out of dependence. However, only a just transition with leadership from 
Richmond’s frontlines communities can ensure the community is able to break its 
dependency on the industry and reconstitute its dependence on corporations into a form of 
community interdependence. 
 
Conclusion: Questions for the Climate Justice Movement 
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This chapter has situated the climate justice movement’s confrontation with Chevron in 
Richmond in the city’s history, geography, and contemporary political landscape. It has 
illustrated how the consequences and confluences of neoliberal disinvestment and 
deindustrialization, white supremacy and structural racism, corruption, and environmental 
injustice allowed petro-hegemony to thrive. The fossil fuel industry has developed a strategic 
hub for processing, exporting and importing fossil fuels in Richmond, and the Bay Area more 
generally. Refineries along the East Bay are retooling and upgrading their technology to 
process lower quality but potentially lucrative crude oil. For much of the last decade the 
frontlines of the fight to halt the import of heavier dirtier crude into the Bay Area has been in 
Richmond where activists sought to impose strict conditions on Chevron’s refinery 
modernization project. The project was ultimately permitted but at far greater cost to 
Chevron than it had originally anticipated. In the process the company has lost its 100-year 
control over the city’s politics, economy and culture. In the process, Richmond is shrugging 
off its history of dispossession as its residents confront corporate power through movement 
vehicles like the local environmental organizations and Richmond Progressive Alliance. As a 
result, the story of an impoverished, destitute, and dangerous city is one that Richmond’ 
residents and activists are actively resisting and rewriting. 
 
While much of the rest of this dissertation looks into the specific strategies climate justice 
activists developed to win significant counter hegemonic victories against the company, in 
this chapter I provided a narrativized timeline to highlight the fifteen-year period over which 
Chevron’s hegemonic status has been successfully dismantled. I then demonstrated how 
Chevron and the broader fossil fuel industry developed and maintained hegemonic status in 
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the city for so long. Exploring the different relations of power contained by hegemony, I 
investigated the mechanics by which interventions in consent, coercion, and compliance have 
maintained and advanced Chevron’s hegemony in Richmond. As I did Chapter Three, and by 
way of concluding this chapter, I want to draw readers’ attention to four questions and 
observations that I encountered through this case study and which animate the conversations 
about the composition of the carbon rebellion in the chapters to come. Some of these overlap 
with the questions I encountered in my research in British Columbia while others are specific 
to what I learned in Richmond. Together, these questions and observations concern the role 
of the state in climate justice strategy, the relationship between organizing and mobilizing 
strategies, the politics of accountability and the relationship between unity and different in 
movement building discourses, and finally confronting the limits of the local through the 
question of scale. Below I highlight how different elements of this chapter and their relation 
to the framework developed in Chapter Two have given rise to these questions. 
 
The role of the state in climate justice strategy 
 
The role of the state in climate justice strategies is a crucial question being debated within the 
movement and the Richmond case provides a useful lens through which to assess it. Activists 
in Richmond have relied upon institutions of the state to deploy coercive power against the 
industry and hold it to account. This includes the strategic use of lawsuits, building 
movement infrastructure with the intention and capabilities of winning elections, and 
working through regulatory agencies to impose restrictions on the refinery’s excesses. While 
we cannot doubt the fact that activists have met with some success through these institutions, 
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there is also always a danger that their political perspectives, strategies and tactics come to be 
coopted, deradicalized and neutralized through this form of engagement. Seeking electoral 
office, for example, often requires certain compromises in strategic orientations and values 
that others in the movement may not be willing to make. Working through the courts, 
meanwhile, may exclude many activists without the expertise, time, or resources to fight 
drawn out legal battles. On the other hand, as many activists explained to me, they are not 
unaware of these risks, rather they have sought to develop a democratic and accountable 
relationship between grassroots movements and the movement allies they get elected to city 
council. One example this case offered was the process of capturing state resources in order 
to create more opportunities for grassroots movements to assert themselves and their 
consolidate victories.  In Chapters Six and Seven, I further explore the possibility of synergy 
between capturing state resources and how these might be funneled towards the climate 
justice movement whose members might then use them to prefigure just climate solutions 
outside the frameworks of state and capital.  
 
The relationship mobilizing and organizing  
 
This case study also illustrates an important tension within social movements over strategic 
preferences for community organizing on the one hand and mobilizing in the other. In 
general terms we might think of organizing strategies as those which build and grow social 
movements with close attention to the specificities of local context to create social change 
over time. Mobilizing strategies are more oriented to the rapid generation of political 
pressure through mass action and harnessing semi-spontaneous uprisings. Different schools 
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of social movement theory place different emphasis on each of these.  Chapters Five and Six 
are loosely organized around organizing strategies in the former and mobilizing strategies in 
the latter. However, Richmond’s activists indicate the importance of combining mobilizing 
with organizing strategies. One example is the RPA’s commitment to community organizing 
in between election cycles which was combined with fast-paced mass mobilization during 
election seasons. Additionally, observing the timeline of struggle as it has unfolded over 
fifteen years, patterns of organizing and mobilizing periods became observable in the city. 
For example, for two- or three-year periods at a time it might seem that activism had gone 
quiet when in actual fact these were the periods during which more resources were being 
devoted to the patient, quotidian work of community organizing. Then, seemingly all of a 
sudden, excited and frenzied periods of action would erupt in apparent spontaneity. However, 
these moments are in fact connected and could be made to operate cyclically. The moments 
of mass mobilization and activity are made possible by the months and years of community 
organizing that take place between them. Meanwhile, the moments of mass mobilization 
infuse community organizations with new energy and new members. In Chapter Seven, 
therefore, I examine the relationship between organizing and mobilizing in greater depth and 
demonstrate how mobilizing and organizing strategies may complement one another as they 
are deployed in a cyclical manner. 
 
Accountability and the relationship between unity in difference 
 
The internal constitution and structure of the RPA and its relationship to other environmental 
and climate justice organization in Richmond raise important questions about alliance 
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building and accountability across different relations of privilege and politics. On the one 
hand, the RPA provides important lessons for how activists across a broadly leftist spectrum 
of radicals and reformers might work together in a commitment to what George Lakey calls 
“revolutionary reforms.” By this he means an accumulation of reforms to a system that then 
open up the possibility of revolutionary action and further radical social change. Activists’ 
ability to work across strategic and political difference rather than descending into impotent 
purist factionalism is to be commended. However, these alliances are rarely without friction 
and come at a cost. In particular, this is true where differences are distributed not just across 
ideology but across intersections of race, class, gender and other relations of material 
privilege. RPA activists certainly encountered these tensions and they have sometimes 
threatened the alliance’s longevity. Yet, RPA activists have also been working to establish 
clearer accountability structures that are more cognizant of intersectional oppressions and 
privilege within the movement. Negotiating the relationship between unity and difference is 
necessary both in everyday movement practice but also in the narratives and discourses of 
alignment that activists have used to broaden their base and develop alliances across social 
struggles. Narratives that build alliances often erase important relations of difference. Thus, 
through an exploration of a term I call intersectional populism, I problematize the process of 
alliance building, practices of accountability and trust, and the relationship between 
narratives of universalism and particularism in Chapter Five. In Chapter Seven, meanwhile, I 
discuss the possibility of a spectrum of strategy and how it may be used to coordinate 
differences between strategic orientations within the movement. 
 
Scale and the limits of the local.  
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Finally, this case study very clearly illustrates the limits of localized community struggle in 
the face of an industry’s whose operations exist far beyond the local context. This case 
provides examples of how the industry’s hegemony exists at multiple scales and how it may 
use its influence at the regional or national scale to compensate for its loss of hegemonic 
status at a local scale. The industry’s influence over the passage of AB 398 is one important 
instance of this dynamic. Moreover, it indicates that activism at the local scale alone is not 
enough to counter the hegemonic status of an industry that operates at multiple scales. As 
such the movement must engage with questions of at which scale its interventions may be 
most strategic, and moreover, the scale to which the movement itself must, and can, grow to 
combat the global proportions of the fossil fuel industry.  
 
Furthermore, this case demonstrates the ways petro-hegemony shapes and is shaped by its 
interactions with neoliberalism, class, and structural racism. It showed how different power 
relations interact with intersectional forces of oppression within Patricia Hill Collins’ “matrix 
of domination.”  Confronting both the global proportions of the industry and the broader, 
revolutionary, scope of action needed to dismantle the matrix of domination, the climate 
justice movement must consider the manner in which it scales up. Here questions of scale 
intersect with questions of democracy, accountability, strategy, ideology and the 
revolutionary potential of this movement.  I take up these questions in Chapter Eight by 
comparing the process of aggrandizement to scale and aggregation to scale.  
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To conclude, then, this chapter has provided practical examples of the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter Two and illustrations of the ways petro-hegemony operates in 
contextualized specificity. Both the case study chapters and Chapter Two have been 
constructed in conversation with one another. Thus, much of the framework theorized in 
Chapter Two emerges out of, and has been adapted and evolved in conversation with, my 
field research and observations from the frontlines of climate justice movement. Together, 
these three chapters offer insight into the theoretical and empirical functioning of petro-
hegemony. The following four chapters examine different dimensions of the counter 
hegemonic response to petro-hegemony – the emergence of the carbon rebellion. This 
chapter has indicated some of the interventions climate justice activists used against 
Chevron, the following chapters organize these into the carbon rebellion framework to assess 
their strengths and limitations and explore the different questions they raise. I have offered 
these case study chapters not as the definitive history of struggle in either context, nor as 
evidence of the existence of petro-hegemony, but rather to illustrate theory in relation to 
practice and provide readers with an understanding of the social conjunctures in which my 
study into the operations of petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion has been carried out. 
While I use this framework to generalize my findings through the rest of the dissertation, it is 
the specifics of the struggles I have described that makes all the difference in this 
investigation into the strategies, tactics, and narratives of petro-hegemony and the carbon 
rebellion on the frontlines of climate justice. 
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PART 3: ORGANIZING AND MOBILIZING THROUGH THE CARBON REBELLION 
 
 
Chapter 5 – Building Blockadia: The counter hegemonic politics of alliances, alignment 
and discourse on the frontlines of climate justice  
 
A social movement is a shared story – Patrick Reinsborough  
 
To change everything, we need everyone – The People’s Climate March  
 
 
Introduction  
 
If the climate justice movement is to shift relations of consent away from the fossil fuel 
industry and around a vision of climate justice instead, it must engage in the process of 
aligning diverse interests, actors and social struggles into broad-based alliances that are able 
to contest and replace the industry’s hegemonic status. This chapter explores the role that 
narrative and communications strategy play in contesting the fossil fuel industry’s 
legitimacy, winning support for climate justice, and developing alliances across social 
difference. Along with discourse, however, it also examines the material dimension of 
alliances centering movement practices of accountability and the forging of solidarity 
through realizing shared material interests. In so doing, I avoid a singular emphasis on either 
the discursive or the material dimensions of solidarity and argue both are critical and 
inextricable.  In less abstract terms, I explore the process of aligning diverse social groups 
through the political cultures of opposition and creation developed in the case studies 
described in the previous two chapters (Foran, Grosse, and Gray 2017). As such, much of 
this chapter’s contribution to the dissertation concerns community organizing and the 
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strategies, narratives, and tactics, climate justice activists use to organize their communities 
into alignment against the industry. 
 
This chapter responds to Gramscian insights into waging the war of position, forging a 
historic bloc, articulating chains of equivalence, and how these have informed a recent surge 
in climate populism (Bosworth 2018; see also Laclau and Mouffe 2014; Smucker 2017). 
Through the PCOC, I argue that populist unifying discourses and stories play an essential 
role in building movements, holding alliances together, and reproducing what Rick Fantasia 
calls a “Culture of Solidarity” (1988). However, with Fantasia, I argue that alliances and 
solidarity rest upon more than discourse, and that our analyses of their construction should 
also consider shared material and economic interests, the praxis of accountability, and the 
bonds that are wrought through collective action. Movements that are able to respond to 
material interests and provide for day-to-day material needs, services and livelihoods, across 
social struggles, can build trust and accountability with the communities they seek align and 
organize. I will argue that a just transition may be able to help achieve this. Moreover, 
drawing upon Zoltán Grossman, I seek to amend the ways that populist discourses, and 
counter hegemonic intervention, often revolve around a politics of the universal, erasing 
material and historical power dynamics, privilege, difference, and the particular (2017).  I 
introduce the term intersectional populism with which scholars and activists may negotiate 
the intricate tensions between the politics of universalism and the particular to address deep 
internal differences while maintaining an externally cohesive populist front. 
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If we recognize that social movements are, among other things, a shared story, then one of 
the most important activities movement builders can do is extend their stories to encompass 
the values, interests, and struggles of larger and more diverse constituencies. Reinsborough 
and Canning’s “story-based strategy,” changing the stories we use to interpret and make 
meaning out of the world around us, plays a crucial role in building alliances across identity 
groups and social struggles to grow social movements (2010). Discursive intervention is, 
therefore, a fundamental component of contesting petro-hegemony. Through developing their 
own PCOC, climate justice activists are waging a war of position against the fossil fuel 
industry, undermining its social legitimacy, and aligning consent to alternative social 
formations. Their most persuasive discourses tend to capture populist framings of connection 
to land, public health, corruption of democracy, just transition, and the articulation of a clear 
external enemy.  However, populist narratives that seek to unite constituencies across 
difference often erase those differences and subtly, or not so subtly, reinforce existing 
dynamics of privilege and power. As such, I argue for an intersectional populism that aligns 
people across difference based upon their exposures to overlapping systems of oppression in 
which the fossil fuel industry is implicated. Discursively articulating intersectional populism 
is one thing, practicing it is quite another. Exploring intersectional populism in campaign 
praxis, I reinforce Moore and Kahn Russell’s claim that collaboration across difference 
depends upon active accountability that confronts, challenges and ultimately dismantles 
historical and material dynamics of power and privilege (2011). This includes the 
materialization of a just transition beyond rhetorical promises and visions of climate justice 
futures that can foster translocal solidarity to grow the movement. 
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Drawing upon empirical Participant Action Research in Blockadia and the praxis of the 
campaign case studies, combined with the theoretical framework I developed in Chapter 1, I 
explore this chapter’s arguments in four parts corresponding to four major themes. First, I 
analyze the discursive strategies and narrative interventions that these campaigns are 
deploying to grow the movement. Here I illustrate the efficacy of populist climate discourses 
and the points of intervention campaigners have exploited to fight the battle of the story. 
Second, I problematize the universalizing tendency of hegemonic and populist political 
strategy through the lens of intersectionality. I demonstrate the ways these campaigns are 
experimenting with intersectional populism to reach larger and more diverse audiences while 
remaining attuned to material, cultural, and historical particularities. Third, I explore the role 
of accountability and leadership in maintaining and reproducing alliances. Finally, I examine 
the ways alliances grow the movement through realizing, defending and advancing different 
potential constituents’ material interests. This section also analyzes the ways material 
interests and narrative intervention might be combined to develop translocal climate justice 
solidarities beyond the contextualized confines of place-based struggle.  I conclude with 
reflections on the significance of this chapter’s interventions, their pertinence to wars of 
position, and how they may help us grow a PCOC for climate justice large enough to combat 
petro-hegemony at the different social scales it pervades.   
 
Part 1 –  Building a populist alliance against the fossil fuel industry: story and framing  
 
Growing the movement through alliance building is a cultural intervention in relations of 
consent. It involves persuasion, discursive strategy, the construction of a PCOC, and what the 
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Center for Story-based Strategy calls “narrative power analysis” to unravel our opponents’ 
stories while developing our own (Reinsborough and Canning 2010). In Gramscian terms 
this means fighting and winning the war of position by articulating into alignment popular 
consent to an alternative hegemony (Haluza DeLay and Carter 2016). A PCOC for climate 
justice is developed in the process of wresting consent away from petro-hegemony and 
around alternatives instead. As campaigners intervene in relations of consent, and 
successfully “change the story” in Blockadia, we can map the different points of intervention 
and discursive strategies that are already undermining the fossil fuel industry’s social license 
and forging a new consensus. As more people share and find themselves included in the 
stories climate justice campaigners tell, they ally themselves through the PCOC. The PCOC 
then encompasses more worldviews, struggles, and identities. New identities reflecting the 
values and interests of the different constituencies of the movement are developed and the 
movement grows and evolves – at least in theory. In practice, the process can be fraught with 
tension and is often undermined by internal divisions, alienating practices, and refusal to 
engage with particularity. The infighting and consistent failure of the Left to cohere around 
theories of change, visions of alternatives, or leadership models is well rehearsed. 
Nevertheless, the cultural politics of alignment cannot be abandoned, obliging us to engage 
with the strengths and limitations of different models of alliance building. 
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s addition to Gramscian hegemony, in which they seek to “identify the 
discursive conditions for the emergence of a collective action, directed towards struggling 
against inequalities and challenging relations of subordination” provides valuable insight into 
how discursive intervention may be used to build counter hegemonic alliances across social 
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struggles and identities (2014, 137). Social movements must restructure “discursive 
conditions” by “articulating chains of equivalence” between struggles and identities.  
Discursively joining these individual struggles together, demonstrating their common ground 
and common enemies to articulate a new common sense, provides the basis of populist 
intervention in hegemonic politics. Fundamental to this praxis is the understanding that 
people are more receptive to meaning than truth. Narrative and discourse are the tools we use 
to interpret information and make meaning from it. Grounding these ideas in movement 
experience and praxis, Reinsborough and Canning explain how the process of articulation 
and alignment rests upon narrative intervention, or changing the stories we use to interpret 
and make meaning out of the world around us. As they write “stories are the threads of 
human life and fabric of human cultures” and therefore have immense political power (2017, 
23). Movement actors can change the stories we use to make meaning and that shape 
common sense and thereby align many more interests, identities, and groups together in a 
populist rejection of the hegemonic order. Laclau and Mouffe understand counter hegemony 
as a populist endeavor in which discursive intervention aligns disparate groups into a united 
alliance that may take collective action (2014). 
 
Poor communication and the tendency to earnestly explain “the facts” without delivering 
them in narrative form often stymie activist efforts to grow social movements, develop 
alliances with other social struggles, and establish common ground with broader 
constituencies of society. As Reinsborough and Canning write, “Too often progressives think 
that just because their story is factually true, it will be meaningful to our audiences, and 
therefore build our power. But the reality is just the opposite: if a story is meaningful to 
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people they will believe it is true” (2017, 24). Activists are good at telling each other “the 
story of the battle,” or narratives that mobilize an already active base, but often fail to fight 
“the battle of the story,” deploying narratives that persuade broader publics by challenging 
underlying assumptions, meeting people where they’re at, and “outcompeting opposing 
narratives” (ibid, 54). Fighting the battle of the story helps structure “information in a way 
that reaches and convinces people who are not already active supporters” (ibid, 59). The 
battle of the story communicates new meanings and challenges dominant discourses so that 
people come to identify more with the new stories than the old ones and consider themselves 
part of the social movement’s story. 
 
Critiquing those who only tell the story of the battle, Jonathan Smucker identifies a dilemma 
in social movement spaces that he calls the Political Identity Paradox. He finds that “while 
political groups require a strong internal identity to foster the commitment needed for 
effective political struggle this same cohesion tends to isolate the group” (2017, 96). 
Camaraderie, solidarity, ideological commitment, and expressing group identity form the 
basis of cohesion and resilience necessary for collective action. They can also alienate people 
outside the group. This isolation produces, and is produced by, activist enclaves that are more 
concerned with expressing activist identity and credibility than actively engaging with 
hegemonic power relations. These isolated groups tend to be defined by “the story of the 
righteous few” into which only the “purest” political expressions of radicalism are allowed to 
enter (2017, 94).  These groups establish their own rituals, norms, and reference points that 
exclude outsiders. This internal ordering becomes a barrier to entry and is the opposite of 
populist counter hegemonic politics. Often activists’ appearance, language, and framing 
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stories “inoculate” broader social constituencies from engaging with their message, 
preventing them from winning wars of position or fighting the battle of the story. Willingness 
to open up these spaces with story-based strategy that can unify groups across different 
identities and politics, can help grow the movement and break down exclusionary practices.  
 
To avoid political isolation, discursive interventions need to be deployed with intended 
audiences in mind. The 2014 People’s Climate March that brought over a million people into 
the streets around the world was famously organized under the slogan “to change everything, 
we need everyone.” 99  While rhetorically effective it is, as the organizers were aware, also 
untrue. The CJM doesn’t need everyone and we certainly won’t win everyone’s support, but 
we do need to persuade and engage many more constituencies than currently compose the 
movement. Reflecting on organizing around the People’s Climate March, 350.org strategist, 
Cam Fenton, argues that the climate justice movement must movement beyond the “big tent” 
approach to movement building. He argues that rather than looking up at the ceiling of the 
big tent and what unites the movement over our heads, for example climate change, we 
should look down at the ground beneath our feet and think about the shared connections 
between struggles. As Fenton puts it: 
 
There needs to be enough room to move that the tent itself can be relocated through 
conflict, disagreement, negotiation and shared strategizing. Without this, the big tent 
will stagnate rapidly, accepting the lowest common denominator of agreement among 
 
99 The People’s Climate March was an attempt to reach larger audiences by redefining the dominant narratives 
positioning climate change as an isolated environmental problem. The 400,000 strong march in New York was 
led by frontlines communities under the banner “Frontlines of Crisis, Forefront of Change” signaling a shift in 
the climate movement’s framing away from polar bears and melting glaciers towards more immediate impacts 
on people. However, given how broadly inclusive the march was, and the organizer’s refusal to name their 
opponents, there is some debate as to whether is constitutes a march for mainstream “climate action” or a march 
for “climate justice.” See Smucker and Premo’s article What’s Wrong with the Radical Critique of the People’s 
Climate March (2014) for more on this debate. 
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the groups in the tent rather than unifying around demands that are in line with the 
scale of change that we really need. (Fenton 2015) 
 
In this way communication and alignment strategies might come to prioritize connection over 
unity. This means movements of movements cannot define themselves by the lowest 
common denomination they share in common, but rather must seek to forge what Adrienne 
Maree Brown calls critical connections across their differences (2017). I will return to this 
argument in later sections of this chapter and in Chapter Eight, but I preview it here as a 
caveat to the arguments about movement building that follow. 
 
Prioritizing connection over unity, effective communication strategists can construct 
messages, develop narratives, and create “movement moments” that resonate with many 
different constituencies to help grow alliances and build the movement. One way of targeting 
different audiences is through the “Spectrum of Allies” (Moore and Kahn Russell 2011). 
 
Diagram from Moore and Kahn Russell's Organizing Cools the Planet 2011 
The Spectrum of Allies distils audiences into five categories and then subdivides them into 
more specific constituencies. The five categories are Active Allies who already support the 
movement and actively mobilize and organize with it, Passive Allies who support the 
movement but don’t necessarily act on that support, Neutrals who either haven’t heard about 
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the issues or are unaffected and disinterested by them, Passive Opponents who oppose the 
movement but don’t act on their opposition, and Active Opponents who counter the 
movement’s agenda and advance or defend their own agendas against it. Rather than wasting 
resources on trying to persuade the Active Opposition to join the Active Allies, campaigners 
should seek to move each group one category over to the left. The goal is to shrink the 
number of Neutrals, Passive Opponents, and Active Opponents, while growing the number of 
Active and Passive Allies. This gives communicators a better sense of their discursive 
intervention’s objectives so they can design specific interventions that move Passive Allies 
into Active Allies or they can seek to move Neutrals into the Passive Allies’ camp. 
Connecting with specific audiences’ values, cultural reference points, and interests, or 
“meeting them where they are at,” helps communicators develop stories that include new 
constituencies into the movement rather than alienate or drive them away. 
 
Story-based strategy can frame information according to which constituency along the 
Spectrum of Allies activists are targeting. Frames are mental structures we use to interpret 
and process information or to focus and organize our attention. Framing is about triggering 
those mental structures using language, key words, or imagery that a conjures a particular 
story or meaning in the minds of an audience. Facts without frames are rarely persuasive. As 
George Lakoff writes, facts must be “framed appropriately if they are to be an effective part 
of public discourse” (2014, 154). Frames “operate as pre-existing narrative lenses in our 
minds” (Reinsborough and Canning 2010, 121). Reinsborough and Canning explain that 
“since an audience’s existing stories will filter new facts or information, change agents need 
to offer a new story” (2010, 46).  New stories and reframing narratives expose and 
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undermine assumptions contained in dominant stories and frame the movement’s facts 
couched in values more likely to persuade their audiences (Reinsborough and Canning 2010). 
Therefore, (re)framing narratives need to engage with shared values, interests, and cultural 
reference points. Meanwhile, campaigners can use specific points of intervention and 
movement moments with which to elevate their narrative and draw attention to the 
inconsistencies of their opponent’s narratives. (Re)framing narratives become counter 
hegemonic tools when they are used in the war of position to challenge hegemonic narratives 
that provide the bases of consent, and forge alignment around an alternative narrative instead. 
These forms of discursive intervention shift the discursive conditions upon which consent to 
the hegemonic order rests and can articulate into allegiance a larger range of constituencies to 
oppose the hegemon. 
 
Images and imagery are another crucial framing tool climate justice activists have at their 
disposal (DeLuca 1999). Indeed, “show don’t tell” is important lesson developed through 
story-based strategy. Activist manuals suggest that rather than telling a neutral or passive 
audience that ‘capitalism and the fossil fuel industry are evil and are at the heart of the 
climate crisis,’ it may be more effective to illustrate this narrative with actions at different 
points of intervention which reveal these truths in a visceral, experiential way. Telling 
audiences these truths may trigger frames that inoculate them from engaging with, or lead 
them to dismiss, the message. Allowing the imagery to do the talking is often less likely to 
trigger those frames and may lead audiences into being more receptive to the message. 
Communications strategists and organizers suggest creating moments that demonstrate these 
truths with imagery that audiences can use to make meaning of them (Reinsborough and 
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Canning 2017; Alinsky 1970; Smucker 2017). Garth Lenz’s photography of the scale of 
destruction wrought through tar sands extraction that have been shared virally online are 
good example of the ways imagery can undermine the social license of fossil fuel companies. 
Targeting specific points of intervention, like the gates of a refinery, a museum sponsored by 
an oil company, or the waterways through which oil tankers would traverse, allows 
campaigners to combine narrative and imagery to persuade larger and more diverse 
constituencies of their facts. Similarly, the construction of the Watch House outside Kinder 
Morgan’s tank farm on Burnaby Mountain created imagery that directs audiences’ attention 
to the conflict in the story and demonstrate who “the bad guy” is. 
 
Studying the mobilizing and organizing discourses deployed in British Columbia, Richmond, 
and indeed at Standing Rock, reveals some clear trends in climate justice narratives, frames, 
and favored points of intervention. In all three cases campaigners deployed image politics, 
targeted new constituencies, undermined the narratives through which petro-hegemony 
maintains consent, and aligned different social struggles together through a PCOC for 
climate justice.  Their narratives built upon populist discourses and universalizing politics in 
which “the community” or “the people” is positioned against an enemy or clearly named 
threat like “ Big Oil,” Chevron, the Dakota Access Pipeline, or Kinder Morgan. In all these 
cases the local community’s health, resources, land, air, water, culture, self-determination 
and identity are identified as being in need of protection against outside dangers. This 
produces an “us vs. them” narrative and articulates into alignment a common identification 
with what Smucker calls “the We” in politics (2017). 
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In Richmond, for example, universalizing discourses framed the fight over Chevron’s 
refinery upgrade in terms of public health and corruption of local democracy. Moreover, the 
Richmond Progressive Alliance (RPA) and the Our Power campaign captured public 
imaginaries with an emphasis on the city’s regeneration through a just transition away from 
dependency on Chevron. Climate change and greenhouse gas emissions have played a 
secondary rhetorical role but are rarely centered in campaigners’ narratives. During this 
struggle, city council elections, particularly the 2014 election, were points of discursive 
intervention that the RPA and Our Power campaigners captured and framed. This helped 
construct the impact of Chevron’s refinery on the community as the election’s ‘wedge issue,’ 
as RPA strategist Mike Parker explained.  Meanwhile, Gayle McLaughlin emphasized the 
discursive impact the RPA’s refusal of corporate money has had on city politics. Not only 
does it position candidates who do take campaign money from Chevron as being corrupted, 
but it also endows those who do not take this money with authenticity and genuine concern 
for the city’s welfare. Articulating a polarizing “us vs. them” narrative, the 2014 election was 
successfully framed around corruption of local democracy and as a referendum on Chevron’s 
influence on city council. Chevron obliged activists by reinforcing this frame and spending 
over $3 million buying up every billboard in the city, sending out thousands of glossy 
mailers, and attacking RPA candidates in waves of television ads.  
 
That same year witnessed Richmond’s largest ever march and scene of civil disobedience on 
the one-year anniversary of the refinery fire. The demonstration focused discursive attention 
on the health implications of the Chevron’s refinery and provided a point of intervention 
from which Our Power, the RPA, and other environmental justice activists could emphasize 
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the company’s irresponsible approach to the health and livelihoods of the people of 
Richmond in the run up to the 2014 election. In addition, the Our Power narrative responded 
to Chevron’s emphasis on the jobs and revenue it provided the city with a focus on the Just 
transition alternatives like solar cooperatives being experimented with in the city. This 
tapped into the growing sense that Richmond was emerging from difficult times and moving 
into a brighter future. Campaigners built narratives around these frames that wrested consent 
away from Chevron and developed consent around the visions of alternatives that Our Power 
and the RPA articulated.  
 
While my interviews revealed climate change to be one of the primary motivations for 
activists’ involvement in Keep-it-in-the-ground campaigns, rhetorically the fights are mostly 
defined by localized environmental and social justice concerns. With regards to the Trans 
Mountain pipeline fight in B.C., Dogwood’s communication director, Kai Nagata, explained 
that climate change is not a frame that has activated large constituencies beyond those who 
are already involved in the fight (personal communication, May 17th, 2018).100 Moreover, 
Dogwood’s research and practice over the past 20 years suggests that their audiences 
“respond in a deeper and more lasting way to narratives around self-determination than 
around harm to the environment.” Emphasizing the pipeline’s local impacts, BROKE, 350 
Vancouver and Protect the Inlet (PTI) activists staged a series of  “die-ins” outside the tank 
farm where the pipeline would terminate to draw attention to the hazardous materials being 
transported through the city and the potential health impacts of fires or other accidents 
occurring at the facility. These die-ins’s imagery implied a populist narrative about threats 
 
100 Kai later told me that this has started to change as the climate crisis increasingly framed the Canadian 
elections in 2019 and with the influence of the youth climate strikes throughout that same year. 
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the company posed to a clearly defined “public’s” health.  Localizing frames emphasizing 
impacts at the pipeline terminus in Burnaby have been used to connect broader critiques of 
the pipeline, like climate or colonialism, to the community’s own points of reference and 
interests. According to Kai, communications strategists are increasingly recognizing that “the 
future is going to be local in terms of politics and in terms of how you reach people, who you 
have credibility with, and in terms of crafting policy solutions.” This helps explain why 
Burnaby’s activists’ stories framed the fight against Kinder Morgan in terms of the pipeline’s 
local implications rather than on the more global terrain of climate politics and fossil fuel 
supply chains. It is a paradox that populist climate justice narratives rarely center climate 
change.  
 
Populist narratives that unite a group around an articulation the “We” in politics, and defined 
against a “them,” often take on universalizing resonances in order to extend the sense of 
“We” as far as possible in order to build alliances across as many constituencies as possible. 
A universalized version of “us” positioned against a monolithic “them” is a hallmark of 
populist politics on the Left and the Right. This is because populist narratives help build and 
share the kind of collective identity, vision, and purpose defined against an outside “other” 
upon which movements thrive. Standing Rock’s meme #WaterIsLife became what Laclau 
calls “a floating signifier”101 that established the “We” to which people of many political 
orientations, settlers and Indigenous peoples alike, could attach meaning. The statement 
 
101 Ernesto Laclau’s floating signifiers are politically ambiguous discursive interventions that contain enough 
meaning to rally committed constituents but remain vague enough to allow people of many different political 
identities to attach their own meaning to them. They become powerful discursive tools when people of many 
different identities and politics can identify and rally around them. They are often associated with populist 
politics because of the politically vague cross-sectoral alignments they can produce. Occupy Wall Street’s “We 
are the 99%” is a good example, as was President Obama and his “Yes We Can” rhetoric (Smucker 2017). 
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itself, water is life, couldn’t be more universal. Water forms the building blocks of life, 
without it not one of us could survive - it is the most common of common grounds.  The viral 
images of police brutality being deployed upon the Water Protectors focus attention on a very 
clear “them.” The violence used against unarmed Indigenous peoples and their allies shocked 
audiences, and in particular forced non-natives to confront whether they were an “Us” or a 
“Them.” The images, narrative, and framing also moved many Neutrals into Passive Allies 
and Passive Allies into Active ones. Standing Rock’s intervention demonstrated how, 
framing fights with the fossil fuel industry around public health, self-determination, water, 
and land, in other words establishing what we have in common, develops a larger us and a 
clearer them. Narratives that articulate what Grossman calls a common sense of place, 
common sense of purpose, and common understanding (2017), help articulate a new common 
sense, and so lay the foundations for counter hegemonic alliance building and political 
culture of opposition and creation. 
 
Narrative is amongst the movement’s most potent tools in waging the war of position against 
petro-hegemony. However, one may develop the most attractive narrative in the world, but it 
is worth very little if there is no way for an audience to receive it. As such, there are different 
points of intervention on the terrain of struggle defined by relations of consent that climate 
justice activists and the industry must fight over to mediate their discourses and win the war 
of position. These specific points of intervention are the cultural institutions, moments, and 
events through which discourse and common sense is mediated. By mapping our cultural 
landscape, it is possible to identify points of intervention where petro-culture may be 
vulnerable and where the narrative may be shifted. Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks focused on 
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schools and churches that his Communist comrades could capture from Bourgeois hegemony 
and use these to mediate a new common sense that aligned broader constituencies of Italian 
society into a historic bloc. Religious institutions, schools, and universities are prime points 
of intervention but to these we must add mass and mainstream media, corporate news media, 
social media (including hashtags and memes), alternative media, museums, art galleries, 
sports teams,  as well as community barbeques, town festivals, and so on (Duncombe 2014). 
Petro-culture can operate through all of these and much of the movement’s cultural work 
must be to expunge its influence from them. Moreover, through capturing these media the 
movement also advances its own narratives and discursive interventions. 
 
These platforms from which to mediate narratives are not level playing fields and tend to be 
heavily skewed in favor of the fossil fuel industry. Those with more resources tend to have 
greater access and influence over mainstream sites of mediation (Quiroz 2013). As much of 
the Left knows all too well, many of these institutions, particularly the corporate news media, 
are hostile to our politics and will often distort our messages, undermine our messengers, and 
erase our stories. As Kai Nagata told me of his experience working in Canada’s corporate 
media: 
 
When all of your reporters are afraid of losing their job and all of your advertizing 
revenue comes from, oh say government and fossil fuel companies, not to mention 
real estate developers and auto dealerships, the incentive for individual journalists to 
stick their head out and try to present a counterintuitive or alternate narrative is very 
low.  (personal communication, May 17th, 2018) 
 
These pressures, alongside the concentration of media in the hands of just a few companies 
that have an interest in maintaining the status quo, places the movement’s narrative 
interventions at a disadvantage. Training activists in communications techniques that work 
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within the norms and confines of these institutions is important, despite these imbalances. At 
the Protect the Inlet Camp and at Standing Rock, for example, who was allowed to tell the 
story was carefully controlled, there was very disciplined messaging, and spokespeople 
stayed “on message.” However, for the time being the CJM is unlikely to capture major 
corporate news outlets away from industry framings and interests.  
 
There are other points of intervention in which movement and industry are more evenly 
matched. College campuses and some religious institutions, social media outlets, viral 
images, memes, video clips and hashtags are all points of intervention that climate justice 
activists are often able to influence to contest Petro-culture. Indeed, as Lakota journalist and 
activist, John Bigelow, explained of his media work at Standing Rock: “We can establish our 
own voices now in media, we don’t have to depend on mainstream media to carry our songs 
and to carry our stories. Technology has levelled that playing field for us so that we can stand 
up and explain what Mni Wiconi means to the world” (2017). While the point is fast 
becoming cliché, it is clear that social media, and particularly the use of viral images and 
livestreaming, are now key tools through which to upend dominant media narratives. When 
campaigners are able to influence all these different points of intervention, they gain a 
legitimizing base from which to project their populist narratives and align more 
constituencies into allegiance. 
 
Part 2: Negotiating the Universal and the Particular through Intersectional Populism  
 
The task of counter hegemonic actors, as Laclau and Mouffe see it, is to discursively 
articulate the chains of equivalence between different irreducible political identities such that 
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they recognize their common cause and around which they may align to articulate a new 
common sense and take collective action against their common adversary. If this is to be one 
of the ways activists establish a PCOC through the carbon rebellion, then we must pay close 
attention to the mechanics by which it might be achieved. 
 
Populist discourses draw into alignment an articulation of “us” or “the people” and of 
“them,” the excluded outsider that threatens “us.” One of the major differences between 
progressive and reactionary populism is the process by which constituencies are either 
included or excluded from the articulation of “us.” Where reactionary populism relies on 
race, ethnicity, religion, or nationhood to articulate cohesion around a particular definition of 
“the people,” progressive populism tends instead towards an articulation of shared interests, 
“the community” and the inclusion of all peoples across racial, class, religious and national 
identities and interests against “the rich,”  “the 1%”, corporations, and so on (Laclau 2005; 
Smucker 2017). Both reactionary and progressive populism positions its articulation of “the 
people” against a perceived “elite,” although progressives’ claims that their politics will 
challenge the elites are arguably more authentic. Populism, particularly in times of 
hegemonic legitimacy crisis, becomes a potent discourse as the old ways of articulating 
identity, interests, and political possibility are challenged and competing claims on “the 
people” emerge to take their place. Climate justice campaigners are experimenting with 
populist rhetoric that unites large and diverse constituencies against the fossil fuel industry to 
keep fossil fuels in the ground, arrest climate change, and advance a just transition (Bosworth 
2018). This unity, however, entails an erasure of important differences in privilege, 
resources, culture, identities, and histories of oppression. Indeed, erasure of difference is 
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inherent to, and to a certain extent seems to be the very purpose of, populism.  Ignoring the 
tendency towards erasure contained within populist discourses and strategy can sow the seeds 
of division and resentment which lead alliances to crumble from within.  
 
Kai Bosworth, writing on the populist discourses that brought Native and rural white settler 
communities together against the Keystone XL pipeline, explains how protection of land and 
resentment of outside corporate interests overriding local ones helped establish the “Cowboy-
Indian Alliance” that has posed a significant threat to the completion of the pipeline (2018). 
“The land” was the populist frame that brought these different constituencies together, but it 
also had the potential to erase cultural differences and the legacy of colonial exploitation 
existing between them. Connection to the land meant different things to the white settler 
landowners and Native communities. The frame’s ambiguity allowed relative cohesion 
between the groups but, as Bosworth writes, “because a critique of racial capitalism and 
settler colonialism was actively occluded by such a vague reference to land, populist 
resistance remained liberal and multicultural in character” (2018, 19). We know that there 
can be no just solutions to the climate crisis that do not address settler colonialism and racial 
capitalism. The question remains, then, how can anti-capitalism and decolonization in the 
context of climate justice be populist?  
 
I found instances of populist discourses that raised similar questions in my own case studies. 
Petro-culture in Richmond, for example, has embedded Chevron deep in the city’s history 
and identity. The company presents itself as a benevolent neighbor without which the city 
could not exist. Activists seeking to disarticulate Chevron’s benevolence from the city’s 
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imaginary have focused on its corruption of local democracy and reclaiming democracy for 
“the community.” As McLaughlin told me of the RPA’s communications strategy, “we found 
that our prevailing message, or the message that really bound us together, was that we were 
corporate free, that the organization did not take corporate money, and that any candidates 
that we endorsed… had to vow not to take corporate money” (personal communication, July 
18th, 2018).  Populist discourses that emphasized corporate corruption and reclaiming local 
democracy have certainly helped unite the community across difference but also risked a 
somewhat colorblind approach to how the impacts of corporate control of city politics are 
structured along lines of race and class. McLaughlin and the RPA certainly recognized that 
the refinery’s pollution disproportionately affects the health of the city’s low-income 
communities of color, but the democracy frame doesn’t necessarily capture this unless 
explicitly tied to who is impacted first and hardest by the corruption of democracy. As I’ll 
show later, Our Power campaigners worked hard to ensure narratives about corruption of 
democracy framed a broader discourse emphasizing environmental racism. 
 
In British Columbia, populist narratives about protecting the province from the intrusion of a 
foreign (Texas-based) pipeline company that threatened the beloved coastline and coastal 
economy arguably facilitated the election of the Green Party-backed NDP government to 
office in 2017. Dogwood’s Director of Organizing, Laura Benson suggests that Premier 
Horgan’s stake in opposing Kinder Morgan’s pipeline is less about environmental concerns 
or First Nations’ rights and title and more about “standing up for BC” particularly when, as 
she notes, Kinder Morgan’s pipeline “became this bizarre rhetorical national political debate” 
(personal communication, May 18th, 2018). Standing up for British Columbians against a 
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Texan oil company became one of the dominant frames in corporate media accounts. It is a 
populist narrative in so far as it claims to represent all British Columbians’ interests and 
defines these against a foreign or outside threat. Meanwhile, Horgan’s high-profile 
opposition to the pipeline on these terms has bolstered a reductionist media narrative in 
which the struggle is largely presented as a disagreement between the British Columbia and 
Alberta provincial governments with British Columbians selfishly undermining Canada’s 
national interest.  This narrative has often erased First Nations’ stake and leadership in the 
fight in most corporate media representations, especially with regards to Kinder Morgan’s 
failure to adequately consult with First Nations or gain their free, prior, and informed 
consent. The fact that the pipeline extension would be built on unceded First Nations’ 
territory - legally recognized as such by the Supreme Court of Canada – is also invisiblized 
or obscured. While standing up for British Columbians remains a productive unifying frame, 
it hides one of the most significant motivations for First Nation’s leadership in the campaign, 
namely asserting First Nations’ culture, rights and title on unceded territory against colonial 
intrusion.  
 
In his analysis of place-based environmental alliance-building between Native and non-
Native communities, Zoltán Grossman identifies two, often competing, social movement 
narratives tending towards either universalism or particularism. Drawing upon Laclau, 
Grossman understands particularism as an assertion of “the particular differences between 
racial/ethnic groups or other groups based on gender, sexual preference and other social 
identities” (2017, 10-11) Meanwhile, universalism “asserts common ground or the 
similarities between groups that claim inherent differences” (ibid). Populist narratives tend to 
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universalize a set of shared interests across the social constituency identified as “we” or “us”. 
Emphasizing common ground, these narratives articulate common sense or consensus around 
which constituents imagine their own role and stake in the social movement’s story. 
Universalizing discourses therefore play a decisive role in developing and growing counter 
hegemonic alliances. Particularism, on the other hand, is often associated with identity 
politics and might be considered antithetical to counter hegemonic projects because of a 
perceived rejection of common ground and consensus. Identity politics recognizes the 
distinctiveness of particular marginalized groups where the group’s identity is leveraged to 
make political claims for greater representation, participation, and self-determination. An 
assertion of difference is also an assertion, and sometimes privileging, of a particular identity, 
stake or history, and a call for autonomy or self-determination. As Smucker points out, 
particularism can be a trap into which activists fall when they prioritize the performance of 
the identity of the group over strategic engagement with hegemonic power relations (2017). 
 
Explaining the dangers of each, Grossman demonstrates how “particularist movements face 
the risk of local isolation and failure to confront national or global systems that are the 
ultimate source of their problems,” while “universalist movements face the risk of abstracting 
or homogenizing local differences and locking in inequalities within a “unified” society” 
(2017, 12-13).  Particularism is often dismissed as divisive identity politics, antithetical to 
alliance building or establishing counter hegemonic consensus while universalizing 
discourses are extolled for their ability to construct unity across difference (ibid). Through 
what I’ve termed intersectional populism, however, I want to argue that a synthesis of 
particularism and universalism is, in fact, a much more productive approach to counter 
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hegemonic alliance building than is prioritizing one or the other tendency on their own. 
Successful alliance-building must reject the negative tendencies of each while embracing and 
synthesizing the constructive components of both. This may also help circumnavigate the 
Political Identity Paradox Smucker describes as a limitation to growing social movements. 
 
Grossman devotes his book to a study of how the competing tendencies between 
universalism and particularism might be negotiated and synthesized. Building upon his 
analysis and placing it in conversation with intersectionality theorists Kimberlé Crenshaw 
(1989) and Patricia Hill Collins (1990), I’ve observed campaigns negotiating universalist-
particularist tensions through the discourse and praxis of intersectional populism. The theory 
and practice of intersectionality is often, negatively and unfairly, associated with the divisive 
elements of particularist narratives emerging from identity politics (Hancock 2011). 
Intersectionality explains how different oppressive forces intersect with identities or social 
categories to produce different intensities and experiences of oppression. On the basis of 
race, class, gender, sexuality and so on, an individual can experience multiple intersecting 
oppressive forces at once like class inequality, structural racism, and patriarchy. The specific 
experience of oppression is unique to those identities occupying the intersection of these 
multiple and combined oppressive forces. Intersectionality’s connection to identity politics 
and particularism is therefore quite clear: the specificity of oppression based on, for example, 
the intersections of race, class, and gender, necessarily produces a distinctive set of political 
claims, forms of representation, and modes of political action and praxis.  
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Patricia Hill Collins explains the ways intersectional identity groupings politically mobilize 
the particularity of their experience to make claims, gain representation, and establish the 
distinctive nature of their position within what she calls a matrix of domination (1990). Yet 
she also critiques how intersectionality may be interpreted as a method for quantifying and 
ranking oppressions. Constituencies might add up the number of oppressive forces they 
experience to privilege the perspectives and politics of those who rank highest (1990). This 
ranking of oppression is often referred to as playing “the Oppression Olympics” in social 
movement spaces. It can lead to a divisive political praxis of silencing and establish perverse 
hierarchies that “thwarts rather than facilitates democratic deliberation and political solidarity 
within and between politically relevant categories of difference” (Hancock 2011, 4).  Collins 
argues for an “interlocking” instead of an “additive” approach to intersectionality (2012). As 
she writes, “The significance of seeing race, class, and gender as interlocking systems of 
oppression is that such an approach fosters a paradigmatic shift of thinking inclusively about 
other oppressions” (2012, 228). By presenting these systems of oppressions as interlocking 
within a “matrix of domination” she demonstrates different ways to think inclusively about 
oppressions. In other words, rather than ranking oppressions, intersectionality can be used to 
connect groups across and in response to systems of oppression. The matrix of domination 
makes visible the common sources, or matrix inputs, from which intersecting oppressive 
forces emanate. This moves praxis beyond a crude and potentially divisive ranking of 
oppression and instead forms the basis of solidarity across multiple oppressions from which 
collective action may be taken to address common sources of domination (Hancock 2011). 
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The matrix of domination simultaneously enables conceptualizing the distinctiveness and 
specificity of exposure to multiple intersecting oppressions as well as the interactions, 
connections, and relationships between different oppressive forces and differently oppressed 
groups. Collins uses the phrase “intersectionality as critical praxis” which “sheds light on the 
doing of social justice work” as a way to understand how social movements use 
intersectionality to build solidarity across social struggles against different-but-connected 
systems of oppression (2015, 16). Intersectionality as critical praxis engages the matrix of 
domination to identify the common sources of domination and suggests at how collective 
action might confront those common sources. It forces us to recognize common adversaries 
and common ground between social struggles, while paying closer attention to the interplay 
between unity and difference that an intersectional response to domination rests upon. This 
praxis goes deeper than simply identifying a common adversary and mobilizing against it, 
however. It is about recognizing that, as Audre Lord famously said, “there is no such thing as 
a single-issue struggle because we do not live single-issue lives.” It recognizes that our 
struggles against systems of oppression intersect and are interrelated. The climate justice 
movement is developing multilayered alliances, discourses, and tactics, based upon the 
configuration and articulation into alignment of different social identities that cohere around 
addressing the multiple interconnected systems of oppression from which climate injustice 
emerges.  
 
Intersectional populism is a discourse and a praxis that balances and synthesizes the 
particularism defined by unique exposure to intersecting oppressions, while also 
universalizing struggle by articulating into alignment an “us” - comprised of the different 
 345 
particular groups facing different oppressive forces - against a “them,” or the common 
sources from which these oppressive forces emanate like the drivers of capitalism, 
colonialism, patriarchy, racism and so on. Intersectional populism as a discourse advances 
the understanding that oppressions are connected but differentiated and stratified by 
gradation and degree. Intersectional populism as praxis revolves around the assertion of 
differences that can’t be set aside but must be “worked through” between movement 
constituents. Meanwhile, alliances built upon intersectional populism are only possible if 
there is an understanding that the constituent struggles within the movement are 
differentiated along particularist lines, corresponding to histories and dynamics of power, 
privilege and marginalization that must be addressed rather than “put aside.” Only then can 
constituents truly be accountable for their own roles in dismantling oppressive or 
marginalizing movement practices and truly consider one another as allies. Therefore, 
intersectional populism isn’t just about connection across difference, but connection based 
upon difference. The ability to articulate common ground against a common threat, and reach 
new audiences where they are at, while simultaneously working to dismantle internal 
differences in power and privilege defines intersectional populism. 
 
Synthesizing universalism and particularism through intersectional populism is strategic not 
only because it helps forge a PCOC for climate justice, but also because it can mobilize 
unique positions or advantages held by certain movement constituencies to the whole 
movement’s benefit. Doing so has to be reciprocal rather than extractive or exploitative, 
however. For example, Grossman explains how the Native/non-native environmental 
alliances he studies have “creatively negotiated the tensions between particularity and 
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universality and [have] attempted to interweave them by identifying Native self-determination 
as a way to protect the land and water for everyone” (Grossman 2017, 13). Here, Native self-
determination, or asserting rights and title, articulated as particular, helps advance the climate 
justice movement’s interests as a whole e.g. protecting the land and water. Fighting for the 
liberation of particular constituencies of the broader movement must be seen as advancing 
the interests of the broader movement and not a distraction from them.102 I’ve observed 
examples in my own research where nascent versions of intersectional populism resting upon 
opposition to the matrix of domination in which the fossil fuel industry is implicated, are 
aligning broad and diverse groups into a counterhegemonic PCOC for climate justice. 
 
In their confrontation with Kinder Morgan’s pipeline proposal, First Nations and Indigenous 
activists, grassroots community organizations, and NGO groups seem to have worked 
through some of their historic tensions and developed sturdier alliances that encompass a 
wide range of identities, stakes, and political orientations. The praxis and discourse of 
intersectional populism developed within the movement may help explain why these groups 
have been work through these deep rooted antagonisms. Many of these groups articulate 
populist alignment through connection to place, common sense of place, and the need to 
protect it. Indeed, the messaging around protection is even framed through different 
organization’s names like Protect the Inlet, Our Sacred Trust, Coast Protectors, and the 
creation of the Watch House to alert the community to danger. These Indigenous-led 
initiatives advanced an invitation to all those who cared about their home to defend it from 
 
102 We must also engage with how struggles are presented as universal or particular in the first place. Why is 
Indigenous peoples struggle for self-determination a particular interest, while protecting water and land a 
universal one? Who gets to decide what is particular and what is universal? These are questions the movement 
must confront as it advances intersectional populism. 
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intrusion. At the same time, they also required newcomers and movement constituents to 
understand whose unceded land they are living on and seeking to protect. As several older 
white grassroots activists told me, they have had to learn that protecting the land from 
intrusion must also involve recognizing whose land it is in the first place.  
 
Asserting their rights and title to the land, Tsleil-Waututh, Musqueam and Squamish First 
Nations have positioned their culture and unique connection to place at the forefront of the 
campaign’s communications. First Nations leaders place themselves at the head of the 
marches and often speak first at rallies and meetings. Moreover, the protest/protection camps 
like Protect the Inlet are run according to Indigenous protocols and are considered a form of 
prayer. The land and coast remain a universalizing frame that unites the community across 
their particularisms. However, the discourses and movement praxis positioning First Nations, 
and particularly women, as the leaders of the campaign, because of their unique relationship 
to the land, has helped demonstrate why the intersecting forces of climate change, patriarchy, 
colonialism, and capitalism that must be resisted simultaneously.  
 
Despite important strides in developing intersectional populism, some intersections are still 
excluded from the narratives and praxis of climate justice activists’ resistance to the Trans 
Mountain pipeline. As Greenpeace organizer, Mary Lovell, reminded me, while alliances 
between predominantly white environmentalists and First Nations activists are decolonizing 
white environmentalist paradigms and discourses, the connections between Vancouver’s anti-
racist organizations, immigrants’ rights organizations and the Environmental NGOs or 
grassroots groups opposing the pipeline haven’t yet been clearly articulated. Nor have, for 
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example, the farm workers movement in the lower mainland and anti-pipeline activists had 
much connection. Intersectional populism forces activists to consider not only how to work 
with immediate allies with obvious shared stakes, but also to build connections to other 
campaigns and movements and articulate their inherent interconnectivity. Climate justice 
activists, for example, still need to do more to demonstrate the connections between migrant 
rights, tar sands extraction, and climate change in the lower mainland (Walia and Kahn 
Russell 2014). Similarly, some connections have been made between the unions that organize 
Burnaby’s refinery workers (and these workers did indeed oppose the pipeline), but a clearer 
articulation synthesizing universal interests with particularist ones must go deeper to 
establish a culture of solidarity between workers and keep-it-in-the-ground activists. Building 
these connections through narrative strategy at different points of intervention in the war of 
position will help the climate justice movement grow a much larger, more diverse and more 
resilient PCOC. 
 
Moving from Burnaby to Richmond, democracy as a populist frame opened up a narrative 
about the intersections of race, class, and the environment to broader audiences. By 
articulating these intersections, climate justice activists have helped organize powerful 
community-led grassroots campaigns to take back control of city hall from corporate 
influence. The Our Power campaign has helped lead this initiative by emphasizing leading 
characters in the narrative being told that other people in Richmond can relate to. As RPA 
and climate justice activists sought to take back control of city hall, Our Power positioned 
Richmond’s low-income communities of color at the forefront of the narrative. While 
frontlines communities’ heightened exposure to pollution and toxins from the refinery is an 
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important part of their story, even more essential is the role they are playing in taking back 
control of, and revitalizing, the city. Through grassroots leadership in just transition projects 
like community owned solar power, urban gardening and food sovereignty, or training 
former oil workers and young people in the development of the city’s renewable energy 
infrastructure, community members are demanding ownership of the just transition and the 
trajectory their city will take. Here reclaiming democracy doesn’t just mean winning city 
hall, it means taking control of decisions that affect the community’s lives directly.  
 
Our Power doesn’t just tell audiences about grassroots and frontlines leadership, it shows 
them. At the Our Power convergence in Richmond in 2014, organizers put together a series 
of short videos in which members of the Richmond community explained their stake in the 
fight. In one example, Mey Saechao, a member of APEN’s community network, tells a story 
that would be familiar to many of Richmond’s residents:  
I have lived in Richmond for thirty years and since 2005 my illnesses have gotten 
worse. I live very close to the Chevron rail so if there was an explosion I would be the 
first to one to go... After the Chevron explosion in 2012 I tried but I didn’t get the 
treatment I really needed.... Why can’t they leave dirty oil where it is? Here it harms 
and kills us... I am happy to be part of this movement so my children and 
grandchildren can have green jobs and healthier lives.” (Saechao 2014)  
Stephanie Hervey, also a resident of Richmond and a member of Communities for a Better 
Environment, recounts how she started working on climate justice and just transition 
initiatives:  
When I got to Richmond and there was an explosion at Chevron, that’s when I 
realized that I had to do something about this, that I was not going to sit by and allow 
some big corporation to just pollute the air and walk away without remedy and 
without accountability and so that’s when I started to get involved with Communities 
for a Better Environment... This Our Power campaign...it’s helping us realize who we 
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really are when we come together. It gives us the opportunity to talk amongst each 
other about solutions... We need to feel confident that we have the answers within 
ourselves, that we don’t need anyone to tell us how to do this, we are in the front lines 
but we have a vision and so we also have a solution. (Hervey 2014)  
In her story, Hervey highlights how she helped develop a community-owned garden in what 
is being called Richmond’s “Green Way” or Green Zone that is designed to protect 
Richmond’s low-income communities from food insecurity and pollution, foster community 
relationships, and enhance food sovereignty. The imagery of the actual transitions being 
deployed are leveraged in these narratives to develop the belief that alternatives are possible 
and already exist. 
 
The Our Power stories were then developed into shorter video clips and photos coupled with 
quotations from their testimonies that could be reproduced and shared across the social media 
via Twitter, Instagram and Facebook.  Mey Saechao is depicted with a quote from her 
testimony superimposed on the photo: “We live everyday on the frontlines of the climate 
crisis – with illness and danger of explosions... I am happy to be part of this new journey so 
my children and grandchildren can live a better, healthier life” (ibid.). Stephanie Hervey 
stands beside her quote: “We have the expertise and people power to create a sustainable 
future. We won’t wait, we are moving ahead and making a switch to a path where policy 
makers and corporations will soon follow” (ibid.). Experiencing the intersection of race, 
gender, pollution, and capitalist exploitation, low income people of color, particularly women 
of color, lead this movement and are positioned as protagonists at the forefront of the 
narrative and imagery Our Power shares. In both instances, the videos and images never 
needed to directly say ‘we are anti-capitalist,’ instead, through their imagery and language, 
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they positioned the consequences of racial capitalism as experiences much of the community 
could relate to and so accept their broader message. 
 
While these communities are disproportionately impacted by Chevron’s pollution, their 
stories and vision are ones that transcend their unique intersections. Activists concerned with 
addressing each intersecting force, for example people resisting pollution, or capitalist 
exploitation, or racism, may find common ground. They serve as examples of a discourse 
that brings people together around what they have in common while recognizing and 
working through what sets them apart by foregrounding the stories of those most impacted. 
In this way, developing shared narratives which center, and are told by frontlines 
communities, is a political intervention and also a pedagogical act. The rhetoric around the 
just transition in Richmond has developed through these examples of intersectional populism. 
The transition can connect people across struggles against capitalism, racism, patriarchy, and 
pollution but not without the leadership of and accountability to those most impacted at the 
intersections of these oppressions. 
 
Narrative interventions in Richmond and Burnaby provide significant insights into the act of 
story changing, but it is Standing Rock’s Water Protectors and their story-based strategy that 
provides some of the most coherent example of intersectional populism. This intervention 
was captured in the two versions of the Water Protector’s viral meme “Water is Life” in 
English and Mni Wiconi in Lakota. Drawing upon intersecting oppressive forces, their story 
was both universalizing – water is life (there probably isn’t an idea more universal and 
viscerally understood than that all life depends on water) – and particular to the Indigenous 
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identity and experiences of the Sioux – as expressed through Mni Wiconi, indicating that this 
was an Indigenous-led struggle for self-determination and a resurgence of Indigenous culture. 
As Jaskiran Dhillon and Nick Estes write: 
 
Mni Wiconi embodies the strength and wisdom of ancestral anticolonial struggles 
imprinted on the land and Mni Sose [the Missouri River]. It is also situated in the 
power and leadership of Indigenous youth and Indigenous women, who are 
foregrounding the way that colonialism functions through race, class, gender, and 
sexuality to create interlocking systems of oppression. (2016) 
 
Mni Wiconi articulated these interlocking systems of oppression seeking to align groups 
along these intersections while refusing possible cooptation by settler-allies. The Water 
Protectors discursively navigated the complicated relationship between universalism and 
particularism. In most social media posts Mni Wiconi and Water is Life would often appear 
side by side helping advance intersectional populism. Moreover, on several occasions the 
phrase was used to connect the ongoing lead pollution of water in Flint Michigan, 
disproportionately impacting the city’s majority African American community, and the fight 
to protect water at Standing Rock. From this particular intervention campaigners in the 
Movement for Black Lives issued a statement of support for the activists at Standing Rock, 
pledging their solidarity and several representatives joined the Oceti Sakowin camp (Black 
Lives Matter 2016). 
 
Intersectional populism helps synthesize and balance universal and particularist tendencies 
within social movements. It aligns different social constituencies and struggles into alliances 
by emphasizing an inclusive, populist assertion of common ground while positioning the 
people most impacted at the intersection of multiple systems of oppression as the movement 
leaders. Each individual system of oppression brings different people into the movement. 
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Intersectionality thus allows us to see the connections between these oppressive forces. 
Intersectional populism develops a unifying and inclusive discourse in which people with 
quite different political orientations and identities can identify their own stake while asserting 
the leadership and accountability to the communities most marginalized by intersecting 
systems of oppression. Intersectional populist interventions fundamentally assert that your 
involvement in the movement must entail a willingness to engage in the liberation of your 
comrades against a threat that impacts all of you. When these discourses are deployed in 
different points of intervention with different audience in mind on the terrain of struggle 
defined by consent, they can help climate justice activists win the war of position by 
articulating common enemies and alignment around a common cause. This develops deeper 
and more resilient connection based on the understanding and willingness to work through 
the politics of privilege and intersectionality. 
 
Part 3: Accountability and Leadership 
 
Alliance building and growing the movement relies upon telling more inclusive stories, 
presenting more compelling characters, communicating with broader and more diverse 
audiences, and changing the discourses through which people make meaning out of the world 
around them. However, discourse on its own is not enough to build and maintain the trust, 
accountability, and leadership necessary for the deep, resilient relationships upon which all 
social movements thrive. Maintaining alliances requires the hard work of establishing 
accountability and relationship building for which there are no shortcuts. Solidarity and 
accountability are active relationships developed through movement practices, not just 
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discursive articulations of shared values. Here, then, we may think of intersectional populism 
as both a discourse and a praxis. 
 
Partly because of their preoccupation with class as the privileged point of antagonism within 
capitalism, and partly because of their own biographies and contexts, Gramsci and many 
Gramscian scholars have not fully engaged with the question of accountability (Ekers et al.’s 
edited volume Gramsci: Space, Nature, Politics (2013) indicates this trend is changing). 
While alliances across difference are of fundamental concern to Gramscians, the role 
accountability and the maintenance of  social relationships between different constituents of 
alliances have received less critical examination.103 Even in their reflections on the role of 
“leadership” or “the organic intellectual,” Gramscians haven’t yet paid close enough 
attention to the maintenance and social reproduction of alliances through accountability and 
relationships within the movement (again Eker’s et al. offer an important exception).  
 
Instead, it is black feminist thought, for example Adrienne Maree Brown’s Emergent 
Strategy, that has developed these ideas most coherently (2017). If climate justice activists 
are to articulate consensus around the movement and its vision, then practicing accountability 
and taking time to develop relationships between all the constituents, is the glue holding that 
holds the consensus together. Maree Brown has argued that “critical relationships” or 
“critical connection” as opposed to “critical mass” is the key to the success of social 
 
103 Jonathan Smucker is one of the few Gramscian scholars who does engage with the question of social 
relationships and dynamics of privilege within social movements. However, even here, his purpose is more to 
warn readers against prioritizing group culture and “the life of the group” over strategic intervention in 
hegemonic power relations, than it is to investigate the significance of the relationships to social movement 
alliances (2017).  
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movements. She urges readers to “move at the speed of trust.” Smucker’s intervention, which 
in many respects can be contrasted with Maree Brown’s, provides a great deal of insight 
about building critical mass but less about developing critical relationships and trust. I 
believe we need both and that their combination is critical to winning wars of position. 
Reflection on conversations and observations through my case studies illustrate some of the 
successes and limitations of climate justice activists’ attempts to practice accountability, 
build trust and develop leadership to grow the movement. 
 
Accountability and the Politics of Privilege  
 
The discourse and praxis of accountability in social movement spaces is often alienating, 
reflecting the Oppression Olympics and competition over who is the most “woke” or whose 
expression of activist identity is most authentic, that Smucker (2017) and Hancock (2011) 
warn activists against. At best, this version of accountability can identify relationships of 
privilege and encourage those who often take up a lot of space in social movement spaces, 
usually straight white men, to step back, listen, and learn. This is valuable and can help undo 
dynamics of marginalization and privilege within the movement. But it can also tend towards 
participants silencing themselves either out of defensiveness or fear of saying the wrong 
thing (Moore and Kahn Russell 2011).104 At its worst, it reinforces unacknowledged 
hierarchies or otherwise alienates potential newcomers because they don’t believe they have 
the right language or cultural references to be able to participate or be respected in the group. 
As Moore and Kahn Russell write of accountability in social movement praxis: “that 
 
104 The defensive or disbelieving response many white people exhibit when they are confronted with ideas that 
challenge their notions of race and racism is what Robin Di Angelo (2018) calls “white fragility.” 
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conversation can feel like a field of landmines [and]… in a field of landmines, it’s 
intimidating to take risks and to innovate” (2011, 31). Instead, developing on Moore and 
Kahn Russell, we can make a helpful distinction between inactive accountability and active 
accountability (2011). Inactive accountability is the practice of just doing what you’re told 
and “not stepping on anyone’s toes” (ibid, 34). Active accountability, on the other hand, is 
reciprocal and cyclical and is practiced intentionally with the purpose of establishing 
relationships in which collaboration is possible. Collaboration is the goal and accountability 
is a means of achieving it. Active accountability is a more productive, inclusive, and I would 
argue emancipatory, praxis than inactive accountability.105 As I develop examples from my 
case studies, I will demonstrate instances of unaccountability, inactive accountability and 
active accountability. 
 
In both Burnaby and Richmond, many of the grassroots community organizations contesting 
petro-hegemony were primarily, although certainly not exclusively, organized by older or 
retired white progressive men and women. This was true of the RPA and the Sunflower 
Alliance in Richmond and of BROKE and Pipe Up in Burnaby. Younger activists and 
activists of color often think of older white people with resources as being most resistant to 
changing power relations, and generally this tends to hold true. However, in organizing with 
frontlines communities (communities whose intersectional exposure to the impacts of 
 
105 To be clear, none of this is to suggest that straight white men whose privilege is most pronounced in 
dominant society should feel justified in taking up as much space as they often do. Active accountability is hard 
work and will often make people with relatively more privilege feel uncomfortable. Indeed, active 
accountability is inherently an uncomfortable and discomforting process because it is intended to undo 
dominant paradigms and practices that activists bring with them into movement spaces, some of which activists 
don’t even know they have. However, as newcomers join the movement, they may need community and 
empathy as they are learning difficult lessons. The praxis of “calling in” rather than “calling out” is a 
constructive rather than destructive approach to active accountability. 
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pollution, racism, inequality, and marginalization intensified their experiences of 
oppression), the older retired activists learned more about what accountability and privilege 
meant in the movement. As Pipe Up member, Michael Hale, explained to me: 
  
I think the challenge for me, and this is probably in common with most people that 
have gone along a similar journey, was to check my privilege at the door sort of thing, 
you know, and that means being aware of it. And like a fish swimming in the water, 
you don’t know the water that you’re swimming in, it’s just there. So realizing what 
privilege is and then overcoming the denial…that's quite a process. I’ve seen it with a 
lot of my colleagues at Pipe Up. And so we’re kind of educating each other constantly 
and checking each other constantly and it’s led to some interesting snafus, you know, 
and learning. (personal communication, October 9th, 2018) 
 
Hale’s particular experience of developing active accountability was derived from building 
relationships between Pipe Up activists and the Kwantlen First Nation in the lower mainland 
outside Metropolitan Vancouver. As many Pipe Up members learned more about their 
relative privilege and the continuing role colonialization has played in the conflict with Trans 
Mountain, they were able to build an alliance based on reciprocity in which white settler 
allies learned how to be accountable to First Nations leadership. As Hale suggests, the 
process was not without its “snafus” and is often discomforting and deliberately 
“unsettling.”106 However, through recognizing First Nations leadership and practicing active 
accountability, this alliance of activists forced the local college, Kwantlen Polytechnic, to 
refuse funding from Kinder Morgan. Campaigners from the Kwantlen Nation told the college 
they would rescind its right to use their name if the college administration accepted what 
amounted to Kinder Morgan’s bribe. The Kwantlen’s unique position in this alliance allowed 
 
106 See Unsettling settler colonialism: The discourse and politics of settlers, and solidarity with Indigenous 
nations (Snelgrove, Dhalmoon and Corntassel 2014). As the authors suggest, the process of coming to terms 
with settler colonialism as a settler is supposed to be unsettling in all senses of the term, it could hardly be 
otherwise. 
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them to make this argument and convince the campus administration to reject the funding 
(Mendoza 2015). Hale explained how recognizing the Kwantlen’s leadership and stake in 
this campaign helped the alliance win a small victory against Kinder Morgan. Hale’s 
rendition of the story provides an example of an older generation of white climate justice 
campaigners grappling with the politics of privilege, practicing active accountability, and 
recognizing the ways that First Nations leadership advanced their campaign objectives. 
 
I observed another example illustrating similar dynamics when a group of roughly 30 
activists from BROKE, 350 Vancouver, Climate Convergence, along with the PTI 
organizers, met up at the PTI camp to plan last minute logistics for a die-in action that would 
take place the following morning. All those who are considered allies at the PTI camp must 
understand that Indigenous leadership is to be followed on site and their protocols are to be 
obeyed. All of us gathered that day, including the PTI organizers, were non-Indigenous. 
Indeed, the demographic was largely consistent with most of the grassroots groups I’d 
worked with: primarily over 60 and primarily white men and women (apart from the PTI 
organizers who were both younger and identified as gender non-binary).  
 
The meeting went smoothly, until one disgruntled member asked why his life-size effigy of 
the Grim Reaper had been excluded from the die-in’s visual props.  The PTI organizers 
explained that the camp’s First Nations’ Elders believed the Western symbol and associations 
with Death would set the wrong tone at the action, despite it being a die-in. Clearly 
unsatisfied, the man who built the effigy wanted to know more about the decision-making 
process that seemed to him to be taking place without the group’s input. This agitated quite a 
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few people and the sense of discomfort was palpable. The man was upset by what to him 
may have seemed like an undemocratic decision-making process and called on the PTI 
organizers to be more transparent about the way decisions were made. However, several of 
the older women then interrupted the confrontation and calmly explained to him the 
importance of following First Nations protocol on First Nations territory and how doing so 
was part of being an ally on unceded territory and was crucial to advancing the camp’s 
purpose of asserting First Nations’ rights and title. Perhaps the man was responding to 
gendered or ageist prejudice, but it was nonetheless a remarkable moment to witness people 
of this older generation explain privilege and solidarity with First Nations to each other in a 
way that deescalated the situation and convinced this man to reverse his position.  
 
This otherwise somewhat minor event illustrates a good deal about the ways these older 
participants in the movement have been trained in allyship and how effectively they were 
then able to share their learning with their peers. Moreover, it exhibited a moment in which 
settler allies were productively calling each other in rather to demonstrate solidarity with 
First Nations activists - none of whom were at the meeting - rather than claiming moral 
superiority or point-scoring against each other’s activist credibility. I raised this moment in 
an interview with Susanne from BROKE (who was also at the training) and she explained 
how quite a lot of members have been trained in allyship. Working under Indigenous 
leadership has forced them to do a lot of learning, listening, and reconsidering. This is a 
small part of the transformative praxis necessary for decolonizing relationships within the 
movement. However, while she emphasized the importance of following First Nations 
leadership, she also voiced some frustration at topics that, to her, were presented by younger 
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organizers as being taboo subjects. She told me that she and her peers need to talk about 
tensions around race, colonialism, and identity in order to understand them, rather than just 
being told how to behave (S. Jackson, personal communication, May 24th, 2018). This 
dynamic is hardly unique to Burnaby and it is crucial to decolonization that allies are able to 
have these profoundly unsettling conversations with one another in order to move from 
inactive to active accountability.107 Only the negotiation and renegotiation of the terms in 
which these alignments are narrated will lead to the fundamental transformation in 
relationships required of alliances for climate justice. 
 
Accountability must exist not only between individual members or demographics of the 
movement but between constituent organizations and organizational forms too. Historically, 
alliances between large environmental NGOs (ENGOs), grassroots community activists, and 
First Nations in British Columbia have been fraught (Vasey 2014). Many of the ENGOs 
have, often rightly, been accused of selling out radical activist groups, grassroots and 
frontline community organizations, and First Nations, and are called out for preferring to 
publicize compromise with corporations in the interests of appealing to funders. Meanwhile, 
some grassroots groups have been highly suspicious of, some might say paranoid about, 
engagement with any larger organizational bureaucracies and “professionalized” activism 
that do not share their political orientation or theories of change (ibid). In addition, some 
First Nations activists and leaders criticize the ways in which ENGOs remain highly 
colonized institutions that ‘talk-the-talk,’ often by tokenizing colonial oppression of First 
 
107 It is also necessary to understand that some Indigenous activists may be tired of explaining these politics to 
newcomers or find the process too painful. Having settler allies learn to educate each other to the extent 
possible may often be the most appropriate pedagogical approach. 
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Nations and cherry-picking or scouting for First Nations spokespeople, but rarely taking 
leadership from or being accountable to First Nations interests (Fuller 2019). As Mike 
Simpson has documented, the alliances forged against the Trans Mountain pipeline are not an 
exception. His own interviews with PTI activists suggest that some ENGOs’ practices 
continue to reinforce colonial and oppressive dynamics at the Watch House and PTI camp, 
even as they claim to be in solidarity with First Nations (Simpson 2019). Clearly, tensions 
between all these organizations and organizational forms do still exist amongst activists 
confronting the Trans Mountain pipeline. 
 
Mary Lovel was especially critical of the movement’s failure to build broader coalitions 
between different organizations, political orientations and social struggles. In particular, 
many ENGOs still haven’t fully developed a relationship of reciprocal and active 
accountability with frontline communities. Echoing, Maree Brown’s insights into critical 
relationships, Mary told me that some ENGOs are participating in what she called “extractive 
organizing,” which she defined as “organizing on an issue that you’re not very familiar with, 
and… essentially mobilizing mass numbers of people, but not actually doing the harder 
emotional labor of building community strength and power.” When these ENGOs seek to 
mobilize large numbers of people into taking action but fail to build meaningful relationships 
with people already on the frontlines, they lose the trust of those communities and 
accountability between the frontlines and the ENGOs breaks down. Moreover, while Mary 
acknowledged that “the movement against Trans Mountain has done a lot of work on 
decolonization and on understanding Indigenous rights,” she also said it “hasn't done nearly 
as much work on racial and broader social justice and showing up for people who are most 
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impacted by climate change in a meaningful way.” She explained that there are migrant 
justice, racial justice, and farm workers’ rights movements in Vancouver and the lower 
mainland that many climate justice activists haven’t yet organized with, articulated common 
ground with, or aligned interests with. This, so far unrealized, potential for even broader 
based alliance building between social and climate justice organizations and groups in the 
region also suggests that climate justice activists must be seeking to develop relationships 
and accountability beyond those already established with First Nations and Indigenous 
activists. 
 
Despite clear instances of the limitations of alliance building in British Columbia, my 
research does suggest climate justice activists are making progress in advancing active 
accountability – at least when compared to Vasey’s critiques of earlier environmentalist 
campaigning in the region (2014). Funneling resources and trained organizers to the 
frontlines of the struggle Greenpeace and Stand.org, for example, supported the Watch 
House and PTI camp with more than empty rhetoric. Indeed, the PTI camp was where many 
important relationships were developed and civil disobedience blockades at the tank farm 
gates became the sites at which the fruits of the relationship-building accountability and trust 
were made visible. The camp hosted members of many different political identities and 
strategic orientations who all agreed to the protocols established by the Indigenous 
leadership. The biweekly tank farm and marine terminal blockades always featured prayer 
and ceremony, reminding all participants that their struggle was not just one of 
environmental or climate protection but of defending and advancing First Nations’ rights and 
title. Meanwhile, members of BROKE, 350 Vancouver and Pipe Up, have all demonstrated 
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ways in which they are taking leadership from First Nations and confronting the politics of 
privilege without reverting to defensiveness and inactive accountability, or simply saying 
“just tell us what to do.”  
 
Moreover, as several organizers were keen to explain, they believed that one of their greatest 
accomplishments was bringing together many different political identities and strategic 
orientations into a coherent coalition advancing different but coordinated strategies. 
Dogwood worked on broader electoral strategies but was invited to run workshops at the PTI 
camp too. BROKE, 350 Vancouver, PTI and Pipe Up organized blockades and rallies at the 
Kinder Morgan pipeline terminus. These were supported by groups like Stand.earth and 
Greenpeace. Greenpeace also played an important role coordinating direct actions requiring 
more technical expertise. Events hosted by 350 Canada featuring environmentalist headliners 
like Bill McKibben raised money for legal defense funds for activists arrested in civil 
disobedience actions or blockading the tank farm gates. Climate Convergence, which 
emerged to bring an explicitly anti-capitalist critique into the local movement, also sought to 
decolonize their praxis while sharing spaces and strategies with more liberal activists to 
organize some of the campaign’s largest rallies and marches in downtown Vancouver. The 
Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs kept the focus on the First Nations-led struggle in 
the media. The Tsleil-Waututh government contracted West Coast Environmental Law to 
advise and help construct the legal strategy, while the RAVEN Trust and Pull Together 
coalition raised money around the province for the costs of litigating against Kinder Morgan 
and the Canadian government. Without at least some accountability between the groups it is 
unlikely such coordination could have been achieved. 
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Despite involving quite different demographics, accountability amongst Richmond’s climate 
justice activists looked similar to Burnaby’s but involved the added nuance of what happens 
when some members of the movement gained a degree of institutional power, in this case on 
the city council. Many of my conversations with activists and council members about 
accountability in Richmond focused on how city councilors, backed by the RPA, remained 
accountable to the organization, how the RPA leadership in turn remained accountable to its 
membership, and how the organization as a whole remained accountable to other allied 
environmental and social justice organizations in the city. An inside-outside strategy in 
which some activists or campaigners seek roles within dominant institutions while others 
push those same institutions from the outside, almost inevitably yields the potential for 
imbalances of power and consequent barriers to accountability within the movement. 
Examples from Richmond demonstrate how activists were challenged by these dynamics and 
how they have sought to overcome them. 
 
Dr. Henry Clark helped form the West County Toxics Coalition in the 1980s and was one of 
the original members of the Richmond Progressive Alliance. He has spent decades holding 
Chevron and other industrial polluters’ responsible for their pollution but has recently been 
engaged in internal fights with the local environmental justice community and the RPA. He 
believes the RPA’s approach to local politics, with the backing of environmental justice 
groups, has become just as undemocratic and dogmatic as the corporate sponsored officials 
they’re replacing: “what’s their end goal?” he asked, “do they just want to be RPA on the 
council forever?!” (H. Clark, personal communication, July 6th, 2018). According to Clark, 
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the RPA lacked accountability to the community and were operating for power’s sake alone. 
Rifts have also developed between Clark and other environmental justice organizations, with 
some members of the latter accusing him of selling out to Chevron – an accusation he 
himself told me about and one he vehemently denies. These divisions seemed to escalate at 
the same time that the city council was engaged in negotiations with Chevron. 
 
Indeed, some of the clearest instances of Richmond’s climate justice activists confronting 
questions of accountability emerge in activist’s reflections on the negotiations between 
Chevron and the city council that took place in 2010 and again in 2014. The product of these 
negotiations was that the city council voted in favor of Chevron’s refinery expansion and 
continuing operations in exchange for increasing its share of taxes and signing a Community 
Benefits Agreement. Many activists believed the council should have demanded more from 
Chevron and levelled harsh criticism at the incumbent city councilors (Early 2017). In both 
instances RPA councilmembers were outnumbered and believed they played their hand as 
well as they could within the constraints of positioning themselves against a majority of 
councilmembers favoring a deal on Chevron’s terms. However, these votes opened up 
important questions about the extent to which RPA-backed city councilors were expected to 
vote in line with RPA policy, and more broadly the local movement’s agenda, versus making 
decisions independently of the RPA. The debate, whenever I raised it with RPA activists, 
was framed in terms of accountability.  
 
Councilman Eduardo Martinez told me that accountability to the movement was about 
honoring the values he had been elected to represent: “[the community] can trust me by 
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looking at my voting record. They see what I've done, and either I walk the walk or I don’t, 
and if I don’t they can’t trust me and if I do they can, so that’s the accountability” (E. 
Martinez, personal communication, July 9th, 2018). McLaughlin added that a distinction had 
to be drawn between decisions that RPA councilmembers could make independently and 
those that were of “fundamental concern” and required alignment with the RPA’s agenda:  
 
The elected officials who are part of this movement have to be in line with these 
fundamental concerns. And so how does one hold them accountable? Well, in terms 
of the RPA…if the elected official that has been endorsed by the RPA is not standing 
with the community on these fundamental issues, they will not get endorsed again… 
But it can be kind of uncertain at times, what are the issues of fundamental concern? 
…That's something that the RPA is grappling with right now. (personal 
communication, July 18th, 2018) 
 
The power differentials between the RPA “electeds” and the RPA organizers that helped get 
them elected are cause for tension over accountability that have yet to be resolved. This is 
particularly true in terms of alignment over where compromise is permissible and where red 
lines must be drawn. Nonetheless, both former Mayor McLaughlin and Councilman Martinez 
emphasized the extent to which they encouraged activists and community members to work 
with them to co-produce policy and mobilize the community in support of these policies (E. 
Martinez, personal communication, July 9th, 2018). They saw the combination of policy 
coproduction and community mobilization as a crucial component of maintaining 
accountability between elected officials and the broader movement in the city. 
 
The question of accountability once asked, however, also led activists to voice their opinions 
about accountability internally, within the RPA, and between the RPA and the broader 
movement in Richmond. Diana, an RPA steering committee member, told me that when she 
first joined the group she was particularly concerned about the impact the organizational 
 367 
structure was having on maintaining accountability between different constituents of the 
organization.  When she joined the Steering Committee she argued for implementing a code 
of conduct and spending more time on what she called “process.” As she told me: 
 
I come from a long tradition of faith justice communities and it's really interesting the 
amount of time we would spend on process and how we treat one another, but 
oftentimes we [didn’t] get off those conversations in order to do things. And then 
[what] I find in political groups [is] they're so quick to get things done, they forget 
about how to treat each other.” (personal communication, July 6th, 2018). 
 
Here she invokes the tension between Smucker’s model of activism and Maree Browns’ in 
which one group emphasizes relationships to the detriment of action and the other 
emphasizes action to build critical mass to the detriment of critical relationships. She 
explained that the threat to the group’s internal cohesion was not irreconcilable political 
differences but “egos.” Process for Diana was about building relationships, creating 
structures, and developing a group dynamic that would mitigate divisions stemming from 
what she identified as egotism.108 Accountability was therefore deeply connected to process 
and required more structure and bureaucracy than the what she argued the largely 
horizontalist orientation of the organization was then able to provide. Conversely, Bk, the 
RPA’s current co-chair, suggested that it was its structure that made the organization 
accountable in the first place (personal communication, July 17th, 2018). RPA is a 
 
108 It is worth mentioning here that Diana left the RPA for a year following our interview. Diana later told me 
that, at the end of 2018, a number of very active members left the RPA over the issue of “unseemly behavior” 
mostly on behalf of one member whose angry outbursts through email and in person meetings became too 
much. This individual’s naming, blaming, and shaming, in particular against two City Council members who 
voted against RPA positions, rose to a fever level. Diana left, as did two (and later a third) other prominent RPA 
members. Others had left previously because of this member’s behavior. By October 2019 the RPA Steering 
Committee decided to oust this member from the Steering Committee and they put it to the Membership to vote 
on at the end of October, who ratified the decision. Since then, Diana and the other three members have all 
decided to return to the RPA. For her, the issue was always that the organization needed to treat all people with 
dignity and respect and that she could not remain in the organization while this unseemly behavior was allowed 
to continue on the RPA’s Steering Committee (D. Wear, personal communication, December 10th, 2019). 
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membership-based organization and members vote on all major decisions, and these 
decisions are scrutinized by the membership and the local media. As she explained: “I think 
that accountability comes from knowing we're always under scrutiny and also a being 
membership organization.” Like many groups within the movement, the RPA is not alone in 
navigating the tensions between horizontalism and structure or bureaucracy. Yet, it seems 
that despite these tensions, and challenges most members do remain authentically and 
ideologically committed to being held accountable to the community and to the 
organizations’ membership. 
 
Finally, activists discussed accountability in terms of developing relationships between the 
RPA and other local social and climate justice organizations. Diana explained to me that one 
of the RPA’s major goals when she joined the group was to deepen their commitment to 
inclusivity and diversity. They were aware that many of the constituents of the core team and 
steering committee did not reflect or necessarily represent Richmond’s communities of color. 
While most of the city council candidates RPA has supported have been people of color, the 
early team of organizers were mostly older white retirees. One way the RPA had already 
been addressing representation was by inviting members of Richmond’s other grassroots 
social and environmental justice campaigns onto the RPA steering committee - indeed 
several, like Andrés Soto with Communities for a Better Environment and Henry Clark with 
East Coast Environmental Toxics Coalition, were instrumental in the early development of 
the organization. However, Diana argued that simply inviting these organizations to the table 
wasn’t enough, commitments had to be made to deepening the relationships between these 
communities. This rested upon the RPA demonstrating active accountability. The RPA 
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standing behind Jovanka Beckles against racist and homophobic attacks during her election 
campaign and time as a council woman impressed Bk who, like Beckles, is a queer black 
woman:  
 
The RPA, none of whom seemed to be, (at least that I could see), black queer 
folks...  still presented a message of inclusiveness that stood out for me, 
watching Beckles and watching the RPA support her. So being able to see a very 
small group stand up for a person who seemed to be nothing like them, I thought that 
that was pretty powerful. And we talk about, you know, identity politics sometimes, 
and… I don't think we need to lead with that but I think it's important that when 
we're with this organization that doesn't look like the average person in Richmond, it's 
very important that people are able to see that the RPA actually does stand up and 
fight for people who aren’t like them. (Personal communication, July 17th, 2018). 
 
Even though most of the RPA didn’t look like her, showing up to these fights and 
challenging racist and homophobic attacks meant Bk felt like the RPA’s activists were 
walking the talk. This led her to take more interest in the RPA and ultimately take up her 
position as co-chair. While anecdotal, this example reinforces an important lesson about 
active accountability which is that this praxis is not just about educating, listening, learning 
about privilege but involves actively seeking to dismantle systems of oppression and 
“showing up” for the struggles other members of your group are fighting. Again, while not 
without its limitations, the RPA’s commitment to accountability and relationship building 
appears authentic and indeed authenticity has always the RPA’s major appeal. Indeed, very 
public indications that this commitment was coming under pressure was one reason why the 
RPA ended up losing seats in the 2018 elections (Geluardi 2018b). 
 
Active accountability, therefore, is about doing the hard work of learning from and honestly 
educating your allies and comrades about how power dynamics within the group can 
reinforce marginalization and acting to dismantle them, while ensuring this education 
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happens in a way and in an environment that remains open and welcoming so that 
collaboration across difference remains possible. It is also about showing up for different 
constituents’ struggles, building trust, and developing the critical relationships necessary to 
hold alliances together as they grow and contest petro-hegemony. The war of position cannot 
be won and the alliances will not last without the constituents who are forging the new 
consensus and building a PCOC for climate justice maintaining critical relationships of active 
accountability with and amongst each other. 
 
Leadership 
 
The question of leadership and whose leadership should be followed deeply informs 
accountability and its relevance to relationship building and coalition politics. However, this 
is a particularly difficult question when uneven dynamics of power, privilege and identity are 
contained and must be challenged within counter hegemonic alliances. Moreover, there are 
three different types of leadership that are deeply interconnected in counter hegemonic 
climate justice politics. The first is moral or intellectual leadership that Gramsci argues is 
ultimately what the War of position is fought over. There is also frontlines leadership and the 
ethico-political question of who should lead or guide the climate justice movement. Finally, 
we must engage with leadership development through community organizing, growing the 
infrastructural capability or competency to lead, and asking who can and is able to lead. 
Connecting these three types of leadership is a complicated but vital activity that is often 
overlooked in the scholarship and praxis of each. 
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Gramsci and Gramscians have had a great deal to say about leadership, its pertinence to 
counterhegemonic consensus building, and how subaltern groups come to “lead” through a 
War of position. But they have not always addressed the uneven dynamics of privilege and 
power that engagement with leadership should encompass. Leadership, in Gramscian terms, 
is mostly discussed as moral or intellectual leadership around which consensus across social 
difference is forged and from which revolutionary action can emerge. For Gramsci, the 
proletariat or working class would be the moral/intellectual leaders of any anti-capitalist 
revolution against the bourgeoisie, because only they were the ones who could articulate 
alignment and thus consensus across different social categories.109 Of course, one of Laclau 
and Mouffe’s innovations in their theorizing of hegemony was to displace class as “the 
privileged point of rupture” and instead argue for articulating the chains of equivalence 
between different irreducible “subject positions.” Their intervention complicates the notion 
of leadership in counter hegemonic strategy and forces us to question who leads the 
movement and how it should be led. Moore and Kahn Russell address leadership in this way. 
Engaging with who should lead, they respond that the constituencies on the climate justice 
movement’s frontlines, those with most at stake, must be understood as the movements’ 
leaders. In other words, those most impacted by colonial, gendered, capitalist and racist 
oppression and taking action to disrupt these forces, are the ones whose direction the 
movement should take.  
 
Meanwhile, other social movement theorists, like Marshall Ganz (2010) or Harie Han (2014) 
for example, have interpreted leadership in quite a different sense. Too often the question of 
 
109 Gramsci, like many Communists of his time, was particularly concerned with forging alliances between the 
working class in Italy’s Northern regions and the rural peasantry in Southern Italy (See Featherstone 2013). 
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who should lead overwhelms theorizing of who can or who is willing and able to lead. With 
a focus on agency, these authors have devoted critical attention to how individual leaders 
within social movement organizations are developed and reproduced. For Ganz leadership 
means “accepting responsibility to create conditions that enable others to achieve shared 
purpose in the face of uncertainty. Leaders accept responsibility not only for their individual 
“part” of the work, but also for the collective “whole”” (2010, 1). Leadership here is about 
ability and willingness and these can be developed through organizing. Leadership is 
understood here as an orientation, skill or characteristic rather than political position.  
Interrogating these three approaches to leadership in my own findings from Blockadia yields 
important insights about the role relational organizing and accountability play in 
counterhegemonic alliance building. I began this chapter by illustrating the communication 
strategies being deployed in the struggle over intellectual and moral leadership in the 
Gramscian sense, so I will focus the conversation below on these two other types of 
leadership, before connecting them back to Gramsci’s notion of leadership. 
 
The complexity of the question of leadership in the climate justice movement became 
apparent to me at Standing Rock, particularly in the Winter of 2016, after then President 
Obama issued an executive order halting the pipeline’s progress until a full Environmental 
Impact Statement had been completed. Following the announcement, the Standing Rock 
Sioux tribal chairman, Chief Dave Archambault III, thanked all non-Sioux allies for their 
support but called on them to pack up and leave the camps arguing the pipeline no longer 
posed a significant threat (Archambault 2016). Other Indigenous leaders, Elders, and youth 
activists, called on allies to stay through the winter and urged more people to join and 
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continue defending the camps (Charger 2017). Arguing that President-elect, Donald Trump, 
would quickly reverse President Obama’s ruling and that the court system could not be relied 
upon to protect them against violations of rights and treaties, these activists condemned 
Archambault’s trust in these colonial institutions. Observing the debate unfold on social 
media I was unsure about whose leadership to follow. I wanted to be a “good ally” and take 
direction from frontline communities, but the frontlines in question did not, and rarely do, 
speak with one voice. Even before this more public division, it was rarely clear (nor could it 
have been) whether tribal Elders, the Standing Rock Sioux chief and council, Indigenous 
Environmental Network organizers, or grassroots activists were setting strategy and leading 
the campaign. However, based on the terms of the debate I was unsure whether or not I 
should return to Standing Rock and defy the tribal government or whether I should have 
stayed home and ignored allies’ calls to bolster the camp’s numbers.110  
 
Moore and Kahn Russell write that: 
 
Communities do not speak from one commanding voice. They’re messy and full of 
people who don’t always agree. One way to effectively navigate these tensions is to 
seek guidance from political leadership. Political leadership can take shape in a group 
of people, or perhaps a few organizations that are trusted by, (and most often from 
and accountable to) their community. (2011, 30) 
 
The first sentence holds a crucial lesson for allies, particularly those with positionalities 
similar to my own: leadership is messy, and all communities are complicated. As Moore and 
Kahn Russell go on to argue, though, “all too often activists simply seek out groups within a 
 
110 In the end the weather conditions made getting to Standing Rock over the winter much harder and I decided 
to visit another pipeline blockade I’d been following in British Columbia at the Unist’ot’en camp on unceded 
Wetsuweten territory instead. It was only later that I would discover that equally fraught tensions over 
leadership existed there too, with the elected representatives of the Wet’suwet’en endorsing new pipelines and 
the hereditary chiefs and local clans opposing them. 
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community that affirm what they previously wanted to do anyway.” Fuller calls this 
“scouting,” where activists (and indeed academics) look for an Indigenous person who shares 
their view in order to claim they’ve been accountable to frontlines communities and can then 
proceed with their agenda (2019). However, acknowledging the necessarily unsatisfactory 
nature of their answer, Moore and Kahn Russell explain that solutions to this complexity 
“come from collaborative, shared work. The more you get to know and understand that 
environment, the powers at play, and the people on all sides, the more effective you’ll be” 
(2011, 31). Accordingly, understanding and being embedded in the context, listening and 
learning, makes it much clearer, at least as an ally, whose leadership one should be 
following. This is ultimately why relational organizing is such an important component of 
counter hegemonic alliance building that is led by and accountable to the frontlines.  
 
The question of leadership, however, is further complicated in organizing contexts involving 
First Nations and Indigenous activists because allies must recognize they are not just working 
amongst differing social and cultural constituencies but often altogether a different 
government and governance structures. In British Columbia, for example, the Watch House 
and the Protect the Inlet Camp weren’t officially a project of, or endorsed by, either the 
Tsleil-Waututh Nation or the Union of British Columbian Indian Chiefs. The camp and 
Watch House were established according to Coast Salish Indigenous customs and protocol 
and were led by members of the Tsleil-Waututh Nation but acting in solidarity with, and 
taking direction from, Indigenous leaders there, didn’t necessarily mean activists were acting 
in solidarity with and taking leadership from the Tsleil-Waututh Nation.  
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Eugene Kung, a lawyer with West Coast Environmental Law, explained to me that as a 
lawyer contracted by the Tsleil-Waututh Nation, he felt his primary duty was to the Nation 
and not necessarily to the Watch House organizers, despite having many friends amongst 
them and a good deal of communication with them (personal communication, October 5th, 
2018). He said that the Watch House was often conflated with the Tsleil-Waututh Nation in 
the minds of well-meaning activists and environmental organizations who wanted to 
demonstrate their solidarity with First Nations against the pipeline. However, the legal 
strategy, taking Kinder Morgan and the Canadian government to court, was the Nation’s 
preferred mode of intervention. Eugene explained that there were some concerns about how 
the Watch House and PTI might impact that strategy and the media representations of the 
Nation as a whole. Meanwhile, some Indigenous activists did not trust the court system 
regarding it as a colonial instrument of domination and believed direct action and asserting 
title over the land by reclaiming it was the better strategy. However, media representations 
and allies’ narratives sometimes conflated the goals and strategies of the Nation with the 
goals of the PTI camp or First Nations or “Indigenous people” tout court. Yet for better or 
worse the Nation is the recognized form of government and representation and, as Eugene 
explained, “they also have an interest in ensuring that rules are followed and that laws are 
followed” (personal communication, October 5th, 2018) Additionally, they have other 
priorities that may superseded defeating the pipeline. How environmental activists decided 
whether to prioritize the leadership of the Nation or the Indigenous-led PTI camp, or indeed 
Indigenous activists at Camp Cloud, complicates the notion of frontlines leadership that is so 
engrained in climate justice activism. 
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While the Tsleil-Waututh Nation and PTI organizers were often in communication, shared 
many of the same goals, and are committed to defeating the pipeline, they were not the same 
entity and did not always speak with the same voice or endorse the same strategies. In this 
particular case, their differences did not appear to be a source of significant disruption within 
the movement, at least publicly. But complicating the idea that allies should just follow the 
constituency in questions’ political representatives does raise questions about whose 
leadership was actually being followed and whether ENGOs and grassroots organizations 
claimed to be following Indigenous leadership by choosing whichever group aligned most 
closely with their agenda. Conversely, uncritically taking direction from the chief and council 
or a First Nations’ government is not without its own problems either. As Coulthard has 
pointed out, in Canada these governments representing the Nation are a product of the Indian 
Act which helped dismantle and outlaw Indigenous peoples’ original governance structures 
(2014). The extent to which these governments can be considered legitimate from the point 
of view of a strategy for decolonization is therefore contested. As Eugene explains of 
pipeline opposition on unceded territory, the Canadian and provincial governments and 
corporations want to engage with the imposed chief and council system  “because it's easier 
to talk to one or two elected chiefs as representatives [but] I think there's a wide range 
amongst Indigenous communities in terms of how and whether that reflects the community” 
(personal communication, October 5th, 2018). In the case of the Tsleil-Waututh, however, 
rejection of the pipeline was unanimously agreed upon in a referendum of the Nation’s 
membership.111  
 
111 This is not always so straight forward. Further north in British Columbia, members of the Unist’ot’en clan of 
the Wetsuweten Nation have reoccupied their land and have been blocking pipeline routes for over a decade. 
They have the support of the hereditary chiefs whose legitimacy is derived from pre-colonial governance 
system but are opposed by the elected representatives of the Nation (Democracy Now! 2019). 
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Moreover, taking leadership from some First Nations does not necessarily mean taking 
leadership from all First Nations. Some First Nations governments in British Columbia and 
Alberta support the construction of more pipelines to transport tar sands and natural gas. 
Despite their stated commitment to Indigenous rights and title, most environmental 
organizations and climate justice activists (myself included) could not honestly claim to be in 
solidarity with these Nations or take leadership from them. As such, it becomes necessary for 
climate justice activists to examine why they have aligned their interests specifically with 
those of Indigenous allies whose positions they support. This critical self-examination is 
important but doesn’t necessarily mean non-Indigenous climate justice activists are cynically 
picking and choosing which Indigenous people they are in allegiance with. This should be 
contrasted with the more cynical practice of scouting.  
 
Corporate media commentators and fossil fuel companies are often quick to exaggerate and 
enflame internal differences between Indigenous peoples and divide alliances between 
climate justice activists and Indigenous peoples (Hopper 2018). Many First Nations’ 
governments have signed benefits agreements with Kinder Morgan and endorsed pipeline 
projects out of economic necessity. Some have proposed building their own pipeline from the 
Alberta tar sands to the coast and others have considered buying a stake in the Trans 
Mountain pipeline (CBC Radio 2019; Canadian Press 2018d). At least one chief has accused 
environmentalist organizations of “red-washing” their campaigns by claiming to be in 
solidarity with Indigenous communities but are in fact engaged in “eco-colonialism” and 
through their environmentalism are ignoring Indigenous peoples’ agency and rights (Shore 
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2018; Hopper 2018). These attacks, while often disingenuous, still pose complicated 
questions for non-Indigenous climate justice activists about the extent to which they are 
willing to, and the extent to which they should, take direction from frontlines leadership. 
Leadership from the frontlines can provide moral clarity but it is also important to critically 
examine who is leading and why they have either been positioned or positioned themselves 
as movement leaders. 
 
Different leadership models, leadership development and capabilities are a crucial concern to 
counter hegemonic movement building. Of the leadership models in the campaign against the 
Kinder Morgan pipeline Mary told me, “it feels [like] there's a few, sort of, thought leaders 
that have a lot of resources that then make a lot of decisions, instead of a broad-based 
collective power.” Mary critiqued some ENGO’s models of leadership in which the people 
within the movement that have more resources, contacts, and influence are the ones whose 
voices are heard and have most weight. Contrasting this with her own commitment to broad-
based collective power leadership models, Mary suggested that the ENGO-led approach to 
the campaign wasn’t producing the kind of political realignment around climate justice many 
activists involved wanted to see emerge out of the struggle.  
 
Susanne, on the other hand, voiced frustrations about the non-hierarchical, horizontalist 
decision-making models in anti-pipeline organizations she’d worked with, saying it was often 
inefficient and “chaotic.” She was in favor of broad-based collective power but also argued 
that they needed structure: “you need democracy, you need people to be able to talk, but you 
need to control and order, and somebody bringing it all together too” (S. Jackson, personal 
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communication, May 24th, 2018). She commended BROKE saying “it’s very democratic but 
it's also structured, you know, so you can't go off on a rant for 20 minutes, that’s not going to 
happen, but you can speak... There’s no sort of boss… so there’s not [a] specific person, but 
there’s definitely a sort of core, and I would defer to them.” Susanne was also mostly positive 
about the leadership dynamics between grassroots organizations and the ENGOs because of 
the resources ENGOs were able to leverage to support grassroots campaigners:  
 
Then you have got the NGOs who are actually paid and … they're helpful and they’re 
good… I find what they're really good at [is] getting and consolidating information, 
disseminating information… As a grassroots person, you don't have the resources and 
the ability to do that. And, I find in terms of leading a lot of the marches and stuff like 
that, they're more facilitators than the actual driving forces behind them. (personal 
communication, May 24th, 2018) 
 
Ironically, Mary was a paid organizer with Greenpeace and was more critical of the 
relationship between ENGOs and grassroots, while Susanne was a core member and 
volunteer with the grassroots organization, BROKE, and was generally supportive of the 
ENGOs leadership model. Conversations with many different organizers and activists in both 
case study sites often illustrated these contrasting positions, with some preferring 
decentralized broad-based decision making and others arguing for more structure and clearer 
chains of decision-making. The tension between competing leadership models, best 
understood in terms of horizontalism and hierarchy or bureaucracy, is hardly unique to these 
case studies or even the broader climate justice movement. It has been most hotly debated in 
conversations about the purported successes and failures of the so-called leaderless model 
deployed by Occupy Wall Street in 2011 (Smucker 2017; White 2017). Distinguishing 
between leaderless models and leaderful models is productive here.112 Allowing for the 
 
112 I’ve not been able to track down who coined this distinction. 
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flexibility, empowerment, and movement ownership so crucial to the horizontalist approach 
but ensuring structure, coordination, and accountability that tempt so many towards 
hierarchical organizing, the leaderful model captures the best of both orientations. 
Fundamentally, it rejects the notion that leadership is a zero-sum game – if someone has it, 
someone else doesn’t – and instead encourages us to expand our understanding of leadership 
to see its manifestation in a multitude of ways and forms.  
 
Leadership, particularly in the leaderful model, is something that can be developed through 
community organizing. With training and competency anyone can become a movement 
leader in a whole variety of forms. Developing grassroots community leadership is a vital 
role for community organizers to perform. Community organizing around climate justice in 
Richmond has relied upon leadership development amongst grassroots actors. For example, 
leadership development is the foundation of the Asian Pacific Environmental Network’s 
(APEN) work in the city. As APEN executive director, Miya Yoshitani told me, “the heart of 
our strategies is really around organizing and deep leadership development” (personal 
communication, July 12th, 2018).  Leadership development to Miya meant “demystifying 
how change happens and really making sure that people have an opportunity to kind of live 
and experience where they're part of change, and that their understanding of power is 
transformed” (personal communication, July 12th, 2018).  A community organizer’s role is to 
help community members see themselves as leaders. It’s when constituents see themselves as 
part of creating the vision for change is that they start to see themselves as a leader. Ensuring 
activists have ownership over part of the decision-making process and strategy setting is 
therefore crucial to leadership development according to Miya.  
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Echoing much of Hahri Han’s research on leadership development and membership retention 
in social movements (2014), Miya explained that the development of community leadership 
is a science and an art. Fundamentally, the science or mechanics of leadership is based in 
creating and providing opportunities for constituents to take ownership over the process: 
 
In order to develop leaders, you need to provide space for them to be able to make 
decisions, to be able to be engaged in something that they care about, that's 
interesting to them, you need to be able to make room for them to feel a sense of 
ownership over what's happening…you actually have to have something for someone 
to experience. Identifying a problem, identifying a solution, fighting for that solution, 
building power for that, and winning, and that's the thing… that keeps people 
engaged and wanting to come back and experience more of that and learn more from 
that, and become… more self-activated in that process…[Leaders] connect with other 
people, they really want to be part of something, and … it's not about whether or not 
they can do good public speaking… but, you know, do they see themselves as being 
part of what's going on to get their community, friends and family, neighbors, 
engaged in a change that's going to improve all their lives. (personal communication, 
July 12th, 2018) 
 
Echoing Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1996), this model of leadership is about 
preparing people to make decisions autonomously and to feel empowered with their own 
sense of agency and ability to make change. Without leadership development in frontlines 
communities and without frontlines communities leading, counter hegemonic struggle for 
climate justice may, despite the best of intentions, reproduce the kind of power dynamics and 
marginalization Mary critiqued. Some might argue that such an approach still contains within 
it a paternalistic or abstract orientation toward “the community” that must be taught how to 
lead, but in a society in which many frontline communities have been systematically 
disempowered and conditioned to believe that their disempowerment is inevitable, re-
empowerment must be learned and should come from organizers within their community. I 
think this leadership model is closer to what Mary had in mind when she described broad-
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based collective power but also retains the structure and coordination that Susanne believed 
was necessary. Ultimately, a leadership model oriented towards broad-based collective power 
and decision-making also requires competency and training in how to lead.  
 
How, then, do we connect the three categories of leadership that I identified in opening this 
section? What is the relationship between frontlines leadership, leadership development and 
advancing moral or intellectual leadership? While often overlooked in the literature on 
counterhegemony, combining these three forms of leadership is fundamental to the praxis of 
counterhegemonic alliance building and, as such, the war of position must encompass and 
combine these three types of leadership. This challenges us to think critically about what 
kind of a world the leading voices guiding our alliances are producing - and might be 
reproducing. As an alternative hegemonic consensus is established, the question of frontlines 
leadership makes us examine who gets to, and who is able to, influence that alternative 
hegemony and who is excluded from the process. Leadership can provide moral and 
intellectual clarity, structure and vision around which constituents can cohere, but can also 
silence, invisiblize, and oppress. If those waging wars of position cannot see these different 
sides of leadership as they seek to build a new consensus and grow alliances, they may either 
reproduce the very marginalization they are seeking to overturn, or they may render their 
movements ineffective, immobilized and without direction. If these alliances are reproducing 
a world in which many of their constituents will remain oppressed or marginalized, they will 
likely fracture and fail.  
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But, questions of leadership capabilities and whose leadership is to be followed aren’t just a 
reaction to the potential of fractured alliances, they are also fundamental to proactively 
challenging petro-hegemony on the terrain of consent. Activists, organizers, and leaders, 
must be ready for moments in which their advances on the terrain of consent have forced a 
legitimacy crisis in petro-hegemony. Advancing moral and intellectual leadership must 
therefore be accompanied by the development of community leaders ready to take advantage 
of crisis and translate symbolic or discursive victories into institutional intervention 
(Smucker 2017). Frontlines community leaders need to be developed in order to seize 
opportunities yielded through the war of position. Miya explained this logic to me in terms 
grounded in advancing a Just transition in Richmond as petro-hegemony and broader 
neoliberal hegemony have experienced legitimacy crisis: 
 
We were kind of built for this moment, it's like…groups who have been organizing 
on the front lines, in frontline communities, in most impacted, heavily impacted 
communities, have spent years, you know, decades, actually innovating solutions to 
both organizing a methodology, like how to build power, but also the actual things 
that we want, the tangible things that we want to win… it's going to be hard fought 
for sure. It's not like it's an automatic thing, but there will be…a swing in the other 
direction, and we need to be prepared for what we do with that, how far can we push, 
how deep can we go, you know. I feel like, that's where the urgency comes in, for me. 
It's like, we have to demand much more out of our wins than we have in the past been 
able to do… And that's part of what I feel like, is … so important, to having 
something like the economics of a just transition, because it gives you a pathway and 
a direction that we are… starting to align around. And so that there's a point of 
readiness for when that turn happens. And without that kind of a framework, we don't 
have…the ability to say, like, “well, here are the things that are most important to 
fight for in this moment.” (personal communication, July 12th, 2018) 
 
Frontlines leadership is therefore fundamental to alignment around a counter hegemonic 
program and to advancing that program at key movement moments. Miya, like many of the 
activists I interviewed, identifies the economics of a just transition as the counter hegemonic 
program available to climate justice activists. Having the Just transition outlined, framed and 
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narrativized by frontline communities for frontline communities is thus a crucial way in 
which all three forms of leadership identified in these pages are combined. The Just transition 
may become a frame of reference that can be deployed leading up to and in the moments of 
hegemonic legitimacy crisis.  
 
Part 4: Realizing Material Interests and Translocal Solidarity 
 
“Just transition is just an invitation to a fancy funeral,”  Rich Trumka, president of the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 
 
 
Alignment against petro-hegemony and around counter hegemonic alternatives like a just 
transition rests upon more than narrative, more than accountability, and more than leadership, 
although all of these are fundamental components to winning a war of position.  However, 
even discourses developed out of intersectional populism will inevitably run up against the 
reality that people and activists are living unequal and often spatially segregated lives with 
distinct historical and contemporary experiences. When the climate justice movement is able 
to offer material redistributions of wealth and power in the present, for example by providing 
for the livelihoods of the communities it seeks to organize, they will enter the lives and 
lifeworlds of many more potential movement members. This means that the practice of 
accountability within movements is not enough to counter the material differences and 
inequalities within communities that climate justice activists seek to organize. Therefore, 
alignment must also be founded upon the realization of material interests which means we 
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must pay close attention not only to the war of position but also the war of economies and the 
breaking of the dynamic of dependency upon which compliance rests.113  I use the word 
realization both in the sense of coming to a common understanding of where shared material 
interests exist, but also in the sense of making real, actualizing, materializing and fighting for 
those interests. The war of economies, and the economics of a just transition, may therefore, 
prove critical to winning the war of position. 
 
The promises of the just transition cannot remain just promises, they must materialize and be 
prefigured if they are to convince potential allies, particularly in the labor movement, that a 
transition away from fossil fuel-based economies will not leave them in poverty, without 
work or dignity. Moreover, the place based common interests articulated through 
intersectional populism, such as land, water, air, and self-determination, are all material 
interests too. Workers’ rights and protection of the land and water are not ideological 
commitments but material interests. Too often the former is considered an urgent material 
interest and the latter an ideological luxury.114 These are both urgent material interests and 
must be negotiated. This insight matters, because, as Fantasia observes, alignment, alliances 
and solidarity, are not just (or he argues even primarily) founded upon prior commitment to 
specific political ideology or a particular discursive orientation but through struggle over 
 
113 In this way, counter hegemonic action on the terrain defined by a War of Economies has direct implications 
for the War of position and the process of alignment. 
114 East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice in Los Angeles have reframed this false distinction where 
the argument in favor of further development in their community has so often been “we’re just trying to put 
food on our table, we just trying to eat” and East Yard activists responded “well, we’re just trying to breath.” 
Their interests are material and irreducible to who provides the better argument. In some ways, however, the 
reframing reinforces a jobs versus the environment narrative which is why material interests must be negotiated 
rather than superseding one another. 
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interests: “Solidarity is created and expressed by the process of mutual association” (1988, 
11).  
 
To be clear, Fantasia is not suggesting that consciousness of solidarity, ideology, and 
narrative don’t matter, but he is saying these most successfully forge alignment across 
difference through the process of struggle where shared material interests are realized. He 
cites Gordon Marshall who argues that:   
An overemphasis on class imagery at the expense of class action can perhaps be 
attributed to the widely held belief among academic observers that it is somehow 
necessary for men and women to encompass society intellectually before they can 
attempt to change it. This premise is not confirmed by the history of class action on 
either a revolutionary or on a more modest scale… Consciousness is generated in and 
changed by social action… Experience has shown that it is the relationship between 
attitudes and actions that are important and that these can only be studied 
contextually. (Gordon Marshall, cited in Fantasia 1988, 8) 
 
It is, therefore, studying the relationship between action and attitude, material struggle and 
narrative struggle, that can help us understand the process of developing solidarity and 
counter hegemonic alignment.  
 
Echoing Fantasia, Gedicks and Grossman write that environmental justice alliances are 
strongest “where livelihoods rather than environmental consciousness are at the forefront of 
environmental movements” (2004, 200). By and large, my cases reinforced this argument. 
I’ve found that alliances in Blockadia are formed between people who recognize they are 
facing common material threats to their way of life, be it climate change, water pollution, air 
quality contamination, self-determination, or economic livelihoods, or indeed the intersection 
of all of these. While I certainly contest Fantasia’s somewhat overzealous displacement of 
narrative and its relationship to ideology as secondary to social struggle, the evidence I 
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gathered suggests that the movement’s commitment to recognizing and struggling over the 
material interests of its constituents must be just as strong as its commitment to discursively 
articulating those struggles into counter hegemonic alignment.115  
 
Grossman argues that the most resilient alliances rest on a shared sense of place, purpose, 
and understanding (2017). Climate change was rarely the leading frame used to mobilize or 
align communities in Richmond, Burnaby, or indeed at Standing Rock. These alliances occur 
around place-based struggles because the localized and more immediate threat to material 
interest is what brought people together – it was through struggle around these issues that 
counter hegemonic narratives made sense and took hold. This may explain why climate 
change, though certainly urgent, is not the frame that aligns groups in placed-based struggle. 
However, I also want to challenge the notion that just because it rests upon the realization of 
material interests, solidarity can only be place-based and only aligned through localized 
NIMBYism.116 Necessarily, in fact, counter hegemonic alignment cannot be limited to the 
local so frames and material interests that transcend the local, that build translocal and 
transnational solidarity, are crucial (Routledge 2011; Tegelberg and Roosvall 2015).  
 
Analysis of my case studies has crystalized these thoughts into three claims: Firstly, that the 
just transition is a strategy as well as a goal and must therefore be prefigured in the present; 
 
115  Hegemonic alignment between corporate elites and segments of the white working class in the US around 
an ideological commitment to white supremacy or patriarchy may be considered an exception (During the 2016 
Presidential Election, some commenters rather paternalistically suggested that white working class 
demographics are voting against their economic interests when they endorsed Donald Trump’s racism and 
misogyny), but I think these aren’t just ideological commitments, they’re also about maintaining white, male 
social status and the access to cultural, social or economic capital these entail. 
116 NIMBY stands for Not in My Back Yard. See article on transition from NIMBY to NOPE (Not on Planet 
Earth). 
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secondly, that realizing material interests is not isolated to labor and if a just transition is to 
develop counter hegemonic alignment it must absorb and be informed by but also extend 
beyond the concerns of labor; and thirdly, that realizing material interests tends to prioritize 
alignment around place-struggle but if it is to build a counter hegemonic alliance against 
petro-hegemony at grander scales, the climate justice movement must recognize, defend and 
claim material interests translocally and transnationally too. Moreover, as the term 
“transition,” suggests, the aspirations of the just transition are not to achieve any one end or 
outcome but rather a permanent space of social transformation and regeneration. Radical 
social change in the same of climate justice, therefore, implies a continual process of 
transition and transformation. The revolution is never truly over.  
 
Movement Generation coined the phrase “transition is inevitable, justice is not.” It is a core 
principle in the climate justice movement that the transition away from fossil fuels cannot 
leave former oil workers and working people dependent on the industry behind – indeed, 
ideally these constituents would be some of the people leading the movement. Transitioning 
away from fossil fuels to renewables without addressing any of its underlying and systemic 
roots reproduces marginalization and injustice. It is also strategically counterproductive and 
threatens the possibility of broad-based counter hegemonic alignment across struggles, 
including organized labor. As Miya Yoshitani puts it, “you're never going to get 
there…you’re [never] going to inspire enough people to be involved if it's not going to be 
good for them” (personal communication, July 12th, 2018).   Therefore, the just transition is a 
strategy of continually striving for alignment of constituencies around alternatives and not 
just an end or a goal. For this reason, Miya, APEN, and the Our Power campaign have 
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invested a great deal in supporting workers affected by energy transition. For example, Miya 
told me about their support for local autoworkers who had been organizing for better 
conditions and were fired when their factory was converted into a TESLA plant. Miya 
explained that she “wanted to make sure that we did a public thing about that, because it is 
about how we're creating a framework for just transition that, if we have exploited workers in 
a sustainable economy, that is not…a future for the economy that actually works” (personal 
communication, July 12th, 2018).   Many of the plant’s worker are Asian and Pacific Islander 
immigrants and so the intersection of energy, climate, racial, and immigrant justice informed 
this alignment of interests here. 
 
As climate justice activists have long argued, addressing marginalization and oppressions is 
not a distraction from, but absolutely integral to, addressing climate change and fossil fuel 
expansion (Pellow 2018). As Miya told me, we are not going to build the alliances and 
support the movement needs unless we address these material concerns too:  
 
The more we try to get to our climate goals while ignoring inequality, the further 
week get away from being able to, to get to those numeric climate goals…The more 
we try to build this around, build our approach to climate on, on inequality, the, the 
longer it's going to take. And so these arguments about timing and urgency are always 
so frustrating to me. (personal communication, July 12th, 2018) 
 
In this vein, she described the just transition as “a populist approach that is necessary to get 
the public support that's needed.” This particular conversation took place in the build up to 
the Rise for Jobs, Justice, and Climate march in San Francisco that APEN, amongst many 
others, was helping organize. Miya wanted to ensure the march’s messaging maintained this 
populist orientation. She saw it as an opportunity to  
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speak directly to communities and to reframe climate in a way that a broad swath of 
communities, frontline communities, working families, normal people in general feel 
like they see themselves inside of that vision, inside of that frame. They see the best 
interests of their kids and future generations and their actual, like, daily needs right 
now for jobs, clean air, health, housing, healthcare. (personal communication, July 
12th, 2018) 
 
The just transition is understood in explicitly populist terms revolving around local material 
interests which are crucial to counter hegemonic alliance building.  
 
Despite the rhetoric, however, the extent to which unions and much of the labor movement 
have found these promises and this vision persuasive is limited at best. Thomas, a union 
member, labor activist and a core member of Climate Convergence in Burnaby, argued that 
massive labor opposition to the Kinder Morgan pipeline would have been a game changer:   
 
if workers decide to play a key role in this, it’ll be decisive.  If oil workers or oil 
related workers start to speak up, to organize, start to demand changes, and in some 
cases, refuse to participate, that would change it immediately. So it makes it really 
important. And I would say that's the challenge that we haven't been able to meet yet. 
(personal communication, September 28th, 2018) 
 
Moreover, as Thomas went on to explain, it’s not as though the outreach to workers isn’t 
being engaged with. He said that it’s clear that most of the construction jobs from the project 
would not be unionized labor and that most of the refinery work that provided well paid 
union jobs in the oil sector has been outsourced to the United States. This fact saw the 
Burnaby chapter of UNIFOR, Canada’s largest private sector union representing thousands 
of energy workers, express their opposition to the pipeline (UNIFOR 950). The president of 
this union, which represented the last oil refinery in Burnaby, even spoke at rallies against 
the pipeline precisely because the oil would not end up in Burnaby’s refinery. In addition, 
Thomas argued that efforts to wrest workers support away from the industry have also 
focused on how the oil industry literally left workers hanging, as the suicide rate in the 
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Albertan tar sands has spiked during periods of recession and workers are laid off. The 
question we must ask then, is why hasn’t the rhetoric of the just transition, in which workers 
material interests are made central, aligned large enough portions of unions and the labor 
movement against the industry and around a democratized and sustainable energy economy 
instead? 
 
The reasons are numerous and, as Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate, must include the 
significance of consent to the industry forged through petro-culture. However, another clear 
reason is petro-capitalism and the role of compliance.  As Steve Bramwell, a member of 
BROKE and a union activist from the Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, explained of his 
time working in the tar sands: 
 
When I talked to the guys on the jobs, they’re all mortgaged to the hilt, and they got 
brand new pickup trucks and all this stuff and kids, and there’s guys making 10 grand 
a month and if they miss a few days work, they can’t make their payments. That's the 
situation they’re in, well that's not a healthy situation for bargaining or anything you 
know. This is now, with the idiotic housing blow up we’ve had, the housing bubble 
we’ve had in Canada, there’s so many people in debt that they’re running as fast as 
they can to stay in the same place. (personal communication, May 24th, 2018). 
 
Debt has fueled economic dependency on the industry in both Alberta and, though to a much 
lesser degree, British Columbia (Bergot 2018). If the promises and vision of the Just 
transition remain just that, promises and vision, then quite often it may not much matter how 
intellectually persuasive they are. Indebted populations are often compliant ones. As such, 
without actually materializing the jobs, income, and revenue promised by petro-capitalism, 
and without addressing the drivers of compliance, the just transition strategy is unlikely to 
bring indebted fossil fuel workers into the movements’ ranks. While the jobs, income, and 
revenue that petro-capitalism promises are under threat, particularly in the tar sands, but also 
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through automation of extraction sites and refineries like those in Richmond, and due to 
competition with renewable energy, they remain a source of income that for the time being 
exists in the urgency of the present. Therefore, if the just transition is to be a counter 
hegemonic strategy for aligning environmentalists and the labor movement examples of the 
existence and possibility well-paid, democratized green jobs need to be prefigured and 
materialized in the present. Reflecting on this point, Miya told me “it's so essential to have 
examples of the infrastructure that we're talking about in people's neighborhoods, [so] that 
people can actually see and experience that part of it” (personal communication, July 12th, 
2018).   Indeed, it is in Richmond that some of the most salient examples of the just transition 
is being prefigured and challenging the dependency much of the community has had upon 
Chevron’s refinery. 
 
It’s not just livelihoods and economic material interests that must be realized through a Just 
transition, however. Connection to the land as a source of identity as well as sustenance, the 
ability to breath unpolluted air and drink uncontaminated water are also material interest that 
align Indigenous activists, white environmentalists, and frontlines environmental justice 
communities. Andrés Soto, an organizer with Richmond’s Communities for a Better 
Environment, suggested that a just transition must encompass the whole city because “the 
refinery sector is not that labor intensive and so while the Just transition for the workers will 
be important, it's really also the just transition for cities like Richmond… what is their 
financial strategy post refinery?” (personal communication, July 11th, 2018). The just 
transition must be made to do more than transition former fossil fuel industry workers into a 
democratized, decarbonized, and decentralized energy economy. As the Climate Justice 
Alliance understands it: 
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Just transition strategies were first forged by labor unions and environmental justice 
groups, rooted in low-income communities of color, who saw the need to phase out 
the industries that were harming workers, community health and the planet; and at the 
same time provide just pathways for workers to transition to other jobs… Building on 
these histories, members of the Climate Justice Alliance, many of whom are rooted in 
the environmental justice movement, have adapted the definition of Just transition to 
represent a host of strategies to transition whole communities to build thriving 
economies that provide dignified, productive and ecologically sustainable livelihoods; 
democratic governance and ecological resilience. (CJA 2019b) 
 
Alliances developed around a Just transition of this sort will require that different material 
interests be negotiated and balanced.  The land and water are material interests just as much 
as jobs and tax revenue or self-determination are. Moreover, these interests and the identities 
that form around them are not fixed or static. Therefore, alignment around a Just transition 
will necessarily, involve synthesis and through this process the production of new political 
identities and collective will. David Featherstone identifies in Gramsci’s writing, “an 
insistent sense of struggle as generative of new forms of identity and political practice” 
(2013, 65). Through the articulation of new alignments and struggle for a Just transition we 
are likely to see the formation of new political identities and the generation of a new 
collective political will. We cannot know what these will look like before they emerge, but as 
we think about its formation, it is essential that identities and interests are not constructed as 
static or fixed.  
 
Finally, we must engage with translocal solidarities that extend beyond place-based material 
priorities. If, as Fantasia and Grossman suggest, solidarity and alliances in these struggles are 
founded upon material, contextualized and place-based concerns, how can they be 
generalized or become translocal? This was also one of Gramsci’s major concerns in his 
work on Aspects of The Southern Question (Featherstone 2013). However, like Fantasia and 
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Grossman, alliances for Gramsci, in his case between the peasantry of southern Italy and the 
working class of the north, remained contingent upon specific conjunctures of place and 
history (Karriem 2013).  Similarly, focusing on the material interests and populist framings 
that align, organize, and mobilize communities against petro-hegemony at the local scales 
that I’ve discussed so far, may distract us from the creation of a translocal Political Culture of 
Opposition and Creation that must grow out of place-based and frontline community-led 
struggle in Blockadia. The question lingers, therefore, how do place-based counter 
hegemonic alignments become translocal and transnational? I will leave the complexities of 
scale to Chapter Six, but as the current chapter is about growing the movement through 
building alliances, I feel some obligation to discuss how climate justice activists are 
developing translocal geographies of solidarity (Routledge 2011).  Some clues lay in thinking 
about how the interests and framings deployed in the local contexts I’ve studied could be 
generalized or universalized.  
 
The drivers of climate disruption and climate justice are the obvious frames to draw these 
contextualized struggles into translocal alignment. As I’ve indicated several times, however, 
most activists in Richmond, Burnaby, and Standing Rock didn’t articulate their struggles first 
and foremost in terms of climate change. They’re confrontation with key drivers of climate 
disruption (the fossil fuel industry) certainly renders them vital constituents of the climate 
justice movement, but climate connects them to other place-based struggles only on an 
intellectual level, not a visceral or necessarily affective level. I am tempted, therefore, to 
return to water and Standing Rock where the focus on water protection combined materialist 
and cultural imperatives with narrative intervention to universalize the struggle. When 
Ladonna Brave Bull Allard and the first Water Protectors erected the Sacred Stone Camp, 
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they called for support across the nation asking “everyone who lives on or near the Missouri 
River and its tributaries, everyone who farms or ranches in the local area, and everyone who 
cares about clean air and clean drinking water [to] stand with us” (Allard quoted in Grossman 
2017, 189). Water doesn’t have to be place-bound. Indeed, if we think of it in terms of its 
hydrological cycles, water is never place-bound. As Naomi Klein writes, “interconnected 
bodies of water ... are arteries of life, flowing together to bind... disparate communities in 
common purpose” (2014, 298). She argues that “what has emerged in the movement against 
extreme extraction is less an anti-fossil fuels movement than a pro-water movement” (2014, 
297). Standing Rock’s Water Protectors and their emphasis on the water, therefore, provide 
lessons about transforming place-based struggles into translocal ones.   
 
Water was crucial to the alignment of interests across space and which rippled out across the 
country from Standing Rock. Protecting the water was not only a symbolic or rhetorical 
intervention, it was a cultural and material imperative that aligned different groups into a 
counter hegemonic PCOC that posed a significant challenge to petro-hegemony. Across the 
border, in Burnaby, banners, slogans and rhetoric directly drew upon Standing Rock’s 
articulation of the terms of struggle: “Water is Life.” Many activists there saw themselves as 
deeply connected to the Standing Rock uprising. Taking up the name Coast Protectors, some 
activists mirrored the framing of protection advanced by Standing Rock’s Water Protectors.  
 
Meanwhile in Richmond, Idle No More SF Bay activist, Pennie Opal Plant, told me about the 
role water plays in Indigenous-led mobilizations throughout the Bay Area, particularly in 
contextualizing their healing walks as both ceremony and an alliance building tool: “we 
started each walk with a prayer ceremony and prayers for the water because all these fossil 
 396 
fuel projects are along the water and at each resting place that we stopped we would invite 
allies or you know other folks to share what they were doing and how people could plug in, 
so it was a way of broadening the movement” (P. Opal Plant, personal communication, July 
19th, 2018).  Describing the healing walks she and Idle No More SF Bay would lead, Pennie 
went on to make the connection between Standing Rock and alliance building between 
Indigenous and non-Native climate justice activists in the Bay Area: 
 
the majority of people that walked with us were not Native Americans… we 
estimated there was over 1100 walkers, and some of those people went to several 
walks. But that's a lot of people that were, [that] had never been around Indigenous 
people, our protocols, how we operate with prayer, how strong that is to follow 
Indigenous women's leadership. And then when Standing Rock happened, a lot of 
those people went to Standing Rock, and they were already familiar with how native 
people do things. (personal communication, July 19th, 2018).   
 
The healing walks, led by Indigenous women and framed in terms of water protection, 
prepared non-native climate justice activists for acting in alliance with the Standing Rock 
Sioux’s Water Protectors. It seems that water is an interest that can make this movement 
translocal but we must also make sure that a demand as apparently modest as water 
protection does not dilute the movement’s radicalism. Rather, it must be understood that for 
everyone to enjoy something as simple as clean water, radical social change is necessary. 
 
Water is not the only connection Pennie made to the broader climate justice movement. Oil 
connected the geographies of Richmond, Standing Rock, and Burnaby too. Oil, like water, it 
is not place bound, as it is commodified it is transported through global supply chains from 
sites of extraction through transportation networks to sites of refining and processing, to 
consumers around the world. Resistance at sites of strategic vulnerability in oil infrastructure 
across its supply chain, what Hoffman calls “segmented localism” (2012 cited in Haluza 
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DeLay and Carter 2016, 464), has the potential to build transnational solidarity and connect 
place-based struggle throughout Blockadia. Fracked crude oil from the Bakken fields of 
North Dakota, the same ones from which DAPL transports its oil, has also been transported 
to Richmond’s Chevron refinery by train and was vehemently resisted in Richmond. 
Meanwhile, as we know from Chapters 2 and 3, much of the oil that would be pumped 
through the Trans Mountain pipeline from the Alberta’s tar sands would end up in the 
refineries around the Bay Area. These place-based struggles have all informed each other. 
Pennie told me about the tactics and narratives shared between organizers in Burnaby and 
those in Richmond (personal communication, July 19th, 2018).  . Demonstrating their 
solidarity with Trans Mountain pipeline opponents in British Columbia, activists in 
Richmond took non-violent direct action and blockaded a Kinder Morgan terminal. 
Indigenous activist Isabella Zizi of Idle No More SF Bay and Stand.earth told local reporters: 
 
It’s important for me to stand up today for my Indigenous brothers and sisters of the 
First Nations. This crude tar sands oil will not just be affecting those up in Canada. It 
will likely be transported to the West Coast and potentially to here in my hometown 
of Richmond. Our lands, our waterways and our air needs are constantly being 
overlooked by these industries. We, as indigenous people, cannot and should not be 
swept under the rug. If any of these elements are harmed, all life will suffer the 
consequences. (Diablo Rising Tide 2017) 
Meanwhile, the contemporary Philipps 66 refinery expansion proposals in Rodeo just North 
of Richmond, that would facilitate the refinery’s processing of tar sands from Alberta have 
also experiences vehement opposition. Pennie told permitting officials to expect a Standing 
Rock style response if they permitted the expansion. As she said to me “I have told them in 
the public hearing part that if this is permitted, that Phillips 66 will be our Standing Rock, 
and that we will have an encampment and that we will blockade and that we will refuse to 
allow tar sands to come through our Bay” (personal communication, July 19th, 2018).  Bay 
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Area climate justice and Indigenous activists have explicitly invoked their solidarity with the 
opponents of the Trans Mountain pipeline at permitting hearings for the Phillips 66 refinery 
expansion. Pennie told me that when they finished their testimony at one of the Bay Area Air 
Quality Management hearings, activists left the room singing the women’s warrior song that 
comes from the Secwepemc Nation that I myself had heard sung at almost every action I 
attended in Burnaby (personal communication, July 19th, 2018). The song was a gift from 
First Nations activists in British Columbia to activists in the Bay Area. Later, John Gioia 
from the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors told Pennie he would visit the tar sands and 
pipeline opponents in Canada.117 Pennie also connected regional opposition to oil 
infrastructure to Indigenous-led campaigns in the Ecuadorian Amazon and to water rights in 
New Zealand. A great deal of the oil drilled in Ecuador ends up in the Chevron refinery and 
activists in both countries have visited each other in solidarity. Of her time in New Zealand, 
Pennie explained, “Standing Rock is everywhere… when we were in Aotearoa, I've been 
there twice in the last year and a half, Standing Rock there was a huge big deal, everybody 
wanted to know about Standing Rock” (personal communication, July 19th, 2018).  I have 
found that shared experience of fighting oil and protecting water connected activists in 
translocal solidarity across Blockadia far more viscerally than did climate change. 
Yet water and oil are both very easy things to rally for and against. Much harder are visions 
of the world or other possible worlds in which, for example, water does not need protecting 
because it is no longer threatened. What vision of a future or futures can hold climate justice 
 
117 And indeed, Supervisor Gioia did visit both the Alberta Tar Sands and anti-pipeline campaigners in BC. He 
later presented at a panel in Richmond with Cedar George and Charlene Alleck, two prominent First Nations 
anti-pipeline campaigners he had met in BC, to speak on the matter. 
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activists together across their differences and grow the movement? At an abstract, intellectual 
level, all climate justice futures must involve collective liberation but what this actually 
means in practice, and in terms of recognizing and negotiating different material interests, is 
a point of contention to be negotiated at the frontlines. I’ve found that the economics of a just 
transition, and the many just transitions necessarily contained within it, is the most articulate 
and articulated response to this question amongst climate justice activists. If the Just 
transition is to be made translocal, it must be context specific and versatile but must also 
mean something specific across localities. As I’ve discussed, however, elements of the Just 
transition must also be materially realized and more substantially prefigured in the present 
before its potential for alignment across difference can be fulfilled.  
 
In the meantime, the resurgence of the Green New Deal in the United States contains 
elements of a Just transition within it and has great possibility for aligning constituents 
around a counter hegemonic alterative. It’s popularity and national reach demonstrate its 
potential as a unifying frame. However, it is worth mentioning that many Green New Deals 
exist –  progressive ones, radical ones, and mainstream technocratic ones – and that each one 
constitutes different degrees of compromise between the capitalist elites and the state with 
climate justice activists.118 A fight over its meaning and the suit of policies it may ultimately 
include will be necessary. At the same time, the prominent rise of the Extinction Rebellion 
and its demands that national governments declare a Climate Emergency has also aligned 
thousands of people in the UK with Scotland and Wales national governments and then the 
UK parliament declaring a Climate Emergency in the weeks following Extinction’s 
Rebellion’s mass direct action campaign (Cowburn 2019). What a declaration of Climate 
 
118 Some of whom, on both sides, find any such compromise totally unpalatable. 
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Emergency will actually entail and what it legitimates, however, is (perhaps deliberately) 
even less politically defined than a Green New Deal. Such political ambiguity may help build 
movements, but it leaves political trajectories ill-defined, unsatisfying, and thus open to state 
and capitalist cooptation. As intersectional populist narratives combine with the realization of 
material interest to become translocal articulations of alignment, they will have to strike a 
complex balance between specificity and ambiguity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have identified and discussed the different elements of alliance building 
necessary for growing the climate justice movement. My overarching thesis has been that 
narrative is a crucial but on its own, a necessarily incomplete, component of growing social 
movements. I have contextualized this conversation in terms of a Gramscian War of position 
and the process of wresting consent away from petro-hegemony. I have illustrated the 
different dimensions and considerations relevant to alignment around counter hegemonic 
alternatives and have sought to analyze and, where possible synthesize, key debates on 
movement building in social movement theory and praxis. The evidence gathered from my 
case studies and participation action research has informed and illustrated my arguments 
throughout the chapter and, combined with analysis of social movement theory, led me to six 
key components of growing movements and alliance building. These were narrative and 
framing, intersectional populism, active accountability, leadership, the realization of material 
interests, and translocal solidarity.  
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The arguments I presented pertained to each of these six components of movement building. 
I demonstrated the ways narrative can be strategically deployed to shift discursive conditions 
and align new constituents into a political culture of opposition and creation against petro-
hegemony. My case studies illuminated the art and science of story-based strategy and 
explored the frames and narratives that have helped universalize struggles to reach larger and 
more diverse audiences. Introducing intersectional populism as a movement building 
discourse, I sought to fuse a common divide in movement literature and praxis by bringing 
intersectionality into conversation with populism. The strategic advantage of doing so lies in 
its being able to negotiate tensions between universalizing discourses emphasizing social 
cohesion on the one hand, and particularist ones emphasizing social distinction on the other. I 
suggested this relationship will grow movements in ways that are accountable to the diversity 
of their constituents.  
 
Moving the conversation beyond discursive intervention, I engaged with the development of 
active accountability as the bond that holds discursive alignment together. I showed how 
members of the campaigns I’ve studied have learned more about what active accountability 
can do for their alliances and how they’ve sought to negotiate tensions that emerge based on 
relations of privilege though the praxis of active accountability. Then I positioned three 
different types of leadership next to one another – Gramscian intellectual and moral 
leadership, models of frontlines leadership, and leadership development – to draw out the 
ways these should be connected to advance a War of position. Next, I argued that realizing 
the material interests of constituents such as jobs, land, water and self-determination all had 
to be prefigured in the present through the economics of a just transition if they are to be 
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persuasive to those as of yet unconvinced by the movement’s promises. Finally, I reflected 
upon how local campaigns against fossil fuel infrastructure might take on translocal 
resonances and suggested that while oil and water can unite translocal constituencies around 
something to protect and something to fight against, we need visions like a Just transition, 
that translocal campaigns can mobilize together for. 
 
Combining lessons from each of the six elements I identified will help grow a climate justice 
movement that is capable of challenging petro-hegemony and aligning constituents around 
counter hegemonic alternatives, while also seeking to ensure forms of marginalization and 
oppression activists inevitably bring into the movement are not reproduced through its praxis. 
This chapter, and particularly the wisdom shared by the interviewees and interlocuters I bring 
to bear on these complex questions, are a significant contribution to Gramscian and populist 
literature, intersectionality theory, and theories of social movement building. The 
contribution I want to pay closest attention to is that of synthesis. Rather than making the 
case for why one approach to movement building may be stronger than another, or why my 
theory of alignment works better than anyone else’s, I’ve instead tried to demonstrate the 
most useful and insightful elements of each and then synthesize them into something more 
productive than either on their own could offer. I combined universalism and particularism to 
create intersectional populism. I complemented narrative strategy with accountability, 
leadership and material interests to strengthen interventions in the war of position, and I 
illustrated the benefits of combining critical mass and critical relationships. To that end I 
hope the insights I have produced will also be useful to all those engaged in the actual work 
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of aligning broader swathes of society into a political culture of opposition and creation large 
and powerful enough to win the war of position. 
 
Despite the inroads I believe my contributions have made in the chapter, there remain several 
unanswered questions. Throughout the chapter I hinted at, but never confronted, the question 
and the questioning of scale. Specifically, we must examine the extent to which intersectional 
populism and are able to scale up beyond the familiarity of the local. I have not yet, in any 
substantial way, identified the frames and interests that can inform translocal solidary 
without losing their meaning, or how to address the need for translocal narratives that 
balance political ambiguity with uncompromising specificity. Chapter Eight, however, will 
explore the processes by which movements might scale up and out of Blockadia while 
maintaining relationships of accountability and democracy. Chapter Eight will also explore 
the critiques leveled at hegemonic politics from the anarchist and autonomist left. Here I 
examine non-hegemony and pluriversal articulations of climate justice futures. Finally, this 
chapter also led me to question how climate justice campaigns within Blockadia are 
connected and grow with or alongside climate interventions that are not part of Blockadia, 
like the Sunrise Movement and Extinction Rebellion. Again, Chapter Eight will explore these 
possibilities in the context of scale.  Each of these questions will be developed upon through 
the rest of this dissertation, but I hope that the conversations, debates and arguments I’ve 
engaged with throughout this chapter have inspired, encouraged, and challenged readers as 
we develop our strategies to confront petro-hegemony together. 
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Chapter 6 - Mobilizing Strategies and Tactics Through the Carbon Rebellion 
 
"What can we do today, so that tomorrow we can do what we are unable to do today?" – 
Paulo Freire119 
 
Introduction 
 
The frontlines of climate justice contain a great collection of logics of intervention and 
theories of change from which a wide range of strategies and a diversity of tactics are 
derived. Some activists rely on strategies that physically obstruct the supply chains of capital, 
infrastructure and labor upon which fossil fuel development depends. Others place more 
emphasis on working through regulatory frameworks to delay construction. Deploying story-
based strategy, many activists seek to change the narratives through which energy and 
environment are understood thereby revoking consent to the fossil fuel industry’s operations, 
while others devote their efforts to lobbying for or against particular legislation and engaging 
with courts or lawsuits. Some have focused their efforts on organizing and mobilizing 
communities around winning local elections that place movement candidates in elected 
office. Meanwhile, many Native and First Nations activists are committed to prefiguring a 
resurgence in Indigenous cultures, customs, and governance by reclaiming their lands, 
asserting sovereignty over them, and defending their rights and title through the courts.  
 
Attempts to align this diverse array of tactics are emerging according to a logic of dual power 
in which activists develop strategies to confront the dominant structures and institutions as 
they currently exist, while simultaneously prefiguring alternative institutions and practices 
 
119 Moore and Kahn Russell attribute this quotation to Freire in Organizing Cools the Planet. It is an excellent 
example of the question strategy should force us to ask. 
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that will ultimately replace those dominant ones. Despite growing interest in strategic 
cohesion through logics of intervention like dual power, the movement has yet to align all the 
different strategies and tactics it is deploying in a coordinated challenge to the power 
relations upon which petro-hegemony depends. To this end, I offer the carbon rebellion as a 
framework for organizing action that allows activists to plan and coordinate mutually 
reinforcing tactics on points of intervention in relations of consent, coercion, and compliance. 
 
While the strategies and tactics explored in Chapter 5 mostly pertained to narrative, alliance 
building, and the kinds relationships and leadership development more commonly associated 
with community organizing, this chapter identifies strategies and tactics that pertain to social 
movement mobilizing (while of course recognizing that there is a great deal of overlap 
between the two). The climate justice movement draws upon a long and colorful history of 
social movement mobilizing throughout North America. In this chapter, I assess the different 
strategies and tactics climate justice campaigners deployed in Burnaby and Richmond, 
critically analyze their strengths and limitations in terms of their ability to intervene in 
relations of consent, coercion, or compliance, and finally develop on the ways in which these 
strategic interventions can be made legible to the theory of hegemony developed in Chapter 
1.  
 
Reading these interventions in terms of hegemonic struggle illustrates how a particular tactic 
may be interpreted as advancing either a war of position, war of maneuver, or war of 
economies. This in turn reveals the different points of intervention existing on each of the 
different terrains of struggle climate justice activists must engage with to contest petro-
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hegemony. Meanwhile, the concept of hegemony can expand our notion of what counts as a 
site of struggle and so multiply the number of points of intervention upon which social 
struggle can be conceived. Accordingly, the carbon rebellion framework helps us assess 
which tactics are most appropriate for each terrain of struggle and to ensuring tactics are 
engaging all the different points of intervention that exist upon them. 
 
Chapter 6 is developed in two parts. Part One identifies and analyzes all of the different 
strategies and tactics I was able to observe in both case studies. Here, tactics are assessed 
under different categories of strategy. For example, direct action may be considered a 
category of strategy, while civil disobedience, or blockades, are tactics that I analyze under 
that broader category of strategy. Part One preempts some of the debates about strategic 
orientations that will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Seven. For the most part, 
however, this section seeks to explain how the strategies and tactics I observed work and the 
functions each one performs. Part Two then develops the carbon rebellion framework and 
illustrates how different tactics are more or less appropriate for different points of 
intervention on the three different hegemonic terrains of struggle.  Consequently, I explore 
how the great diversity of tactics currently being deployed across a range of different 
strategic orientations might be aligned, organized, and coordinated so that this diversity plays 
to the movements’ advantage, rather than serving as a basis for division and mistrust. I argue 
that the carbon rebellion is a concept and framework that allows us to see which points of 
intervention are being engaged with and which are not, which terrains of struggle are being 
privileged and which require more attention, and which tactics are appropriate to engage with 
each point of intervention. Finally, I demonstrate how a diversity of tactics can be 
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coordinated through the carbon rebellion to reinforce interventions in each of the relations of 
consent, coercion and compliance. 
 
Part 1: Identifying the Strategies, Narratives, and Tactics of Mobilization  
 
Tactics and strategies ranged from the spectacular to the quotidian on the frontlines of 
climate justice. This was certainly true for both Richmond and Burnaby. However, to speak 
in crude and general terms, strategic orientations in Richmond have revolved around 
community organizing and building up local organizational infrastructure, local council 
electoral politics, lobbying, and working through legal or procedural frameworks. Story-
based strategy has played a vital role informing all of these strategies. While, in British 
Columbia, and particularly in Burnaby, strategic orientations fluctuated between different 
phases of organizing and mobilizing, and the central role First Nations governments and 
Indigenous activists have played in the struggle has opened up a larger range of strategic 
opportunities not necessarily available to activists in Richmond. The strategies deployed 
against the Trans Mountain pipeline included pursuing legal and regulatory avenues, 
performance politics, direct action, “land defense,” civil disobedience, alliance and 
infrastructure building, and in some cases close attention to local and provincial elections.  
Given the significant overlaps and differences between the two case studies, I order this 
section according to each category of strategic intervention and then analyze corresponding 
tactics as they have been deployed in their respective campaign contexts. 
 
Contestation through Regulatory Frameworks 
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The seemingly most banal and yet most entrenched strategy I encountered in both Burnaby 
and Richmond was engagement with the regulatory frameworks existing at each site. While 
at first glance the regulatory framework may seem a somewhat underwhelming place to start 
discussing social movement strategy, the ways in which activists turn these frameworks to 
their advantage, particularly under conditions of the corporate capture of regulatory agencies, 
are important. Fossil fuel development, like almost any other form of infrastructure 
development, is subject to regulation which sets the standards for what infrastructure 
developers are allowed to do and the conditions under which they are allowed to operate. 
From federal, to provincial/state, to local government, different interest groups fight over the 
regulations and conditions under which industry may operate (McBeath 2016). The model 
for regulatory frameworks that include environmental oversight emerged in the aftermath of 
the 1969 Santa Barbara Oil Spill and has, somewhat problematically, been exported to 
different parts of the world since then (Spezio 2018; Barandiarán 2018). While Canadian and 
US regulatory systems obviously aren’t the same, we can make some generalizations about 
how both operate and how activists intervene upon them.  
 
In general, industry lobbyists will often seek to dilute the regulatory burden governments 
impose upon them, while oppositional interest groups will seek to strengthen those 
regulations (McBeath 2016). With regulations and standards in place, developers are required 
to attain permits to prove they have met the regulatory standards necessary to begin 
operations and to promise they will operate under the conditions set by the regulations. The 
permits are issued by various government bureaucracies and agencies from the local to the 
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federal level. Regulatory agencies are mandated to provide governmental, and supposedly 
independent, oversight over the implementation of, and compliance with, these regulations. 
They also set the terms of the permits and enforce them. Amongst other evidence, developers 
must submit environmental, social, and cultural impact analyses to the regulatory agencies 
who then use these to make recommendations about whether the project in question should 
be permitted. Regulatory agencies are also required to open up these analyses for public 
comment and to host public hearings on whether or not affected communities approve of the 
project. Once issued, permits operate as a contract between the regulator and the regulated.  
If a company fails to meet regulatory standards, they will not be given permits. If they violate 
the conditions under which they promise to operate, they may be sued for damages and the 
permits can be rescinded. At least in theory. In practice, whether or not industry projects are 
given permits, or whether those permits should be revoked, is a site of intense conflict 
between activists, regulatory agencies, politicians, and industry advocates.  
 
Regulatory agencies are often subject to corporate capture, meaning many of the agency’s 
staff members are unduly influenced by, under pressure from, or formerly employed by the 
industry they are regulating (McBeath 2016). As former Executive Director of Sierra Club 
Canada and current Green Party Member of Parliament, Elizabeth May, told me, Canada’s 
National Energy Board (NEB), one of the primary agencies dealing with permits for the 
Trans Mountain pipeline, is very much subject to corporate capture by the fossil fuel industry 
(personal communication, May 15th, 2018). One of the NEB’s members famously withdraw 
his participation from the agency, citing the extent to which its mission had been captured 
and perverted by the fossil fuel industry (Hager 2014). Similarly a great deal of evidence 
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suggests that in the US federal agencies like the Environmental Protect Agency, California 
state agencies like the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and the Division of Oil Gas 
and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR), and local agencies like the Bay Area Air Quality 
Management District (BAAQMD) which has oversight over air quality in Richmond, are all 
also heavily influence by the interests of the fossil fuel industry (McBeath 2016; Aronoff 
2017; Lu 2018; CBS SF Bay Area 2019; Willon 2019).  
 
Given perceptions of the profound corruption within regulatory agencies, there is, 
understandably, some debate amongst campaigners and activists as to whether engagement 
with these institutions is strategic at all. Some of my interlocuters argued that these 
institutions are inherently and deliberately structured along colonial and extractivist logics 
and so engagement with them is not only pointless but self-defeating. This is an argument I 
will address directly in Chapter Seven. Nevertheless, many others viewed interventions in the 
regulatory system as a necessary and strategic approach to halting or slowing down the fossil 
fuel industry’s expansion. The strategic orientations of some climate justice organizations 
and activists suggest that the regulatory system is genuinely able to contain and restrain the 
fossil fuel industry. Others, however, recognize these agencies’ inherent corruption but have 
instead approached engagement with regulatory frameworks as a platform from which to 
narrativize the threats posed by the industry and organize community-based opposition. 
Activists also use regulatory frameworks to intensify the regulatory burden companies must 
endure if they wish to develop projects in a particular community. The strategy here is 
develop regulations that make it too costly, or otherwise impossible, for companies to 
continue their plans. As examples from both case studies suggest, intervention in the 
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regulatory system can be a crucial but often incomplete component of engaging with the 
petro-state as one a point of intervention on the terrain of struggle defined by coercion. These 
examples also demonstrate the different theories of change that overlap in the deployment of 
tactics intended to engage regulatory frameworks. 
 
Intensifying refineries’ regulatory burden is one approach climate justice activists in 
Richmond and around the Bay Area believed they could use to curtail the industry’s 
expansion. For several years after Richmond’s city council permitted Chevron’s refinery 
expansion, Communities for a Better Environment, Asian Pacific Environmental Network, 
Sunflower Alliance, and Idle No More SF Bay (all members of the BAAQMD Alliance), 
targeted BAAQMD, calling on them to more stringently regulate Bay Area refineries’ 
greenhouse gas emissions. Their efforts almost saw the agency sign an agreement to establish 
a new rule that would have made it much harder for Chevron to process heavier and dirtier 
crude oil with higher carbon intensity, essentially defeating the purpose of its refinery 
upgrade plan. In 2017, however, AB398, then California Governor Brown’s Cap and Trade 
Bill, passed the California Assembly containing a clause restricting local air districts’ and 
regulatory agencies’ ability to regulate stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions, thus 
thwarting climate justice activists’ efforts. Indeed, many activists in Richmond believe the oil 
industry lobbied for this item to be included in the bill as a direct response to their successful 
lobbying of BAAQMD (Aronoff 2017).  
 
Bay Area activists are now developing a similar tactic with the Richmond Levin Terminal. 
This time, however, they are calling on the air district to regulate coal dust blown into the 
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community from cargo trains entering the export terminal and the containers in which the 
coal is stored at the terminal. They are demanding that the coal dust covers be paid for at the 
industry’s expense. As Sunflower Alliance activist, Jean Tepperman told me “The hope is 
that if they were required to do a lot of expensive stuff, they would say never mind. I mean 
we don't really want them … to be exporting coal and covering it, we really want to not 
export coal. This is just a form of harassment” (personal communication, July 18th, 2018). 
This example suggests that even where there is little doubt that the regulatory framework is 
heavily influenced by fossil fuel companies, there are still loopholes and regulations activists 
may be able to exploit to “harass” fossil fuel companies into abandoning their projects.120  
 
Regulatory proceedings offer opportunities for activists to intervene upon the permitting 
stage of infrastructure development. Permitting agencies and government bureaucracies are 
obliged to give communities an opportunity to comment on the impacts of development and 
the findings of environmental impact analyses. Because these are supposed to inform the 
permitting agents’ decision to permit or deny a project, they often become a site of 
contestation between activists and the company requesting permits. Campaigners will devote 
considerable resources to organizing communities to attend public hearings and write public 
comments which provide an opportunity to share narratives and information about fossil fuel 
industry’s projects (Hoberg 2018). This kind of activism also constitutes low bar for entry 
into the movement for community members who may never have considered themselves 
activists or “political” until presented with a direct threat to their water, landscapes, or 
 
120 If your campaign strategy is to harass the industry into submission through the coercive tactics available 
through the state, you would still have to confront petro-culture. Otherwise those regulations will be easily 
overturned later (Woodly 2015). This is why campaigns need a diversity of tactics that are deployed to each 
specific terrain of struggle. 
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agricultural resources. These spaces can also be coopted by activists to share stories and 
solidarity across the climate justice movement. Pennie Opal Plant provided a good example 
of this in her recounting of the time when Bay Area activists sang the warrior women’s song 
gifted to them by Secwepemc First Nations activists as they left the BAAQMD hearing 
(personal communication, July 19th, 2018). I have also observed how public hearings can 
become sites at which individuals come to recognize themselves as being part of a 
movement. Attending public hearings is not just about the regulatory process itself but can 
become movement building opportunities.  
 
To varying degrees within the US and Canada, companies are also obliged to consult with 
Indigenous and First Nations governments whose communities and land would be directly 
impacted by one of their projects. Decades of First Nations-led struggle in Canada have 
strengthened the obligations of Canadian regulatory framework to consult with First Nations 
governments. These are obligations are more potent than those found in the regulatory 
frameworks in the United States. This is not to say the Canadian regulatory system is more 
responsive to Indigenous people’s sovereignty than regulatory systems the US. Indeed, a 
2019 government report commissioned by the Trudeau administration found the state of 
Canada complicit in “race-based genocide” against Indigenous women partly for the failure 
of the regulatory system to take Indigenous peoples’ concerns seriously (BBC 2019).  In the 
United States and Canada, the regulatory frameworks operate according to intensely colonial 
logics. However, for reasons too complex to begin unraveling here, First Nations have had 
more success claiming accountability from the Canadian state than Indigenous peoples in the 
US. The Tsleil-Waututh, Squamish and Musqueam Nations’ governments, along with the 
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Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, have used this to their advantage, demonstrating 
the extent to which the NEB and Kinder Morgan failed in their duty to adequately consult 
with them during the pipeline’s permitting phase. This failure provided the grounds for the 
lawsuit that halted pipeline construction in August 2018.  
 
Meanwhile, the NEB hearings on the pipeline themselves became a forum through which 
First Nations activists asserted their rights and title. Several interviewees told me about 
occasions on which First Nations activists would turn the public hearings on the pipeline into 
spaces for ceremony, where they would offer prayers, dance, and speak to NEB staff in their 
traditional languages. These were intended to draw attention to the ways the regulatory 
institutions are colonized, and remain colonizing frameworks, operating on unceded First 
Nations territory. These moments of cooptation were also an attempt to shift the balance of 
power away from the NEB officials. As Eugene Kung recounts of one hearing:  
 
I can remember a moment in the National Energy Board [hearings] during what they 
call the Aboriginal oral testimony phase where Gabriel George, who's a Tsleil-
Waututh member, cultural leader, told a story… one of the stories that makes Tsleil-
Waututh law…and he told it and spoke in his language and at the end of the story, as 
is often the case, he stood up and he sang a song, and the whole room of about 80 
people, mostly Tsleil-Waututh, all stood up together, and many started singing. And I 
was watching very carefully the panelists, the non-indigenous government-appointed 
panelists or NEB appointed panelists, whose courtroom we were in, right…it was 
their space, it was their show and then, all of a sudden, it just flipped. And to see the 
discomfort… “do we stand to? What do we do? We want to be respectful.” … There 
was something very palpable in the air … reclaiming the space was very powerful. 
(personal communication, October 5th, 2018) 
 
Eugene is describing something similar to the process of “unsettling” settler colonialism in 
which the assumptions engrained in colonial norms and colonizing institutions were revealed 
and challenged through reclaiming space (Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel 2014). First 
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Nations leaders claimed the space from the colonizers and turned the power dynamic around 
in a moment that reified their assertion of rights and title.  
 
Similarly, finding Kinder Morgan’s environmental impact assessment to be inadequate, the 
Tsleil-Waututh Nation commissioned their own independent report, under their own laws, 
and according to the principles of free, prior and informed consent. The report documented 
many more of the impacts of transporting diluted bitumen to and through their traditional 
territories (Sacred Trust 2015b). This was a way of delegitimizing the inadequacy of the 
consultation process and Kinder Morgan’s report, and again asserting their own jurisdiction 
over their territory.  First Nations claiming and holding these regulatory institutions on their 
own terms not only advanced the narrative that Kinder Morgan’s pipeline and the Canadian 
government were continuing the legacy of colonialism, but they were material assertions of 
First Nations rights and title on unceded territory in which activists physically and vocally 
took over these spaces. In this way, the public hearing component of the regulatory 
framework can become one of the focal points around which to rally and mobilize 
community members and through which to advance movement narratives. 
 
Finally, participation in the regulatory framework can help set the stage for subsequent 
lawsuits or to legitimize an escalation of tactics, laying the narrative groundwork for direct 
action or civil disobedience. As the “legitimate” political opportunity structures (i.e. 
regulatory proceedings, public hearings and public comments) for concerns to be genuinely 
registered and included in regulatory assessments are closed down or eroded, litigation 
and/or direct action become the only available options for activists seeking to oppose these 
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projects (Hoberg 2018; Haluza-Delay and Carter 2016). Pipeline opponents arrested in civil 
disobedience actions, or appearing in court after their arrests, would consistently reference 
the failure of the regulatory system to adequately register their opposition or argue that it was 
“rigged,” leaving them with little choice but to escalate (De Souza 2018a; Waisman 2018d; 
Waisman 2018e; National Observer 2018). Eugene explained that the failures of the 
regulatory system to adequately consult First Nations and carry out an adequate 
environmental impact assessment were the grounds on which the lawsuits against Kinder 
Morgan and the NEB were heard (personal communication, October 5th, 2018).  Showing 
that project opponents participated in the regulatory proceedings in good faith but were 
ultimately ignored helps legitimize and narrativize an escalation in strategy and accompany 
tactics. 
Strategic Engagement in the Judicial System 
 
Lawsuits and court cases are another strategy primarily relating to coercion and targeting the 
petro-state. Obstructing fossil fuel development through the courts has had mixed results in 
both case studies. For example, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeals (FCA) dealt the Trans 
Mountain pipeline one of its heaviest blows, finding that Kinder Morgan, the NEB and the 
Canadian government, had failed in their duties to adequately consult with First Nations and 
to carry out an adequate an environmental impact assessment of associated marine tanker 
traffic (De Souza and Meyer 2018). On August 30th, 2018, three months after the federal 
government announced it would buy the project from Kinder Morgan, the FCA “quashed” 
the pipeline permits, calling the parts of the consultation process “unacceptably flawed” and 
stating that Canada “fell short of the standard prescribed by the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
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Court” (Kung 2018).  The government was ordered to halt construction and the NEB 
mandated to redo the consultation process and aspects of the environmental impact 
assessment. This has postponed the project by at least another year. Similarly, permits for the 
first iteration of Chevron’s refinery upgrade were overturned in a lawsuit against the city 
council’s approval of the project in 2008. The court found that project’s the environmental 
impact review concealed the amount of pollutants the refinery expansion would emit 
(Mclaughlin 2018). Chevron was forced to revise the project and resubmit its application 
several years later. 
 
Other lawsuits have been less successful, however. In May 2019, British Columbia’s 
provincial government lost an important court case that would have provided another legal 
avenue for halting the project by allowing the provincial government to regulate the contents 
of pipelines in the province.  Meanwhile, Chevron, and what many activists referred to as its 
“army of lawyers” have pursued an effective strategy of attrition. Mike Parker told me about 
how Chevron wears down opponents with its vastly superior resources and intimidation of 
understaffed agencies tasked with keeping the company accountable (personal 
communication, July 11th, 2018). Lawsuits can be an appropriate and often necessary 
strategic intervention in coercive relations, but they are a high risk, high reward approach, 
requiring large amounts of resources to which activists often have little access.     
 
One of the reasons court cases against the industry remain a popular strategy, despite their 
inconsistent track record, is their ability to delay infrastructure projects, sometimes 
indefinitely. Lawsuits may not necessarily result in court victories for the movement or halt 
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the projects forever, but they can slow them down and cost fossil fuel companies a great deal 
of resources. This frustrates fossil fuel development and extends the period between 
companies receiving regulatory permits to begin construction and the actual deployment of 
construction equipment on the ground. These delay tactics are significant because they can 
contribute to an overall environment of risk and uncertainty, persuading many investors, and 
as the case of Kinder Morgan demonstrates, company executives, to abandon their 
investment.  Eugene described how the court cases against Kinder Morgan, in conjunction 
with a range of other strategies, had intensified a political climate in British Columbia in 
which the company and its investors grew increasingly anxious about the viability of their 
investment (personal communication, October 5th, 2018). Indeed, Kinder Morgan’s decision 
to abandon the project and sell it to the Canadian government saw the company’s share 
prices increase and Kinder Morgan Canada’s two executives receive large bonuses (BNN 
Bloomberg 2018; Bakx 2018). This suggests at the extent to which investors were glad to rid 
themselves of any responsibility for a project that they clearly believed could not be built. 
The fact that the court of appeals ruled against the pipeline proponents in August 2018 
confirms investors had good reason for their anxiety.  
 
Legal intervention often depends upon whether or not evidence of a violation of rights can be 
demonstrated. First Nations in Canada, and indeed federally recognized tribal nations in the 
United States, are entitled to unique rights. These can be a powerful legal tool through which 
Indigenous activists are able to assert their claims to their traditional lands against the 
interests of fossil fuel companies in the courts. Noting this, Clayton Thomas Müller, formerly 
an organizer with Indigenous Environmental Network and now with 350.org, introduces 
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what he and his colleagues call “The Native Rights-Based Strategic Framework (2014). As 
he explains, “with our unique priority rights – the fiduciary obligation governments have to 
Native Americans, defined by our sacred treaties, trust relationships and other unique legal 
instruments – Native-Americans have an important tool” (2014, 249). This tool, and these 
unique rights, are what Thomas Müller and others have developed into the strategy they call 
the Native Rights-Based Strategic Framework.  
 
The Native Rights-Based Strategic Framework’s ability to hold the petro-state accountable 
means that, as Thomas Müller argues, First Nations and Native Americans activists play a 
pivotal and in the leadership of the climate justice movement. If activists working to keep 
fossil fuels in the ground want to be leverage these unique rights, they must simultaneously 
embrace the movement for decolonization and Indigenous resurgence. Thus, First Nations 
and Indigenous activists bring powerful tools into the movement to which settler and non-
native activists do not have access themselves. These tools, however, come with price. As 
Glen Coulthard argues, rights must still be recognized through the colonial state and the 
colonial court system and thus legitimize the colonial state as the arbiter of rights and 
recognition (2014). As Chapter Seven will demonstrates some activists believe this tradeoff 
undermines anti-colonial movements by reifying colonial and settler state authority. 
 
Nevertheless, court cases have met with particular success in Canada where aboriginal rights 
and First Nations rights and title have been enshrined in the Canadian constitution since 
1982.121 While there is certainly debate about the extent to which these rights carry much 
 
121 See Indigenous Corporate Training Inc.: Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 (ICTI 2014). 
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weight in Canada’s provincial and Federal governments, legal scholar, Bill Gallagher 
documents a “winning streak” of over 150 cases in which Canada’s Supreme Court has ruled 
in favor of First Nations and against companies, provincial governments, and the Federal 
government, seeking to extract resources on First Nations territory without adequate attention 
to their rights (2012).122 Enduring colonial logics with which the agency is inscribed, as well 
as the corporate capture of the NEB help explain why the agency so often permits 
development projects without adequate consultation and the consent of the First Nations 
upon whose land the projects would be developed. Their failure to adequately consult and 
gain consent, however, leaves the industry vulnerable to lawsuits and explains why even 
when the industry received permits these are often invalidated by the courts. 
 
In waiving these projects through without rigorous oversight, regulatory agencies may 
actually make it harder for projects to get built. As Eugene Kung explains of the NEB’s 
consultation process:  
 
As long as it's being viewed through this lens of colonial contempt, and trying to do 
the minimum, they will repeatedly end up back in court because … what they're 
aiming for is the floor… if they want to avoid continuing ending up back in court, 
even if they win sometimes, they need to aim higher than the floor. They need to do 
more than whatever they perceive the legal minimum to be. And time and time again 
this approach has resulted in a misjudgment of where the floor is. (personal 
communication, October 5th, 2018) 
 
Aiming for the legal minimum has consistently seen corporate captured regulatory agencies 
and extraction companies lose under Canadian legal system. In an opinion piece written 
before our interview, Eugene argued that “Aiming for higher than the minimum means that 
the starting point of consultation should be the recognition of the inherent rights, never 
 
122 Gallagher updated this number to 250 wins on his blog in 2017, (Gallagher 2017). 
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extinguished by Canadian law, for Indigenous peoples to make decisions about what happens 
to their homelands and territories. It means implementing UNDRIP and respecting free, prior 
and informed consent” (Kung 2018). Adequate consultation means being prepared to have 
the project rejected in the process but, for most developers, consultation is disparaged as just 
another legal hurdle before getting projects built. Paradoxically, therefore, the enduring 
“colonial contempt” for First Nations’ rights and title that Eugene identifies as being 
embedded in the regulatory system, provided Trans Mountain opponents with the arguments 
they needed to win their court case and delay the project.  
 
Climate justice activists in Richmond have not had the same opportunities to work with these 
legal instruments. This is partly because First Nations leadership played a more prominent 
role in Burnaby than Indigenous climate justice activism has in Richmond.  Moreover, as 
RPA strategist Mike Parker reminded me, activists have had access to very few legal avenues 
through which they could reign in Chevron’s excesses:  
 
We have very few tools to work with, I mean the only tool we really have, dealing 
with a company like Chevron, is CEQA [the California Environmental Quality Act] 
and building permits and… given court suits and stuff, Chevron has enough lawyers 
that even in these processes, they have the advantage. So we have to have pretty 
strong community mobilization in order to basically get those things used. (personal 
communication, July 11th, 2018) 
 
Even when local ENGOs and climate justice groups were able to deploy these legal 
interventions by providing evidence of violations of CEQA, building permits or zoning laws, 
they have often been hopelessly outnumbered and out resourced when they have taken on 
Chevron’s lawyers. 
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Nevertheless, on several occasions, local organizations have taken the company to court or 
persuaded the city of Richmond to do so. The most notable instance of their winning one of 
these cases was in 2008 when the Contra Costa Superior Court ordered that the 
Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for Chevron’s refinery upgrade to be rescinded with the 
judge stating that “the EIR fails as an informational document because the project description 
is unclear and inconsistent as to whether the project will or will not enable Chevron to 
process a heavier crude slate than it is currently processing” (Earthjustice 2009). The city 
also sued Chevron for damages and gross negligence after the 2012 refinery fire and was 
awarded $5 million in 2018 (Gartrell 2018). This came on top of a further $2 million 
Chevron was forced to pay in fines and restitution in 2013. Lawsuits and the courts can be a 
highly strategic point of intervention in relations of coercion. If activists win lawsuits against 
the fossil fuel industry, they can use the coercive enforcement capabilities of the state to keep 
the industry in check or hold it accountable when it breaks the law.123 However, legal 
intervention is an expensive approach that tends to be heavily stacked in favor of those with 
more resources. 
 
Electoral and Legislative Strategy 
 
There is not space in this chapter, nor in this dissertation, to draw attention to all of the 
injustices and deficiencies built into both the US and Canadian electoral systems, but neither 
is it my intention to do so. Instead, I want to illustrate some of the major reasons why climate 
justice activists are skeptical of electoral and legislative strategy and how, despite their 
 
123 The city of Richmond has also joined nine other California cities suing oil companies for climate change 
related damages and clean up (Cliff 2018).  
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skepticism, they have found ways to win certain strategic advantages in this point of 
intervention. I locate electoral politics as a point of intervention existing on the terrain of 
struggle defined by coercion because, as an intervention in petro-hegemony, it is most 
relevant to the state’s ability to enforce a political agenda. However, strategic engagement 
with legislation and electoral politics is hardly limited to coercive relations alone. Such 
strategies must inevitably also influence terrains defined by relations of consent and 
compliance. While strategic engagements with regulatory frameworks and legal interventions 
also resonate across all three terrains of struggle, they are most clearly an attempt to shift 
relations of coercion and enforcement. Electoral and legislative strategy certainly involves 
gaining access to, or limiting, the state’s enforcement and coercive capacities, but their 
implications for interventions on the terrains of consent and compliance are so significant 
that we could think of this particular point of intervention existing on all three terrains 
simultaneously. 
 
Drawing on decades of social movement experience – not to mention a history largely 
defined by disappointments in electoral strategy – many in the climate justice movement are 
wary of engagement with, or otherwise hostile towards, electoral politics. As Green Party 
Member of Parliament, Elizabeth May explained to me, the First Past the Post Electoral 
system in Canada has created conditions in which the electorate feels obliged to “vote 
strategically” rather than necessarily in accordance with their values (personal 
communication, May 15th, 2018).  Voters who would support more radical climate policy 
will often instead vote for the Liberal Party with the rational of keeping the Conservative 
Party out of office. Without much but rhetoric distinguishing the Liberals from the 
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Conservatives in terms of climate policy (let alone climate justice), and the positions of the 
NDP in state of almost perpetual flux, the Green Party has sought to capture the votes of 
those disaffected in an electoral system stacked against them.124 Recently, the NDP and the 
Green Party have been competing to earn the votes of disaffected Liberals following Prime 
Minister Trudeau’s failure to follow through on promises he’d made on radical climate action 
and repairing relations with First Nations. Yet the Canadian Green Party, too, is not without 
its own contradictions. Balancing a generation of more conservative environmentalism with a 
younger generation of climate and environmental justice advocates, the Canadian Greens’ 
commitment to climate justice as a political project appears ambiguous at best.125 Moreover, 
it officially rejects left wing politics and instead embraces the politically empty slogan: “Not 
left. Not right. Forward together.” This apparent ideological ambiguity has also alienated 
many within the climate justice movement in Canada. The failures of the electoral system 
and the parties operating within it, particularly at the federal level, to adequately represent a 
platform of climate justice means some in the movement have abandoned electoral politics 
and legislation altogether.  
 
 
124 Traditionally positioning itself as a party representing the labor movement, the New Democratic Party has 
been caught in an intense conflict over the implications of embracing more radical climate policies for workers 
and particularly the large union support it receives. Their annual party conference in 2016 saw this tension 
explode in a debate over whether the party would adopt Naomi Klein’s Leap Manifesto (Rodriguez 2016). The 
debate descended into mutually destructive accusations of job killers and environment killers. The Party’s 
current leader, Jagmeet Singh, has put forward an impressive climate platform akin to elements of the Green 
New Deal in the US and called for a swift managed decline of tar sands operations. Alberta’s former NDP 
premier, Rachel Notley, meanwhile, was one of the leading proponents of the Trans Mountain pipeline while 
the British Columbian NDP premier, is one of its prominent political opponents.  
125 This tension was on display at the annual Canadian Green Party Conference that I attended in British 
Columbia. Keynote speakers included Grand Chief Stewart Philip and several anti-pipeline activists expressing 
their commitment to climate justice and decolonization, followed by Professor Thomas Homer Dixon who 
explicitly called upon the Party to reject the Leap Manifesto and the document’s orientation towards a politics 
of revolutionary climate justice. All speakers received standing ovations but from different sections of the 
audience. Philip ultimately endorsed Jagmeet Singh and the NDP in 2019’s General Election.  
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In the United States, meanwhile, the dominance of the two mainstream parties ensure climate 
justice is marginalized and dismissed. The centrist moderation of mainstream Democratic 
Party politicians and the outright climate change denial of the Republican Party constitute a 
politics of “the lesser of two evils” where the solutions presented in the climate justice 
movement are considered too radical to be engaged with seriously. Moreover, at the federal 
and state level, the effective exclusion of third-parties representing a platform for climate 
justice from real participation in the electoral process, means that the Green Party (which in 
the United States certainly is more clearly committed to climate justice as a political project), 
socialist parties, and others, are hopelessly isolated. Moreover, the fossil fuel industry 
maintains an immensely influential lobbying force in both Californian Democratic and 
Republican Parties, donating vast sums of money to both parties’ campaign funds (McBeath 
2016; Seidman and Connor 2018; Bollag 2019). Electoral politics in the US, even more so 
than Canada, tends to be a venue in which the climate justice movement is vastly 
outnumbered, outspent, and under resourced. Understandably, therefore, some climate justice 
activists argue that the movements’ limited resources would be better invested in engagement 
with points of intervention where victories are more easily won. 
 
Yet, despite climate justice activists’ legitimate critiques of the electoral systems in both 
countries, many also understand that elections are a point of intervention that cannot be 
surrendered to the fossil fuel industry. The success of the Richmond Progressive Alliance’s 
populist electoral insurgency against the fossil fuel industry, and the political establishment 
over which it has been so influential, suggests that, at least at the municipal level, victories 
against the industry can be won and new political programs institutionalized and enforced.  
 426 
 
The RPA emerged to wrest control of the city council away from Chevron and corporate 
influence without splitting the progressive vote. In the past, well-meaning but ill-prepared 
progressive candidates would run against each other, and the city’s corporate-backed political 
establishment, but would divide the progressive vote amongst themselves to the advantage of 
establishment incumbents (Early 2017). Since 2003, the RPA’s response has been to run an 
alliance of candidates from the Green Party, progressive Democrats, various socialist parties, 
and independents, on a slate that the RPA would select and endorse. Their model, as RPA co-
founder and strategist Juan Reardon articulates, is based on the following idea: 
 
If you are going to run, run by organizing. Organize by running. Rather than being a 
‘lone ranger’ who tries to gather support from a few unions and organizations to run 
for office, the RPA model views running for office as a way to educate and develop 
anti-corporate consciousness– a way to create a long term progressive local 
organization that will remain in place long after the election is over. (2018) 
 
The RPA uses elections as specific moments to mobilize Richmond around progressive 
issues for longer term struggles.  Meanwhile during election seasons, it uses organizing 
techniques to turn out the vote and get their slate of candidates elected. Parker told me this 
model is influenced by the European Leftist mass parties’ model of the 20th century (and I’d 
add contemporary Leftist South American parties). According to Parker this model of 
electoral intervention “combines being a political party with a social movement” (personal 
communication, July 11th, 2018).  The movement-party model isn’t necessarily new, 
although it has certainly had to be reborn in the United. Indeed, as Parker suggests, the model 
has roots in the parties that represented workers’ movement in 20th century Europe and 
across the US. The RPA’s great innovation has not been its model of political intervention 
but rather its ability to hold together traditionally fractured left and progressive wing of 
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politics in an alliance that brings diverse constituencies together across political ideologies 
and relations of privilege, class, race, and identity. This model has thrived in South America 
and helped build the Pink Tide that brought leftwing and indigenous alliances to power 
across the continent. With populist insurgencies in mainstream political parties, or the 
emergence of new populist parties emerging out of social movements, this model is being re-
innovated in the Global North in what Micah White identifies as the hybrid movement-party 
(2016).  
 
As Reardon explains, the movement-party uses organizing strategies to win elections and 
uses elections as opportunities to educate and build the movement. In Richmond, RPA 
councilmembers consider themselves part of the local movement and believe they are 
accountable to that movement. Former mayor, Gayle McLaughlin, told me that: 
 
You need both the people sitting at the dais who are truly supporting the people in the 
city versus the corporate donors, and you also need a local movement so that the 
representatives sitting at the dais have a movement to converge with … and have that 
local movement pressure the other elected officials… who are doing the bidding of 
the corporations. (personal communication, July 18th, 2018) 
 
With movement-party candidates sitting on city council willing to resist Chevron’s influence, 
implement just transition programs, and appoint officials more supportive of climate justice 
activism, the local movement has gained access to institutional tools through which to 
advance their political program. The movement-party hybrid has been re-invented and 
evolved in Richmond over the past decade, but it is important to remember that the Black 
Panther Party, with its own movement-party model, has roots in Richmond from which local 
activists also draw inspiration (Early 2017). Moreover, as equal parts movement and party, 
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the RPA’s electoral success has to be understood in the context of the organizing and 
mobilizing efforts led by local climate, environmental, and social justice grassroots 
organizations. Many of these organizations’ members, like Andrés Soto of CBE, were part of 
the RPA’s founding team, and many others have sat on the RPA’s steering committee at 
different times. The RPA is not intended to be just another party machine with a social 
movement base. Rather, it is constituted by, and for the most part is accountable to, its 
members and local grassroots organizations comprising the city’s broader movement 
ecology. 
 
Using elections to organize the community helps instigate and publicize shifting political 
orientations in the city, even when RPA-backed candidates don’t necessarily win their 
election campaigns. Running a slate of allied candidates allows the local movement to 
crystalize the issues around which common ground exists and voice what the local movement 
stands for. Rather like branding itself, the RPA has sought to gain recognition by having the 
community associate the RPA with a very clear political program and set of values that 
doesn’t change despite shifting priorities from election to election. To give one example, 
Mike Parker emphasizes the importance of the RPA finding a “wedge issue” for each 
election season that allows it to assert its values and define them against those of their 
opponents: 
 
We're very big on trying to find for each election what we call a wedge issue, an issue 
that is sort of the defining issue of the election. So people know, as in 2016, if you're 
for rent control, you vote for the RPA. If you're against it, you vote for somebody 
else. In 2014, if you want to stand up to Chevron, you're for the RPA.  If you want to 
capitulate to Chevron, you vote for somebody else… 2012 it was the soda tax. 
(personal communication, July 11th, 2018) 
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Wedge issues, as framing theorist George Lakoff explains, are “stand-ins for the whole of a 
moral system,” through which systemic critiques and demands for an alternative may be 
framed (2014, 148). Ideally, a wedge issue frames and defines the political contest around the 
movement’s values, on terms advantageous to the broader movement’s goals, and shifts 
discursive conditions against their opponent. Chevron’s role in the community has provided 
the RPA with a powerful wedge issue and a signifier embodying a broader critique of 
corporate capture of politics undermining the community’s ability to govern itself. The 
wedge issues RPA selects are drawn out of the concerns that most concern the city’s 
residents which are gathered from town halls and community meetings. As such, these 
remain embedded in the city’s political landscape for years after the election season is over. 
In Richmond, wedge issues like the refinery’s toxic pollution, how much tax Chevron should 
pay, and the degree to which the company is able to influence city politics, have provided the 
frames through which new narrative interventions can be used to organize and align a 
broader movement around climate justice. 
 
Organizing the community in order to win elections has required both RPA-backed 
councilmembers and RPA activists to demonstrate a deep commitment to addressing these 
wedge issues in between election seasons. The movement-party strategy is intended to keep 
the wedge issues on which the election was or will be fought in the community’s 
consciousness long before or after the election occurs. This means the community must 
remain activated and mobilized in between elections. As McLaughlin explains: 
 
What you see happening is that people get excited about elections and then what 
happens [with] the election is you either win it… and then people say, “Okay, now I 
don't have to worry, I got some good representatives in.” Or you lose it, and you're 
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disappointed and you say, “Okay, well, you know, I’ll wait till the next election 
season comes and maybe I'll activate then.” I think we saw it a little bit happening at 
first with the RPA, and we didn't want it to happen that way though so… we made 
sure that we kept the community charged, and we did this by mobilizing on issues… 
You stand for issues during the election, and then, after the election happens, and if 
you win, then you have to act on the issues that you stood for, and bring the 
community in a mobilized fashion to support those issues. (personal communication, 
July 18th, 2018) 
 
RPA has depended on long-term relationships with different community leaders and 
supporting different organizations’ campaigns in the city to keep citizens mobilized between 
elections. Condemning Chevron’s influence over city politics helped many RPA candidates 
get elected. Once elected, they worked with the movement that got them into office to hold 
the company accountable and to implement policies that would make the city greener, 
cleaner and safer – all the while trying to hold gentrification at bay. This has meant using 
their influence in local government to support local organizations, like APEN, CBE, ACCE, 
RYSE, and others, who do much of the day-to-day community organizing and run campaigns 
in Richmond. As such, the success of the movement-party model has not only been in the 
election of movement candidates to city council, but also that these elections and the 
movement’s elected councilmembers have been able to create new opportunities for 
organizing and supporting the movement’s infrastructure.  
 
With RPA leadership on city council, particularly under McLaughlin’s terms as mayor, local 
climate justice activists had strong support in their campaigns against Chevron, taking the 
company to court, getting the company to pay a fairer share of taxes, and delaying the 
expansion of the refinery. While it is true that local government’s authority and mandate in 
municipalities across the United States has diminished, as federal and state oversight have 
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grown,126 one of the powers local government and particularly mayors still have is the 
appointment of allies to different government commissions and boards. As Steve Early 
described, McLaughlin’s appointment of climate justice activists and movement members to 
the city’s planning commission ensured far more scrutiny over Chevron’s refinery expansion 
application and the inclusion of much more rigorous environmental and public health 
standards in the plan (2017). Current mayor, Tom Butt, has also used this power to appoint 
his more politically moderate allies and, as some RPA members allege, deny RPA associated 
applications for these positions.127 Recognizing the influence available to those sitting on 
such commissions, RPA and allied organizations have hosted trainings and workshops for 
members guiding them through the application process and how to best use these positions. 
 
RPA appointments of movement members to these boards also increased institutional support 
for the development of early just transition programs like more sustainable and accessible 
public transport, the growth of urban gardens and food sovereignty, community choice 
energy, solar energy training programs, and locally owned cooperatives. Council support for 
these programs has shifted the landscape of economic and political possibility whereby 
climate justice solutions can be experiment with and practiced in the city with access to local 
government resources. One of the most significant examples of institutionalizing this support 
was in the updating of the city’s General Plan.128  
 
126 See Steve Early’s introduction to Refinery Town (2017) for an important history of municipal reform in 
Richmond and across the US. 
127 As Butt’s antipathy for the RPA has intensified, RPA steering committee member, Diana Wear, also 
suggested that movement members seeking appointment to these commissions may want to distance themselves 
from the RPA in their applications (personal communication, July 6th, 2018). 
128 Every city in California is, by law, required to adopt and maintain a General Plan. The General Plan is legal 
document guiding city administrators on the city’s future development goals. It contains at least seven core 
elements including Housing, Transportation, Noise, Open Space, Conservation, Safety and Land Use.  The land 
use element is often the most significant one, providing what Richmond city manager, Bill Lindsey, described 
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New policies, programs and projects have been developed out of the General Plan mandate. 
In particular, the Plan’s Health and Wellness element led to an initiative the city council 
adopted called “health in all policies.” Through this initiative councilors, administrators, and 
regulators are required to factor community “health equity” into their decision making with 
regards to all new development projects (again here we see “public health” leveraged as a 
floating signifier to stand in for concerns of climate and environmental justice).129  Former 
city manager, Bill Lindsey, explained that this was “tested when we were processing a 
modernization project for the Chevron refinery” (personal communication, July 16th, 2018). 
The Climate and Energy element, meanwhile, is intended to incentivize more resources and 
government support for community choice energy, public transport, and solar power job 
skills training, while reducing the city’s dependency on Chevron’s economic influence. 
Meanwhile, combining health in all policies with objectives contained in the Climate and 
Energy Element, the city’s Climate Action Plan, published in 2016, is an ambitious program 
committed to:  
 
[building] resiliency to climate change impacts through actions focused on 
transitioning to renewable energy, strengthening critical transportation infrastructure, 
 
as “the city’s land use constitution” between the city council, administration, citizens and industry (personal 
communication, July 16th, 2018).  Legally, all future development in the city should fit into the general goals or 
blueprint set out by the different elements of the General Plan. Starting in 2005, Richmond administrators and 
councilmembers began a rewrite of the entire plan which was ultimately released in 2012. The plan contained 
15 elements including, for the first time in California, an element on Energy and Climate Change, as well as a 
new element on Health and Wellness. 
129 The Richmond city council website explains that “Health in All Policies, or “healthy public policy,” is based 
on the idea that health starts with where people live, work, learn, and play, and that community health is 
influenced by more than individual choices. One’s physical and social environments, along with local 
government decisions and actions that shape these environments, have an impact on health outcomes” (City of 
Richmond 2015). We may justifiably infer from this highly depoliticized technocratic explanation, at least some 
acknowledgment of the founding premises upon which environmental justice rests. 
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creating safe and affordable housing, enhancing local jobs and wages, creating 
healthy local food systems, and protecting natural resources and habitat. (RCAP 
2016) 
 
As more RPA candidates joined McLaughlin on city council over the course the General 
Plan’s composition, local activists were able to have a great deal more influence over its 
contents and shape future city development policy. Lindsey told me that outreach to the 
Richmond community had been unprecedented and he seemed to genuinely believe this 
outreach had meaningfully adopted many community leaders’ suggestions.  Gaining access 
to the forums in which the General Plan was developed through the RPA’s influence on 
council was an important strategic maneuver to shape the construction of a legal document 
local activists can now use to challenge future development projects or demand the city 
uphold its commitments made in the Climate Action Plan. Indeed, activists could 
conceivably now use the General Plan’s health in all policies initiative to demand more 
oversight over the Levin Terminal project, and the city itself can point to their General Plan 
to justify permitting decisions if taken to court over rejecting further fossil fuel development. 
 
Finally, movement councilors have used what authority they have to support activism on 
intersecting issues from reigning in corruption and police brutality that was endemic to the 
local Police Association, to passing rent control measures to ensure Richmond’s residents are 
able to enjoy and the fruits of cleaning up their city, to a whole range of other progressive 
issues profoundly interwoven with climate justice. When operating at its best, RPA is a 
movement vehicle through which activists may gain influence over city council. This has 
opened up many strategic opportunities for activists to claim institutional support, enforce 
accountability from Chevron, and translate their symbolic victories into policy ones. While 
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local government has limited mandate and authority, Chevron’s agents certainly thought the 
city council was influential enough to spend $3 million on Richmond’s city election in 2014. 
By refusing to surrender electoral politics and local legislation to Chevron, activists have 
often been able to turn local government against the company and make modest but 
important gains converting a climate justice program into policy. So far, and remarkably, the 
movement-party model has not replicated Robert Michels’ so-called “Iron Law of 
Oligarchy.”130 From my observations, elected movement members do, for the most part, 
remain accountable to the local movement and to the community at large. 
 
Richmond provides salient examples of how climate justice activists engage with local 
government, legislation and electioneering as points of intervention against the petro-state. 
However, climate justice activists certainly engage with electoral politics and legislation in 
their confrontation with the Trans Mountain pipeline too. The electoral victory of parties who 
ran explicitly in opposition to the pipeline opened up new strategic avenues for contesting the 
project in British Columbia. While the previous Liberal provincial government had supported 
the pipeline, they were ousted in 2017 in an election upset that saw a Green Party-backed-
NDP government take control of the British Columbian legislative assembly. They came to 
power promising to “use every tool in the toolbox” to defeat the pipeline project (Kane 
2017). Kinder Morgan invoked the change of government as one reason why it no longer 
believed it could get the pipeline built. While regime change has not necessarily seen the 
provincial government make broader commitments to prioritizing climate justice policies, the 
 
130 Michels argued that any organization, no matter how democratic its original philosophy and intention may 
have been, inevitably tends toward rule by an oligarchical elite as it professionalizes and becomes more 
bureaucratic. 
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government and legislature’s opposition to the pipeline means activists have gained some 
influential allies and tools with which to delay the pipeline. 131  Additionally, they no longer 
have to focus as much of their resources on confronting a hostile provincial government. 
 
As the federal government’s support for the pipeline has intensified, culminating with its 
outright purchase of the project, organizations like 350 Canada, Dogwood, the Justin 
Trudeau Brigade, and others, developed a strategy and a variety of tactics to peel Liberal 
voters’ support away Liberal party politicians. Strategy consultant and current 350 Canada 
campaigns manager, Amara Possian, suggested that Trudeau’s support for the pipeline could 
cost him the October 2019 federal election. She argued that the Prime Minister’s support for 
the pipeline has alienated the very constituency that the Liberal Party’s 2015 campaign relied 
upon to win office: youth, progressives and those voting strategically to oust the 
Conservative Harper government (Possian 2018). Prior to the government purchasing the 
pipeline, 350 Canada organized local 350.org chapters around the country to target Liberal 
MPs in vulnerable swing seats, calling on them to publicly reject the pipeline buyout or risk 
losing their voter base. For the most part, however, it seems the Liberals closed ranks and 
couldn’t be picked off.  
 
 
131 As Chapter 2 illustrated, the NDP government in British Columbia has not been supportive of a broader 
climate justice agenda. They remain committed to a construction of pipeline through Wet’suwet’en territory 
carrying fracked gas to a new LNG facility on the North west coast of the province. The NDP provincial 
government has also continued to support the controversial Site C hydroelectric dam in the North of the 
province. Moreover, as Chapter 4 suggested, the British Columbian NDP’s highly public opposition to the 
pipeline has been something of a double-edged sword as corporate media narratives increasingly framed 
resistance to the pipeline as provincial confrontation between Alberta and BC and their two NDP premiers. On 
the other hand, the new administration’s anti-SLAPP legislation has helped curtail some the industry’s access to 
coercive resources in the province. SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. Kinder 
Morgan had filed several SLAPP suits targeting activists and claiming millions of dollars in damages after 
protests in 2014.  
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While it is not clear whether this strategy achieved its desired objective, targeting MPs across 
the country has had the advantage of spreading opposition to the pipeline and building the 
resistance across Canada. For example, on one 350 Canada webinar with local chapters, 
campaigners said they’d targeted over a third of the Liberal MP caucus with over 60 actions 
outside their offices. Just five days after the government announced the pipeline buyout, 
pipeline opponents across Canada held a Day of Action at their respective MPs’ offices. The 
actions drew attention to the sense of betrayal many Liberal voters felt the government’s 
support for the pipeline represented (Ball 2018).132 Opposition to the Trans Mountain 
pipeline is particularly strong in Quebec, a province long known for guarding its jurisdiction 
against federal oversight. Quebec is an especially important province in election mathematics 
as the Party that wins the majority in Quebec tends to be the able to form the next 
government. Federal elections provide the movement with an excellent opportunity to put 
pressure on vulnerable candidates and spread opposition to petro-hegemony beyond localized 
sites of extraction, transportation, and refining. 
 
Nevertheless, as the 2019 fall General Election would prove, broadening the campaign’s 
scope to target Liberal MPs wherever their seats were vulnerable did not intensify pressure 
on the Prime Minister to the extent that the Party would change its position. Despite climate 
change emerging as a top election priority, this did not translate into broader opposition the 
Liberal Party’s position on the Trans Mountain pipeline. Along with the pipeline and climate 
 
132 For national context, the federal Liberal Party gained a parliamentary majority with roughly 40% of the 
popular vote across Canada in 2015. In the October 2019 General Election, they won 33% of the vote and 157 
seats (13 short of a majority). The Conservatives won 34% but fewer seats, up from 31% in 2015. The Green 
Party’s polling before the election increased from 3.5% to 11%, however settled back at 6.5%, winning the 
party three seats in the election. The federal NDP’s dropped from 20% in 2015 to 17% in 2019 (CBC News 
2019d). 
 437 
change other major election priorities included affordable housing and corruption accusations 
which dominated the headlines in the last weeks before the General Election. Indeed, by all 
indicators, Prime Minister Trudeau seemed to believe that appealing to conservative voters 
with promises to get the pipeline built is the more prudent reelection strategy than appealing 
to progressives. Meanwhile, as the Liberal’s popularity declined (perhaps more likely in 
response to a wider perception of the Party’s broken promises, the recent Lavulin-SNC 
scandal and images of the Prime Minister wearing blackface than, directly because of the 
pipeline) progressive voters were split between the NDP, the Green Party and, in Quebec, the 
Bloc Quebecois. After a series of very public broken promises and scandals, the election 
returned the Liberals to power but this time in a minority government.  
 
The tactics climate justice activists use to engage with electoral politics range from lobbying, 
petitioning, and canvassing to direct action targeting elected representatives, to running for 
office themselves. The different strategic orientations have included targeting representatives 
in vulnerable seats to peel political support away from fossil fuel projects, running movement 
candidates through a movement-party hybrid to force the industry’s influence out of local 
government, taking advantage of relationships with elected allies to curtail the industry’s 
coercive power, and unleashing the resources of state institutions to support just transitions. 
The specific strategy and tactics activists use to engage with this point of intervention 
inevitably depends upon the political opportunity structures and context in which they are 
operating. However, despite legitimate suspicion of engaging with legislative and electoral 
politics, most climate justice activists have decided not to surrender this point of intervention 
to the fossil fuel industry and have, in many cases, been rewarded for their decision. 
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Direct Action in Burnaby and Richmond 
 
Direct action has been a stalwart component of social movement strategies for as long as 
there have been social movements to practice them. Activist, and author of Direct Action: 
Protest and the Reinvention of American Radicalism, L.A. Kauffman, explains that direct 
action “can refer to a huge variety of efforts to create change outside the established 
mechanisms of government” (2017, x). The array of direct action tactics is indeed expansive. 
Traditionally they have included mass marches, sit ins, banner drops, blockades, lockdowns, 
occupations, strikes, action camps or protest camps that claim or defend land, sabotage133, 
and civil disobedience. While these tactical genres are some of the most common in activist 
repertoires, direct action tactics are often creative, innovative, and adapt these more 
traditional iterations into a multiplicity of variants manifesting in imaginative and surprising 
tactical formations. Direct action, as the term implies, sees individuals and groups take direct 
control of political intervention and deploy specific action that challenges, disrupts, opens up, 
shuts down, prevents, advances, creates, or illuminates different dynamics of power (Kahn 
Russell 2012). As Kahn Russell writes in Beautiful Trouble “Direct action means that we 
take collective action to change our circumstances without handing our power to a middle-
person” (2012, 32). The Ruckus Society defines direct action as “the strategic use of 
immediately effective acts to achieve a political or social end and challenge an unjust power 
dynamic” (Ruckus Society in Moore and Kahn Russell 2011, 51). Direct action tactics can be 
 
133 Stephen D’Arcy prefers the more technical term, “community-based, public interest infrastructure 
disassembly” or what we might call “strategic infrastructure disassembly” for short (2014, 289). Debates 
continue to rage within the movement about whether sabotage is ever strategic and the extent to which it departs 
from nonviolent to violent direct action. 
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spectacular or subtle and they can be carried out en-masse or by small decentralized “affinity 
groups.”134 
 
Direct action can be deployed either as a tactic or a strategy.  Where direct action is deployed 
as one tactic within a broader strategic framework, its impact tends to be symbolic or 
expressive. Where direct action is the strategy, the intent and impact should be instrumental 
as well as expressive.135 When direct action is the campaign’s strategy, the corresponding 
tactics must follow the logic of that strategy. Whether strategic or tactical, direct action 
should always tell the movement’s story through its form, genre, and the point of intervention 
it targets. Stephen D’Arcy writes that effective direct action tactics “have to be implemented 
relentlessly, on an escalating trajectory, with an ever-broadening base of support” (2014, 
289). These criteria articulate at least one metric by which the efficacy of direct action may 
be judged. To this Kauffman explains that direct action tactics are increasingly being infused 
with intersectional analysis that is more conscious of who is and isn’t able to participate in 
different tactics and where and when direct action is appropriate (2017). Examples from 
 
134 Affinity groups, as explains Kauffman, are “small assemblages of roughly five to fifteen people who take 
part in an action jointly, planning their participation collectively” (2017, 14). Murray Bookchin, who borrowed 
the term from anti-fascist guerilla groups in the Spanish Civil War, wrote that affinity groups are constituted by 
people who “were drawn together not by residence, not even by occupation, but on the basis of affinity: 
friendship, individual trust, background, history,” Kauffman explains that “affinity groups reflected both 
anarchist ideals of free association and military needs for security…because affinity groups were small and 
formed only by people who knew each other well, they were difficult to infiltrate or uncover… they acted 
autonomously with no central command.” Despite their emergence in a situation of incredible violence, the 
affinity group is now an important feature of nonviolent direct action (2017, 15). 
135 Moore and Kahn Russel make a distinction between expressive and instrumental tactics. As they put it, “A 
tactic is instrumental to the degree that there is a specific quantifiable objective you are trying to achieve with it. 
For example, maybe we want to blockade a port that is shipping out weapons to kill people in the Middle East. 
We have a specific economic impact on our target, and a way to evaluate success. A tactic is expressive 
insomuch as it expresses one’s worldview, values, and identity. A mass march in response to an injustice can 
fall into this category. It may be useful for exciting our base, building networks and capacity, or creating a 
media spectacle, but usually do not have a concrete SMART goal that we can point to and say, “We achieved 
this specific change as a result of this tactic”” (2011, 51).  
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these case studies demonstrate that the use of direct action tactics can and should 
complement, supplement, support, and sometimes replace, action taken through the 
supposedly legitimate channels of political intervention, like lobbying elected officials, 
election campaigns, legislation, lawsuits, regulatory frameworks, or petition gathering.  
 
While direct action tactics and strategy have been deployed throughout the campaign against 
the Trans Mountain Pipeline, they have been used only sparingly to intervene in petro-
hegemony in Richmond. This was partly because opposition to petro-hegemony was taking 
place in different movement moments. While I was in Richmond, climate justice activists 
were in a period of self-evaluation, assessing the different points of intervention to engage 
with next, and developing the wedge issues the November 2018 local elections would be 
fought over. Meanwhile, while I was conducting field work in Burnaby and throughout the 
lower mainland, activists were in the midst of intense mobilization and escalation. These 
different movement moments illuminate much about when and where direct action tactics are 
appropriate and how they can complement other interventions.  
 
Burnaby: 
 
Beginning with 10,000 people marching against the pipeline on Burnaby Mountain, and 
coinciding with the construction of the Watch House in March, organizers and campaigners 
escalated their intervention with a series of direct action tactics throughout the spring and 
summer of 2018. The NEB approved the pipeline’s permits in December 2017 only to have 
the newly elected provincial government pledge it would do all in its power to stop the 
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pipeline. As such, the mobilization escalated in a wave of actions at the precise point that 
Kinder Morgan’s project seemed to be most vulnerable. At their peak, campaigners were 
deploying direct action events between two and three times a week. From March to 
September, and throughout this period of escalation, the Watch House and Protect the Inlet 
camp on Burnaby Mountain represented an intensification of Indigenous-led oppositional 
tactics. Camp Cloud emerged on the mountain several weeks prior to the Watch House and 
PTI camp and remained in place until it was evicted after the city council ordered its 
removal, several weeks before the court quashed the permits. The emergence and 
disappearance of both camps provides helpful bookends for this particular period of 
escalation during which Kinder Morgan abandoned the pipeline, the Canadian government 
buying the pipeline, and finally the project’s permits being quashed two months later. 
 
The primary form of direct action deployed during this period was a combination of civil 
disobedience and blockading the gates of either Kinder Morgan’s tank farm just a few 
hundred feet away from the PTI camp, or the company’s West Ridge Marine Terminal on the 
opposite side of Burnaby Mountain. Every Saturday, and on some weekdays, these blockades 
would last between two and five hours, preventing vehicles from getting in or out of 
worksites. The blockades were always accompanied with ceremony and prayer according to 
Coast Salish First Nations’ customs, and Indigenous elders would ensure the spiritual and 
ceremonial tone endured throughout the action. These events also featured a series of 
speakers, protest songs, imaginative banners and posters, a large canopy tent to protect from 
rain or sun, some folding chairs and often a picnic table with snacks and water. Attendance 
varied, with some Saturday actions drawing up to 250 participants, but numbers usually 
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settling at around 60 or 70 attendees. Participants would block the entrance until the police 
arrived, at which point those willing to risk arrest would sit down directly in front of the 
gates and refuse to move while everyone else took up positions just outside of Kinder 
Morgan’s injunction zone. From here they would sing and offer support and solidarity for 
those taking part in civil disobedience. The police would then read out the terms of the 
injunction and give those remaining in front the gates 10 to 20 minutes to read it themselves. 
Before arresting them, police officers would often spend several minutes trying to persuade 
protestors not to participate in civil disobedience. 
 
The weekly actions were intended to keep a media spotlight on the climate justice 
campaigners’ narrative and framing of the struggle because the corporate media was 
increasingly framing the fight as a provincial contest between competing premiers: John 
Horgan versus Rachel Notley. Blockading the gates was an opportunity to recapture the 
narrative while providing an outlet for activists to register and provoke moral outrage directly 
and publicly. Advancing the narrative and registering moral outrage meant ensuring 
Indigenous leadership and speakers were at the forefront of messaging, that residents of 
Burnaby mountain could express their concerns about the hazards the pipeline and tank farm 
posed to their community, and that those being arrested were able to explain their reasons for 
taking “bold action.” Local news outlets, documentary makers and bloggers would often 
attend to record the actions. However, reporters from larger corporate news outlets would 
only attend when an action promised to feature a relatively well know speaker, a theme or 
spectacle likely to attract a larger crowd, or a high-profile arrest.  
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The arrests of MPs Elizabeth May and Kennedy Stewart, on March 23rd, focused media 
attention back on Burnaby Mountain and climate justice activists’ direct action at the gates. 
Two weeks later, the entire leadership of the Union of British Columbian Indian Chiefs, 
including Grand Chief Stewart Philip, as well as author and activist Naomi Klein, blockaded 
the gates. This also increased the media profile of the gate blockades. On this occasion, 
however, Kinder Morgan officials quite sensibly refused to allow the situation to escalate and 
law enforcement never showed up to arrest anyone. A day later, on April 8th, the company 
announced it would halt all unessential spending on the project until it had the political 
certainty that the pipeline could proceed without interference from the provincial government 
or activists. Whether the blockades directly influenced the company’s decision to withdraw 
spending is the subject of intense debate. However, it is clear that the attention they received 
intensified discursive perceptions of risk and uncertainty associated with the company’s 
ability to get the pipeline in the ground.136 
 
Despite some instrumental objectives, direct action and the blockades on Burnaby Mountain 
primarily performed expressive or discursive roles. Blocking the gates for several hours a 
week may have cost the company a relatively small amount of time and money, but the 
rolling weekend blockades didn’t actually do much to delay and interrupt the daily flows of 
 
136 As well as a narrative intervention, civil disobedience and the weekly blockades were a tactic within a 
broader strategy of mounting pressure on Kinder Morgan by maintaining and escalating conditions of risk and 
uncertainty such that their project appeared untenable to investors and the company leadership. For example, 
one of the longest blockades which saw the Westridge Marine Terminal besieged on land and by several 
“kayactivists” paddling in from the Burrard Inlet to close off the sea entrance coincided with Kinder Morgan’s 
Annual General Meeting where Tsleil-Waututh leaders addressed investors telling them that their pipeline 
would never be built. (Amassing dozens of people paddling kayaks out to block oil tankers and blockade has 
become a popular tactic amongst coastal communities resisting fossil fuel infrastructure expansion.) 
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capital, resources, and labor upon which the pipeline’s construction depended.137 Instead, 
direct action was mostly a discursive interruption in narrative flows, seeking to provoke a 
crisis of legitimacy and moral authority. Provoking a legitimacy crisis for the company and 
its supporters in the federal government might be considered an instrumental objective, but 
its effect is cumulative, and the discursive impacts of the blockades might not be observable 
for months, if not years.  
 
Civil disobedience is a particular type of direct action in which adherents break the law to 
demonstrate that that law is unjust (Kauffman 2017). Direct action, on the other hand, may 
well break laws to achieve particular ends, but breaking the law is not necessarily its intent. 
When those engaging in civil disobedience deliberately break an unjust law, and thereby 
provoke the state to enforce its unjust law, they accept that they will endure the coercive 
(often violent) repercussions of said provocation nonviolently. In doing so they seek to force 
what Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. called a “moral crisis,” or a crisis of moral authority and 
legitimacy on those who would enforce an unjust law. Civil disobedience can be used to 
force a choice point or “decision dilemma” in which the authority in question must either 
accede to the campaign’s demands or deploy coercion against the campaigners but risk losing 
their legitimacy. Civil disobedience has become one of the most common tactics deployed in 
Blockadia. 
 
 
137 Activists noted that police presence would be far more intense when blockades happened on weekdays when 
work could actually be interrupted, while weekend actions were often more festive and less intensely 
confrontational. 
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As a symbolic or narrative intervention intended to provoke moral outrage, civil 
disobedience and the blockades at the gates comprised a very carefully orchestrated 
spectacle. Younger organizers from Stand.earth and volunteers with Protect the Inlet would 
often act as action marshals, while Indigenous Elders ensured the tone and energy of the 
action remained peaceful and in prayer. The marshals, recognizable as figures of authority in 
their high visibility vests, were stage managers for the action, and were largely responsible 
for maintaining control of the narrative and the action itself. The orchestration of these 
spectacles required a great deal of discipline from participants, including message discipline. 
To this end, actions always included a pre-determined set of spokespeople who knew how to 
stay “on message” and were capable of dealing with difficult questions from journalists and 
reporters. All the other participants were encouraged to decline media interviews and instead 
direct reporters to these spokespeople. While maintaining message and action discipline may 
seem quite draconian, operating in a hostile media environment means it is often necessary to 
reduce the chances of activists’ being misrepresented and having their words distorted to 
reflect the movement in general.  
 
Meanwhile, all those taking “bold action,” or those prepared to risk arrest through civil 
disobedience, would be required to participate in a nonviolent direct action (NVDA) training 
before participating in the blockades. Above all, these short trainings were about managing 
participants’ expectations, thinking in advance about how to respond in unexpected and 
potentially dangerous scenarios, and how to keep the action “deescalated” and thus 
controllable. While civil disobedience was a deliberate form of escalation, unplanned 
escalation could see the activists quickly lose control of the action and the narrative, with 
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police potentially provoking violence. One of the most often repeated pieces of advice at the 
NVDA trainings was “don’t talk to the police.” According to campaigners, the police are 
trained to gather information from participants by appearing friendly and chatty but can use 
that information to identify and indict protestors later on. Indeed, the RCMP’s use of 
audio/visual recording devices was ubiquitous at all these actions. After being arrested 
activists tended to be processed by police on site and then allowed to leave with the promise 
that they would appear before the judge at court to begin legal proceedings on a certain date. 
After being released, members of a local legal collective would then give arrestees a briefing 
about their legal options and offer to advise activists through the legal proceedings. Ensuring 
that those taking bold action had all the legal support necessary was a crucial part of maintain 
the blockades, nurturing an ethic of responsibility within the movement, and caring for those 
submitted themselves to arrest. 
 
Usually, one of the lead organizers would act as a police liaison. Providing a buffer between 
action participants and police officers, the liaison would manage relations with law 
enforcement, ensuring officers remained calm while keeping track of police activity and 
intent. The blockades in the 2018 spring and summer escalations rarely saw police escalate 
enforcement tactics beyond surveillance, relatively minor intimidation, and strapping 
activists who refused to move of their own accord into a metal cart and wheeling them 
away.138 The machine guns, tear gas, armored vehicles and riot gear so pervasive at Standing 
Rock were entirely absent outside Kinder Morgan’s gates. Indeed, the police seemed to be as 
 
138 According to former Mayor of Burnaby, Derek Corrigan, policing of escalation on Burnaby Mountain in 
2014 was far more repressive because it included a lot of law enforcement officers from other counties who 
were unnecessarily anxious about the threat of so-called eco-terrorism (personal communication, June 12th, 
2018). 
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much a part of the orchestrated media moment as were the protesters. On one occasion 
officers were even invited into the prayer circle outside the gates and participated in passing 
around a prayer pipe during the action’s opening ceremony. The role of the police in these 
performances can be read both as a necessary compromise on the part of the protestors but 
also as being deliberately used by protestors to heighten the narrative drama and discursive 
framing of the pipeline as a militaristic and colonial invasion of unceded First Nations 
territory. In this way, the police are tolerated by protestors because they can be made to stand 
in for the systems of domination that animate their narrative strategy and persuade audiences 
of their moral high ground. The intended audience of this particular action were Liberal Party 
voters who might be persuaded to revoke their support for the Party given Trudeau’s pipeline 
policies. Thus we might view the welcoming of police officers into the prayer circle as a 
naïve gesture of goodwill but it could also be read as strategically framing the 
“reasonableness” of the protestors to liberal audiences who believe in “dialogue” and 
“listening to all sides.”139 
 
Over 200 people were arrested in the waves of escalation in Burnaby between March and 
September. To keep the escalation going through the summer, usually just three or four 
people would be arrested at each blockade action. As more and more people were arrested at 
the gates, prosecutors sought harsher penalties to dissuade further action. Several activists 
were sentenced to spend between five and fifteen days in jail, while fines increased from 
$500 to $3000. Rather than use intimidation on site, law enforcement’s strategy seemed to be 
 
139 Of course, we must also entertain the likelihood here that this particular instance was a moment of 
improvisation on the part the protest organizers, and therefore, an example of the kind of political fluidity that 
makes protest as performance not only possible but compelling. 
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to rely upon Crown prosecutors, and Kinder Morgan’s lawyers, to petition the court handling 
all the civil disobedience cases for steadily intensifying legal consequences for activists who 
took direct action. This only escalated the actions further, with many activists outraged at 
what they saw as blatant intimidation of dissent. Attending “court support” actions was a 
crucial part of demonstrating solidarity with those who took bold action and maintaining 
movement morale. Court support actions usually involved a rally or street theatre outside the 
courthouse where those who had been arrested were obliged to appear before the judge. After 
the rally everyone would go into the court and watch the proceedings from the spectators’ 
gallery. Court support rallies were also opportunities for narrative intervention, and they 
could feature up to 150 supporters at a time in the spectators’ gallery. 
 
While stage managing these blockades allows organizers and campaigners to maintain 
control of the narrative, ensure escalation unfolds on their terms, and provide arrestees with 
legal and moral support, the action itself is rendered totally predictable and so is easily 
controllable by law enforcement. Critics of civil disobedience, particularly amongst the 
anarchist Left, often accuse the large NGOs orchestrating these tactics of turning direct 
action into cheap photo opportunities and of relegating them to the domain of protest rather 
than of resistance (CrimeThInc 2017; Kauffman 2017). Some also argue that civil 
disobedience accepts and reinforces the legitimacy of the state to make and enforce rules or 
otherwise assumes that activists’ claims made through civil disobedience are being made 
upon a democratic system that doesn’t actually exist (Collis 2014; White 2017).  Others, 
meanwhile, raise concerns that non-violent direct action, and especially civil disobedience, is 
too passive a response to the systemic violence they are confronting (Kauffman 2017; Engler 
 449 
and Engler 2017). Civil disobedience, therefore, is not without critics from within the 
movement. 
 
Yet, Gene Sharp, a preeminent theorist of non-violent direct action, argues that non-violence 
is anything but passive: “As a technique… nonviolent action is not passive. It is not inaction. 
It is action that is nonviolent” (2005, 248). Sharp explains that by refusing to engage with the 
opponent on their own terms, i.e. violence, activists are able to undermine their opponent’s 
moral authority and so use their opponent’s deployment of violence against them. Many 
examples of non-violent direct action throughout history reinforce Sharp’s position.  
However, when the forms of escalation remain so carefully deescalated, or indeed passive, 
and the violent response of the state is therefore underwhelming or remains invisible, as it did 
in Burnaby, activists may find it difficult to claim the moral authority civil disobedience 
should afford them. Moreover, when activists’ spontaneity and self-expression is so carefully 
managed, the spectacle of civil disobedience itself may lose moral potency.  A delicate 
balance between spontaneity and orchestration seems to be vital to the success of nonviolent 
direct action.  
 
Recalling the failure of a US Civil Rights campaign in Albany, Georgia and the later success 
of “Project C” in Birmingham, Alabama, 350 Canada campaigner, Cam Fenton, suggests that 
aggressive policing is a necessary ingredient of civil disobedience that dramatizes the 
injustice and creates the spectacle that undermines the opponent’s legitimacy (Fenton 2017). 
He argues that one of the differences defining the success of the Birmingham campaign and 
the failure of the Albany campaign was in how each was policed and the extent to which 
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campaigners were able to produce a moral crisis out of the conditions they created. The 
Albany police chief, Laurie Pritchett, ordered his deputies to exercise restraint and arrests 
were made with relatively mild charges. This kept the campaign out of headline news, didn’t 
produce a national moral crisis, and meant activists were unable to continue their escalation. 
Police chief, Bull Connor, in Birmingham, on the other hand, unleashed intense violence on 
campaigners from the very beginning of the campaign. Images of children being brutalized 
by police, teargas, and attack dogs were quickly shared across all the national newspapers 
and created conditions of national moral outrage. Out of these conditions, the Birmingham 
campaign was able to continue a principled escalation with a great deal of public support, 
while revoking their opponent’s moral authority.  
 
In his 2017 article Fenton applies this lesson to strategic targeting and principled escalation 
against Kinder Morgan in British Columbia. He explains that, by late 2017, pipeline 
opponents had not yet produced the kind of moral crisis necessary to shift the political 
landscape in their favor. Moreover, the RCMP in British Columbia had established a unit of 
officers whose role it was to keep escalations out of the headlines called the Division Liaison 
Team (DLT). As Fenton writes, “Dressed in grey windbreakers and polo-shirts, this team 
exists to “work with all groups that are planning and executing events so that they are able to 
fulfill their objectives in the safest manner for everyone.” Their goal is straight out of the 
Pritchett playbook: Squash the drama” (2017). The DLT attended all of the actions I 
witnessed outside Kinder Morgan’s gates. Lenient and low energy policing of the blockades 
in 2018 did, with a few important exceptions, “squash the drama” and often kept the arrests, 
and thus the movement’s narrative, out of mainstream media headlines.  
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Of course, one thing Fenton does not account for is how difficult it is for social movements 
to actually gauge the impacts of their interventions on public sentiment. Beyond polls, which 
are often expensive, and focus groups, which also require a certain degree of expertise and 
resources, it is very hard for social movement actors to say that their particular intervention 
produced a specific moment of moral crisis. As scholars, we must also be wary of the 
possibility of false causality. Just because activists acted does not mean their action produced 
the particular changes we are identifying. Moral crisis, therefore, is not a given or automatic 
response to civil disobedience. This situation is produced by conditions both within and 
outside of activists control. Therefore, we may be able to examine the interventions within 
activists’ control and suggest at how they produce moral crisis or other political conditions, 
but we also have to look at the other forms of political conditioning taking place that activists 
have no influence over. As such it is the confluence of what activists can and cannot control 
that we should look to understand the orchestration of moral crisis and social legitimacy. 
This echoes many of the ideas developed through Adrienne Maree Brown’s concept of 
emergence whereby agents of social change act with greater fluidity and use improvisation to 
respond to conditions as they find them (2017). On Burnaby Mountain, however, direct 
action and civil disobedience were carefully crafted to the extent that there was often only a 
little room for improvisation and tactical flexibility.  
 
The organizations orchestrating direct action on Burnaby Mountain placed a premium on 
keeping their tactics under control so that the mounting escalation could unfold on the 
campaigners’ timeline and on their terms. However, this made it harder to produce the kind 
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of moral crisis that civil disobedience is intended to provoke. Comparing policing of this 
protest to Standing Rock demonstrates the different consequences of either overwhelming or 
underwhelming state violence on protest. The violence deployed against Water Protectors at 
Standing Rock was overwhelming. While it did provoke a crisis in legitimacy, it was 
ultimately that same colonial violence and state coercion that sowed division, broke up the 
camps, evicted Oceti Sakowin, and ultimately diffused further escalation. Meanwhile, 
escalation in Burnaby, in 2018, remained relatively muted. As such, the state’s response was 
underwhelming and the campaign either didn’t want to, or wasn’t able to, provoke the same 
kind of mass moral crisis that law enforcement’s response to the Standing Rock Sioux’s 
occupation of their own land had produced. Thus, civil disobedience seems to depend upon 
just the right amount of violence being used against its adherents, not so much that 
movement is crushed but enough that it produces a situation of moral outrage and a crisis of 
legitimacy. 
 
While civil disobedience and the gate blockades were the most prominent direct action 
tactics and carried out with greatest regularity, the Protect the Inlet camp should also be 
understood as a form of long-term direct action. The camp and the Watch House were an 
assertion of Indigenous leadership in the campaign and provided a space for action trainings, 
meetings, and education. The Watch House was built in one day out of a single tree in 
accordance with Indigenous Coast Salish Peoples’ customs. It was erected just 20 feet from 
Kinder Morgan’s tank farm fence line and on top of the pipeline route. Claiming, occupying 
and defending land on unceded Tsleil-Waututh territory on Burnaby Mountain, the Watch 
House frames the campaign as an assertion of First Nations’ rights and title and a resurgence 
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of Indigenous cultural practice. It comprises a “spiritual resistance” against the pipeline’s 
threat to Indigenous Coast Salish culture and self-determination.  
 
The Watch House itself was a place for reflection and prayer and was often occupied by 
Indigenous leaders and allies. Built on top of the pipeline route, the Watch House physically 
blocks the pipeline from reaching its destination. This means that either the Watch House 
must be destroyed, or the pipeline route must be altered if the project is to be completed. The 
visual, symbolic, and material impact of destroying a place of ceremony and prayer on 
unceded territory to build the pipeline, without local Indigenous consent, roots this struggle 
in a context that weaves anti-colonialism and resistance to fossil fuels together. Moreover, 
the permanent presence of the Watch House and its positioning adjacent to the tank farm 
fenceline identifies and physically points towards the enemy. As its website explains, the 
Watch House is a defensive structure, protecting Coast Salish territory from outside 
intrusion: 
 
A Watch House, (“Kwekwecnewtxw” or “a place to watch from” in the henqeminem 
language, used by members of the Coast Salish Peoples) is grounded in the culture 
and spirituality of the Coast Salish Peoples. It is a traditional structure they have used 
for tens of thousands of years to watch for enemies on their territories and protect 
their communities from danger. 
 
The Watch House framed the pipeline resistance in terms of an invasion of sovereignty and a 
violation of rights and title that British Columbia’s First Nations have been fighting for 
against the state of Canada for generations.  
 
The PTI camp, built in a soccer field adjacent to the Watch House, became a focal point for 
campaigners and media reporters. It was a hub where activists could meet and share stories 
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while demonstrating solidarity with Indigenous allies who were physically claiming and 
protecting their land. Like the Watch House, the camp was also run according to protocols 
set by Coast Salish Indigenous leadership. Will George of the Tsleil-Waututh Nation 
oversaw the camp and the Watch House and was its main spokesperson. Allied campaigners 
with Stand.earth and Greenpeace, along with many volunteers, were responsible for 
maintaining the camp upkeep and training new volunteers. As a physical site of resistance, 
the camp was intended to help local in Burnaby residents’ minds where the pipeline would be 
and the physical presence of the company in their city. It was also a place where the values of 
the campaign could be clarified and articulated, where actions could be planned, new 
relationships built, and solidarity forged. As such it was not just a space of opposition but 
also creativity that sought to prefigure more just relationships between participants. 
Organizers were committed to ensuring the space remained welcoming and open to all, so 
long as those who stayed agreed to follow the camp protocols. 
 
Meanwhile, in Secwepemc territory, the Tiny House Warriors, led by Kanahus Manuel, have 
been building ten tiny houses that “will be placed strategically along the 518 km Trans 
Mountain pipeline route to assert Secwepemc Law and jurisdiction and block access to this 
pipeline.” In the same way that building the pipeline would require Canadian authorities to 
dismantle the Watch House, so too would it require evicting the tiny houses. In both cases 
building the pipeline forces the Canadian government to destroy and dismantle symbols of 
solutions rooted in climate justice and Indigenous self-governance. As the Tiny House 
Warriors’ website asserts: 
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We are going big, by going small, by building these Tiny Houses, we are asserting 
our collective Secwepemc responsibility and jurisdiction to our lands and waters. 
Each tiny house will provide housing to Secwepemc families facing a housing crisis 
due to deliberate colonial impoverishment. Each home will eventually be installed 
with off-the-grid solar power. The Tiny House Warrior movement will be the start of 
re-establishing village sites and asserting our authority over our unceded Territories. 
 
This innovative form of direct action both prefigures solutions to the climate crisis that are 
rooted in an intersectional and anti-colonial paradigm, but also forces the Canadian 
government to destroy the symbolic representation of that paradigm in order to get the 
pipeline built. Like the Watch House, this direct action intervention provokes a moral crisis, 
prefigures climate justice solutions, while physically obstructing the pipeline’s path. 
 
Land defense of this sort in Burnaby was not without its skeptics, however. Some 
campaigners thought that land defense and direct action was premature. Laura Benson, 
meanwhile, suggested the camp was more like a “small, isolated, vanguard instead of the 
predicted big wave of thousands of people” (personal communication, May 18th, 2018). She 
understood the PTI camp as a harbinger of the kind of escalation that might be necessary in 
the future, but that direct action should be reserved as tactic of last resort after all other 
avenues had been exhausted. Similarly, while supporting the activists’ right to take direct 
action, some members of the Tsleil-Waututh leadership were careful to maintain a degree 
distance between the Nation’s government and the camp. They worried that associating with 
this kind of tactic might jeopardize their lawsuit.   
 
Other less-escalated direct action tactics against Kinder Morgan and Trans Mountain 
involved demonstrations, rallies, and marches. These bring the movement together and 
express public resistance to the pipeline. Such demonstrations have taken place on land and 
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at sea. On several occasions, First Nations leaders, Indigenous campaigners and allies have 
launched flotillas comprising dozens of vessels and hundreds of activists into the Burrard 
Inlet, sometimes sailing out to surround Kinder Morgan’s Westridge Marine Terminal and 
drawing attention to the threat the project poses to the coastline. One march I attended 
specifically targeted the different banks financing Kinder Morgan and led activists to rallies 
outside each of these banks in Vancouver’s financial district. Calling on them to divest from 
the pipeline these actions are an example of what Stephen D’Arcy calls secondary targeting. 
Here activists target the institutions, legitimizing agents, and resources their opponent is 
dependent upon rather than the opponent itself (2014). This action was an intervention not 
only in narrative and relations of consent but also targeted banks as a point of intervention in 
relations of compliance. 
 
Greenpeace campaigners led other notable instances of direct action intending to keep 
national attention on opposition to the pipeline with spectacles demonstrating the threat the 
pipeline posed to the local community. On one occasion they tracked the movement of a 
massive boring drill being transported to Burnaby. They scaled the drilling equipment 
making the presence of pipeline infrastructure even more visible and viscerally felt in the 
city. Sat astride the drill two Greenpeace activists, livestreamed the action which was shared 
across social media and later picked up by local news outlets. On another occasion, 12 
Greenpeace activists and volunteers, including Will George, staged an “aerial bridge 
blockade,” with seven of them repelling down the Ironworks Memorial Bridge and setting up 
hammocks in which they spent over 40 hours. Hanging beneath the bridge they blocked 
marine traffic and claimed to have stalled one of the oil tankers anchored at Kinder Morgan’s 
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marine terminal from leaving for the duration for their action. They flew 7 enormous flags 
designed by 7 Indigenous artists, symbolizing Indigenous-led resistance, cultural resurgence, 
and protection of the water (Greenpeace 2018b). Police officers removed and arrested the 
protestors, but charges were later dropped. The purpose of both actions appears to have been 
to use the spectacle to keep attention focused on the pipeline opposition and its narrative 
while intensifying pressure on the federal government.  
 
Richmond: 
 
In contrast to Burnaby Mountain, direct action to confront petro-hegemony in Richmond has 
been used quite rarely. While Richmond activists have led marches and rallies outside 
Chevron’s gates, their broader strategic orientations have tended to focus on community 
organizing around regulatory agencies and mobilizing around election campaigns during 
election seasons. Steve Nadel of the Sunflower Alliance told me that direct action to shut 
down fossil fuel infrastructure isn’t a strategic priority amongst most activists focused on 
fossil fuel infrastructure in Richmond and the Bay Area. As he puts it: 
 
Our targets here are already established fossil fuel facilities. Direct action in terms of 
actual civil disobedience - trying to shut things down - is not a real top priority 
strategy… We're not gonna shut down one of the refineries and we're not going to do 
a campaign that’s focused on shutting [them] down… (personal communication, July 
18th, 2018) 
 
Instead, as Steve explained, activists have generally focused on working with public 
institutions and regulatory agencies to force them to strengthen legal standards and hold 
polluting companies accountable to those standards. In addition, they’ve worked through 
these agencies and authorities to pressure them to refuse all new fossil fuel infrastructure 
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permits. As such, many activists in the region have emphasized the need to prevent further 
expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure in the region rather than shut down projects that are 
already operational. Nevertheless, some, like CBE’s Andrés Soto, have argued more 
enthusiastically for decommissioning Chevron’s refinery and the other refineries over the 
coming decade (personal communication, July 11th, 2018). 
 
Steve suggested that because activists are trying to force these agencies to protect public 
health, they’re working with public officials and regulators to get them on their side. Direct 
action isn’t necessarily a helpful intervention while activists are still working to build 
positive relationships with public officials. He qualified this sentiment, explaining that he 
believed direct action was an important tool but that in the current phase of their 
interventions through BAAQMD it wouldn’t have been appropriate or strategic (S. Nadel, 
personal communication, July 18th, 2018). Where the political opportunity structures 
available in regulatory agencies and local government have not been entirely closed off, 
Richmond’s climate justice activists have found it prudent to work through them not against 
them. While direct action “on the outside” can sometimes support activist negotiations with 
public officials “on the inside,” winning influence in city hall has meant climate justice 
activists have less cause to escalate against their institutional targets with this kind of 
pressure. 
 
Meanwhile, Jean Tepperman, also of Sunflower Alliance, 140 argued that sporadic and 
relatively low stakes direct action events wouldn’t be enough to effectively shut down a 
 
140 I interviewed Sunflower Alliance activists, Steve Nadel, Jean Tepperman, and Janet Johnson, together, 
which allowed them to build on and challenge one another’s ideas (personal communication, July 18th, 2018). 
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refinery anyway. According to her, unless direct action, and specifically civil disobedience, is 
used on a massive scale, over a longer period of time, to physically disrupt operations and 
business as usual, then it’s just another form of propaganda, or an expressive tactic:  
 
With small numbers of people civil disobedience is not really stopping them. It's just 
a form of propaganda. It's good to do as part of building a movement, but it's not 
decisive. I think some people think, “oh, civil disobedience, you know, direct action 
is really stopping them.” [But] direct action isn't really stopping them. Unless you 
have it on a large enough scale for over a long enough period of time, it’s just a fancy 
demonstration. And so sometimes that kind of fancy demonstration is helpful. But it's 
not like this is real power… To really interfere with their activities it's a huge, huge 
thing… You have to have numbers, you have to have big enough numbers to sustain 
it over a long enough period of time so it's actually inconvenient [otherwise]… it’s 
just a little demonstration. It’s propaganda.141 (J. Tepperman, personal 
communication, July 18th, 2018) 
 
There have been occasions on which climate justice activists found that direct action events 
and civil disobedience aided narrative intervention, or what Jean calls propaganda. As one-
off tactical interventions, however, these have not, to borrow Stephen D’Arcy’s formulation, 
been deployed in an escalating trajectory, relentlessly over a long period of time, or with 
large numbers of people while growing the base of support (2014).  
 
Building on Jean’s argument, Steve explained that if direct action is to have a measurable, 
instrumental, impact beyond propaganda or narrative intervention, then it must be deployed 
as a strategy rather than a tactic. In other words, deploying direct action as a strategy means 
that tactics and strategic choices are derived from a logic of intervention guided by the 
premise that sustained disruption of the target’s operations will force the target into 
 
141 Neither Steve nor Jean distinguished between civil disobedience and direct action in this interview. Using the 
terms interchangeably, I interpreted their conflation to be referring to what Steve described as “shutting things 
down” (personal communication, July 18th, 2018). Shutting things down can of course be part of civil 
disobedience actions or it can be a particular type of direct action, but of course it doesn’t cover the whole range 
of direct action tactics.  
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submitting to the campaign’s demands. As such all the tactics of the campaign are carried out 
to intensify disruption, build numbers of participants, and sustain the action. As Steve 
clarifies:  
 
I've done a lot of direct action organizing, and for me, to summarize what Jean was 
saying, direct action is a strategy not a tactic... When you do it as a tactic, it is a one-
off PR piece. If you want to have an [impact]… you’re making a strategic choice that 
that's how you're organizing, and that's how you're gonna do it long term, and that's 
how you’re going to mobilize, build alliances, and so on…So you [bring] all these 
movements together and [turn] out thousands of people… and so it's a sustained 
campaign, and you have a very specific goal, and you're going to achieve that goal 
through organizing repetitive direct actions and building support for those. (personal 
communication, July 18th, 2018) 
 
Based on these testimonies, and my own observations and archival research, it seems fair to 
surmise that where direct action has been used in Richmond to challenge the industry’s 
power, it has been deployed as a tactical intervention in narrative, not as a strategy. There 
are, however, three important instances of direct action that climate justice activists 
organized after the Chevron refinery fire in 2012 and which demonstrate direct action’s 
tactical significance in confronting petro-hegemony in the city. These were a march to, and 
civil disobedience outside, Chevron’s gates one year after the refinery fire, a day of civil 
disobedience blocking the gates to Kinder Morgan’s railyard in Richmond to protest the 
transportation of fracked Bakken crude oil into the city, and a lockdown outside the Kinder 
Morgan’s facility in solidarity with climate justice activist in British Columbia. In addition, 
Pennie Opal Plant, of Idle No More SF Bay, has repeatedly told BAAQMD officials that if 
they approve Phillips 66’s refinery expansions in Rodeo, they should expect a direct action 
“Standing Rock style response” (personal communication, July 19th, 2018).  This 
demonstrates how many of Richmond activists are not ideologically opposed to direct action 
but believe it is only appropriate and strategic under specific conditions. 
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The march to Chevron’s gates in August 2013 was attended by over 2500 people and 
included 350.org’s Bill McKibben and then Mayor McLaughlin amongst its lineup of 
speakers. In addition, it featured one the largest acts of civil disobedience in Richmond’s 
history. The march commemorated the one-year anniversary of the 2012 refinery explosion. 
It also promoted 350.org’s Summer Heat series of direct action and mass civil disobedience 
protests in which thousands of activists risked arrest across the country to demand the federal 
government keep fossil fuels in the ground and commit to stronger climate policy (Ostrander 
2013). As one of the series’ first actions, the event framed Summer Heat in terms of climate 
justice, placing communities most impacted by fossil fuel extraction and leading the 
transition away from fossil fuels at the heart of the narrative. Moreover, as a prelude to the 
intense struggle for city hall that would take place in November of 2014, activists with local 
climate justice organizations and the RPA used the event to condemn Chevron’s influence 
over city politics and the disproportionate impact its pollution has had on Richmond’s 
communities of color. 
 
Blocking Chevron’s gates for several hours, 210 people were arrested after refusing police 
orders to leave the site. They were cheered on by thousands of supporters. The arrests and 
blockade were symbolic rather than instrumental, in that they did little to halt Chevron’s 
immediate operations or shut down the refinery for any significant period of time. However, 
the event helped refocus the local media spotlight on Chevron’s contributions to local air 
pollution, to greenhouse gases, the refinery’s status as California’s largest stationary source 
of greenhouse cases, and, of course, the refinery fire itself. As such, the event provided a 
 462 
strategic opportunity for climate justice activists and the RPA to intervene in local discourse 
and begin framing the terms of the next city council election around Chevron’s impact on the 
city. These frames helped develop a compelling narrative about Chevron’s corruption of city 
politics into the 2014 election’s wedge issue. This instance of direct action was used to 
support intervention against Chevron’s influence through electoral politics, providing an 
illustration of how direct action tactics can be used to complement less confrontational ones. 
 
In interviews and media sources, many activists remarked on the police conduct of the day. 
Steve Early sites the restrained, and even friendly, policing as an example of the police 
department’s changing attitude towards protest under the newly appointed Police Chief, 
Chris Magnus (2017). Indeed, one media source quotes Magnus as having described the 
event as “A very successful protest,” in which “People made their point and conducted 
themselves in a thoughtful way.” Of the protestors, he apparently went on to say “they are 
part of our constituency…We don’t work for Chevron. We work for the community.” (350 
Bay Area 2013). Early describes how police officers would shake hands with protesters and 
treat them with great respect following Magnus’ lead. We might cynically read this as a 
policing strategy rather similar to Burnaby’s in which law enforcement is simply seeking to 
“squash the drama.” However, many Richmond activists believe Magnus’ intent was genuine 
and welcomed the new policing style relative to the more heavy-handed approach of the 
previous decades (Early 2017). At the very least, the Police Chief’s deliberate distancing of 
law enforcement from Chevron’s interests certainly contrasts markedly to the friendly 
relations between Chevron and the Richmond Police Officers’ Association.  
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Another salient example of direct action that Richmond activists participated in was against 
Kinder Morgan’s presence in the city in September 2014. Kinder Morgan operates a train 
depot in the city which supplies local refineries and factories in the Bay Area. In this case, 
activists were shut out of the regulatory process after BAAQMD officials quietly approved 
Kinder Morgan’s application to switch the product it was transporting from ethanol to 
fracked oil from the Bakken fields in the Dakotas. By the time activists found out that Kinder 
Morgan had been given permits, it was too late for them to take legal action. Following a 
rally of 100 residents at the depot gates in May, local activists, including Andrés Soto from 
CBE, organized direct action in September of the same year arguing they had been shut out 
of the regulatory process. Contending that BAAQMD broke the law in modifying the 
existing permit, a dozen or so activists risked arrest by chaining themselves to Kinder 
Morgan’s gates.  Police were onsite but made no arrests and, judging from the archives, the 
action received very little media coverage. The collapse in oil prices later in 2015 saw Kinder 
Morgan halt shipments of Bakken crude to Richmond and activists focus their attention on 
the broader issue of fossil fuel shipments into the city. Nevertheless, the September action is 
significant because it demonstrates activists’ willingness to take direct action where they 
perceived the legal avenues to have been closed off. This suggests that the relative scarcity of 
direct action events in Richmond is less about an ideological opposition to escalated tactics 
and more about whether or not they are perceived to be strategically appropriate.  
 
As a one-off tactical intervention, the action itself contributed to the broader city-wide efforts 
to ban so called “bomb trains” from the city. In a press release following the action, Megan 
Zapanta of APEN explains why residents risked arrest: 
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I work with Richmond residents who already struggle with cancer, asthma and other 
devastating health impacts of pollution. Now they are living with bomb-trains full of 
explosive Bakken crude oil driving through their neighborhoods. By allowing this to 
happen, BAAQMD is failing to protect us and choosing Kinder Morgan’s profits over 
our safety.  
 
Demonstrating activists’ willingness to risk arrest this action strengthened their bargaining 
position and publicly questioned BAAQMD’s legitimacy.  In an Al Jazeera feature piece on 
Richmond residents’ confrontation with new oil-by-rail shipments, APEN member Lipo 
Chanthanasak, who lived in oil trains’ “blast-zone” radius, explained that “this community 
has already suffered Chevron for over a hundred years, and now we have to be concerned 
about [Kinder Morgan] shipping and storing crude oil here” (Lim 2014). Media coverage of 
this broader struggle against oil-by-rail featured many similar accounts in which Kinder 
Morgan’s oil shipments into the city were framed as an additional burden or threat the oil 
industry already poses to Richmond’s residents. Taken together, city-wide efforts to ban 
bomb trains were crucial in framing the narrative of Big Oil’s outsized influence over city 
politics. 
 
In July 2017 activists from Idle No More SF Bay, CBE, and Diablo Rising Tide returned to 
Kinder Morgan’s facility and again blockaded the railyard gates – this time to demonstrate 
solidarity with opponents of the Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain pipeline in British 
Columbia. Using U-Locks to attach themselves to the gates and each other, they sought to 
draw attention to the direct connection between the oil being pumped out of the Alberta Tar 
sands, the threat this pipeline posed to First Nations sovereignty along the pipeline route and 
coastline, and the fact that this oil would likely be refined in Bay Area refineries (Diablo 
 465 
Rising Tide 2017).142 The activists remained locked down for several hours and two of the 
twelve participants were arrested (Kirkwood 2017). The action received relatively more 
media coverage than in 2014, probably because of the arrests but also reflecting the growing 
influence anti-fossil fuel activists have had on the media agenda since 2014. As Bay Area 
refineries have sought to upgrade their refineries to process heavier sour crude like tar sands 
oil, activists formed the Protect the Bay Coalition to prevent further refinery expansions in 
2019. Direct action at Kinder Morgan’s gates in 2017 was a preamble to this coalition and 
made a narrative intervention where other forms of action probably wouldn’t have been as 
effective because the issue had received very little media attention. 
 
The logic underlying nonviolent direct action in both Burnaby and Richmond resonates with 
Gramscian insights on legitimacy crisis and contesting moral leadership. As nonviolence 
theorist, Gene Sharp, writes: 
 
When people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in their 
disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic human 
assistance and cooperation which any government or hierarchical system requires. If 
they do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, that government or hierarchical 
system will no longer have power. This is the basic political assumption of nonviolent 
action. (2005, 247-248)  
 
 
142 As Idle No More SF Bay activist, Isabella Zizi explained in one press release: “It’s important for me to stand 
up today for my indigenous brothers and sisters of the First Nations…This crude tar sands oil will not just be 
affecting those up in Canada. It will likely be transported to the West Coast and potentially to here in my 
hometown of Richmond.” Andrés Soto was also one of the campaigners who again chained themselves to the 
gates. In his statement to reporters he emphasized the impacts the transportation of tar sands to the Bay Area 
would have on those already exposed to extreme air pollution from the refineries: “We are already over-taxed 
when it comes to pollution in our community and toxins in our bodies…Kinder Morgan doesn’t care about their 
workers. They’re making them sacrifice their health and the health of their families in order to put food on the 
table. We demand clean jobs for our community. We refuse tar sands oil” (Diablo Rising Tide 2017). 
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The argument is easily translatable into traditional Gramscian terms: Nonviolent direct action 
can provoke a crisis of legitimacy through which people’s consent to the opponent’s rule is 
revoked. When they revoke their consent, that system will no longer have power. Yet, as 
Chapter Two demonstrated, when the hegemon’s consent is revoked and its legitimacy is 
thrust into crisis, the hegemon does not back down but deploys coercive and violent means to 
crush its challengers. Contemporary examples from Occupy to Standing Rock demonstrate 
that even where nonviolent direct action is able to amplify the movement’s narrative and 
force a crisis of legitimacy upon the hegemonic opponent, so long as the hegemon maintains 
control of coercive capacity, it’s defeat is hardly guaranteed. Micah White argues that this is 
one of the reasons why the assumptions underlying contemporary protest and nonviolent 
direct action are flawed (2016). Direct action in both case studies has primarily operated as 
an intervention in relations of consent and, as such, leaves other terrains of struggle relatively 
untouched. When direct action is deployed as a strategy to try to force the industry into 
submission, its coercive dimension is revealed as well.  
 
Each of the instances of direct action I’ve identified in these case studies sought to challenge 
consent to the industry through their framing and form. Provoking a crisis in the industry’s 
moral leadership, these actions provide helpful examples of how activists can contest 
relations of consent. Yet none of these examples directly disrupted the everyday operations 
of the companies they targeted, let alone shut them down. They were not relentless, did not 
operate on an escalatory trajectory, and were not participated in by sufficient numbers of 
people for long enough. This is less a failure of the movement and more because these 
actions weren’t intended to do any of these things. They were symbolic and expressive 
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tactical interventions, designed to chip away at the industry’s social license by grabbing 
media headlines and challenging the dominant narratives the industry depends upon. Finally, 
these examples illustrate how direct action can complement and support tactical interventions 
against other points of intervention on other terrains of struggle. For example, civil 
disobedience in Richmond helped reinforce the narrative around Chevron’s political 
corruption which the RPA could then use as a wedge issue in the 2014 city election. 
Meanwhile, the civil disobedience, action camp and Watch House in Burnaby added to the 
overall conditions of risk and uncertainty that forced Kinder Morgan to abandon the project. 
Thus, climate justice activists are demonstrating important innovations in how tactics can be 
codeveloped and coordinated to engage all three of the terrains of struggle upon which petro-
hegemony must be fought.  
 
Performance Politics  
 
Many of the tactics that I’ve described above contained elements of performance politics 
within them. In his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Dr. King wrote that “Nonviolent direct 
action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has 
constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks to dramatize the issue 
so that it can no longer be ignored” (King 1963). Performance politics, and particularly the 
performance of protest, is one way to dramatize dissent to injustice so that the issue can no 
longer be ignored. The orchestration of civil disobedience outside Chevron and Kinder 
Morgan’s respective facility gates in both case studies certainly resembled a kind of 
performance through protest. Activists performed their political commitment as a public 
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spectacle framed to a particular audience with a particular message to dramatize and draw 
attention to their dissent by risking arrest. Yet resistance through performance took was not 
just limited to civil disobedience. It has included street theatre, ceremony and prayer, camp 
protocols, and social rituals. Micah White writes that in many contemporary formations 
“protests are collective rituals organized by civilian agents of change in a bid to transform the 
social reality and shift the legal regime” (2016, 64). Performing them through ceremony and 
ritual can help activists breathe life into the political relations they want to emerge while 
expressing resistance to those they would defeat. In this way, new kinds of political and 
cultural relationships can be literally performed into being. 
 
L.A. Kauffman says that the most strategic forms of direct action are ones in which the 
message is incorporated into the action so that the action itself always presents a symbolic or 
discursive intervention. The ubiquitous use of livestream technology used to share real-time 
footage of dissent and the activists’ contestation of petro-hegemony through social media is 
helping them make these discursive interventions.  This is particularly true where hostile 
media environments tend to present dissent in a negative light. One of the teachings of story-
based strategy activism is “show don’t tell” (Reinsborough and Canning 2017). As these 
protests are shared online and garner hundreds, and often thousands of views, activists’ 
performance can reach larger audiences by showing their story rather than telling it. 
Performance is also a way of circumventing hostile ideological predispositions. Performance 
tells a story and through that story an audiences’ hostile frames may not necessarily be 
triggered as they see themselves represented in the story. Street theatre, for example the die-
ins outside the tank farm gates dramatizing the threat of toxic exposure and explosions posed 
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to residents of Burnaby Mountain, didn’t need to say capitalism is evil and Kinder Morgan is 
extending colonial jurisdiction over unceded Indigenous territory while placing profit over 
people’s safety, it showed it through the performance. The performance speaks for itself and 
can be received by audiences without triggering frames that may alienate them. 
 
The “Healing Walks” Pennie Opal Plant and Idle No More SF Bay led through the different 
Bay Area refineries provide a helpful example of how performance through ceremony can 
contribute to broadening the representation of who and what is at stake, and thereby 
exacerbate legitimacy crisis.143 Pennie explained that these helped link different Blockadia 
struggles together in their participants’ minds:  
 
It was four walks over a period of four years that connected one fossil fuel impacted 
community to another along what we called “the refinery corridor,” and which wasn't 
really part of the lexicon here in the Bay Area until we started using that [language]. 
We began to notice that it was showing up in government reports and in newspaper 
articles and things like that. And they were led by Indigenous people in prayer, deeply 
in prayer... And we started each walk with a prayer ceremony and prayers for the 
water because all these fossil fuel projects are along the water and at each resting 
place that we stopped we would invite… other folks to share what they were doing 
and how people could plug in. So it was a way of broadening the movement…And so 
it helped our community members along the refinery corridor really understand that 
this is not just us the fossil fuel industries is impacting, it's also happening all around 
the world and its leading to not only the health effects on the sacred system of life, 
but also the climate that we need to exist. (personal communication, July 19th, 2018)  
 
Pennie estimated that roughly 1100 people participated in these healing walks, many of 
whom came to see themselves as part of a broader movement and in solidarity with 
Indigenous frontlines struggles through their participation. Pennie also explained that 350.org 
funded prominent Indigenous activists from Alaska to Ecuador to speak at and participate in 
 
143 Healing Walks have been an important component of frontlines Indigenous resistance to fossil fuel 
companies in the Bay Area, in the Athabasca tar sands, the Keystone XL pipeline and the Dakota Access 
Pipeline. 
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the walks as well (personal communication, July 19th, 2018). Through their participation new 
solidarities emerge and one part of the movement’s cognizance of another part of the 
movement expands. Meanwhile, performance scholar, Janet Fiskio, suggests that through 
these performances “the conjunction of state and capitalist violence [is] revealed by the 
expressive forms employed by Idle No More” (2017, 8). In this unveiling the industry’s 
social license is challenged. As such, performance is an important mode of intervention in 
power relations, particularly against petro-culture, that can shift dominant narratives and help 
forge new solidarities.  
 
Nonetheless, performance politics also has its limitations. Sharing reflections on what he 
believed to be the shortcomings of the Occupy Wall Street movement, White says that it was 
partly the flawed assumptions guiding nonviolent direct action, and precisely its limitations 
as mere performance, that meant the movement could not translate its discursive victories 
into institutional ones: 
 
We maintained a theatrical view of activism that treats public space as the stage for a 
political spectacle. We assumed that the United States would be unable to use force 
against non-violent democracy protestors without eventually capitulating to our 
demands because the eyes of the international community would be on our political 
performance. (2016, 25) 
 
According to White, nonviolent direct action and the political spectacle it produces is no 
longer, if it ever was, able to create sufficient conditions of moral crisis such that the 
hegemon is not able to respond with violence. The hegemon may still be able to deploy 
coercion against its challengers without losing moral leadership. Meanwhile, activists got so 
caught up in expressing their identity and performing the political relations they want to see 
emerge that they did not seek to confront state institutions or broaden the movement and 
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make it accessible to newcomers (see also Smucker 2017). As such, White claims that 
performance and symbolic, narrative interventions are not enough to force the opponent into 
capitulation. White’s intervention should make us question the implications of protest that 
only contains a symbolic or narrative dimension.  
 
White’s point is a valid one, but it also misses the other forms of resistance performance 
politics is able to produce. In Burnaby, for example, one of the songs that regulars at the 
blockades came to know very well was adapted from a song sung by political prisoners 
resisting South African apartheid. Here it was sung to encourage arrestees as they were taken 
away to be processed by the police: “Courage/ my friend/ you are not alone/ we will/ walk 
with you/ and sing your spirit home.” On Burnaby Mountain, songs in the languages of 
British Columbian First Nations were always sung, drums beat, sage was always burned, 
ancestors invoked through prayer, and ceremonies performed during civil disobedience 
actions at the gates. Indeed, song, ceremony, and prayer were all crucial for developing 
bonds of solidarity and human connection at the blockades. Performance was not necessarily 
just about framing a narrative to an audience, it was about cultivating relationships, 
expressing identity, and for Indigenous activists, asserting their culture, rights, and title to the 
land. White’s critique of performance politics ignores these. 
 
Similarly, the Healing Walks Idle No More SF Bay led between the Bay Area refineries 
were, as Janet Fiskio articulates, expressive forms that “combine cultural practices, direct 
action, and social media” (2017, 1). As such, we miss a great deal if we only understand 
indigenous led- ceremony at sites of protest in terms of protest. As Fiskio reflects: 
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It is important to note that the term "protest" is not sufficient, because these 
performances are not only acts of resistance. These demonstrations draw on 
expressive forms, such as dancing, singing, and drumming, practices that create and 
support Indigenous community, sovereignty, and continuance, and thus exceed the 
context of settler colonialism. (2017, 3) 
 
Placing their performances in the context of their cultural practices, Indigenous spiritual 
leadership in these frontline struggles demonstrates both an authentic commitment to the 
resurgence of their cultures through ceremony and prayer, while at the same time the 
performance of ceremony through protest carries out strategic intervention in discursive 
relations as well. The optics of arresting people carrying out their ceremonies and prayer on 
their unceded territories can provoke the kind of moral crisis activists are seeking to produce. 
Ceremony, then, is an act of resistance and self-defense but also an assertion of identity that 
exists outside what we may traditionally understand as resistance.  
 
Moreover, Fiskio explains that the Idle No More protest performances under her own 
analysis are “constructive as well as resistant” and that  “like literature and art, round dances, 
and other actions, function not only as critique and resistance, but also as active constructions 
of Indigenous space, meaning, and community that enable continuance” (2017, 9). I observed 
a powerful example of this at the Vancouver courthouse during a court support action. One 
Indigenous woman appearing before the judge spoke in her own native language as a 
performance subverting the authority of the colonial courts and resisting its coercion, while 
asserting First Nations rights and title on their territories. Meanwhile an Elder was passing 
around prayer ties (small packages of cloth containing ashes from the sacred fire he’d prayed 
over) in the court which evoked another reminder of the illegitimacy of the colonial court 
system on unceded lands. These subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, subversive 
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performances in the context of the colonial court both contest and delegitimize its authority 
and articulate a resurgence of Indigenous culture and authority. Therefore, while 
performance politics in the case of direct action may not be producing the kind of moral 
crises activists might hope they would, they do serve other equally important purposes in the 
context of solidarity building and decolonization. 
Dual Power and Prefigurative Politics  
 
As both seek to perform new social relations into being, performance politics and 
prefigurative politics share a great deal in common. In his reflections on anti-capitalist 
struggle, John Holloway explains that in prefigurative politics “the struggle for a different 
society must create that society through its forms of struggle” and, moreover, that activist 
attention should be concentrated not upon the destruction of capitalism but on “the building 
of something else” (2010, 50). As Holloway clarifies “This certainly does not mean… that 
we cease to struggle against capitalism, but that, as far as possible, we take the initiative, we 
set the agenda, we make it clear that it is capitalism struggling against us, our lives, our 
projects, our humanity” (2010, 45). Francesca Polletta, meanwhile, explains that “the label 
prefigurative has remained popular as a way to describe movement groups whose internal 
structure is characterized by a minimal division of labor, decentralized authority, and an 
egalitarian ethos, and whose decision making is direct and consensus oriented” (2002, 6).  
Thus, prefigurative politics undoes dominant power relations by imagining and practicing a 
way of being that exists outside of those relations. 
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Meanwhile, in so far as prefigurative politics may be a strategic intervention in petro-
hegemony, it should contribute to the development of dual power.144 Dual power seeks to 
fundamentally shift dominant social relations through simultaneously engaging with existing 
regimes of governance, while establishing alternative institutions that build the political 
reality that will ultimately replace those dominant institutions. As Yates McKee explains, 
dual power includes the “forging of alliances and supporting demands on the existing 
institutions—elected officials, public agencies, universities, workplaces, banks, corporations, 
museums—while at the same time developing self-organized counter-institutions” (2014). As 
such, dual power combines prefigurative politics and the preforming of an alternative 
political reality into being with direct contestation of dominant power structures and the 
political reality as it currently exists. Several of the interventions activists made in Burnaby 
and Richmond reflect this important combination of prefigurative and oppositional strategy 
and tactics. 
 
Examining social reproduction at protest camps like Protect the Inlet provides illustrations of 
how the people who participate in them seek to redefine power dynamics and address 
privilege between activists in their own organizational forms and norms, while also 
countering the broader power relations upon which petro-hegemony depends. In one 
particularly rich conversation with activists at the PTI camp on Burnaby Mountain we 
explored the question “Who will do the movement’s dishes?” We discussed the gendered 
relations internal to land defense camps like this one and how often women took on, or were 
 
144 Dual power has a long legacy of influence in leftist political strategy. Since Vladimir Lenin’s popularization 
of the term during the 1917 Russian revolution, dual power has undergone several iterations and has been put to 
use in many different political projects (Marxists Internet Archive 2005). 
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expected to take on, the additional labor of preparing camp meals, cleaning the camp, and 
washing the dishes. To address this, men are encouraged, and often asked first, to prepare 
meals, clean, and to do the washing up. However, we also discussed why doing dishes is 
rarely perceived as revolutionary work or activism in the first place, and what kinds of 
theories of change stem from the assumptions that render its significance illegible. Where 
theories of change rest upon narratives of a revolutionary leader, usually a man, and a small 
cadre of dedicated agents, usually men, all of the other components of making a revolution 
are ignored. As such, the reproduction and maintenance of the camp is rarely even legible as 
part of a revolutionary strategy. Prefigurative politics places the micro-politics of these 
internal relations at the forefront of its theory of change suggesting that radical social change 
must be embodied through the form of intervention if it is to arise at all. 
 
In their assertions of Indigenous jurisdiction and First Nations’ rights and title, the Watch 
House and the PTI camp prefigured a decolonizing paradigm. Through the claiming and 
occupation of land on their unceded territories, Tsleil-Waututh activists and their allies 
created a space in which decolonization was prefigured through a set of norms, practices, and 
ceremony. Taking the land back, governing it, and protecting it, moves decolonization 
beyond metaphor and into a physical confrontation with colonial power relations. At its most 
tangible, however, this meant visitors to the camp agreed to follow the protocols established 
by Coast Salish leadership and were answerable to that leadership in this space. In addition, 
visitors were included in cultural practices like tending the sacred fire, setting aside food at 
mealtimes to place in the fire and make prayers to ancestors, respecting Elders and listening 
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without interrupting them, or ensuring that Elders were the first to get food when common 
meals were prepared.  
 
Invitation to participate in these customs was part of prefiguring a resurgence in Indigenous 
cultural practices on their territories that wasn’t just confined to their reserve lands. 
Meanwhile, claiming this land on Burnaby Mountain illustrated the narrative that the Tsleil-
Waututh continue to have jurisdiction over their territories and that obtaining their consent is 
necessary before projects can be permitted. This prefigured a political reality in which 
governments actually do seek Indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed consent regarding 
activity on their unceded territories. Prefiguring resurgence of culture and governance 
through land defense-style interventions and performing these into existence creates what 
John Holloway calls a “crack” in logic of colonial dispossession by expressing alternatives to 
it. It also helped audiences understand pipeline construction without First Nations’ consent as 
an act of colonial dispossession that threatens the resurgence of Indigenous cultures and 
systems of governance.  
 
These examples do not necessarily suggest such experiments were always successful in 
undoing unjust power dynamics internal or external to the camp.  Unjust power dynamics 
have not been fully banished from these spaces and, so long as oppressive power structures 
exist outside these enclaves, prefiguring alternative social relations will always remain a 
performance of a desired reality rather than a mainstream norm. However, emphasis here 
should be placed upon how the experimentation with dismantling oppressive power 
dynamics in intimate space took place. Furthermore, as activists experiment with disrupting 
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oppressive power dynamics by prefiguring alternatives within their communities and intimate 
relationships, they may strengthen bonds of solidarity within the group. Experimentation, 
moreover, implies that activists are figuring out for themselves what kinds of relationship 
norms and practices perpetuate or hide oppressive dynamics and which ones successfully 
banish them. These are necessary for building the kind counter hegemonic alliances that put 
intersectional populism into practice. 
 
Prefigurative politics isn’t just about experimenting with alternative relationships within 
activist groups, it can also disrupt petro-hegemony directly. The Tiny House Warriors, for 
example, are deploying an intervention that prefigures a just transition and decolonizing 
solutions to the climate crisis that also directly disrupts the pipelines’ construction. Their 
decentralized solar powered tiny houses, providing homes for Indigenous women, children, 
and survivors of abuse and violence to heal from trauma, prefigure a compelling example of 
the kind of decolonizing and intersectional solutions combating the climate crisis requires. 
Simultaneously, these homes will be placed directly in the pipeline’s route on Secwepemc 
territory. These physical constructions will force a decision dilemma on the Canadian 
government which has publicly pledged to build more accountable relationships with First 
Nations and take meaningful climate action: do they evict the homes, essentially destroying 
symbols of climate action and Indigenous healing and resurgence to build the pipeline, or do 
they let these symbols endure and reroute the pipeline costing more money, time, and 
political capital? In this way the Tiny House Warriors’ intervention operates according to a 
logic of dual power because it both engages with dominant existing institutions, i.e. 
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confronting the colonial Canadian state, while also prefiguring alternative solutions existing 
outside the logic of the colonial state.145 
 
Activism in Richmond illustrates quite a different approach to dual power that nonetheless 
manifests itself in interventions against dominant institutions alongside the simultaneous 
construction of alternatives. Once movement candidates were elected to city council, they 
could exercise their ability to appoint movement allies to local advisory boards and 
commissions. This has meant more resources and support from local government are 
available to local activists. Funneling these resources from local government, particularly 
funds from Chevron’s increased taxes and community benefits agreement, to the people 
prefiguring just solutions, activists have learned how to use the hybrid movement-party 
formation to extend their influence on city council to support local just transition initiatives. 
Their intervention has developed a synergy between tactics that confront the dominant 
institutions and those that are prefiguring alternative solutions. Having successfully 
challenged Chevron’s control over city council, Richmond’s climate justice activists have 
since been in a position to consolidate their victories by creating conditions in which just 
transition initiatives can flourish. 
 
 
145 Water Protectors at Standing Rock began a similar project where they began building permanent structures at 
Oceti Sakowin symbolizing just solutions and decolonization. A livestream video shared on Facebook and 
Twitter shows how these symbols were bulldozed by the police when they evicted the camps in February 2017.  
The Unist’ot’en activists building permanent structures that run on renewable energy, including a healing center 
for trauma survivors, on their territory in the path of proposed pipelines is another example.  Activists from the 
Ponca nation have planted seeds and intend to grow crops in the path of the Keystone XL pipeline and a group 
of nuns have constructed a solar power chapel in its path too. Because of its simultaneously discursive and 
material intervention this tactic is becoming increasingly popular. 
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Councilmember Eduardo Martinez explained that RPA legislators hadn’t necessarily 
innovated any new just transition solutions in the city but that they had helped create the 
space for those solutions to emerge. As he puts it: 
 
I don't think the RPA actually did a lot of things but we created the avenues for other 
people do things. Like Rich City Rides, you know, fantastic organization that is 
promoting bicycle ridership, and that came as an outgrowth of the pedestrian and 
bicycle policies that we that we promoted. Urban Tilth, another great organization 
that promotes urban farming… that’s in conjunction with the health in all policies that 
we have in Richmond. (E. Martinez, personal communication, July 9th, 2018). 
 
Similarly, former city councilmember, Jovanka Beckels, explained that “legislators don’t 
have all the answers… that’s why it’s so important to collaborate with organizations that are 
doing the work” (ReelNews 2018). With councilmembers like Beckles, Recinos, Martinez, 
McLaughlin, Willis and others, all of whom came from community organizing backgrounds 
and several of whom were part of organizations leading just transition initiatives in the city, 
the RPA’s majority on council created the space for collaboration between local government 
and the city’s activists prefiguring alternatives to Chevron and petro-capitalism. In this way, 
the movement has captured some institutional support for just transition initiatives while 
remaining relatively independent of state institutions.  Some of these programs have 
explicitly received council support, some won support through campaigns targeting friendly 
city councilmembers, but all have benefitted from the creation of political conditions on 
council that have enabled them to thrive. Even after the RPA’s council majority was lost in 
2018, these initiatives continue to build the foundations for a city that is no longer dependent 
upon the revenue and jobs Chevron provides. Crucially, this kind of intervention offers an 
excellent illustration of the emerging synergy between the constituent elements of dual 
power, whereby activists capture the resources of the current institutions on the one hand and 
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then redirect those resource towards prefiguring just solutions and alternatives on the other 
(LeQuesne 2019). 
 
Many of the just transition initiatives being prefigured in Richmond emerged out residents’ 
concerns articulated in town halls and community meetings hosted by both the RPA and 
members of the Our Power campaign. Affordable Housing, public health, and policing often 
emerge as people’s top concerns. These townhalls do more than survey the city and 
crowdsource campaigns and policy, however. They establish yet another kind of dual power 
by providing a forum for Richmond’s residents to coalesce around a set of key concerns, 
policy and campaign goals, and a broader vision to transform the city. Here the promise of 
the “Our Power” campaign is made real, as these town halls actually do create the space for 
the community’s concerns to be taken up by local organizations and brought directly to city 
council. This model envisions, prefigures and builds upon a city politics that is more 
democratic and accountable to the city’s population. To a large degree then, through these 
townhalls, agenda setting is moved away from top down NGOs and the city council and 
instead emerges out of the conversations and debates that arise from people interacting with 
one another in these public spaces. 
 
Despite its transformative potential, prefigurative politics has a major limitation. Participants 
can get so caught up in performing the creation and nurturing of the world they want to build, 
that they fail to engage with and confront hegemonic power relations in the world that still 
exists (Smucker 2017). L.A. Kauffman explains that prefigurative politics entails “both a 
major time commitment and full immersion in an alternative world with its own culture, 
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lingo, and practices” (2017, 59). As Smucker argues, groups that only engage with 
prefiguring the world they want to see can become inward looking, self-referential, and 
unable to welcome newcomers into the world they’ve already built for themselves (2017). 
Indeed, social movement theorist, Wini Breins, goes as far as to make a categorical 
distinction between strategic politics and prefigurative politics, suggesting that prefigurative 
politics cannot be strategic for the very reason that it refuses to engage with dominant 
institutions as they currently exist (1980).  
 
Gramsci was also critical of the kind of utopianism espoused in what we today call 
prefigurative politics. Smucker suggests Gramsci would not have considered prefigurative 
politics to be politics at all but rather “specific wills which are incapable of relating means to 
end, and hence are not even wills, but idle whims, dreams, [and] longings.” (Smucker 2017, 
112). As such, prefigurative politics is either ambivalent about engagement with power or 
eschews it altogether. Its relevance to counter hegemonic strategy is therefore limited.  
However, I would suggest that prefigurative politics actually can provide a logic of 
intervention for counter hegemonic strategy if and when it is accompanied by strategies and 
tactics that operate synergistically to confront the world as it is while developing the world as 
it could be. To this end, activist and movement scholar, Ben Manksi identifies the possibility 
of a “synthetic prefigurative-strategic politics” (2015, 11).  The productive and positive 
synergy and synthesis between prefigurative and strategic politics is most helpfully 
understood in terms of dual power. Dual power’s orientation towards continuing engagement 
with dominant institutions while also developing the counter institutions that will ultimately 
replace them, positions it as an excellent framework through which to articulate the synthesis 
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of the strategic and the prefigurative. The examples analyzed in this section illustrate how 
dual power is a logic of intervention that has come to shape many of the strategies and tactics 
that the climate justice movement now carries out. As I will demonstrate in the next section, 
dual power is a precursor to the alignment and coordination of strategies made possible 
through the carbon rebellion. 
 
Part 2: The Carbon Rebellion 
 
The strategies and tactics identified and analyzed throughout this chapter have been deployed 
by different groups with different theories of change to achieve different objectives. As such, 
the extent to which they are already coordinated and intended to work together varies from 
organization to organization, and from point of intervention to point of intervention. 
Moreover, individually, these tactics represent quite a conventional repertoire of social 
movement interventions and hardly seem commensurate with the scale of the power relations 
they are intended to address. Nevertheless, when this diversity of tactics and strategic 
orientations are brought together and organized deliberately, the foundations of a counter 
hegemonic strategy to confront petro-hegemony is revealed. Carbon rebellion is a framework 
for intervention that allows us to imagine how the strategies and tactics described in this 
chapter could be aligned and coordinated to engage different points of intervention and alter 
relations of consent, coercion, and compliance on all three terrains of struggle. As a concept, 
then, the carbon rebellion helps us comprehend how these tactics and strategies either already 
are, or could be, organized into a counter hegemonic response to petro-hegemony.  
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Moving from a loosely and unevenly coordinated multiplicity of tactics and strategic 
orientations to a diverse yet coordinated set of interventions that target points of intervention 
on each terrain of struggle is the process through which the climate justice movement’s 
strategies and tactics may be organized into the carbon rebellion. In the following section, I 
demonstrate how different tactics respond to, or engage with, different points of intervention 
on different terrains of struggle defined by relations of consent, coercion, or compliance. 
Doing so demonstrates the points of intervention the movement’s current strategic repertoire 
is best suited to engage with and which terrains of struggle are privileged or overlooked by 
these different strategic orientations. I also illustrate how the tactics and strategies identified 
above may be organized into the counter hegemonic formation of the carbon rebellion. The 
purpose of this section is to demonstrate how we might develop a strategic framework out of 
the tactics and strategies already being deployed to confront the fossil fuel industry in 
Blockadia into a counter hegemonic alignment that aspires towards the movements’ own 
hegemonic leadership and is capable of deposing petro-hegemony.  
 
Waging the War of position: Interventions in relations of consent 
 
The campaign strategies and associated tactics I identified in Burnaby and Richmond are 
most advanced in their waging of the war of position on the terrain of struggle defined by 
relations of consent. In both case studies, climate justice activists have successfully targeted 
different points of intervention with story-based strategies to change the narratives that 
maintain consent to the industry’s operations and develop counter narratives that align the 
movement. While these are mostly represented in local and regional victories, they do, 
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nevertheless, illustrate some of the most important points of intervention to target in the war 
of position, as well as some of the tactics that may be deployed to win on that terrains 
struggle. Conventionally, these points of intervention include independent and corporate 
news media, social media platforms, faith-based organizations, schools and colleges, unions, 
and the intermediaries of popular culture.146 However, climate justice activists in these case 
studies have also claimed elections, public hearings, banks, shareholder meetings, public 
space, college campuses, and the sites at which the industry’s operations are actually 
conducted, as other points of intervention through which to wrest consent away from the 
industry.  
 
Activists use these points of intervention as highly public opportunities to contest the fossil 
fuel industry’s dominant narratives and publicize their own counter narratives. Much of their 
success here has depended upon a commitment to story-based strategy, deliberately crafted 
messages that resonate with their intended audiences, and disciplined messaging with 
carefully selected, and well-trained, spokespeople. The tactics advancing this strategy include 
civil disobedience outside Kinder Morgan’s tank farm gates, street theatre, mass marches and 
targeted direct actions, land defense camps, and press conferences and rallies. They also 
involved harnessing publicity around elections to develop wedge issues that resonate with 
their respective communities, regular public meetings and town halls hosted by community 
organizations, and canvassing or petitioning to build the base of awareness, support and 
 
146 For this last example we could think of Shailene Woodly and Mark Ruffalo publicizing the confrontation at 
Standing Rock or Teen Vogue running stories on the Kinder Morgan’s pipeline. See this article on pop 
crush.com about Hollywood actors’ solidarity with Standing Rock https://popcrush.com/shailene-woodley-
celebrities-support-standing-rock-sioux-dakota-access-pipeline/ and this article by Tsleil-Waututh youth activist 
Kayah George in Teen Vogue:  https://www.teenvogue.com/story/kinder-morgans-trans-mountain-expansion-
oil-pipeline-indigenous-op-ed 
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participation. In addition, activists have gained influence in cultural institutions like local 
churches, city celebrations and festivals, and built alliances with educators and students on 
college campuses. These tactics and their respective points of intervention are all designed to 
change the narrative and discursive conditions through which their audiences understand 
colonialism, environmental injustice, energy, and climate change so that new meanings may 
emerge and be articulated into a counter hegemonic alignment.147 
 
The movements’ access to independent and alterative news media, particularly in British 
Columbia through popular news websites like The Narwhal, The Tyee and The National 
Observer, has also been a crucial tool through which activists have been able to share their 
narrative, particularly online (O’Keefe, Hackett and Gunster, 2019). Together, these sources 
attract hundreds of thousands of unique website visitors each month.  Journalists from 
independent news outlets were often present at the PTI camp and friendly with many of the 
activists. They also consistently covered civil disobedience at the tank farm gates on Burnaby 
Mountain, picking up the movements’ frames and contributing to its discursive interventions. 
Some would also take high quality livestream videos that were viewed and shared thousands 
of times online. In addition, they would often run stories countering the corporate media and 
industry narratives about the necessity of the pipeline and its promises of tax revenue, jobs, 
adequate consultation and record of sustainability. According to communications scholars at 
Simon Fraser University, these alternative and independent media sources are far more 
trusted than the center-right leaning corporate media outlets in Vancouver and Burnaby 
 
147 On a larger scale, fossil fuel divestment campaigns at universities, banks, churches and public pension funds 
have also contributed to a shift in the framing of climate change towards a narrative that positions the fossil fuel 
industry at the center of the issue. However, fossil fuel divestment tends to be a strategy that takes place away 
from the frontlines and oil frontiers. 
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(ibid). Maintaining close relationships with reporters that work with these independent media 
outlets has been important to ensuring there are friendly outlets and venues through which 
the movements’ narratives can enter public discourses.148 As they are shared, understood, and 
practiced these discourses become embodied in every day consciousness and common sense. 
 
Finally, community organizing is also a fundamental strategy to challenge and shift relations 
of consent in Blockadia. Community organizing strategies have included the development of 
anchor organizations that coordinate coalitions of activists and groups from a range of 
different political and strategic orientations, alliance building across different social 
struggles, town halls and public meetings, and leadership development through, for example, 
APEN’s youth leadership training programs. Using elections to organize their community, 
activists in Richmond have crowd sourced their political platforms by, for, and with, their 
community. In Burnaby, members of grassroots community organization have devoted a 
great deal of time and resources to knocking on doors and canvassing their neighborhoods to 
shift the terms upon which the pipeline project is understood. Meanwhile populist 
intersectional alliances are being articulated and aligning larger constituents of the 
community into a counter hegemonic bloc. Developing leaders and communicators for and 
from the community they are organizing is one of the major components of what Saul 
Alinksy called “meeting people where they’re at.” The slow, painstaking work of meeting 
people where they’re at – both literally at their homes, or supermarkets, or places of worship, 
or schools, but also where their values, political consciousness, and cultural reference points 
 
148 Of course, the extent to which these independent outlets are preaching to choir means the movements’ 
narrative does not always reach beyond an activist echo chamber. Hence the need for many different media 
through which to broadcast messages. 
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are at – and communicating and alliance building accordingly is crucial to waging the war of 
position and articulating counter hegemonic alignments around a new common sense. In this 
sense, the points of intervention available on the war of position are numerous but also highly 
context specific. 
 
Waging the War of maneuver: Interventions in relations of coercion 
 
While waging the war of position - and unfortunately sometimes without a war of position – 
climate justice activists have also been waging a war of maneuver. Their war of maneuver 
has involved struggle over points of intervention through the direct use of coercion to achieve 
local campaign objectives. It has also involved winning struggles over key institutions that 
would afford the movement some coercive power to hold the fossil fuel industry in check, 
curtail the industry’s own use of coercion, and institutionalize or consolidate the movements’ 
victories. The degree, intensity, and ambition of the war of maneuver is, or at least should be, 
directly related to the extent to which the war of position has challenged the legitimacy of the 
hegemon and developed a new consensus. Thus, as more points of interventions are fought 
over and won through the war of position, more points of intervention on the terrain of 
struggle defined by coercion become available. Points of intervention available through the 
case study campaigns’ respective wars of maneuver have so far included the judicial system, 
regulatory frameworks, Chevron’s refinery gates, the Trans Mountain tank farm gates, city 
council meetings, and lobbying of potentially responsive decision makers. Elections are also 
an important point of intervention in both wars of maneuver and position. Through local 
electoral successes in Richmond, and Burnaby and Vancouver, activists have sought to 
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consolidate and institutionalize opposition to the fossil fuel industry and enforce regulations 
on the industry through (admittedly, quite limited) coercive power.  
 
As the movement wins the contest over consent, not only do more points of intervention 
become available in the war of maneuver, but the tactics activists use can escalate without 
alienating the movement’s base of support and participation. Therefore, in these case studies, 
the tactics deployed in the war of maneuver were more or less representative of the extent to 
which gains had been made in the war of position. Indeed, almost all tactics deployed in the 
war of maneuver require at least some advances to already have been made through the war 
of position. Even tactics that may not seem particularly confrontational require a degree of 
consent if their impact is to be sustained. For example, lobbying to intensify the regulatory 
burden on both Chevron and Kinder Morgan, or lawsuits to challenge the legality of the 
permitting processes associated with each project, may seem like tactics that require little 
cultural legitimacy. However, if institutional victories are to endure, then as Deva Woodly 
makes clear, they require not only changes in policy or judicial rulings, but a shift in overall 
discursive conditions that will prevent their being overturned in the future (2015).149  The 
tactics and strategic orientations identified in this chapter illustrate this relationship, and this 
relationship, in turn, helps explain why tactics in the war of maneuver associated with each 
campaign have been relatively deescalated so far. 
 
149 In Richmond, discursive conditions have shifted to such a degree that it is hard to imagine institutional 
restrictions imposed on Chevron being relaxed (at least locally). Indeed, despite the RPA losing seats in the last 
election, discursive conditions have shifted to the extent that Chevron’s influence has not been reinstated on the 
council. Meanwhile, although the war of position may be being won in Burnaby and possibly British Columbia, 
climate justice activists have not wrested consent from the industry throughout the rest of Canada. Because the 
Trans Mountain pipeline court case was heard at the federal level, at the Federal Court of Appeals of Canada, 
the quashing of the pipeline permits was more easily circumvented by the Federal Liberal government which 
calculated that support for the industry was greater throughout other Canadian provinces where the Liberal 
Party needs votes, and thus it was politically expedient to buy and repermit the pipeline in 2019. 
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Most strategic engagements in these campaigns’ war of maneuver intervene in institutions of 
the state to capture or harness their coercive capacity in order to force the fossil fuel industry 
into capitulation – or at least, force it to take positions it would not take voluntarily. 
Richmond’s city council became one crucial point of intervention on this terrain of struggle. 
Forcing Chevron’s influence off the Richmond city council through the RPA’s hybrid 
movement-party took years of community organization and waging a war of position. 
However, these victories are being consolidated and institutionalized through a war of 
maneuver. This has forced Chevron to pay a larger share of the taxes it owes the community, 
compromise on the scale and scope of its refinery upgrade, and agree to increased 
accountability and monitoring. Tactics in the war of maneuver have included appointing 
movement allies to local boards and commissions, passing legislation that intensifies the 
regulatory burden on fossil fuel infrastructure in the city, and lobbying councilmembers 
friendly to the movement to unleash city resources to support energy transition. In Canada, 
meanwhile, the Native Rights-Based Strategic Framework has made use of First Nations 
rights and title through the court system to force the industry to delay or cancel pipeline 
construction and comply with regulatory frameworks. Indeed, so effective were the legal 
interventions here that Kinder Morgan likely viewed them as an unsurmountable obstacle to 
getting the pipeline built and thus abandoned the project. The war of maneuver, in this case, 
however, was mostly limited to struggle over the coercive apparatuses of state institutions 
and how they can be used to enforce rules on the industry. 
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While most climate justice strategies in the war of maneuver are oriented towards capturing 
or harnessing coercive capabilities of state institutions, campaigners may also use coercion 
directly to force their targets into positions they would not otherwise take. The use of the 
blockade to claim space and prevent construction is a coercive strategy is a coercive strategy, 
for example. Industry operatives must then choose between calling on the petro-state and its 
ability to deploy state sanctioned violence and coercion, negotiation and compromise, or 
abandoning its project altogether. Using these tactics can force the industry into delaying 
construction, canceling it, or complying with regulatory frameworks. The blockades and civil 
disobedience in both Richmond and Burnaby have so far served primarily symbolic purposes 
(and thus, as a tactic, are more suited to the war of position) while creating conditions of 
uncertainty and risk. If these tactics were to escalate and physically delay pipeline 
construction, however, they would also become coercive tactics deployed in a war of 
maneuver.  
 
Finally, once activists are engaged in a war of maneuver, they are likely to provoke the 
industry into deploying coercive capabilities through the petro-state. These coercive tactics 
will be brought down upon the movement to crush them. In Burnaby and Richmond, tactics 
deployed in their respective wars of maneuver have not yet provoked heavy handed police 
responses.  As such, the resources of the petro-state have been used to litigate and legislate 
against activists’ protest methods, delegitimize them, and in some cases spy on or infiltrate 
their organizations. Yet, the physical policing of protest has remained relatively mild. 
Comparing this to the petro-state response at Standing Rock, with its intensely militarized 
policing, intimidation, sabotage, and surveillance, it becomes apparent that the degree of 
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force and violence deployed against activists engaged in the war of maneuver is directly 
related to the extent to which activists coercive interventions are perceived as a threat to the 
industry’s operations. This is a rather obvious point, but it means that where the movements’ 
coercive tactics escalate to a scale and scope that they are perceived to pose an existential 
threat to the industry’s operations, activists must be ready and prepared for the force and 
intimidation the petro-state will likely use to try and crush them. Preparation here, can mean 
practicing security culture, operating through affinity groups, maintaining a well-organized 
system of jail support for activists who are arrested, providing legal aid, capturing state 
institutions that can limit the petro-state coercive capabilities, and ensuring that each act of 
violence against movement participants further erodes the legitimacy of the industry.  
 
Waging the War of Economies: Interventions in relations of compliance 
 
The third terrain of struggle climate justice activists must engage with is defined by the 
relation of compliance. Remember that this power relation rests upon a dynamic of 
dependency such that dependence upon underlying economic conditions (often conditioned 
by the industry) renders particular communities both unable, and potentially unwilling, to 
resist the fossil fuel industry. The industry itself will often take advantage of this 
dependency, particularly amongst fossil fuel workers and the unions that are supposed to 
represent them, to pitch unions against climate justice activists and frame the well-worn jobs 
versus the environment narrative. It has used a similar strategy seeking to divide First 
Nations in Canada. However, the industry is also subject to a dynamic of dependency, and 
thus also operates according to relations compliance. It is dependent upon finance, 
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investment, and continuing access to capital. Therefore, under petro-capitalism, banks and 
other large investors are the industry’s lifeline. As such, the industry’s own compliance may 
be produced through influencing the capitalist class’ investment decisions.  Taking both 
dependencies into account, the way that climate justice activists can intervene in relations of 
compliance is twofold: firstly, they must help break the dynamic of dependency communities 
have upon the tax revenue, philanthropy, and jobs that fossil fuel companies provide, and 
secondly, they must seek to cut off access to capital and investment that the industry depends 
upon. The way that climate justice activists engage with points of intervention on this terrain 
of struggle will vary depending upon which of these two approaches they are pursuing.  
 
Points of intervention in the war of economies include banks, investment funds, unions, 
government policy and legislation, philanthropies and foundations, refineries, transportation 
routes, construction zones, subcontractors, and social programs. Strategies to engage with 
these points of intervention include advancing energy democracy, divestment, prefigurative 
politics, dual power, secondary targeting and conditioning perceptions of risk and uncertainty 
associated with a particular project amongst its financiers. Their associated tactics involve 
building relationships with unions and the labor movement to demand unionized green job 
guarantees, implementing community choice energy, establishing energy cooperatives, 
capturing the agenda for implementation of local, statewide and national Green New Deal 
legislation, supporting job retraining programs, policy that guarantees fossil fuel workers the 
ability to take early retirement and a full pension, and funneling state resources to context 
specific just transition initiatives.150 Many of these interventions don’t resemble tactics in the 
 
150 As relationships between labor and the climate justice movement are solidified, other points of intervention 
like factories, refineries, and construction sites may become available and intervened through tactics like work 
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traditional sense of the term and yet perform the function of challenging relations of 
compliance and moving campaigns closer to their objectives on this terrain of struggle. If 
these tactics are to follow the principles of climate justice then they must be achieved 
through a just transition framework in which energy systems are decolonized, decentralized, 
democratized, and decarbonized.  
 
One of the major components of a just transition strategy that would break the dynamic of 
dependency on the industry is building closer relationships with the labor movement and 
unions representing workers most impacted by energy transition. Unions are far from 
monolithic entities, even in the oil industry.  Unfortunately, however, their leadership, 
particularly in the building trade unions like pipefitters, electrical workers, boilermakers etc., 
are often closely allied with the oil industry. The climate justice movements’ relationships 
with unions have been mixed in both Burnaby and Richmond. As recently as July 2019, for 
example, fossil fuel industry operatives turned out dozens of workers to a planning 
commission hearing to oppose plans to regulate the export of coal from the Levin export 
terminal in Richmond’s city limits (No Coal in Oakland 2019). However, many activists in 
the RPA have union backgrounds and consider themselves allies to the labor movement 
(Early 2017). Mayor McLaughlin recounted how, during the disputes over Chevron’s 
refinery upgrade, she found herself positioned against local unions and workers for the first 
time in her activist career (2018).   
 
 
stoppages and strikes. The movement currently seems a long way away from being able to make these kinds of 
interventions but they should remain something to aspire towards nonetheless. 
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Richmond city council has also supported numerous just transition initiatives proposed by 
local activists, including jobs training for renewable energy installation, energy cooperatives, 
community choice energy, subsidized solar installation, more spending on public transport 
infrastructure and bike paths, and, its health in all policies initiative (ibid). As more and more 
refinery workers have left Richmond for the wealthier neighboring towns and suburbs, 
Chevron’s argument that it is the city’s largest private employer has lost currency.  However, 
the city continues to depend on tax revenue from the refinery, leading many, including many 
activists I interviewed, to argue they don’t want the refinery to close down, they just want it 
to be more stringently regulated.  Despite important innovations in just transition strategy, 
dependency on the refinery’s tax revenue lingers.151 
 
Meanwhile, in Burnaby, the local chapter of the largest private sector union in Canada 
(which represents many oil sands and refinery workers) spoke out against Kinder Morgan’s 
pipeline because the oil it transported would simply be moved through the city to be refined 
abroad rather than in Burnaby’s last ailing refinery. Although tar sands production has 
increased, four of the five refineries in Burnaby have closed down. As such there is a good 
deal of resentment amongst local building trade unions about the oil being transported 
through their city. Despite this, climate justice activists are so far offering relatively few just 
transition initiatives in Burnaby and British Columbia. This means the industry continues to 
speak for all workers when it makes claims about the pipeline being in the “national interest” 
 
151 CBE campaigner, Andrés Soto, was the most vocal in his enthusiasm for closing down the refinery.  In one 
interview, he proposed imposing a closure bond on Chevron so the company would pay the council for the cost 
of cleaning up and decommissioning the refinery when it does close (personal communication, July 11th, 2018). 
Indeed, decommissioning fossil fuel infrastructure, paid for through instruments like closure bonds, could play 
an important role in maintaining employment through the transition away from fossil fuels. However, this has 
not gained much traction amongst other activists in the city yet. 
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and providing jobs and revenue. The cities of Vancouver and Burnaby have passed relatively 
ambitious legislation to decarbonize their respective of economies, but the extent to which 
these do so in a way that would challenge relations of compliance is less obvious. Moreover, 
contrary to their image of environmental and social consciousness, British Columbia’s 
provincial government is currently doubling down on other fossil fuel industry projects, 
supporting plans to develop a fracked gas pipeline and export terminal in the north of the 
province. Rather than advancing energy transition, the British Columbian NDP remains 
committed to locking in more fossil fuel infrastructure. Finally, the geography of the pipeline 
crossing provincial borders means that just transition initiatives are also necessary at the 
federal level or at least along the entirety of the pipeline route, not just in Burnaby. Relations 
of compliance, and dependency on the industry, remains a particularly difficult terrain of 
struggle for the movement to intervene upon.  
 
Secondary targeting, and particularly divestment are major strategic avenues through which 
fossil fuel companies’ access to finance can be challenged. While the global fossil fuel 
divestment movement is an intervention in narrative, revoking the industry’s “social license 
to operate,” and so is an intervention more suited to the war of position, targeting banks and 
investors to divest from specific oil companies, and specific fossil fuel projects, can also be 
used to interrupt the dynamic of dependency the industry has upon access to capital. This 
intervention can be effectively combined with direct action to intensify the perception of 
conditions of risk and uncertainty amongst investors such that they perceive continued 
investment in a project as too great a financial risk.152 Shaking investor confidence, and 
 
152 In the confrontation with the Dakota Access Pipeline at Standing Rock, for example, divestment from 
Energy Transfer Partners and Sunoco was an important tool that placed a good deal of pressure on the banks 
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indeed Kinder Morgan’s confidence, was an important strategy in the effort to get banks to 
divest from the pipeline and force Kinder Morgan to abandon it. The weekly displays of civil 
disobedience, the provincial governments’ continued hostility, and the likelihood of losing 
the court case were enough for Kinder Morgan to divest from its own project. However, this 
is a tactic that is less likely to work now that the state has bought the pipeline and is not 
subject to the same financial pressures as private companies are. 
 
The tactics deployed in the war of economies are not always legible as tactics in a counter 
hegemonic theoretical framework. Nevertheless, it does appear that it is on this terrain of 
struggle that the movements’ tactics are least developed and most in need of innovation. 
Moreover, breaking the dependency communities have upon fossil fuel companies should not 
simply mean forming dependency on renewable energy companies instead, but rather 
establishing conditions of mutual or inter-dependency such that communities come to depend 
upon one another rather than on any particular industry. Nascent just transition initiatives 
illustrate a commitment to decentralized, decolonized, decarbonized, and democratized 
energy transition that promotes interdependency. Meanwhile, in both the US and Canada, the 
Green New Deal is gaining traction as a nation-wide top down policy agenda that could also 
break dynamics of dependency on fossil fuels.  
 
The Green New Deal has gained a great deal of support amongst contingents of the climate 
justice movement but is viewed with some suspicion by others. National coalitions like the 
 
investing the project to cut their support for it. Several large banks and investment funds, including the 
University of California, did. One of the most intense pressures on DAPL’s construction. Divestment was also 
an intervention that activists across the country could use to build solidarity with the fight in their local 
communities and so helped spread resistance across the country. 
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Climate Justice Alliance, for example, have withheld their endorsement of the agenda on the 
grounds that the proposals have not been inclusive enough of grassroots and bottom up 
solutions. There is a danger that the Green New Deal in its current form will break 
dependency on the industry only to reformulate it around the state and capitalist climate 
solutions. However, there remains an opportunity for more radical contingents of the 
movement to capture the Green New Deal narrative, the policy agenda, and the process of its 
implementation at local, state, and national levels. Doing so could unleash enormous 
resources that local communities could harness and use to innovate their own context specific 
interventions and energy transitions in the war of economies. As such the Green New Deal 
could be one of the most important interventions the movement has to deploy tactics on this 
terrain of struggle, but these must be implemented according to the principles of climate 
justice and the economics of a just transition.  
 
Coordinating the Carbon Rebellion 
 
A great diversity of tactics and strategic orientations are necessary to confront petro-
hegemony on all three terrains of hegemonic struggle. The diversity of interventions climate 
justice activists deployed is represented in the examples provided throughout this chapter. In 
Chapter Two, I proposed the carbon rebellion as a strategic framework through which 
activists might think about organizing a large diversity of counter hegemonic interventions 
into a flexible but coordinated alignment, capable of engaging with relations of consent, 
coercion and compliance, on each of their respective terrains of struggle. I suggested that the 
economics of a just transition could be the vehicle through which tactics are deployed in the 
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war of economies, the development of a political culture of opposition and creation would 
align tactics through the war of position is waged, and tactics would be developed through a 
regime of resilience to wage the war of maneuver. The climate justice movements’ strategies, 
narratives and tactics are not currently organized through the carbon rebellion framework or 
necessarily understood in terms of hegemonic contestation. This section illustrates how they 
could be.  
 
For the most part, the activists I interviewed didn’t appear to have a sense of the terrains of 
struggle upon which their tactics are deployed or how their strategies can be interpreted in 
terms of hegemonic struggle. What many do have, is a strong belief that their tactics should 
engage with culture and narrative, should confront governments and the state, and that they 
need to address the economics of energy transition. In other words, they were well aware that 
the climate justice movement needs to engage with “culture,” “politics,” and “the economy,” 
even if these weren’t interpreted as terrains upon which hegemonic relations of power are 
fought over. Using the carbon rebellion framework, I have interpreted these struggles over 
power in hegemonic terms and, in doing so, seek to demonstrate how the diversity of tactics 
being deployed in Blockadia could be organized and coordinated into an overarching 
strategic orientation that responds to petro-hegemony’s three relations of power.  
 
Organizing strategy and tactics in this way makes visible the interventions that are being 
prioritized and those which are being ignored. It allows us to map out the different points of 
intervention upon which struggle needs to take place. And it helps us make decisions about 
which tactics are most appropriate for engagement with each point of intervention. Thus, the 
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carbon rebellion is not only a descriptor of a repertoire of movement praxis, but also an 
analytical framework that activists can use to assess and map our own power, and plan and 
coordinate interventions across a whole range of tactical and strategic orientations. 
 
Categorizing tactical interventions according to the different terrains of struggle upon which 
they are most relevant is not intended to silo strategic orientations or interventions from one 
another. Indeed, these terrains are actually porous, intertwined and resonate with each other. 
As such, some tactics and strategies can be deployed on more than one terrain of struggle at 
the same time. For example, civil disobedience or land defense is an intervention that can 
help advance the war of position but can also be deployed in the war of maneuver to achieve 
a different set of objectives. Moreover, tactics deployed on one terrain of struggle can be 
done so with the deliberate intention of supporting tactics that are deployed on another terrain 
of struggle. Thus, winning influence on city council relies upon tactics deployed in the war of 
position, advances tactical interventions in the war of maneuver, and can reinforce tactics 
carried out in the war of economies. Allowing us to see how different tactics deployed on 
different terrains of struggle will interact with one another is one of the major strengths of 
coordinating and organizing them through the carbon rebellion. 
 
Activists can use the carbon rebellion framework to map out points of intervention, identify 
which points of intervention are or are not being engaged, make decisions about which 
tactics are appropriate for a particular terrain and point of intervention, and coordinate tactics 
across terrains of struggle so they reinforce one another. This may sound simple enough but 
coordinating a diversity of tactics in a coalition of actors with very different strategic 
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orientations, political analyses, and stakes, can be incredibly difficult. In Chapter Seven, I 
develop one approach that may help activists align a diversity of tactics into a coordinated set 
of strategies, which I call the spectrum of strategy. Ultimately both a spectrum of strategy 
and the ability to coordinate a diversity of tactics rests upon commitment to deep 
relationships, building trust, and willingness to disagree and learn existing between different 
movement constituents.  
 
Following the theory articulated in Chapter Two, to combat petro-hegemony climate justice 
activists must wage a war of position, a war of maneuver and a war of economies. As this 
chapter illustrates, many of the tactics and strategies that pertain to each terrain of struggle 
already exist and are being deployed, while others still need to be innovated. However, 
despite coalitions developing around the coordination of different strategies, the broad 
diversity of tactics that the movement is deploying has not yet been organized or coordinated 
in any formal or theoretical way. The carbon rebellion is a framework that seeks to bring our 
tactics together so that climate justice activists may deliberately coordinate their strategies 
and tactics to engage with petro-hegemony on all three terrains of struggle. The deliberate 
and coordinated, yet flexible and expansive, organization of these tactics is necessary 
because it can ensure that activists are deploying interventions that engage with each relation 
of power, it allows them to deploy the tactics that are most appropriate to each terrain of 
struggle and their corresponding points of intervention, and it allows them to align and take 
advantage of a whole range of theories of change and strategic orientations that already exist 
within the movement. This framework for action organizes counter hegemonic intervention 
by engaging with relations of consent, coercion, and compliance and recognizing that 
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different tactics and different strategies on different points of intervention are appropriate for 
each engagement.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The strategies, narratives, and tactics deployed on the frontlines of Blockadia campaigns in 
Richmond and Burnaby are numerous and diverse. Strategies have included community 
organizing, direct action and land defense, electoral strategy, lobbying, legal strategy, 
intensifying regulatory burden, story-based strategy, dual power, prefigurative politics, and 
performance politics. Meanwhile, their corresponding tactics have engaged many different 
points of intervention and won important victories against petro-hegemony. While the 
strategic repertoires in both case studies remain quite conventional, instances of their being 
deployed in tandem to work together are emerging. This is an exciting and important 
development in the climate justice movement and may help align different constituents 
around a diversity of tactics. Dual power has presented itself as one of the most important 
logics through which combinations of these interventions are already being experimented 
with. The carbon rebellion extends this logic to counter hegemonic intervention across all the 
relations of power upon which the fossil fuel industry maintains and extends its interests. 
 
Counter hegemonic intervention organized through the carbon rebellion framework can 
challenge petro-hegemony in relations of consent, coercion, and compliance on all three of 
their respective terrains of struggle. The campaigns of Blockadia under consideration in this 
dissertation have made their most significant gains through story-based strategy and narrative 
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intervention in relations of consent. Some of these gains have been institutionalized and 
consolidated through confronting the petro-state and deploying coercive tactics or gaining 
influence over state institutions’ coercive capabilities (for example winning influence over 
the Richmond city council). In other cases, however, (such as the FCA ruling) activists have 
managed to gain some influence over coercive apparatus without winning broader consent. In 
these latter instances, the campaigners’ victories appear much less certain. Meanwhile, 
interventions in relations of compliance are only just emerging and are so far 
underdeveloped. This is a terrain of struggle that desperately requires activists’ attention 
through strategies and tactics advancing the materialization of a just transition.  
 
I have by no means offered an exhaustive list of all the possible strategies and tactics 
available to climate justice activists. Rather, I have described and problematized those I 
identified in operation on the frontlines in my case study research. Different contexts of 
struggle will inevitably reveal different points of intervention and different strategies and 
tactics. Moreover, the carbon rebellion framework can be used to identify not only which 
strategies and tactics are being deployed in struggle but also those which are missing. As 
exploration of the terrain of struggle defined by compliance revealed, interventions through 
the war of economies have not yet been developed with anything like the consistency or 
ambition necessary to win against the industry on this terrain. This allows us to see that 
further innovation and development of strategic engagement in relations of compliance and 
its associated points of intervention are necessary. It may also be the case that there are some 
examples of dissent that do not immediately register as counter hegemonic strategy within 
the carbon rebellion framework. Examples of the complicated relationships between prayer, 
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ceremony, protest and performance explored in this chapter offer some illustration of this 
point. Therefore, we must not let this framework dictate what counts as strategy and what 
does not, but rather use it to complement and complicate our notions of strategic intervention. 
 
The carbon rebellion offers activists with a generalizable and cohesive framework through 
which to develop innovative coordination of tactics and strategies which can be 
contextualized in the specific conjunctures of different individual frontlines struggles.  These 
individual contexts will populate the framework with specific points of intervention existing 
across all three terrains of struggle that activists must intervene in and defeat the industry. 
However, if these tactics and strategies are to be coordinated and organized through the 
carbon rebellion, then we must first address some of the major schisms and debates over 
strategy that currently divide the climate justice movement into, sometimes tense, 
factionalism. In the next chapter I address some of these debates, identify possibilities for 
synthesis and synergy between them, and advance a concept I call the spectrum of strategy 
which I believe will be critical to the formation and cohesion of the carbon rebellion. 
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PART 4: DEBATES, QUESTIONS, AND SYNERGIES  
 
 
Chapter 7 - Schisms, Synthesis and Synergy: Towards a Spectrum of Strategy  
 
“Tsleil-Waututh Nation are the people of the inlet and it is our sacred obligation to protect 
the water. In our varied opposition to Kinder Morgan, we are many people paddling different 
canoes in the same direction” – Tsleil-Waututh Chief, Maureen Thomas.153 
 
Introduction 
 
In February 2018, the Tsleil-Waututh Nation’s Sacred Trust initiative tasked with 
coordinating the Nation’s opposition to the Trans Mountain pipeline issued a statement 
articulating their position on constituents of the local movement’s engagement in direct 
action. The epigraph above is an excerpt from their statement written by Tsleil-Waututh 
Chief, Maureen Thomas. I have introduced this chapter with their statement because it 
exemplifies the ethic of unity in difference that is necessary for opponents of petro-
hegemony who espouse quite different strategic orientations, and practice a large diversity of 
tactics, to agree upon a vision and shared direction despite their differences. The Tsleil-
Waututh Nation’s Chief and Council were committed to legal intervention through the 
judicial system, and most of the Nations’ decision makers have remained unwilling to engage 
in the civil disobedience or direct action throughout the campaign. Yet, Thomas’ statement 
reflects an openness to the many different strategic and tactical interventions it takes to 
confront colonialism and the fossil fuel industry. “We are many people paddling different 
 
153 Placing the excerpt in its original context, Thomas’ statement read: “We respect that all residents and TWN 
members have the right to voice their concerns and act according to their own beliefs and while direct action 
has played a vital role in moments of important social change, Tsleil-Waututh Nation Chief and Council are 
focused on the legal challenge that is currently being considered by the Federal Court of Appeals. Tsleil-
Waututh Nation are the People of the Inlet and it is our sacred obligation to protect the water. In our varied 
opposition to Kinder Morgan, we are many people paddling different canoes in the same direction.” The full 
statement can be found online on the Sacred Trust webpage: https://twnsacredtrust.ca/statement-tsleil-waututh-
nation-sacred-trust-on-direct-action/ 
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canoes in the same direction” captures this sentiment perfectly and, in general terms, climate 
justice activists throughout Blockadia would benefit from carrying this ethos with them into 
their disputes over strategy and tactics.  
 
This chapter elaborates on the major tensions, debates and schisms that exist between the 
different strategic orientations and tactical preferences identified and analyzed in Chapter 6. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to prescribe one tactic, strategy or theory of change over 
another. Quite on the contrary, following a theme developed throughout this dissertation, this 
chapter explores the potential for the synthesis and alignment of strategic orientations across 
quite different logics of intervention. It also acknowledges the deep-rooted antagonisms and, 
often justifiable, suspicion different constituents of the movement have towards one 
another’s strategic orientations. While remaining honest about the challenges these divisions 
pose and the difficulty of overcoming them, this chapter asserts that there is potential for 
convergence and even synergy amongst this diversity. I intervene upon three major 
arguments about strategy within the climate justice movement. These are, firstly, the extent 
to which the state or state institutions should, and plausibly can be, engaged with, worked 
through, ignored, or bypassed; secondly, when, where, and in which social contexts, direct 
action is an appropriate mode of intervention; and thirdly, whether community organizing or 
mass movement mobilization should be the strategic priority of activists in Blockadia. These 
often fraught disputes are primarily rooted in the different stakes actors have, or believe they 
have, in dominant institutions, versus perceptions of the extent to which these institutions 
exclude activists from participation. As such debates over strategy are as much about 
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political expression, ideology, and experiences of domination, as they are about the actual 
appropriateness of different tactics. 
 
I pose these debates as responses to three respective questions. Working through each of 
these questions I seek to reconcile some of the schisms between strategic orientations that 
often divides opponents of petro-hegemony. Arguing that there is a great deal of potential for 
alignment and synergy between these positions, while respecting the reasons such profound 
divides continue to produce friction between different activists, I illustrate how the 
differences between their positions may be synthesized to produce more powerful strategic 
analysis and a more holistic approach to counter hegemony. This process also affirms that the 
friction between opposing strategic orientations can be dialectical or generative, producing 
new strategic orientations and frameworks out of their contradictions. The successful 
coordination of tactics that can intervene on relations of consent, coercion, and compliance 
through the carbon rebellion will depend upon the extent to which activists are able to 
embrace not only a diversity of tactics but also a spectrum of strategy. 
 
The spectrum of strategy helps us understand the tactics deploy Blockadia in more inclusive 
terms. Following Naomi Klein’s direction, this chapter expands the notion of the blockade to 
encompass a large spectrum of strategic interventions that may be subsumed by the concept 
of, and praxis in, Blockadia (2014). Blockadia is, therefore, a space in which the multiplicity 
of interventions oriented towards halting the development of fossil fuels and advancing a just 
transition, may be considered in terms of enacting a blockade. Thus “blockading” the 
industry can refer to the whole range of tactics and strategies I observed on the frontlines. 
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This leads me to cautiously refuse the divisive politico-strategic dichotomy of radicalism 
versus reformism that can be pervasive in social movement spaces (Lakey 1976). This 
dichotomy conflates strategy with ideology such that activists come to identify with one 
another along lines of ideological commitment to one or another strategic orientation 
(Smucker 2017). Reformist strategy is then associated with politically moderate ideology 
which contradicts the climate justice movement’s political analysis, while so-called radical 
tactics are associated with a more systemic analysis of the climate crisis, so radical tactics are 
assumed to necessarily address the roots of the problem.  
 
Yet, if we examine the actual performance of these interventions, it becomes clear that no 
tactic or strategy is inherently reformist or inherently radical. While political ideology and 
strategy can never truly exist in isolation from one another, analyzing strategic intervention 
according to the political-ideological binary of “reformist” or “radical” fails to acknowledge 
the multiplicity of tactics necessary for intervention in hegemonic power relations. This 
insight will drive my analysis of the three debates explored throughout this chapter. 
 
Before engaging with these debates, however, I first want to explain how I will be 
differentiating between terms like strategy, tactics, strategic orientation and logics of 
intervention. In this chapter, each term has a distinct and specific meaning that are intended 
to help clarify concepts while allowing the discussion to unfold organically. Strategy, 
therefore, is a plan of operations designed to achieve an intended goal, which often responds 
to, or seeks to preempt, the operations of an opponent or adversarial force. Strategy is derived 
from a theory of change or selected theories of change, while tactics are derived from 
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strategy. Tactics are the individual actions taken to advance a general plan of operations, or 
to respond to an adversary’s actions and plan of operations. Strategy organizes tactics into a 
coherent plan and tactics follow that plan. A strategic action, therefore, is one that puts into 
motion a series of operations or actions that advance the stated objectives of the organization 
or individual in question. Some forms of intervention can either be a strategy or a tactic 
depending whether they are deployed as singular, one-off, actions in a series of other 
individual actions (a tactic), or whether they set the framework for a planned series of 
corresponding operations and actions (a strategy). Strategy, and corresponding tactics, can be 
developed according to which terrain of struggle and points of intervention they are intended 
to influence. However, it should also be noted that strategy and tactics can influence more 
than one terrain of struggle, and their corresponding relations of power, at a time. 
 
A theory of change is a mental map or narrative identifying the different conditions (and their 
relationships to one another) that one believes are necessary in order for social change to 
occur. A theory of change informs which strategies are preferred, when and whether ends 
justify means, the manifestation of particular tactics in particular contexts, and the extent to 
which a goal, action, or target is perceived to be realistic, radical, or reformist. Different 
theories of change may overlap and complement one another, or they may contradict each 
other. Actors may draw upon multiple overlapping theories of change at once.  Logic of 
intervention is a concept I use to connect a specific theory (or theories) of change to a 
specific strategy (or set of strategies), and those specific strategies to a particular set of 
tactics. This allows us to follow a logic of intervention beginning at a theory of change, 
flowing through strategic decisions, and manifesting in a particular set of tactics. Thus, 
 509 
tactical decisions become more easily legible when matched with strategic preferences which 
are derived from an identifiable theory of change. 
 
While all of this remains a rather regimented interpretation of the differences between theory, 
strategy and tactics, -  in which tactics are subordinated to strategy, and strategy to theory – it 
is a helpful schema for analyzing the relationships between the concepts as they tend to be 
deployed, and for illustrating their distinctions in common parlance. Nevertheless, I will try 
to resist some of the rigidity and order I’ve imposed on these categories by employing 
Adrienne Maree Brown’s concept of Emergent Strategy. In emergent strategy, plans are 
always flexible, and tactics are always fluid and adaptable because they emerge out of 
interaction with the specific relationships and contextualized conditions in which they are 
operating (2017). Here tactics are not necessarily subordinate to strategy but responsive, 
taking on a life of their own which is never entirely predictable or governable. Indeed, we 
could think of each of these categories existing in a dynamic relationship with one another, 
which choreographs and organizes counter hegemonic intervention while allowing space for 
fluidity and critical improvisation (Lipsitz and Rose 2014). Furthermore, the difference 
between emergent strategy and the regimented categorization laid out in the paragraph above 
may suggests at how different theories of change come to define the conceptual tools we use 
to explain and interpret radical social change. As such, throughout the chapter, I will be 
transparent about the ways my theory of change has been developed by, and has also 
informed my analysis of, the debates over strategies and tactics I observed and participated in 
in my field research.  
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Two more terms I will use throughout this chapter are strategic orientation and politico-
strategic orientation. When I refer to an organization, campaign, or individual’s strategic 
orientation, I am invoking their general disposition or relationship to one or another type of 
strategy. The term politico-strategic orientation adds another layer to this categorization by 
demonstrating how an individual, campaign, or organization’s political and ideological 
commitments influence their relationship to a particular strategy, narrative, or tactic. In other 
words, politico-strategic orientation is intended to demonstrate discernable instances in 
which ideology and perception of “stakes” in the system shape what is understood as 
strategic and unstrategic. To reiterate, no strategy or tactic is devoid of political ideology, and 
no social movement theory or strategist can perform what Donna Haraway (1988) calls the 
“god-trick” and claim an objective, apolitical view of strategy. However, it is sometimes 
quite clear when politics or ideology have had a large degree of influence over whether or not 
a strategy is adopted or tactical decision executed, particularly in instances where a different 
strategy or tactic might have been more appropriate. I distinguish between strategic 
orientation and politico-strategic orientation simply to draw our attention to the fact that 
strategic decisions are often made based upon the extent to which they reflect a political 
position or identity rather than on whether they are actually strategic. This allows for a more 
candid discussion of the limitations and potential for alignment across different logics of 
intervention.  
 
Engaging the state: Are the institutions of the state appropriate points of intervention on 
which climate justice activists can and should challenge petro-hegemony?154 
 
154 To clarify, although there are some overlaps,  this debate is not necessarily one that invokes Mann and 
Wainwright’s distinction between Climate Mao and Climate X, where Climate Mao presents the state in the 
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One of the major differences between different strategic orientations within the climate 
justice movement, and agents of social change in general, is whether, how, and the extent to 
which, our strategic and tactical focus should engage with the institutions of the state. By 
engagement with “institutions of the state” I specifically mean engagement with regulatory 
frameworks and agencies, judicial bodies, legislative bodies, policy and legislation, elections, 
city boards and commissions, and the coercive policing and disciplinary forces through 
which their authority is ultimately upheld. State institutions are, therefore, those institutions 
whose mandate is legally enforceable through coercion and, where necessary, violence. 
Moreover, by “engagement” I mean the deployment of strategy, tactics, and movement 
resources in these institutions as points of intervention on the terrain of struggle in which the 
war of maneuver takes place. Engagement can include a vast array of interventions, from 
participation in elections to lobbying elected officials, from attending public hearings to 
launching lawsuits, and from forming self-defense cadres to establishing security culture 
within activist organizations. Finally, the question of engaging the state not only involves 
whether it should be engaged but also how it can be engaged. 
 
In the next few paragraphs I’ll present the climate justice activists’ cases for and against 
different types of engagement with the state. Meanwhile, I will advance the thesis that state 
institutions are not only offer appropriate points of intervention, but abandoning them 
 
hands of the anti-capitalist left as the solution to the climate crisis and Climate X is an vowedly anti-
authoritarian and anti-planetary sovereignty approach to climate futures (Mann and Wainwritght’s four 
categories of possible climate futures are outlined in Climate Leviathan (2018)). I would place the movement 
emerging in Blockadia squarely in under the category of Climate X. Thus, the debate is between members of the 
climate justice movement who believe the state may offer some tools our movement can capture to challenge 
the fossil fuel industry, and those who believe our interventions must be independent of, autonomous of, and in 
the long run, a threat to, state sovereignty. 
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surrenders a terrain of struggle to the fossil fuel industry without a fight. Doing so makes it 
harder to institutionalize our movement’s discursive gains, coerce industry agents into taking 
actions against their will, and navigate our responses to petro-state violence and surveillance. 
Yet I also sympathize with those who are suspicious of the state and argue that we must 
remain wary of the reformist, and sometimes authoritarian, tendencies of the those who 
maintain a stake in the state. It is vital that we acknowledge many of the reasons why 
activists turned away from the state to inform instructions as to how our movement may 
engage state institutions while remaining accountable, anti-authoritarian, democratic, 
nonviolent, and radical. 
 
Ceding the state to the fossil fuel industry surrenders a terrain of struggle upon which the 
climate justice movement can make significant gains and consolidate discursive victories 
through coercive power. Smucker makes an important distinction between symbolic and 
institutional contests within counter hegemonic political strategy. Symbolic contest is the 
struggle over the meanings, narratives and culture that inform common sense (akin to 
Gramsci’s war of position), while the institutional contest is the struggle over the institutional 
capabilities, including and extending beyond, state power (mirroring Gramsci’s war of 
maneuver). As he writes, “if we, political challengers, win an uphill struggle over meanings 
and narratives…we have to extend the hegemonic contest beyond symbols, narratives, and 
meanings, and to move into the terrain of institutions, policies, and consolidation” (2017, 
149). Accordingly, political challengers must be comfortable with using coercive power 
against our opponents to consolidate our discursive victories in the state and other 
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institutions.155 Smucker explains that there are many on the social justice Left who are very 
happy to engage in the symbolic contest but who oppose engagement with institutional 
contest on principle, or are otherwise ambivalent about consolidating victories in state 
institutions. The case studies under analysis in this chapter, however, illustrate campaigns 
engaged in both symbolic and institutional contest where activists have made simultaneous 
interventions in narrative and meaning as well as sought to coerce the industry to the extent 
possible through lawsuits, regulatory action, elections, legislation, and the Native Rights-
Based Strategic Framework. 
 
Yet, as Smucker certainly acknowledges, those who oppose engagement with the state 
through institutional contest do so on principles rooted in compelling arguments. For one, as 
David Pellow explains in Total Liberation, antistatist currents, and particularly the anarchist 
environmental left, argue that the state cannot be divorced from its intended purpose of 
imposing violence to enshrine dominant racial, colonial, gendered, interspecies, and class 
orders (2014).156 To work through state institutions, and moreover to consolidate power 
within them, means accepting the inherent authoritarianism of the state and its coercive 
apparatuses, even while one may oppose the orders these uphold. 
 
 
155 As Smucker elaborates: “Most of us know full well that “power concedes nothing without a demand.” Yet 
social movements do sometimes get confused – or are in denial – about the fact that raising such a demand 
effectively amounts to an act of coercion.” (2017, 135).  
156 Pellow elaborates upon the environmental anarchist position on the state thusly: “If modern state formation 
is necessarily authoritarian, monopolistic, speciesist/dominionist, and heteropatriarchal, anarchism is, in 
opposition, supportive of values and practices that enable freedom and egalitarianism for all beings – human, 
nonhuman, and ecosystemic.” Its values are explicitly antistate because the state is fundamentally at odds with 
securing freedom and egalitarianism for all. This is the articulation of leftist environmental anarchist politics 
that I am using when I refer to anarchist currents and tendencies in the climate justice movement. 
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In addition, the state is perceived as entirely incapable of exerting its authority to halt 
environmental destruction. As Pellow writes, “antistatist politics fit comfortably into radical 
ecological movement discourses because so much of the history of mainstream 
environmental movements has involved a reliance on the state to prevent harm to 
ecosystems. That hope has been met by repeated betrayal and disappointment” (2014, 99). 
The contention here is not only that the movement should not work through state institutions 
to halt socio-ecological destruction, but also that it cannot work through them because the 
state is an instrument wholly incapable of addressing social-ecological destruction. 
 
Meanwhile, Indigenous scholars Glen Coulthard (2014) and Audra Simpson (2014) have 
powerfully argued against Indigenous peoples seeking rights-based recognition through 
colonial institutions like the court system, regulatory framework and the settler state end up 
legitimizing the settler state and assimilating themselves into settler colonialism. They’ve 
explained that working through these institutions reinforces and reifies settler colonialism 
which is counterproductive to any decolonizing strategy. From this view, a decolonial, 
radical, and emancipatory climate justice movement that engages in electoral politics and 
colonial judicial systems is contradicting its commitment to some of its foundational 
principles. Few of the professional campaigners and organizers I formerly interviewed 
actually expressed this view, but in informal conversations with some activists at the PTI 
camp, and in other activist spaces in the Bay Area, I encountered a deep skepticism of the 
state and its institutions. 
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Is it possible to keep these very valid points in mind while cautiously engaging state 
institutions nonetheless, or does the (perhaps inherently) authoritarian character of the 
modern state necessarily mean any engagement with it is corrupting and counterproductive to 
our movement? We can justifiably consider many amongst the anarchist environmental left 
that Pellow interviews to be the precise audience at whom Smucker’s provocation is targeted. 
Given that these constituents comprise a large number of the people who operate on the 
frontlines of Blockadia, we have to take this critique of engagement with the state seriously, 
or risk alienating a committed contingent of the climate justice movement.  
 
It is true that the regulatory, legislative, judicial and coercive apparatuses of the state have far 
more often been used to advance domination and ecological destruction than curtail it. 
Moreover, seeking rights-based recognition from the colonial state certainly does mean 
Indigenous peoples can become complicit in surrendering elements of their own self-
determination and self-governance. It is also true, however, that, in both the case studies, 
activists have deployed strategies to capture local government and win advantages in the 
judicial system that have placed coercive pressure on the fossil fuel industry to halt or change 
its operations. These absolutely did delay pipeline construction and significantly altered the 
upgrade of the Chevron refinery (to the extent that regulatory action has, for the meantime, 
more or less barred the refinery from processing tar sands from Canada). On their own, and 
deployed only at the local scale, it is likely that interventions such as these will only ever 
delay and alter projects. However, when they are combined with other tactics, they could 
obstruct fossil fuel infrastructure indefinitely. Therefore, it is at least demonstrable that 
capturing the coercive capacities of state institutions can alter, delay, and potentially halt 
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fossil fuel development. The question remains, should we capture these points of 
intervention? 
 
There exists a tendency towards reformism157 and compromise amongst many mainstream 
environmental organizations that work closely with state institutions that many amongst the 
more radical contingents of the climate justice movement find difficult to tolerate. This 
tendency, as the Engler brothers suggest, is both ideological and structural. For example, 
such organizations have “just enough at stake – relationships with mainstream politicians, 
financial obligations to members, collective bargaining contracts – to make them fear 
lawsuits and political backlash when it comes to sustained civil disobedience” (2017, 28). 
The Englers cite labor movement strategist, Stephen Lerner, who says that, in particular, 
large nonprofits have become “just big enough – and just connected enough to the political 
and economic power structure – to be constrained from leading the kinds of activities that are 
needed” (ibid). This, as Vasey argues, has led to larger mainstream NGOs being accused of 
selling out frontline communities and operating according to the logic of an “NGO-Industrial 
complex.” As such, the perception of reformist tendencies amongst mainstream NGOs is the 
source of deep-rooted division between the environmental and environmental justice 
movements (2014). Nonprofits providing movements with legal assistance, electoral 
strategists, and with relationships to state institutions tend to (but in the case studies under 
consideration did not necessarily) advocate for less confrontational strategies. Through their 
participation in state institutions they gain enough of a stake in the dominant system that 
 
157 I said I would not be making distinctions based on reformist vs. radical strategic orientations within the 
climate justice movement but here I make an exception because I am not convinced that organizations that are 
prepared to make the kind of compromises these organizations are belong in the climate justice movement. 
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more direct confrontation becomes perceived as unstrategic. This is how and why critics left 
tend to view operating through the state as inherently corrupting of values and prone to 
inadequate, often counterproductive, compromise. 
 
Despite these valid criticisms, I find that a sweeping and unnuanced condemnation of the 
state as inherently and necessarily corrupting of movement goals and principles is 
inappropriate and unhelpful. This is because, as these case study interventions suggest, 
climate justice activists are perfectly capable of maintaining an insightful critique of the state 
and its corrupting influence, and remaining accountable to the broader movement, while also 
finding strategic points of intervention to target vulnerabilities in petro-hegemony. Activists 
demonstrated this on numerous occasions. For example, the RPA members I interviewed 
didn’t necessarily share the anarchist critiques of the state, but they were certainty profoundly 
cognizant of the importance of accountability and transparency between RPA-backed city 
councilmembers, the RPA itself, and the community. How that accountability should be 
manifested was the subject of intense debate within the group but, at least in my estimation, 
their commitment to accountability was a foundational value shared in common. 
 
Moreover, crowdsourcing policy and issue-based campaigns directly from community town 
halls and public meetings and then institutionalizing these through contesting local 
governance has created conditions in which residents of Richmond can develop just solutions 
to the city’s problems for themselves with access to resources from local government. 
Meanwhile capturing local government allowed the local movement to reign in Chevron’s 
excessive influence over decision-making, force it to pay more taxes, and agree to 
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concessions it would never have submitted to voluntarily. These interventions illustrate what 
sociologist and activist, George Lakey, described as “reforms, which, if they can be achieved, 
involve such a shift in power that they can fairly be called “revolutionary reforms”” (1976, 5-
6). Revolutionary reforms allow movements to gain footholds, take up new positions, and 
shift institutional and discursive conditions in a way that makes longer term revolutionary 
objectives more achievable. They are an excellent example of how the climate justice 
movement currently leverages state intuitions to advance its more revolutionary objectives. 
 
Similarly, the legal intervention against the Trans Mountain pipeline delayed the project for 
over a year. Even after the pipeline was bought by the Canadian government, intervention 
through judicial institutions of the state has undeniably helped prevent the project’s 
completion. The quotidian invasions of First Nations sovereignty without consent has not 
been stopped, but this particular case of colonial incursion has been held at bay by using the 
unique rights and tools available to Canada’s First Nations that they fought to be included in 
the colonial court system decades earlier. These unique legal tools available to native peoples 
can be used against colonial intervention through the settler colonial state. Both examples 
show that whether or not climate justice activists can and should intervene in the institutions 
of the state is not nearly as unambiguous as either side of the debate might suggest. 
 
The state is a coercive entity with violent capabilities and a surveillance infrastructure 
beyond anything the climate justice movement can match. Through the petro-state, these 
capabilities are placed at the disposal of fossil fuel companies and can, and often are, used to 
repress environmental and climate justice activist. As resistance to DAPL at Standing Rock 
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so clearly demonstrated, if the petro-state’s violent intimidation, surveillance, and sabotage 
of anti-fossil fuel activists cannot be curtailed, moments of mass mobilization can be brutally 
crushed. Gaining influence within, or access to, state institutions may be one way to stop 
these coercive tools from being deployed against activists. The case studies under 
consideration in this chapter show that the policing and repression of environmental activists 
can be exposed and alleviated through capturing or gaining advantages in state institutions. 
For example, in British Columbia, one of the more effective uses of movement allies in the 
provincial government has been to ban the industry’s use of SLAPP suits against activists. 
 
Stephen Collis, an activist and academic who was targeted by a SLAPP suit during the 
confrontation on Burnaby Mountain in 2014, explains these were used to intimidate activists 
into capitulation: 
 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation -- or SLAPPs -- are lawsuits brought 
against group of citizens, usually alleging that the group has committed defamation, 
trespass, or some other civil wrong, which have the effect of curtailing political 
engagement over a public issue. These lawsuits generally involve damage claims and 
requests for injunctive relief, and place a chill on public engagement. The impact of a 
such lawsuit, when brought by a major corporation and claiming millions of dollars in 
damages, cannot be overestimated. The prospect of losing one’s house would test the 
political mettle of anyone. (2015, 34) 
 
In response to Kinder Morgan’s use of state intimidation on Burnaby Mountain in 2014, and 
under pressure from environmental organizations, politicians friendly to the movement under 
the newly elected Green Party-backed-NDP provincial government introduced and 
unanimously adopted anti-SLAPP legislation in March 2019 (Jones 2019). This legislation 
prevents oil companies from intimidating its opponents through frivolous but expensive legal 
proceedings. Similarly, Burnaby’s mayor and city councilors who oppose the pipeline, are 
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continuing to refuse pay for the costs of the RCMP’s policing of the protests on Burnaby 
Mountain. As former mayor, Derek Corrigan told me, “we keep telling them over and over 
again, well, it's like getting blood from a stone because you're not getting it, you know, so we 
want to make clear all this money's on you, and if you keep spending money like a drunken 
sailor… you're going to be the ones who have to absorb it” (personal communication, June 
12th, 2018). The current mayor of Vancouver, former MP Kennedy Stewart, was arrested 
outside the Kinder Morgan tank farm prior to his mayoral election and the current mayor of 
Burnaby continues to oppose the pipeline. 
 
In Richmond, meanwhile, RPA city councilmembers have consistently challenged the 
entrenched interests of the Richmond Police Officers’ Association (RPOA), which Andrés 
Soto dubbed “attack dogs for Chevron.” There is little evidence to suggest that Chevron 
officials ever coordinated with the local police to repress dissent, however, it clear that the 
RPOA and Chevron shared political enemies and the RPOA would consistently send out 
attack ads on RPA members during elections. Steve Early describes how the policing of 
dissent has changed under the RPA as Richmond’s, then-new now-retired, police chief 
instituted reforms that were intended to be more respectful of the public’s right to protest 
(2017). Of course, none of these interventions actually dismantle the violent, colonial, and 
authoritarian tendencies of the state, but they are not necessarily intended to. What they do 
achieve is the ability to manage and curtail the petro-state’s coercive capacities and give 
activists some institutional cover and support while they make interventions against petro-
hegemony across all three terrains of struggle. 
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Nevertheless, it could be argued that the way to prevent (petro-)state repression is not to seek 
advantages within state institutions but to resist the state by implementing security culture 
within organizations, providing support for political prisoners, or otherwise blocking the 
advances of law enforcement, and when necessary learning to physically defend yourself 
(Pellow 2014).158 No doubt, there are times and contexts where these are appropriate and 
there are times and contexts when such tactics are inappropriate. Indeed, all tactics require a 
time and a place, a context in which to operate most effectively. When we learn more about 
how context shapes what tactics are or are not appropriate, we may open up our strategic 
repertoires to greater tactical improvisation and flexibility. This comes with experience it is 
also challenging. It is often difficult to read a particular context and know exactly what is and 
is not appropriate, let alone finding agreement on collective readings of what is appropriate. 
For example, practicing security culture has gained particular resonance amongst some of the 
younger, more confrontational contingents of the climate justice movement. Security culture 
at its simplest means being cognizant of the fact that movements are often subject to 
infiltration by law enforcement and therefore taking precautions to protect you and your 
colleagues from incrimination (ibid). These precautions might include encryption 
technology, only participating in direct action through affinity groups, staying silent about 
participation in direct actions except with your affinity group, and remaining cautious of 
newcomers. Taking such precautions, it is argued, can protect movements from state 
repression. 
 
158 As Pellow suggests, in environmental activism, these practices tend to be more prevalent amongst the 
autonomous cells and affinity groups of the Animal Liberation Front, Earth Liberation Front, and Earth First! 
These groups are more open to tactics like sabotage and property destruction and would therefore require 
greater levels of anonymity and self-defense (2014). However, some of these currents have bled into frontlines 
activism in Blockadia, particularly amongst some contingents at Standing Rock, with security culture being 
especially prevalent. 
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While security culture may be necessary amongst affinity groups participating in smaller, 
clandestine operations, it is inappropriate, and probably impossible, for mass mobilization 
and mass action of the sort more commonly found in the climate justice movement. 
Moreover, security culture can lead to internal paranoia and division within organizations as 
constituents second guess whether or not they can trust the person they’re talking to. Trust is 
a crucial component of movement building, but security culture necessarily involves 
withholding trust. It also limits the potential size of organizations as the attitude of 
cautiousness undoubtedly alienates newcomers. One activist, who gave a detailed and 
nuanced account of the strengths and limitations of security culture in Vancouver and 
Burnaby, suggested that while security culture can be vital to ensuring certain direct action 
tactics aren’t prevented before they can even occur, they had also seen examples of security 
culture being used as a gatekeeping tool to assert an individual’s power and authority in 
social movement spaces. 
 
In his pioneering research on the history of police infiltration of environmental and social 
justice organizations in the UK, Connor Woodman suggests that “Instead of attempting to 
halt infiltration at a group level, our strategy should be two-fold: a) campaign for infiltration 
and surveillance to outlawed at a national level, and b) organize on as open, deep, and broad 
a basis as possible” (2018). In response to the ubiquity of the surveillance state and its vastly 
superior resources, this practice of radical transparency would “render infiltration 
redundant.” As such practicing security culture and learning self-defense is appropriate for 
affinity groups carrying out disruptive but relatively small-scale tactics, but they are hardly a 
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realistic response to the scale and superiority of state infiltration and repression of 
environmental activist groups and mobilizations. Paradoxically, curtailing state violence by 
gaining some advantages in state institutions may be the most appropriate strategy. 
 
To conclude this conversation, I would argue that the different constituents of the climate 
justice movement need to arrive at an understanding that while the state is violent, 
authoritarian, tends towards compromise or moderation, and can corrupt social movement 
principles, it is at the same time possible to intervene in and capture state institutions that can 
help activists consolidate victories, curtail repression, and deploy coercive capacities against 
the fossil fuel industry without conceding the radical principles of climate justice. For all 
constituents of the movement, from the autonomists and anarchists to the reformers, this may 
mean that what matters most is whether the vision of change and justice being articulated is 
one that relies mostly or entirely on state institutions bringing about that change or whether 
state institutions are perceived as just some of the many points of intervention existing on a 
larger terrain of struggle. If our engagement in state institutions is presented as being limited 
and surgically precise interventions on a much longer pathway to change, then it could both 
refuse state dominance while working with and through the state towards a more 
revolutionary and emancipatory  agenda. The different constituents of the movement do not 
have to align on the nuances of their precise ideological or political relationship to the state 
but enduring trust, accountability and solidarity amongst them will depend upon their coming 
to some kind of agreement concerning their strategic orientations to the state. As such, there 
seems to be little reason why these different perspectives cannot be synthesized to produce a 
 524 
cogent and nuanced set of norms for activists who view engagement with the state 
institutions as strategic but are also aware of the state’s fundamental limitations. 
 
The Value of Direct Action: When is direct action an appropriate intervention in petro-
hegemony? 
 
Most, if not all, strategic orientations contained within the climate justice movement would 
likely agree that direct action can be a useful intervention in the power relations that uphold 
the fossil fuel industry. Less harmonious, however, are the diversity of perspectives 
concerning when direct action is an appropriate and valuable intervention. There are some 
organizations and activists who view direct action only as a tool of last resort, to be deployed 
when all other options have run out. There are others whose organizational capacity is built 
around supporting and carrying out direct action tactics, pursuing a belief that only direct 
action achieves campaign objectives. And, of course, there exists a great deal of variance 
between these positions.  
 
This section’s argument is developed primarily with illustrations from Burnaby because this 
is where the disagreements over direct action tactics and strategy were most visible. In 
Burnaby, I observed and recorded activists’ arguments that, on the one hand, their campaign 
should deploy more confrontational direct action tactics or “turn up the heat,” and, on the 
other, that direct action was “vanguardist,” jeopardized other strategic interventions, and that 
it should only be used once less confrontational interventions had been exhausted. While 
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presenting the different dimensions of these arguments below, I advance three corollary 
arguments.  
 
First, I argue that while direct action is often a crucial component of social movement 
activity, it requires legitimizing. This legitimacy, however, can be built through the action 
itself rather than necessarily waiting for “the right conditions” to emerge. Second, I argue 
that activists would benefit from a shared framework for evaluating the conditions in which 
direct action could be considered appropriate.  While context clearly matters when assessing 
whether direct action strategy should be deployed, the terms upon which that context is 
judged varies according to different activists’ ideological commitments, experiences and 
perceptions of personal stakes. I show how we might evaluate the conditions for whether 
direct action is appropriate based upon whether or not those conditions will allow for the 
emergence of Stephen D’Arcy’s three requirements of direct action (that its tactics are 
relentless, that they are deployed in an escalatory trajectory, and that they grow the base of 
participation and support) (2014).159 Thirdly, and finally, I argue that if direct action can be 
legitimized and the conditions in which it would be deployed satisfy D’Arcy’s three criteria, 
then it is not only appropriate but can also support and supplement other strategic 
interventions, particularly, and most relevantly to Burnaby, through the judiciary system.    
 
In reflections on his own involvement in activism against Kinder Morgan’s pipeline during 
the standoff at Burnaby Mountain in 2014, activist, poet, and academic, Stephen Collis, 
 
159 Note here the distinction between direct action strategy and direct action tactics. This section focuses the 
conversation on when conditions for direct action as a strategy are appropriate rather than when one off direct 
actions tactics are appropriate. 
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describes the failure of different groups favoring different tactics to work together. He 
explains that there were three factions on Burnaby Mountain during the 2014 standoff: the 
professionalized NGO campaigners and First Nations representatives, volunteer 
organizations comprised primarily of local retirees and nearby residents, and grassroots 
leftist/anarchist autonomously organized groups of younger Indigenous and settler activists. 
Below he describes the relationship between the local residents’ organizations and the 
autonomous grassroots groups: 
 
The first group [the local residents organizations] was anxious about the second 
group’s direct action focus, worried that more “radical” tactics like occupations and 
blockades would wind up losing the support of the “general public,” and felt that, 
tactically, a more moderate approach, loosely affiliated with the City of Burnaby, was 
most likely to succeed under these circumstances. The second group, in turn, felt that 
the first group’s tactics would take too much time, that Kinder Morgan would waltz 
in to do its work despite popular opposition and the attempts of the City of Burnaby 
to stop them… and that, contrary to the first group’s worries, the “general public” 
would be galvanized and motivated by the actions of protestors on the ground, giving 
their all to stop the pipeline. (2015, 26) 
 
Meanwhile, the third group, the professional NGOs and First Nations representatives, either 
preferred to stay clear of direct action tactics, or otherwise sought to coordinate and 
orchestrate them in a precise, targeted, and controllable way. In the few years since the 2014 
confrontation on Burnaby Mountain, these three groups seem to have resolved some of their 
differences, but tensions certainly do remain.  
 
By 2018, BROKE and other residents’ groups were participating in direct action tactics like 
die-ins, disruptive street theatre, and attending the blockades at the gates. As Susanne from 
BROKE told me of her thoughts about the differences between strategic orientations, “I've 
got a very general acceptance that there's a wide variety of people and methods and ideas, but 
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I’m definitely no violence. If you want to do violence, I'm not interested in an action 
anywhere near you”160 (personal communication, May 24th, 2018). She added that there were 
other organizations who deployed tactics that were “a little bit outside of [her] comfort zone” 
but that she’d be willing to support them. As she put it, “I'm not a, you know, in your face 
and get arrested and make a big noise [person]… I'll help you do that, but I don't necessarily 
want to be doing that” (S. Jackson, personal communication, May 24th, 2018). Susanne’s 
comments suggested that some of the tactical divisions that existed in 2014 had been 
ameliorated. However, even in 2018, Camp Cloud, which hosted many of the autonomist 
anarchist activists, was situated just a few hundred feet away from the PTI camp on Burnaby 
Mountain, and illustrated a continuing divide between politico-strategic orientations amongst 
different practitioners of direct action about how direct action should be deployed. Relations 
between Camp Cloud and PTI varied between an agreement to treat one another as good 
neighbors, agreeing to disagree but maintaining friendly relations, and outright resentment. 
During the 2018 mobilizations, some interviewees would comment on the differences 
between Camp Cloud and PTI to allude to the broader politico-strategic divides about direct 
action within the movement, while others were cautious of all direct tactics at this stage in 
the campaign. 
 
As Collis’ observations allude to, one of the major arguments those who are more cautious of 
direct action will often offer is that such tactics haven’t yet been legitimized amongst “the 
general public” and so the time to deploy them just isn’t right yet. Without legitimizing direct 
 
160 Different activists mean slightly different things when they use the term “violence.” Here I interpreted 
Susanne’s understanding of violence as physical harm to people and physical damage to property that is 
deployed to achieve movement goals. 
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action, the tactics will end up alienating audiences and shrink or limit the campaign’s base of 
participation and support. The argument makes a good deal of sense because counter 
hegemonic mass movements seeking to build a new consensus should be ensuring that they 
are growing rather than shrinking their base of support. One of the easiest ways for direct 
action tactics to be legitimized is for campaigners to demonstrate that they had no other 
choice but to use them. For example, when the legal political opportunity structures through 
which activists and the community at large can register dissent and make demands are closed 
off to them, activists can legitimately claim that they had no choice but to escalate their 
tactics. 
 
Unfortunately, “the time just not being right” can be an argument that is extended 
indefinitely because it is often very difficult to know whether direct action will be perceived 
as legitimate until it happens. Additionally, different groups have different stakes in, and 
levels of access to, those political opportunity structures, and therefore, different perceptions 
of when they’ve been excluded from the legal political opportunity structures. As such, “the 
time not being right” can become a de facto rejection of direct action tactics even if it is not 
officially recognized as one. Activists on all sides of this debate place a high premium on the 
ability to demonstrate the legitimacy of direct action tactics, and legitimacy clearly matters. 
Yet, amongst several interviewees there existed an assumption that activists must wait for the 
right conditions before direct action could be perceived as legitimate. It is this indefinite 
“waiting” for the right conditions that frustrates many who believe escalation is more 
immediately necessary. They argue that activists can also create the “right conditions” 
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through their form of direct action where the action itself provides activists with a platform 
through which to legitimize it and attract more participants whilst it is happening. 
 
In this light, the 2018 camps, civil disobedience, and blockades on Burnaby Mountain can be 
read in two ways. On the one hand, they emerged after the 2017 provincial election had 
demonstrated a great deal of opposition to the pipeline throughout British Columbia, the 
NEB had been thoroughly delegitimized and Kinder Morgan was struggling to adjust to a 
new political environment. Therefore, we might assume that across different groups’ varying 
politico-strategic orientations the time did indeed appear right for direct action. On the other 
hand, the timing being right and direct action having been perceived as legitimate may only 
appear so in retrospect. In other words, maybe it is only after the fact that we perceive direct 
action as having been a legitimate intervention all along. This means activists would have 
produced the legitimizing narrative for direct action through its form of intervention and 
whilst it was being deployed. In this case, as Collis puts it, “the “general public” [is] 
galvanized and motivated by the actions of protestors on the ground” (2015, 26). This 
suggests that activists do not always need to wait for the “right conditions” to emerge before 
taking direct action but can, instead, produce those condition through their action.  
 
It is difficult to say which perspective is more accurate given the multitude of examples and 
counter examples on both sides. And, moreover, given how one probably influences the 
other.  However, what this case does suggest is that the argument that “the time just isn’t 
right” is flawed in part because through carefully and strategically orchestrated direct action 
the right time can, at least sometimes, be produced through direct action itself. Thus, one of 
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the conditions by which to judge the appropriateness of direct action rests upon an 
assessment of whether direct action strategy will be able to legitimize itself in the moment, 
and/or when the contextual conditions provide direct action tactics with legitimacy. 
Legitimacy is relevant to all three of D’Arcy’s criteria because without the perception of 
legitimacy direct action cannot grow the base of participation, cannot be deployed 
relentlessly or escalate further. 
 
Yet, organizer’s with groups like Dogwood continued to voice concern about escalating 
direct action tactics in 2018 period. Dogwood’s communications director, Kai Nagata, 
reflecting on national polls demonstrating a decline in public support for pipeline opponents, 
questioned whether the adoption of civil disobedience and direct action may have been 
responsible: 
 
You’ve probably noticed this shift in the polling in the last few months. I don’t know 
yet why, I haven’t done a deep dive, but I would note that this has coincided with 
Protect the Inlet, and the more public examples of civil disobedience, and the 
resulting counter campaign in the media locally and nationally to paint protesters as 
being unreasonable and unwilling to compromise, as lawbreakers. I don't know how 
much of that is connected and how much of it is coincidence, because there's a whole 
backdrop of other very expensive and effective campaign work that's being 
undertaken by the government and by the fossil fuel companies. But basically, there's 
a correlation that I’ve seen in the last few months between direct action and shrinking 
public support. So that's troubling, I don’t know what to make of it. I hope we can do 
some sort of a post-mortem as a movement to see whether those are connected. 
(personal communication, May 17th, 2018) 
 
It’s important to note that Kai posed this correlation as a question not a statement of fact, but 
posing the question nonetheless suggests that some campaigners thought it at least possible 
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that direct action and escalation on Burnaby Mountain was giving the discursive advantage to 
their adversaries.161 
 
Laura Benson, Dogwood’s director of organizing, articulated similar concerns about civil 
disobedience: 
 
They have sort of gotten started ahead of time, and from Dogwood’s perspective, I 
think we've continued to be at the point where like “well, we haven't exhausted 
everything else,” right, so there still are other tactics and strategies that are viable for 
people to be working on and so it still hasn’t quite gotten to that point. (personal 
communication, May 18th, 2018) 
 
Laura’s suggestion that civil disobedience was premature because other tools had not been 
exhausted is an excellent example of a strategic orientation that places a premium on 
legitimizing direct action before it occurs.  
 
Reflecting on whether she, personally, would take part in civil disobedience, Laura said “It 
just doesn’t seem like the time is right yet… because once you're arrested, then you're 
charged, you're facing criminal charges and you can’t go back and do it again. So, when are 
you going to use your chance to put your body on the line? I don’t know, there’s still lots to 
do!” However, Laura added that there was an important contrast to be made between the 
2018 round of escalation and the confrontation on Burnaby Mountain in 2014. She explained 
that compared to the 2018 blockades of the gates, direct action in 2014 “seemed to garner a 
 
161 Kai later told me that while “it was hard to make the case in March 2018 that all other possible avenues of 
resistance had been exhausted” in order to justify civil disobedience, this is not necessarily the case just over a 
year later. The Trudeau government’s response to the pipeline permits being overturned in court and its further 
commitment to the pipeline following the fall election in 2019 has closed political opportunity structures that 
had been available previously. Winning the appeals case is one of the steps Dogwood campaigners believed 
needed to be carried out before turning to civil disobedience. Again, this illustrates how different readings of the 
context of struggle can legitimize or justify direct action and civil disobedience at different times. 
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lot of public support… the polling then was really very favorable towards the people who 
were taking action” (personal communication, May 18th, 2018). One of differences between 
these movement moments was in the policing of the protest, and another was that new 
political opportunity structures for engagement in the democratic system were perceived by 
some to have opened up after the 2017 provincial election.  Both Kai and Laura’s comments 
did not suggest an opposition to direct action and those participating in it general, but instead 
placed their caution in the context of the specificities of the movement moment. Neither, it 
seemed, believed that in this moment, relentless and escalatory, action that grew the 
movement’s base of support would be possible. 
 
Clearly, legitimacy matters. However, by emphasizing the perception of direct action’s 
legitimacy over its instrumental function we may confuse the difference between expressive 
direct action and an instrumental direct action.  When a tactic is expressive, its purpose is 
changing narratives and growing the movement’s base of support, thus its perceived 
legitimacy is a crucial component of the action. When the action’s function is also, or 
primarily, instrumental, however, its objectives are also to physically disrupt, halt, or change 
the opponent’s activities. For example, direct action in the form of blockades at the Trans 
Mountain tank farm gates was primarily expressive in that it sought to shift discursive 
conditions against the industry. Direct action in this instance would have become an 
instrumental intervention if it had also sought to physically obstruct the flows of labor, 
capital, and infrastructure into and out of the tank farm that made building the pipeline 
possible. The strategy, therefore, becomes one of physically disrupting the flow of materials 
upon which the company depends to force it into submission. The question then, is whether 
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this kind of strategy is also contingent upon perceptions of legitimacy or whether I would 
argue that it does because for a strategy of this sort to force the company into submission the 
tactics must follow D’Arcy’s criteria: they must escalate, they must grow the base of 
participation, and they must be deployed relentlessly. It is very difficult to imagine a scenario 
in which activists could meet any of these three criteria without also winning legitimacy at 
the very least within the community in which it would be deployed.162 
 
Most activists that I interviewed would agree that the legitimacy of direct action strategy 
depends upon the context and conditions in which it would be deployed. However, finding 
alignment on how to judge whether those conditions are appropriate for direct action is much 
harder. This is because ideology, stakes in the system, and politico-strategic preferences tend 
to influence how we read the conditions we’re judging. It may help, therefore, to agree on 
some very basic criteria upon which we might evaluate whether conditions are appropriate 
for the deployment of direct action. Whether direct action is able to be deployed 
“relentlessly,” on an “escalating trajectory,” and grow the movement’s “base of 
participation” and support are indicators of whether or not the strategy is appropriate 
(D’Arcy 2014, 289). Of course, the impact of direct action is contingent on a whole range of 
other factors too (many outside activists’ control).  
 
D’Arcy measures provides us with some fundamental criteria with which to assess whether 
conditions are appropriate for direct action.  Evaluating the appropriateness of direct action 
 
162 Even instrumental direct action interventions that do not require large numbers of participants must still have 
at least some public support, otherwise they can be very easily repressed and their tactics will alienate potential 
allies. 
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then becomes a question of whether conditions are currently, or potentially, suitable for 
direct action to be deployed relentlessly, on an escalating trajectory, while growing the base 
of support and participation. If they are, or if activists can make them so, then direct action 
could be an appropriate strategy. If conditions cannot be produced that would allow activists 
to deploy direct action relentlessly, on an escalating trajectory, and growing its base of 
participation, then direct action as an instrumental strategy probably isn’t appropriate 
(although as an expressive tactic, it still could be). However, as we use “legitimacy” and the 
ability of direct action to build the movement’s base of participation and support, we should 
also be wary of how appeals to the base of support could limit our political imaginations and 
moderate our interventions. Using legitimacy as a measure for a tactic’s perceived 
appropriateness may risk of watering down the possibilities of proposing a more radical 
vision and set of interventions for the movement where the base of support is assumed to be 
less radical, or more reformist and conservative than the activists carrying out these tactics.  
 
We might avoid this scenario by considering not whether the tactic may or may not be 
perceived as legitimate, but rather how we might produce conditions that increase the 
chances that it will be perceived as legitimate.  In other words, activists can 
politicize and educate the base of support so that it accepts radical tactics, rather than 
tailoring and moderating their tactics to fit within the worldviews of a more 
moderate or docile movement base. We also should not assume that the base necessarily will 
be more moderate than those deploying these tactics. Therefore, I want to emphasize here the 
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extent to which activists can produce conditions that legitimize direct action rather than 
simply waiting on conditions to change before engaging in direct action.163 
 
Direct action on Burnaby Mountain in 2018 remained symbolic and largely expressive as 
opposed to instrumental. Thomas explained that this had begun a conversation about whether 
it was worth getting arrested during symbolic actions. As he characterized the conversation: 
 
There have been almost 250 arrests, and a lot of those have been arrests which people 
would understand more as symbolic. They’ve been at the site of the Kinder Morgan 
tank farm, but they haven't been really arrests that have stopped work and cost the 
company money… So there's been a conversation about how has that been 
worthwhile, and what's been the most useful? … Most of those arrests have been 
organized by Protect The Inlet … and they'll go speak to their strategic interest in 
keeping Kinder Morgan in public discourse in the media, and how useful those arrests 
are, and how powerful it is for people to demonstrate how committed [they] are… 
And being part of the media narrative is very important. And then there's been 
another sector of people who said, like, “if you're gonna get arrested, it has to have a 
more direct financial consequences on the company in the immediate sense…” (T. 
Davies, personal communication, September 28th, 2018) 
 
Here Thomas suggests that the organizations coordinating direct action at the gates were 
primarily focused on using media interest in arrests to keep a national spotlight on the 
movement’s narrative. The symbolism and performance involved in the blockades would 
create media spectacles that helped achieve this objective.  
 
These rolling blockades, it is worth noting, were relentless (occurring every weekend for 
several months) and maintained a large enough base of support to keep up moral and 
participation in civil disobedience throughout the summer, despite (and perhaps partly 
 
163 This is true to a Gramscian theory of change which suggests we must gain legitimacy through waging a war 
of position before we deploy our coercive assaults on the hegemon. The war of position is all about how we 
create conditions of legitimacy that allow us to make more radical interventions. To this, I would add, why not 
think about how we can gain legitimacy while we make these more radical interventions. 
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because of) intensifying legal repercussions. However, they were not particularly escalatory 
and, as such, the actions usually stopped short of directly interfering with the tank farm’s 
daily operations. While, the weekly arrests of climate justice activists throughout the spring 
and summer of 2018 did keep some media focus on their narrative, their inability to produce 
a moral crisis led some interviewees to question whether the campaign escalation had gone 
far enough.  
 
Some activists, like those Thomas identified as wanting the blockades to have had more 
direct financial consequences for the company, believed direct action needed to escalate to be 
more disruptive and actually prevent work from happening at the tank farm or disrupt 
business as usual in the city. As an excerpt from one anonymous interviewee illustrates: 
 
There's ways to solve problems that aren’t conventional and I think these groups 
should be using these kind of ways… I think everybody should get their old beat up 
cars and just go park them on the Lions Gate Bridge and chain them all together and 
all these bankers and brokers wouldn't be able to get to work from West 
Vancouver…or spread roofing nails across the bridge in the morning. And then you’d 
hear all kinds whining and screaming you know. And some of these people are 
innocent bystanders, well so what, get involved or get lost, you know… I think any 
time is right for escalation. 
 
Later the interviewee added: 
 
I think [the pipeline opponents] should be getting in the way, right away. Frustrating 
everything, you know. I don’t know where all these [Kinder Morgan] workers park 
their cars but at four o’clock or five o’clock everyone just drives in there and jams the 
parking lot so they can’t get out. Or you fill the parking lot in the morning so they got 
no place to park.  
 
If tactics such as those this interviewee suggested could have been deployed relentlessly, on 
an escalating trajectory, while growing the base of support and participation, then they could 
well have delayed pipeline construction and cost the Kinder Morgan time and resources. 
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They would likely also have been met with a much heavier police response, which might 
have provoked the kind of moral outrage and drama necessary to shift consent away from the 
industry.  However, the constant escalation of such tactics cannot be relentless if they do not 
grow the base of support because, sooner or later, the action will run out of participants as it 
becomes more and more heavily policed. While conditions in Burnaby at the time meant that 
expressive and less disruptive direct action tactics were perceived as legitimate, at least 
amongst the local community, (and so could maintain and grow the base of participation), it 
is not at all obvious that the direct action tactics could have maintained legitimacy had they 
escalated to the extent of impacting these so called “innocent bystanders.” Indeed, those 
skeptical of more disruptive tactics believed they would certainly provoke moral outrage but 
that it would be aimed at the protestors not the police or the industry, and would shrink their 
base rather than grow it.   
 
One way relentless and escalatory direct action strategy can grow the base of support and 
participation, particularly through civil disobedience, is where the repressive policing of 
participants produces moral outrage and potentially a crisis of legitimacy in the hegemonic 
order. While direct action and confrontation with a particularly violent police force did 
produce moral outrage and public support for the movement in 2014, the same could not be 
said for Burnaby Mountain in 2018 where policing was relatively milder and “squashed the 
drama.” However, there are other ways that expressive direct action tactics can intervene in 
dominant narratives that don’t rely on producing a moral crisis. The Watch House, civil 
disobedience, and direct action spectacles like Greenpeace scaling Kinder Morgan’s boring 
drill or its aerial bridge blockade, all sought to keep media attention on the activists’ 
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narrative, brought First Nations and Indigenous leadership to the forefront of the debate, and 
contributed to a discourse of risk and uncertainty around whether the pipeline would ever get 
built.  All of these either contributed to Kinder Morgan’s ultimate decision to abandon the 
project or previewed the reasons why the Federal Court of Appeals quashed the pipeline 
permits. In this way, direct action can supplement and support a whole range of other 
strategic interventions. 
 
Those who were skeptical of the value and appropriateness of direct action would reference 
the ongoing court cases and political lobbying as being more likely to succeed, and that these 
tools were far from being exhausted. Others voiced concern that participation in direct action 
could threaten these other tactics on other points of intervention. Eugene explained that some 
Tsleil-Waututh government representatives were concerned that the Watch House being 
associated with Tsleil-Waututh Nation would jeopardize their legal intervention and the 
ongoing court case at the FCA. Indeed, casual observation would suggest that it has been 
legal intervention through the Federal Court of Appeals (FCA), not direct action, that has 
done the most to delay the pipeline’s construction (personal communication, October 5th, 
2018). However, other activists and campaigners were keen to challenge this perspective. Of 
the court proceedings’ significance to the campaign, Thomas from Climate Convergence, 
said: 
 
I don't think there's gonna be a court victory that’s going to stop this and I think that's 
something that people are learning… I think it’s like a general political awareness 
that people build as they see failure and as they see things that… they were told 
would be able to serve them and like serve justice [fail to do so]. So I think [legal 
intervention] is important to accompany the movement and be part of that process. 
And [that we] always make sure that we are building independent organizations that 
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are still able to do the work, and that we don’t put all of our eggs in that basket. (T. 
Davies, personal communication, September 28th, 2018) 
 
Thomas suggested that the colonial court system wasn’t powerful enough to hold the 
Canadian government accountable and delay the pipeline forever, so other, more direct, 
forms of intervention through the development of a dual power approach, would be necessary 
to stop the pipeline in the longer term.  
 
Similarly, Mary Lovell suggested that direct action could prevent companies from continuing 
their construction while its representatives are in court. She saw court cases and direct action 
as potentially complementing one another. As she put it: 
 
I think that land defense is totally necessary beyond court cases and that they do go 
hand in hand… because your average person might not understand land defense 
without accompanying court cases. So [imagine] you're talking to a stranger on the 
street…about the pipeline construction, if you can't tell that person the pipeline is 
illegal, and that you've tried every single legal avenue they consider, land defense 
[may seem] too extreme. But if they've heard and seen all of the different court 
challenges that are coming forward about it, then they understand that people have 
gotten to that point that they need to stand up and fight to defend the land, because 
they've tried every avenue available to them…I also think that land defense adds an 
element of political uncertainty that will continually delay projects that then allows 
them to actually be heard in court… And that's one of the things that companies very 
often do, is they'll start construction even before they have their result of a project in 
order to show that they've already sunk costs into it. (M. Lovell, personal 
communication, September 25th, 2018) 
 
Mary identified a synergy between land defense and court cases suggesting that the court 
cases can help audiences less familiar with the struggle make sense of why land defense is 
necessary. The court cases can help legitimize land defense and the narratives of their 
proponents in a colonized social system. They can also demonstrate that campaigners have 
tried all the different legal avenues but as these have been closed off, land defense and 
directly impeding the pipeline becomes the only option left to stopping it. Meanwhile, land 
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defense actions can slow down or halt infrastructure construction while the court proceedings 
take place, thus countering what Al Gedicks calls a “psychology of inevitability” in which 
extractive industries seek to build as much of their infrastructure as possible to spread the 
perception that the project’s completion is inevitable both in courts and amongst the public 
(1993).  
 
The different readings of the situation raise the important, but almost impossibly intractable, 
question of whether direct action was at all useful to the campaign when the impact of legal 
intervention apparently eclipsed those of other strategies. In other words, with the benefit of 
hindsight, we might well ask what was the point of having over two hundred people arrested 
and devoting large amounts of movement resources to the encampment on Burnaby 
Mountain when the impact of FCA’s decision to quash the permits seems so much more 
convincing? Direct action tactics were intended to, and did, make a narrative intervention 
which built momentum and helped turn public discourses against Kinder Morgan. But did 
this narrative matter? Most of the campaigners I interviewed argued that it absolutely did 
because the pipeline itself is not just a material threat, but symbolic of the continuation of 
colonial relationships with First Nations and climate injustice. Deployed against this symbol, 
direct action, civil disobedience, and the Watch House all help grow a movement that is 
about confronting more than just one pipeline.  
 
Eugene, who was on the legal team that brought the case to the FCA, put the relationship 
between protest and legal intervention this way: 
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I don't think anyone would say that the legal case alone is what beat Kinder 
Morgan… And to that extent, the land defense and the media attention that it 
generates, and the focus can help to create an outlet for… people who may not be 
able to directly participate in the legal challenges is very valuable. (personal 
communication, October 5th, 2018) 
 
As such, direct action is an important way of bringing more people into the movement who 
do not necessarily have the technical expertise be able to participate in the legal challenge or 
access to other political opportunity structures. Direct action can be a movement building 
tool, which legal intervention on its own could not do. Moreover, direct action’s narrative 
intervention can actually support and complement legal intervention. Mary explained that 
legal intervention through the courts can help people understand why First Nations rights and 
title had to be defended through claiming and protecting unceded land by building structures 
on it (M. Lovell, personal communication, September 25th, 2018). As she suggested, seeing 
First Nations rights and title upheld in courts might help legitimize direct action and land 
defense for “moderate” people who are more cautious of taking supposedly “illegal” action 
of claiming and protecting unceded territories. The inverse of Mary’s argument could also be 
true, where the very public and highly publicized act of asserting rights and title through land 
defense helps develop and spread a discourse that allows people to make meaning out of the, 
often very obscure, legal procedures.  
 
Eugene explained that in Canadian law the courts first recognized Aboriginal title and control 
of their unceded in the Delgamuukw decision of the 1990s. This legal recognition was 
crystalized in the 2014 Tsilhqot'in case. However, these legal rulings are still not widely 
understood in Canada and so, as Eugene puts it “we're kind of in this place now where there's 
a theoretical recognition but not the application” of these rulings( personal communication, 
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October 5th, 2018). Campaigns have to shift cultural attitudes so that legal ruling are 
supported with greater cultural legitimacy. Many arrestees and blockade narratives would 
cite UNDRIP’s clause on Indigenous people’s right free, prior, and informed consent to 
justify their actions to media reporters. In this way, direct action, and particularly civil 
disobedience, has played an important role in shifting these narratives to reinforce legal 
rulings with cultural legitimacy. In The Politics of Common Sense, Deva Woodly shows that 
social movement campaigns that win institutional battles but fail to win over dominant 
discourses and narratives will often see their institutional victories overturned by higher 
courts or after the election of political opponents (2015).164 However, when discursive 
victories have been won alongside institutional ones, it is much less politically safe to 
overturn the institutional victories. Direct action tactics have helped win cultural and 
discursive ground so that the longevity of institutional victories may be secured.   
 
Finally, it is tempting to argue that civil disobedience and continuous public protest might 
have had some influence over the FCA’s ruling in 2018. Unfortunately, however, without 
actually being able to ask the judges, it is impossible to say whether the court would have 
ruled otherwise had direct action and public protest not been part of the equation. On this 
matter Eugene said: 
 
I think if you ask the judge, they would say [protest] does not [influence their 
decisions]… They are looking only at the legal arguments before them and the record 
 
164 Woodly demonstrates her argument with two case study campaigns: Marriage Equality and Raising the 
Minimum Wage. She shows that even as LGBTQ+ activists consistently lost battles through political and legal 
institutions they were gradually winning cultural and discursive ground. When the Supreme Court finally 
legalized gay marriage in 2015, the cultural landscape had shifted such that most conservative attempts to 
overturn the ruling have been abandoned. The labor movement’s fight for raising the minimum wage, on the 
other hand, has seen many policy victories at the municipal and state level but has not managed to shift cultural 
conditions such that those policy victories are politically irreversible even when their opponents take office.   
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before them. But that said, especially with cases like this… the law is not a static 
thing…especially in Canada, the Supreme Court has acknowledged it's a living tree… 
I think the impact of popular movements is hard to measure. But it's certainly not 
nothing. (personal communication, October 5th, 2018) 
 
Eugene’s comments acknowledge that judges and judiciary systems do not exist in political 
isolation, as much as official discourses might have us believe otherwise. This suggests we 
could at least consider the extent to which court rulings, judges, and their staff, are influenced 
by the political conditions and discourses direct action produces.165 Indeed, legal 
professionals are as much contributors to and receptors of public discourses as anyone else. If 
direct action is able to influence the discursive milieu to which legal professionals are party, 
then we could reasonably believe that, if tailored and deployed deliberately to shape the 
particular set of discursive conditions in which legal professional operate, direct action 
interventions could more effectively influence legal rulings. Of course, this remains 
speculative, but activists at the Climate Disobedience Center in the United States are 
experimenting with these very questions today. 
 
 
165 Jack Balkin writes that “Law, and especially constitutional law, is grounded in judgments by legal 
professionals about what is reasonable: these judgments include what legal professionals think is obviously 
correct, clearly wrong, or is a matter of dispute on which reasonable minds can disagree. But what people think 
is reasonable depends in part on what they think that other people think” (2012).  It follows, then, that culture 
and public discourse play a fundamental role in shaping what legal professionals believe to be “reasonable.” 
Where activists are able to influence the discourses to which legal professionals are party, they may be able to 
influence decisions under legal consideration. Legal scholars have become increasingly interested in the 
influence “virtual briefings” may be having over decisions made at the Supreme Court of the United States 
(Fisher and Orr Larsen, forthcoming). Virtual briefings are arguments about ongoing court cases that are 
articulated through, blog posts, podcasts, and tweets, and other social media platforms that judges might be 
likely to read and are published online by legal experts or others with a stake in the courts’ ultimate ruling. 
Organizations with a stake in a particular ruling will seek to have their virtual briefings enter into the online 
discursive milieu which they believe the judge or the courts’ clerks may participate in. In this way they hope to 
have some influence over a judges’ decision making process. In theory, it may be possible for climate justice 
campaigners to use the attention direct action and civil disobedience can garner to allow their arguments to 
infiltrate the discursive reference points through which legal professional make meaning out of the world. Some 
climate justice activists, like Tim DeChristopher and the Climate Disobedience Center, have begun this process 
by pleading guilty to direct action related charges but in terms of the “Necessity Defense.”  
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Direct action may be deemed appropriate and valuable when the surrounding social 
conditions in which it would be deployed allows tactics to be relentless, escalate, and grow 
the base of participation and support. Direct action does not necessarily need to wait for these 
conditions to arise organically because activists can, in some scenarios, produce those 
conditions through the actual deployment of direct action tactics. Legitimacy is a crucial 
consideration when assessing the value and appropriateness of direct action because the 
perception of their legitimacy is one of the key conditions of direct action tactics being able 
to escalate relentlessly while growing their base. It is important to note here that direct action 
tactics do not necessarily require a majority of “the general public” to perceive their 
interventions as legitimate, but they do need to have broad enough appeal that they help draw 
people into participation rather than alienating people from it.  Through civil disobedience, 
movements can win public support by producing moral crises and outrage at heavy handed 
policing while pointing to unjust laws that uphold an unjust social system. However, the 
provocation of moral crisis is not the only way direct action tactics intervene in petro-
hegemony. They can bring new participants into the movement, legitimize and make sense of 
other forms of more institutional intervention, confront symbols of domination and injustice 
in ways that win public support and attention, and can change dominant narratives.  
Furthermore, direct action can be combined and coordinated with tactics on other points of 
intervention to support and complement a variety of strategic orientations.  In particular, 
activism in Burnaby against the Kinder Morgan pipeline demonstrates how direct action 
could be deployed in conjunction with ongoing legal battles. These insights lay the 
groundwork for greater collaboration and coordination across a range of different 
organizations’ and activists’ strategic preferences.  
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Community Organizing Vs. Movement Mobilizing  
 
Most, if not all, of the strategies and tactics I’ve identified in this chapter are oriented 
towards campaigning and mobilization rather than community organizing. Meanwhile many 
of the discursive interventions and alliance building strategies detailed in Chapter Five fall 
more neatly into the category of community organizing. Engler and Engler argue that a 
schism between organizing and mobilizing exists within the theory and praxis of social 
movements. On the one hand, there are those who follow Saul Alinsky’s legacy, modelling 
slow, painstaking relationship and leadership development, along with the construction of 
organizational infrastructure through community organizing at the local level.  On the other 
hand, are those who subscribe to “the disruptive power of mass mobilization that coalesce 
quickly, draw in participants not previously involved in organizing, and leave established 
elites scrambling to adjust to a new political reality” (2017, 32). The mass mobilization 
orientation, exemplified in the writings of sociologist, Frances Fox Piven, positions moments 
of “disruption” led by mass movements as crucial to challenging established social orderings.  
 
Campaigning straddles both organizing and mobilizing as both traditions rely on a campaign-
based model of social change. Traditionally, the campaigns organizers select tend to be 
small, local, and easily winnable, and are used to build the community’s consciousness of 
their own power. Campaigning in the mobilization model usually depends upon mass action, 
are more ambitious in scope, transcend local communities, and strategically target particular 
state institutions, corporations, or influential people. Despite campaigning being an important 
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component of both organizing and mobilizing, some activists will make a distinction between 
organizers and campaigners. Campaigners tend to be associated with Fox Piven’s 
mobilization model, while organizers follow in Alinsky’s tradition. Increasingly the lines 
between the two are being blurred. 
 
Meanwhile, Gramsci’s distinction between a war of position and a war of maneuver indicates 
the different tactical and temporal phases of counter hegemonic action. During the war of 
position, revolutionary actors seek to capture institutions and mediate cultural interventions 
to shift consent away from the hegemonic order, forcing it into a crisis of legitimacy. A new 
hegemonic alignment is then realized, and the war of maneuver can be fought with a large 
base of supporters to confront, and potentially overthrow, the coercive agents of the 
hegemonic order. With the coercive and consensual instruments of hegemonic power fought 
over and won, a new hegemonic ordering can be established. 166  
 
Though hardly a perfect transplant, we could understand the distinction between organizing 
and mobilizing in a similar sense. Organizing, would, therefore, pertain to periods in which 
social movements are being grown, relationships developed, institutions captured, dominant 
narratives changed, leadership built, and common sense challenged and reconstituted around 
alternative visions. This is the period in which John Foran’s political culture of opposition 
and creation is constructed (2016). Conditions are then ready for mobilization to create 
disruption, confront coercive apparatuses, institutionalize discursive victories, win demands, 
and, ultimately, for an alternative alignment to become hegemonic. In so far as it allows us to 
 
166 This formulation continues to exclude the war of economies but as commitment to dual power and strategic 
prefigurative intervention grows, we might imagine a war of economies existing in both phases of struggle. 
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contextualize mobilizing and organizing in different phases of hegemonic struggle, the 
comparison is productive. But it is also somewhat unsatisfying because the phases of 
revolutionary action that Gramsci argues for in The Prison Notebooks do not neatly map onto 
the relationship between organizing and mobilizing. While the respective tactical differences 
between them may mirror the wars of position and maneuver, organizing and mobilizing are 
not bound to the same temporal logic. Nevertheless, transposing the synergy Gramsci 
articulates between the war of position and maneuver to the relationship between organizing 
and mobilizing is highly valuable. Just as the tactics and strategy of a war of position creates 
the conditions in which the tactics and strategy pertaining to a war of maneuver can thrive, so 
too could the synergy between mobilizing and organizing produce mutually reinforcing 
conditions for radical social change. 
 
Professionalized NGOs and grassroots organizations reify the distinction between organizing 
and mobilizing through their praxis, and even pride themselves on following either Alinsky’s 
lineage or the movement mobilization theory of change. Different climate justice 
organizations will often prioritize either mobilizing or organizing, sometimes at the expense 
of the other. These differing strategic orientations can produce conflict over tactics, the 
consequences and longevity of interventions, the allocation of resources, the development of 
movement infrastructure, and the role of - and accountability to - frontlines communities. 
The significance of this division lead Engler and Engler to write that “the future of social 
change…may well involve integrating these approaches – figuring out how the strengths of 
both structure and mass protest can be used in tandem – so that outbreaks of widespread 
revolt complement long-term organizing” (ibid).  
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Examples of both the tensions and synthesis of organizing and mobilizing are observable in 
the climate justice movement. In the case studies, the synergy of organizing and mobilizing 
traditions is emergent but must be nurtured and encouraged to flourished by overcoming the 
deep-rooted suspicion that exists between each theory of change. Both Richmond and 
Burnaby provide examples of community organizing and movement mobilizing. However, 
activism in Burnaby certainly had a focus on mobilization, while activism in Richmond 
demonstrated a greater commitment to organizing. Drawing on the case studies, I’ll suggest 
at how organizing and mobilizing could be synthesized into a cyclical model of 
changemaking where long-term organizing reinforces outbreaks of revolt and such outbreaks 
in turn funnel resources and participants towards community organizing efforts. 
 
The foundation of community organizing strategies rests upon building long term 
relationships within the community and developing the organizational infrastructure that can 
turn those relationships into community leadership strong enough to challenge the interests of 
entrenched elites. Chapter Five already illustrated many of the organizing, leadership 
development, and alliance building strategies that I observed in the Burnaby and Richmond 
cases. These have been deployed through organizing community members to attend public 
forums, hearings, and council meetings, working with progressive church groups, canvassing 
and community education, story-based strategy, and reinforcing or creating new 
organizations that can train new community leaders. These organizations don’t always have 
to be confrontational, but they should contribute to the development of relationships, 
community consciousness, and community resilience. Richmond city councilmember, 
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Eduardo Martinez, for example, was particularly excited about the idea of organizing RPA-
affiliated recreational groups that host soccer tournaments and game nights (personal 
communication, July 9th, 2018). Here participants didn’t have to talk about the issues 
impacting the community but could nonetheless build the kind of relationships necessary for 
the development of a resilient political culture of opposition and creation.  
 
In Richmond, community organizing takes precedence in the periods between city council 
elections, while mobilizing around election campaigns, helping RPA candidates run, and 
deploying more visible tactics to elevate wedge issues is more prominent during election 
seasons. Nevertheless, the RPA’s movement-party model of running candidates to organize 
the community and organizing the community so that candidates can run and win, 
necessitates a permanent commitment to both organizing and mobilizing. Indeed, the RPA 
would likely never have won election campaigns for city council without over a decade of 
community organizing by other local grassroots organizations and the RPA itself. 
Community organizing made community mobilizations around election campaigns possible. 
However, mobilizations around election campaigns have also supported community 
organizing. During periods of electioneering and campaign mobilization, the election wedge 
issues that will define the political landscape of the next administration are developed and 
shared across the community. These issues, like holding Chevron accountable for tax evasion 
and pollution, or combatting gentrification, are then taken up in community organizing 
campaigns to ensure city councilmembers fulfill their campaign promises after elections have 
been won. The campaign mobilizations that see movement allies elected to city council 
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reinforces community organizing efforts as city resources or support for community 
organizations are made available to them. 
 
Organizing and mobilizing operated according to a cyclical logic in Burnaby too – although 
the general theory of change there has favored mobilization over organizing. Between the 
mobilizations in 2014 and 2018, community organizers in the British Columbian lower 
mainland directed resources towards the strengthening of relationships between First 
Nations, professional NGOs, and grassroots community groups, as well as the development 
of resilient and self-sustaining community organizations that could educate and empower 
residents in Burnaby and across the pipeline route.  
 
Grassroots volunteer organizations included Climate Convergence, the Coast Protectors, 
BROKE and Pipe-Up. When mobilization gathered momentum again in 2018, these 
organizations, along with many others, had successfully organized their communities such 
that sustained mobilization and mass action was possible throughout the spring and summer 
of that year. The relationship building, education, and leadership development of the 
previous four years had a direct impact on the longevity and sustainability of mass action 
interventions, ensured participants remained accountable to First Nations and frontlines 
communities, and helped legitimize the disruptions. Yet, as Engler and Engler, suggest, 
organizing can get in the way of mobilizing, just as mobilizing can have negative 
consequences for organizing. In Burnaby, therefore, community organizing and 
accountability to frontlines groups also reigned in some of the more disruptive mobilizing 
tactics other activists believed were necessary to halt the pipeline’s construction. This was a 
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source of tension that community organizing throughout the following year would have to 
address after the mass mobilizations had subsided. 
 
While in Richmond, I observed a particular set of circumstances that exemplified the 
tensions, and potential for synergy, between organizing and mobilizing traditions. During the 
summer of 2018, many climate justice activists in the Bay Area were devoting a great deal of 
resources towards a mass march that would coincide with then-Governor Brown’s Global 
Climate Action Summit (GCAS) in early September, just across the Bay from Richmond in 
San Francisco. Rise for Climate, Jobs, and Justice, as the march was dubbed, was intended to 
reframe California’s mainstream reputation as an environmental and climate leader. Drawing 
attention, instead, to the enduring influence and consequences of the oil industry over 
California politics, the march positioned the just transition and a focus on jobs as an 
alternative narrative and vision. The demands were “racial and economic justice, an end to 
fossil fuel production, and a just transition to 100% renewable energy that supports workers 
and communities” (Rise for Climate 2018). It was organized by a diverse coalition of climate 
and social justice NGOs and Bay Area based organizations including 350.org, the California 
Environmental Justice Alliance (CEJA), APEN, the Sierra Club, Idle No More SF Bay, and 
two local chapters of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). It was hosted under 
the auspices of the People’s Climate Movement.167 Throughout the summer of 2018, 
campaigners planned the march with a large contingent of local volunteer support.  
 
167 The People’s Climate Movement is a U.S. based broad coalition of environmental organizations, unions and 
grassroots climate justice groups. As they state on their website: “The Peoples Climate Movement uses two key 
strategies to demand bold action on climate change:  mass mobilization and movement alignment. By 
mobilizing massive numbers of people on the ground; finding alignment with partners under the banner of 
climate, jobs, and justice; and lifting up our core priorities of economic and racial justice, we build the power 
required to win real and lasting climate policy on the federal, state, and local level.” (See People’s Climate 
Movement 2018). 
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The march attracted roughly 30,000 participants, gained a reasonable amount of media 
coverage on the day, and provided an important space for alignment around the issues that 
define the climate justice movement (Hernández 2018). Before the march, a contingent of 
activists, led by a coalition of Californian environmental justice organizations and South 
American Indigenous opponents of REDD+, blocked the GCAS conference center doors for 
roughly two hours.  
 
The march itself was arranged into different blocks representing both the diversity and unity 
of the movement. Leading the march were representatives of Indigenous and frontlines 
communities most impacted by climate change, fossil fuel extraction, and neoliberal market-
based climate solutions.  The march concluded with participants being invited to contribute 
to an enormous street mural at the Civic Center Plaza. The march’s reframing narrative in the 
corporate media was somewhat overshadowed, however, by former New York Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg’s pithy comment to the GCAS audience that “only in America could you 
have environmentalists protesting an environmental conference” (Sengupta 2018). However, 
the march did help articulate diverse social struggles into alignment, demonstrated an 
alternative narrative to the neoliberal greenwashing emerging out of GCAS, and, most 
significantly, received the endorsement of several influential local unions despite its 
insistence on maintaining “keep-it-in-the-ground” rhetoric. 
 
 
 
 553 
The impact of one march, particularly one of relatively moderate size where the narrative is 
broadcast but distorted by corporate media, is hard to measure. As such, deliberating over 
whether or not the march was “worth it” in terms of its return on expenditure of resources 
and attention is probably a waste of time. Nevertheless, in the buildup to the march I was 
personally concerned that the, relatively speaking, enormous resources, volunteer capacity, 
and time being devoted to what I perceived as “yet another march” would have been better 
invested in community organizing capacity and local Bay Area campaigns against fossil fuel 
refining and transport infrastructure. Both the campaigners and organizers I interviewed, 
however, offered more nuanced perspectives. 
 
Rather than reframing GCAS’ climate narrative for Jerry Brown’s audience, which she didn’t 
think was possible anyway, Miya Yoshitani, saw the march as an opportunity to organize and 
align communities that the climate justice movement has so far failed to reach. Indeed, Miya 
did not view the march as a distraction from community organizing but as a moment that, in 
her words, could “speak directly to communities and reframe climate in a way that a broad 
swath of communities, frontline communities, working families, normal people in general, 
feel like they see themselves inside of that vision, inside of that frame.” The march could 
“bring a whole bunch of people who've been excluded from both the solutions and the 
conversation about climate into power” (personal communication, July 12th, 2018).   APEN’s 
strategic orientation has tended to focus on local campaigns and community organizing rather 
than mass mobilization, but for Miya the march offered an opportunity to build capacity for 
community organizing. People who learned about it and participated in it would then “go out 
and talk to their neighbors” and “vote those values” or “join future actions and mobilizations 
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that broaden the swell of people in California.” With the march’s focus on jobs and justice, 
Miya also saw it as “an opportunity for frontline base building, power building organizations, 
community-based organizations, to show up with, and for, workers” (personal 
communication, July 12th, 2018).  The mass mobilization could, therefore, help align climate 
justice community organizers and organizations with the labor movement and provide a basis 
from which further organizing between these groups could take place. 
 
The march was endorsed by several local chapters of major unions as well as two AFL-CIO 
affiliated labor councils, the San Francisco Central Labor Council and Alameda Labor 
Council, who together represent 285 local unions and 235,000 union members. Steve, Janet, 
and Jean of Sunflower Alliance believed this was a significant breakthrough because one the 
march’s demands was a commitment no new fossil fuel development in California which 
major unions had previously vehemently resisted, and elsewhere in California still do. 
According to Steve, the endorsements of the march were symbolic gestures, but the 
symbolism mattered and could support community organizing and further mobilizing in the 
future (personal communication, July 18th, 2018).   
 
Meanwhile, as Jean explained, the overall strategic approach to combating climate change is 
to shift the cultural and discursive conditions through which meaning is attached to it. 
Community organizing is fundamental to that strategy but marches and mass mobilization, 
and the emotional intensity it can harness, are vital too: 
 
The underlying strategic goal is to change the Zeitgeist. And I think that big marches 
have a role in that, I think symbolic direct actions have a role in it, I think patient day 
to day organizing, and sitting in farmers markets has a role in it… But you can do all 
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the patient day to day organizing in the world and if there are not times of major 
inspirational moments, it's not going to work. You need both of those levels all the 
time. And I think big marches like this are very helpful in helping to create that kind 
of vibe. If you spend all your time doing that and didn’t do anything else, that would 
be a problem, as it would be a problem if you spent all your time doing patient block 
organizing…I gotta plug my book…called This is an Uprising by these two brothers 
named Engler. That's what their book says: you got to have both of those levels. You 
got to have the emotional inspirational stuff and the building stuff… You know, God 
willing, we can figure out how to coordinate them. (personal communication, July 
18th, 2018) 
 
For Jean, having read Engler and Engler’s book, creating social changes required both the 
“inspirational stuff,” which I interpreted as mass mobilization, and the “building stuff,” 
which I took to mean community organizing, and these need to be coordinated somehow 
(personal communication, July 18th, 2018). Her statement, however, already illustrates some 
ways in which activists are thinking about coordinating mass mobilization and community 
organizing. Reflecting on the 400,000-person strong People’s Climate March in 2014, Jean 
believed that marches have the ability to inject energy and inspiration into the movement. As 
she put it, “the 2014 March really had an impact in helping give the climate movement a shot 
in the arm in New York” (personal communication, July 18th, 2018). Placing this idea in the 
context of the 2018 Rise for Climate, Jobs and Justice march, Jean and Janet articulated the 
potential for mass mobilization to revitalize community organizing, providing communities 
with moments of intense energy and excitement that can be harnessed to build local 
organization’s capacity and shift the discursive conditions community members draw upon to 
make meaning of the climate crisis (personal communication, July 18th, 2018). Thus, the 
return on the resources spent on mass mobilization can be invested directly into community 
organizing. If campaigners and organizers can more deliberately build this relationship into 
their respective strategies and tactics, they may find coordination and synergy across their 
respective theories of change is possible. 
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While Miya and Jean illustrate how mass mobilization can support and reinforce community 
organizing, Mary explained how community organizing could support and reinforce periods 
of mass mobilizations. About a month after the FCA quashed Trans Mountain’s permits, 
Mary and I discussed what would happen to the local movement next. Mary explained that 
after the intensity of the mobilization, activists needed to “take a breath,” and then reflect, 
restrategize and refocus, as well as make time for building or repairing relationships at a 
slower pace: 
 
Even within taking this break, a lot of people are still pushing to try to do a lot more 
mobilization which … because they believe that there needs to be a steady drumbeat 
of mobilization… For me, personally, I feel that you have to withdraw in order to 
restrategize and then move forward…it's like a gathering of power when you take that 
time to reflect. (M. Lovell, personal communication, September 25th, 2018) 
 
The temptation to continuously mobilize and escalate can be very strong, particularly when 
the urgency of the climate crisis is so dire, when momentum seems to be on your side, and in 
this case, the pipeline project appeared to be vulnerable to further mass action. Reflecting on 
this, however, Mary suggested that the model of constant growth and escalation of the 
movement mirrors the very economic system and ideology of perpetual economic growth and 
expansion that so many climate justice activists are in this struggle to resist: 
 
What happens [to a movement] when energy will always build and then wane and 
then build again? … And what do you do during the times in which you actually need 
to be restoring as a movement? Or is it always a constant climb? Because it feels like 
a lot of people push for a constant climb. When really, as any person who watches 
nature knows, there's winters, you know. So that's something … I've been trying to 
wrap my mind around, both personally and as an organizer. How do we actually 
continue to share collective power, but not always be building? It sort of reminds me 
of the same economic system that we live with - of this theory of inevitable and 
increasing growth - that is just not physically possible for anything on the planet. 
(personal communication, September 25th, 2018) 
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Constant mobilization, without periods organization, investment in relationships and time for 
reflection wears down the movement’s ability mobilize and draw down its resources without 
replenishing them. Just like the economic system Mary suggested it mirrors, this is entirely 
unsustainable. Despite community organizing itself being exhausting, painstaking work, we 
can think of it, then, as a necessary process of restoring movement energy, building the base, 
and developing the movement’s ability to carry out and intensify mass action and disruption. 
 
Mobilization without relief may also come at the cost of wearing down movement 
relationships that need time to be renewed and nurtured. Reminiscent of Adrienne Maree 
Brown’s invocation to build critical relationships over critical mass, and her argument that 
movements move at the speed of relationships (2017), Mary explained that during the 
intensity of mobilizing, relationships are often sacrificed: 
  
It’s very intense too because when you're in the height of mobilizing, then it's like 
everything goes to chaos. And people wind up like not being intentional and slow 
about their relationships, versus a lot of the people that I've known that have been 
organizing for decades, somehow figure out how to get past that and not get sucked 
into every hurricane of mass mobilization… (personal communication, September 
25th, 2018) 
 
Mary suggested that the interregnum between the 2018 mobilization and when next period of 
mobilization takes off could be used for “doing a lot more intentional outreach, just going 
and having a coffee with someone from, for example, Black Lives Matter Vancouver, or all 
these different people that work on racial justice or migrant justice in Vancouver” (M. 
Lovell, personal communication, September 25th, 2018). In Mary’s estimation, mass 
mobilization needed to be supported by deeper, more intersectional relationships with other 
social justice struggles to build a broader set of movement allies. This meant activists had to 
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be committed to showing up to and for each other’s fights. Creating the infrastructure to 
ensure this alliance building happens in an accountable way takes organizing and 
organizations. As such, a larger, more intersectional, and resilient period of mass 
mobilizations in the future will depend upon deeper commitments to relationship building 
and leadership development in the months and years before it. Thus, not only must 
community organizing rely upon moments of mass mobilization for the excitement, 
resources, and energy they can infuse into the work, but mass, successive, resilient and 
intersectional mobilization depends upon deep commitment to alliances and relationship 
building, organization infrastructure, and leadership development.  
 
Engler and Engler write that “for as long as people have experimented with building 
movements around strategic nonviolence, they have grappled with a dilemma: how to 
reconcile the explosive short-term potential of disruptive power with the need to sustain 
resistance to meet long term goals” (2017, 62). In an attempt to reconcile these, the Engler 
brothers offer a hybrid called “momentum-based organizing,” which draws upon the 
experiences of social movements that have combined diffuse networks of activists operating 
without official hierarchy (but nonetheless maintaining strict guidelines for norms and 
conduct) organizing over the long term, with organizations capable of engineering and 
sustaining mass uprising (as opposed to simply capitalizing on spontaneous but short-lived 
explosions of discontent). The combination of structure and organization with fluidity and 
mass disruption has been experimented with by social movements from Serbia to the United 
States to Hong Kong and the Engler brother’s articulation of this hybrid is an important 
contribution to social movement theory and practice. Nonetheless, as they concede, the 
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hybrid model is rarely able to harness, institutionalize and consolidate victories won through 
their orchestrated uprisings. What is emerging in the climate justice movement, and other 
contemporary social movements, however, seems to push the hybrid model towards this goal.  
 
A synergistic cyclical relationship between organizing and mobilizing in which community 
organizing harnesses the energy and inspiration of mass mobilization and funnels these into 
community organizations, while mobilization is made larger, more resilient, more radical, 
and more accountable through community organizing, is slowly evolving on the frontlines of 
Blockadia. Forgiving, for a moment, the language of the extraction-based economy, we could 
think of organizing as growing the movements’ capital, while mobilizing is about spending, 
or ideally investing, that capital, to gain a larger return which is then directed towards further 
organizing, which then allows us to invest even more in the next round of mobilization, 
which in turn funnels more participants, resources, and energy back into community 
organizing, and so on.  In this relationship, each theory of change provides the foundations of 
support and conditions of escalation for the other. 
 
This cyclical model of organizing and mobilizing, integrated into a counter hegemonic 
strategy, may help institutionalize victories that can ultimately overthrow established 
hegemonic orders. The orchestration of mass mobilization creates conditions in which 
resources and support can be funneled towards community organizations which can then 
capture particular institutions, like city councils, and unleash more resources for community 
organizers. These organizers can then do a great deal more work to lay the foundations for 
the next round of more escalated mobilization which could, in theory, grow the capacity of 
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community organizations and their ability to consolidate power in more influential 
institutions. The cycles of mobilizing and organizing would grow with each turn as the 
interventions of each provide more fertile conditions for the other.  
 
Finally, then, in this formulation, mobilizing would create the conditions and opportunities to 
organize and grow the movement, while community organizing would create more 
opportunities for escalation and larger, more diverse and better resourced mobilizations. 
Operating in a cyclical fashion, each round of mobilizing reinforces the following round of 
community organizing and community organizing in turn facilitates further mobilizations. It 
is also crucial that this cyclical relationship isn’t just growing for the sake of growth but that, 
as Smucker puts it is, “aspiring hegemonic” so that movement victories shift discursive 
conditions which can be consolidated and institutionalized (2017). In other words, the goal of 
each round of mobilizing and organizing is to bring the movement closer to achieving 
hegemony. Considering the similarities between wars of maneuver and position with periods 
of mobilizing and organizing, we could use this idea to move the wars of maneuver and 
position out of the strict linear temporal relationship in which Gramsci places them and into a 
cyclical relationship where each builds upon the gains made by the other. It is highly unlikely 
that just one cycle of a war of position and war of maneuver would topple the current 
hegemonic order and establish a new one. However, successive cycles that increasingly grow 
in strength, numbers, and ability to escalate, with their vision and alignment of tactics and 
strategy oriented towards a building a new hegemonic order, perhaps could. 
 
 561 
Thus, the distinction scholars and activists make between the tactics and strategies pertaining 
to the respective traditions of organizing and mobilizing is a helpful one so collapsing the 
categories into one theory of change could be counterproductive. However, reifying the 
tensions between the two traditions caries its own dangers and limits the availability of 
avenues for intervention. Therefore, a hybrid that harnesses the synergy between mobilizing 
and organizing, such that they are able to build on one another’s interventions, could be a 
crucial innovation in wars of position, maneuver and counter hegemonic strategy. This 
synergy must be developed deliberately with organizers and mobilizers cooperating with, and 
learning from, one another’s theories of change. Just such a hybrid is emergent on the 
frontlines of the climate justice movement.  
 
Towards a spectrum of strategy 
 
This chapter has engaged with some of the major divisions and debates within social 
movement theory and strategy that emerged on frontlines struggles against petro-hegemony. 
However, examples from both Burnaby and Richmond also illustrate the potential for, and 
emergence of, reconciliation, synthesis, and even synergy, between the different positions 
articulated in these disputes. Rather than argue the case for one side or the other, I have tried 
to reconcile these different positions such that, at least theoretically, the most advantageous 
insights of all sides may be harnessed and synthesized. The work of synthesis is not intended 
to gloss over the very real tensions and contradictions that exist between these approaches. 
Rather, it seeks to demonstrate where common ground lays and, even more importantly, to 
articulate the ways in which the synthesis of organizing and mobilizing, direct and indirect 
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action, and state and antistate strategic orientations actually reinforce our interventions and 
empowers our movement.  
 
All of this, however, is far easier theorized than practiced and, indeed, just because the 
potential for synthesis exists doesn’t necessarily mean it will exist. In this final section, 
therefore, I offer another concept, the spectrum of strategy, as one theoretical framework 
through which we might put the reconciliation and synthesis of the different positions 
articulated in these debates into practice. Collis writes that a diversity of tactics allows 
movement actors to deploy a range of interventions “from the more non-confrontational and 
indirect forms of action to the more confrontational and direct forms of action” (2015, 29). A 
spectrum of strategy, then, organizes this diversity in a way that movements can coordinate 
tactical interventions across different groups and activists’ politico-strategic orientations.  
Developing coordinated and deliberate interventions according to a spectrum of strategy 
requires a deep commitment to articulating common ground within the movement, and to 
listening to and respecting a diversity of political differences and tactical orientations. The 
development of relationships of trust and accountability is therefore crucial to the successful 
deployment of a spectrum of strategy. There are no shortcuts to this kind of alignment but 
overcoming the factional divisions over strategy within social movements is one of the 
crucial questions change makers must be asking today. I offer the spectrum of strategy as one 
contribution to the answer. 
 
The spectrum of strategy aligns a diverse array of tactics and tactical preferences not 
according to a dichotomous, binary categorization of “radical” versus “reformist” politico-
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strategic orientations, but rather according to a spectrum of possible actions that may be 
direct or indirect, ranging between non-confrontational and confrontational interventions.168 
By eschewing the dominant framing of tactical interventions as either “radical” or 
“reformist,” and instead placing all possible tactics along spectrum, I seek to remove some of 
the ideological or political baggage we often attach to one or another tactic or strategy.169 
Therefore, the deployment of apparently radical tactics shouldn’t necessarily imply, or be an 
expression of, a more radical or revolutionary political philosophy. Similarly, the choice of 
apparently reformist tactics shouldn’t necessarily indicate more reformist or moderate 
political commitments. One can deploy tactics that are considered reformist while remaining 
ideologically committed to revolution, just as one can be politically reformist but employ 
radical tactics. As such, the distinction we often make between reformist and radical tactics 
can be an unhelpful one that reifies the divides in social movement and fractures it into 
political factions based on the strategies we choose.  
 
Instead, arranging tactics according to a spectrum of confrontational to non-confrontational 
actions allows movements to organize a diversity of tactics into a coordinated and deliberate 
set of interventions with different organizations and groups taking on different roles and 
challenging power relations on a wide range of different points of intervention. It allows us to 
 
168 Tactics we often think of as radical might include blockades, occupations, sabotage, and general disruption 
to business as usual. While, tactics that are often considered reformist tend to include participation in elections, 
marches, lobbying, legal action, participation in regulatory frameworks, and, sometimes, civil disobedience.  
169 No strategic orientation can ever be totally devoid of ideological commitments, nor should it be. Principles 
should always guide strategy. If our strategy and our principles are not aligned then our action is not getting us 
closer to our objectives and so is not strategic. This does not legitimize a puritanical or dogmatic approach to 
strategy, wherein any divergence from one’s political orientation is considered an unacceptable corruption of 
principles.  Quite the opposite is true. By establishing shared vision and shared values within the group taking 
action, one can employ a strategy or tactic that may depart somewhat from the specifics of any individual’s 
political or ideological position while remaining true to the stated objectives of the group. 
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move fluidly across a whole range of tactics without boxing ourselves into a specific political 
position. It also allows different organizations to occupy strategic niches, operating according 
to their organizational expertise and political comfort zone alongside others operating 
according to their own expertise and politics. This is crucial to movements because it opens 
up a march larger range of possible interventions and the ability to coordinate them 
deliberately across difference. 
 
Ultimately, the tactics movements agree upon will be contingent upon their constituents’ 
values and the multidimensional contexts of social struggle. Therefore, the first step towards 
employing a spectrum of strategy is to encourage and facilitate conversations between 
activists of very different strategic orientations. These will provide the foundations for honest 
appraisal of values and analysis of the context of struggle that are both shared and disputed 
between activists and organizations. This means participants acknowledging the 
disagreements, tensions and debates that cannot be resolved but also sharing a commitment 
to finding common ground so that a spectrum of strategy can be developed between them. 
The product of such conversations could be anything from agreements simply to refrain from 
criticizing one another’s tactics in public, to the deliberate collaboration and coordination of 
confrontational and non-confrontational tactics. 
 
The fact that open communication and respectful conversation between these constituents is a 
necessary precursor to their coordinated action may seem obvious, and even easy. But getting 
these factions with deep rooted resentment and divides to actually converse with one another, 
let alone acknowledge the value in one another’s work, is, of course, very difficult. This is 
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partly because of what Stephen Collis describes as the “unevenness” of democracy. In other 
words, whether one prefers confrontational or nonconfrontational tactics will often depend 
upon the stake participants hold in current democratic institutions. If one believes they are 
able to influence these nominally democratic institutions, they are more likely to choose 
nonconfrontational tactics (Pellow 2014; Collis 2015). If they have been systematically 
excluded from those institutions and believe they are unable to influence them through 
persuasion, they will likely select more confrontational tactics. Depending on geography, 
political landscapes, and relations of privilege, different members of the climate justice 
movement will inevitably have different stakes and experiences which inform their 
relationships to the established democratic institutions and available political opportunity 
structures. 
 
The unevenness in the experiences of democratic participation is one of the foundations of 
tension between poltico-strategic orientations.  As Collis writes: 
 
Life in a contemporary democracy is a constant negotiation with those parts of the 
democratic system that seem redeemable and (at least in principle or potentially) just, 
and those parts of it which seem to be beyond repair, or chronically unjust. And this 
essential unevenness is reflected spatially, across democracies, as well as (and indeed 
especially) according to the specific position and experience of communities and 
individuals within democracies. (2015, 28) 
 
This insight helps explain why the conversations about values and vision must occur before 
the deployment of a spectrum of strategy can be realized. Collis goes on to explain that a 
diversity of tactics is only a useful component of social movement strategy “when it involves 
a basic respect for difference – difference of experience, contextual difference that shapes a 
given community’s choice of action – and clear communication about those differences and 
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the different tactical choices they lead to” (ibid). This is hard work, and there can be no 
shortcuts, but the conversations establishing respect and communication are absolutely 
crucial.  
 
Furthermore, as David Graeber writes, from an anarchist perspective direct action “is a form 
of action in which means and ends become, effectively, indistinguishable; a way of actively 
engaging with the world to bring about change, in which the form of the action – or at least, 
the organization of the action – is itself a model for the change one wishes to bring about” 
(2009, 210). As such, developing commitments to a diversity of tactics across politico-
strategic orientation can be further complicated in situations where the form of action or 
praxis is the ideology to which its adherents espouse. In these cases, it may be incredibly 
difficult to divorce tactical preferences from the ideological commitments they are intended 
to perform and prefigure.170 Graeber concedes, however, that embracing a diversity of tactics 
doesn’t mean “anything goes.” There are always “tacit understandings,” sometimes explicit 
agreements, amongst activists about what is acceptable and appropriate within a particular 
context (2009, 222-223). Therefore, the coordination of a diversity of tactics inevitably 
depends upon relationships developed and critical connections developed through movement 
building and community organizing. 
 
Emerging from such conversations may be agreements on the extent to which different 
organizations are willing and able to work with one another, or to embrace a diversity of 
tactics while remaining committed each organizations’ own strategic niche, or , or simply 
 
170 From this perspective, then, it is quite clear why the stage management and orchestration of civil 
disobedience for the purposes of publicity receive such criticism from the anarchist left. 
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agreeing to disagree but to keep those disagreements out of the media spotlight (deploying 
tactics according to spectrum of strategy may not always be possible). The spectrum of 
strategy is an important precursor to embracing a diversity of tactics. But those tactics need 
to be organized and coordinated if the impact of their intervention is to be maximized. A 
diversity of tactics is not, as some might suggest, an “anything goes” approach to strategy 
(Graeber 2009). Thus, the deployment of a spectrum of strategy means that different tactics 
are coordinated in deliberate conjunction with one another, with agreements on when and 
where their deployment is appropriate.  
 
Collis suggests that a commitment to dual power is one way such tactics might be 
coordinated: 
It can help to map diversity of tactics onto the idea of dual power. A dual power 
movement is one which pursues two seemingly contradictory paths at once: one 
aimed at short term “re- forms” or adjustments to the current system, using the 
existing channels a democracy affords, and one aimed at the longer term goal of 
building a “new society in the shell of the old” (as the IWW [International Workers of 
the World] used to say). … So we need diverse social movements, where some are 
working the tools of short term and limited change, while others are working towards 
systemic change at a very deep level. And we need to acknowledge and respect these 
different goals and their attendant tactics and actions.” (2015, 32) 
Dual power is an important starting point because it provides two different avenues of change 
that can work together to win short term, though possibly short-lived victories, that facilitate 
the development of longer-term revolutionary strategy. Moreover, it is an approach to 
coordinating tactics that activists in Burnaby and Richmond demonstrated they are already 
experimenting with. However, dual power alone isn’t enough to coordinate the whole range 
of tactics available to different organizations and movement members. Dual power only 
really refers to tactics oriented towards engaging current institutions on the one hand and 
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prefiguring solutions and alternative institutions on the other. Of course, there is a vast range 
of tactical interventions that exist outside of either prefigurative politics or institutional 
intervention. Therefore, dual power alone cannot encompass the entire potential held within a 
spectrum of strategy. A spectrum of strategy can be developed to deploy tactics that advance 
dual power but also tactics that engage with points of intervention on all terrains of struggle 
and points of intervention that do not pertain to capturing or reforming dominant institutions 
or developing counter institutions. As such, dual power is one way to organize a diversity of 
tactics but a spectrum of strategy is a broader category that allows for the carbon rebellion’s 
coordinated intervention across all the points of intervention on all three terrains of struggle. 
 
Through petro-hegemony the fossil fuel industry unleashes an enormous range of tactics to 
engage with all three relations of power across all three terrains of struggle. The climate 
justice movement must do the same. If we limit ourselves to a set of tactics that only engage 
the state through elections, or only seeks to shift culture through direct action, or only fights 
the war of economies through financial divestment, we may end up ignoring one terrain of 
struggle entirely or deploying tactics that are entirely inappropriate to it. Arranging our 
tactical interventions along a spectrum from nonconfrontational to confrontational rather than 
dividing ourselves into radical to reformist actors, we can invite a large diversity of actions 
and activists into contesting petro-hegemony.  
 
The carbon rebellion must, therefore, insist upon the development of a spectrum of strategies 
that allow activists to deploy whatever tactics their points of intervention requires. Only with 
a spectrum of strategy and a diversity of tactics can our movement compete with the fossil 
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fuel industry’s influence across terrains of consent, coercion, and compliance.  To combat 
petro-capitalism, we need prefigurative tactics that build the just transition and establish the 
material certainty of energy justice in the present; to challenge petro-culture, we need 
interventions ranging from newspaper editorials, to community organizing, to civil 
disobedience; and to dismantle the petro-state, we need tactics that allow activists to curtail 
the industry’s coercive capacities, while democratizing these intuitions, funneling resources 
to frontlines communities and establishing conditions for community’s self-governance. 
Embracing and coordinating these interventions across terrains of struggle necessitates the 
development of a spectrum of strategies and its commitment to relationships and trust across 
politico-strategic differences. 
 
Finally, the spectrum of strategy is only as strong as the relationships upon which it is based. 
Having argued that no tactic is inherently reformist or revolutionary, I use the spectrum of 
strategy to reframe our approach to radical social change by asking in what context is a 
confrontational tactic appropriate or inappropriate and similarly in what context is a non-
confrontational tactic appropriate or inappropriate. This is useful in so far as it allows us to 
facilitate conversations about embracing a diversity of tactics depending upon the degree to 
which a given situation calls for a non-confrontational tactic versus a confrontational one and 
vice versa. The spectrum of strategy seeks to hold us accountable to our political or 
ideological prejudices which often lead us to preferring one tactic over another without 
adequately assessing what the situation requires. In doing so, we open up the imaginations of 
groups devising interventions with the possibility that all tactics could be potentially useful. 
The process of aligning strategic orientations then becomes one of selecting which ones 
amongst this enormous scope of possibilities are most contextually appropriate. None of this 
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is to suggest that simply by ordering all of these interventions along a spectrum activists will 
miraculously agree upon a diversity of tactics. Rather, the spectrum of strategy provides us 
with a conceptual tool that we can use to work through strategic disagreements and 
complexities without resorting to accusations of reformism or radicalism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, the debates articulated throughout this chapter are not as intractable as they 
may at first seem.  I’ve shown how, in theory, the most useful components of these different 
debates can be synthesized. However, their resolution, reconciliation, and activists’ 
willingness to work alongside one another despite differing strategic orientations will, in 
practice, require a commitment to what Adrienne Maree Brown’s calls critical relationships. 
Meanwhile, we may still need critical mass171 to actually carry many of the tactics organized 
through a spectrum of strategy. The next chapter, with its thematic focus on different 
questions of scale, will engage the relationship between critical relationships and critical 
mass in the context of counter hegemonic strategy. Yet, the spectrum of strategy is offered 
here as a loose theoretical framework around which more practical approaches to strategic 
alignment may be developed. It provides us with a way of delinking ideology from tactics 
while remaining attuned to the importance of experiences and principles when selecting 
different interventions. This chapter has discussed the debates surrounding engagement with 
the state, the appropriate contexts in which to use direct action, and the potentially synergistic 
relationship between organizing and mobilizing. The spectrum of strategy provides insights 
 
171 See this review of Brown’s book for more on critical relationships and critical mass: 
https://libromance.com/2018/01/11/from-critical-mass-to-critical-relationships-with-adrienne-maree-brown/ 
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into how a diversity of tactics harnessed through the synthesis of each of these debates might 
be developed, deliberated upon, and coordinated to intervene in relations of consent, 
coercion, and compliance. 
 
The chapter has also illustrated how a large range of strategic orientations and interventions, 
both confrontational and nonconfrontational, might be considered in terms of enacting a 
blockade on the fossil fuel industry. By understanding all of tactics and strategies currently 
being deployed in Blockadia as collectively complicit in the success of blockading the fossil 
fuel industry, the spectrum of strategy moves the three debates articulated above beyond tired 
and cynical accusations of reformism and radicalism. Instead of dichotomy or oppositional 
binary, I have suggested that the interventions I’ve observed are more accurately understood 
as being deployed according to a spectrum of strategy defined in degree and gradation of 
confrontational and non-confrontational strategies and tactics. Blockading the fossil fuel 
industry and confronting petro-hegemony, I have argued, necessitates a range of 
confrontational and non-confrontational approaches and all are significant features of 
activism in Blockadia.  
 
Finally, my argument throughout this chapter has not necessarily been intended to build 
bridges between politically radical and politically moderate agents and actors addressing 
climate change. The climate justice movement is not a space for the politically moderate, 
and, indeed, when it comes to confronting the climate crisis, I remain, politically committed 
to defeating those who demand moderation, not compromising with them. Instead, I have 
made these arguments for synthesis and synergy to encourage activists and scholars of 
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climate justice to develop or maintain an open orientation towards a large diversity of tactics, 
aligned along a spectrum of strategy, through which our collective vision, or collection of 
visions, may be realized. Operating according to a spectrum of strategy allows climate justice 
activists to innovate with a diversity of tactics and explore how these might reinforce one 
another, align or complement one another’s’ interventions, and fight petro-hegemony on all 
the different points of intervention in which it is so pervasive. 
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Chapter 8 - Building Out of Blockadia: Scaling Up the Climate Justice Movement 
 
What has changed in recent years is largely a matter of scale, which is itself a reflection of 
the dizzying ambitions of the extractive project at this point in history. The rise of Blockadia 
is, in many ways, simply the flip side of the carbon boom. – Naomi Klein 2014, 267 
 
In July 2017, the California Legislative Assembly approved the controversial renewal of 
California’s “landmark” climate policy, the extension of the statewide cap and trade program.  
The bill, AB 398, was hailed in many mainstream media outlets as the most comprehensive 
and ambitious legislation to combat climate change passed in any state in the United States to 
date (Murphy 2017a; Mason and Megerian 2017). It was also praised as an instance of “rare 
bipartisanship” between Republican and Democratic Party legislators (ibid). Dubbed then-
Governor Jerry Brown’s flagship climate change policy, Brown was tireless in his efforts to 
win the bill the two-thirds majority it required to ensure its immunity from hostile lawsuits 
from conservative activists. Amongst conservative critics the plan was vilified as a thinly 
veiled, and potentially illegal, job-killing tax on industry (Murphy 2017b). The bill was also 
divisive amongst California’s many different environmental organizations. Larger and more 
moderate ENGOs like the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Environmental California, 
and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) endorsed the bill (NRDC 2017), while 
grassroots climate justice networks like the Climate Justice Alliance (CJA) and the California 
Environmental Justice Alliance (CEJA), as well as several larger climate organizations, 
including the Sierra Club and 350.org, condemned it vehemently (Johnson 2017; CEJA 
2017).  
 
AB 398 particularly enraged Richmond’s community of environmental justice organizers. 
After years of lobbying and organizing, activists in Richmond were, by the summer of 2017, 
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on the verge of convincing BAAQMD to use its regulatory powers to limit Chevron’s 
greenhouse gas emissions and associated particulate matter at the refinery. The agency’s 
powers to do so were revoked under the new legislation and years of organizers’ work to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the Bay Area refineries were thwarted when the bill 
was signed into law. The significance of the bill’s passage to this chapter is the illustration it 
provides of the different scales at which petro-hegemony operates through the global oil 
assemblage. From the perspective it provides, we can grasp the ways in which activism in 
Blockadia must exceed the localized blockades of oil frontiers to confront, not only petro-
hegemony, but the entirety of the matrix of domination (Collins 2012) in which petro-
hegemony is embedded and out of which the climate crisis has arisen. Using this case study 
example, and several others, this chapter problematizes different dimensions and questions of 
scale and their relation to counter hegemonic struggle. 
 
The California Legislative Assembly passed the state’s first cap and trade program, AB 32, in 
2006 under former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. The bill passed with a simple majority 
and the Governor signed it into law with a pledge to review the program’s progress and a 
vote on whether or not to extend it by 2020 (Megerian 2017).172 The legislation was always 
vulnerable to lawsuits, however, because many conservative think tanks, lobbyists, and 
politicians argued it constituted an illegal tax hike on heavy industry (Murphy 2017a). 
 
172 In theory, the program incentivizes industrial decarbonization by implementing an annually declining 
statewide cap on emissions and supply of carbon credits which polluting companies are required to purchase or 
trade for the right to emit a certain about of greenhouse gas.  The state holds annual auctions selling off carbon 
credits with the idea that as the cap decreases, fewer credits will be sold off and so their value will steadily 
increase. As credits become scarcer and more expensive, companies will feel the incentive to reduce emissions 
instead of paying for more credits. If a company buys credits but doesn’t need to use them it can sell those 
credits to another company that is likely to produce more emissions.  Meanwhile, the revenue raised through the 
state auctions is ringfenced for state spending on “climate solutions” like improved public transport. The second 
iteration of this program passed in 2017 looks very similar to first. 
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According to a 1978 amendment to the state’s constitution, raising taxes in California 
requires approval from two-thirds of both the state Assembly and state Senate. Throughout 
its first iteration, whether or not the program constituted a covert tax on industry was the 
subject of intense legal and political controversy. Seeking to extend the cap and trade 
program, and win a safer two thirds majority to ensure its legal longevity, Governor Brown 
championed the legislation and took it upon his administration to guide the bill through the 
state legislature in 2017. He was ultimately successful, winning in a 55-21 vote in the state 
Assembly and 28-12 in the state Senate. However, the process of gaining a two-thirds of the 
legislature required compromises with Democrats and Republicans who maintained close ties 
with California’s oil and gas industry. As a result, the bill that passed was an even more 
diluted version of the previous program, with promises to allow the extension of freely 
allocated carbon credits to fossil fuel companies until at least 2030 (CEJA 2017).  
 
Climate justice activists argued that the bill reproduced, almost word for word, the Western 
States Petroleum Association’s (WSPA) “wish list” for the state’s climate change policies 
and have consistently cited Jerry Brown’s own close relationship with California’s oil 
industry in their criticisms of the bill (Aronoff 2017). 173 Condemning the legislation’s failure 
to actually stop greenhouse gas emissions at their source and keep fossil fuels in the ground, 
or to protect communities from air pollution associated with greenhouse gas emissions, 
climate justice activists pledged to resist AB 398’s passage.174 With few statewide 
 
173 WSPA is the fossil fuel industry’s main lobbying association. In 2016 and 2017 it contributed more in 
campaign spending and lobbying than any other lobbying group in California. Chevron’s political spending 
came a close second. In 2018, WSPA’s political spending was only outmatched by Pacific Gas and Electric 
(PG&E) after the utility company faced immense pressure for its alleged responsibility faulty equipment leading 
the largest wildfires California has ever seen (Bacher 2019). 
174 While the state’s overall greenhouse gas emissions have declined since 2009 (mostly in the electricity 
generation and transportation sectors), emissions in the industrial sector, which accounts for the oil and gas 
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institutions or resources, and relatively little statewide organizational capacity, however, 
local campaigns and climate justice organizations were heavily outspent and outmatched in 
the state legislature. As one concession to environmental justice organizations who argued 
that cap and trade would do nothing to prevent the continued air pollution of their 
communities at the source of emissions, the Assembly passed a companion bill, AB 617. AB 
617 was aimed at strengthening the monitoring of greenhouse gas and particulate matter 
emissions at their source and improving air quality in frontlines environmental justice 
communities. The companion bill brought Democratic assembly members representing 
environmental justice communities in line with the cap and trade program. While climate 
justice activists welcome increased monitoring and emissions transparency, few believe the 
tradeoff was justified.  
 
Crucially, AB 398 contained controversial articles that removed local and regional regulatory 
agencies’ jurisdiction over local sources of greenhouse gas emissions. These were largely 
perceived as the bill’s greatest betrayal of environmental justice communities. Following the 
bills’ passage, activists participated in a lockdown outside the Kinder Morgan’s gates in 
Richmond. Their press release explained that AB 398 “blocks the ability of local air quality 
agencies from establishing rules limiting greenhouse gases and opens up the door for refining 
 
industry, have fluctuated between one and three percent above and below their 2009 levels (Roberts 2019). This 
suggests that in the dozen years since cap and trade was introduced, it has had little to no impact on industrial 
sector emissions. Indeed, Morello Frosch et al. argue that California’s refinery emissions from have actually 
increased under the cap and trade program (2017). The oil and gas industry was only fully included in the 
program in 2012 and emissions are projected to decrease as the state-wide cap on emissions falls, and carbon 
credits become more expensive. However, for as long as credits are freely allocated to the industry, any 
dramatic drop in oil and gas sector emissions, particularly over the critical next ten years, remains unlikely 
(Cullenward and Coghlan 2016; Haya 2019). The free allocation of credits is intended to prevent heavy industry 
from leaving California for states with less stringent regulations but is widely criticized as counterproductive 
amongst energy experts and activists (ibid). 
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tar sands crude in Richmond, which would worsen air pollution in surrounding communities” 
(Diablo Rising Tide 2017). Perversely, in other words, Chevron and the other Bay Area 
refineries could actually increase their emissions under the cap and trade program because 
they could refine more polluting heavy oils like tar sands imported from Canada, as long as 
they paid for the credits to do so.175 As Andrés Soto says:  
 
Thanks to California’s brand new cap and trade climate bill, AB 398, it’s now 
extremely likely that this very terminal we are blocking will be a destination point for 
the tar sands oil that would be piped in by Trans Mountain… AB 398 is an 
abomination and a threat to environmental justice worldwide. (Ibid) 
 
Highlighting the different scales at which petro-hegemony operates, and indeed the global 
and local dimensions of the oil assemblage through which petro-hegemony manifests itself, 
Soto articulates the connection between air pollution from Bay Area refineries, California 
state legislation on cap and trade, and oil infrastructure development in Canada. Through 
provisions outlawing most local and regional regulations on refinery emissions at their 
source, cap and trade could actually incentivize the construction of the Trans Mountain 
pipeline in British Columbia and the further development of tar sands mining in Alberta by 
ensuring a market for the product continues to exist in California. According to the Energy 
Information Administration, of the five Bay Area refineries four have doubled the processing 
of heavy sour crude from Canada between 2016 and 2018 (EIA.gov 2019).176 The necessary 
 
175 And, of course, many credits are still allocated freely to fossil fuel companies which means that, even on its 
own terms, the state is ultimately subsidizing the import of tar sands to refineries in California. As such, there 
exists very little incentive for refinery owners in the Bay Area not to import Canadian heavy crude from an 
emissions intensity perspective. 
176 Chevron’s Richmond refinery increased Canadian heavy sour crude imports 80,000 barrels in 2016 to 
322,000 in 2018; imports to the Philipps 66 refinery in Rodeo increased from 1,052,000 barrels in 2016 to 
2,362,000 in 2018; Shell’s Martinez refinery increased imports of Canadian heavy sour from 1,336,000 barrels 
to 2,411,000 over the same period; Marathon also in Martinez didn’t import Canadian sour crude in 2016 but 
imported 264,000 barrels in 2018. Valero’s refinery in Benicia was the only one to decrease imports, from 
892,000 barrels to 328,000. Meanwhile total imports of Canadian heavy sour crude to the US have increased 
from 388,000,000 barrels in 2009 to 920,282,000 in 2018, 14 million of which arrived to Californian refineries 
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incentives for reducing source emissions from tar sands refining under the cap and trade 
program simply aren’t in place. Without local regulatory agencies’ ability to regulate 
emissions at the source, California’s refineries will remain a profitable market for heavier 
crude oil, not only from Canadian tar sands but extreme energy extraction all around the 
world. According to local activists, Bay Area refineries are upgrading their facilities to 
process heavier crude for precisely this reason (Sunflower Alliance 2018a). 
 
I have offered the description of the implications of this particular legislation in such detailed 
relief as an introduction to, and because of its implications for, questions of scale with which 
activists in Blockadia must inevitably contend. This example makes visible the global 
dimensions of the oil assemblage touching down in the local through interconnected 
infrastructure upgrades in both Burnaby and Richmond. It also makes clear that contesting 
petro-hegemony at the scale of the local or regional alone simply isn’t enough to keep fossil 
fuels in the ground. Moreover, it illustrates the broader systems of domination in which 
petro-hegemony is itself embedded and why activists cannot ignore these in their efforts to 
keep fossil fuels in the ground. Mann and Wainwright ask their readers to consider how 
revolutionary potential in the name of climate justice that could overthrow the matrix of 
domination (which they call “Climate Leviathan”), could be cultivated in Blockadia. Echoing 
Mann and Wainwright’s reflections on the conditions in which “Climate X” might be 
realized (2018), the critical question of this chapter are, therefore, how do we build a 
movement from within, but out of and exceeding, Blockadia? And, moreover, how do we do 
 
in 2018. 1.9 million arrived in the five Bay Area refineries in 2009 while 5.6 million barrels of Canadian sour 
crude arrived in the Bay Area refineries in 2018. These numbers all indicate the increase in tar sands refining in 
California and the current failures of California climate policy to prevent it. These numbers are publicly 
available through the US Energy Information Administration website: 
www.EIA.gov/petroleum/imports/browser  
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so in a way that both exceeds the scale of the local to address the scale of the oil assemblage 
and the matrix of domination with which it is entwined, while remaining democratically 
oriented and accountable to the local frontlines? Richmond and Bay Area climate justice 
activists’ experiences with these very questions are particularly illustrative but are by no 
means exceptions for activism in and out of Blockadia.  
 
In Richmond, climate justice activists have found they must move between the different 
“nested scales” in which petro-hegemony exists (Lefebvre 1989). From expunging Chevron’s 
influence over the common sense micro-politics of city culture, to the contestation of the 
company’s relationship with city council, to lobbying regional regulatory agencies, to 
challenging state-wide climate policy, to the city’s strategic positioning in the “thin green 
wall” along the Western coast of North America (which is preventing fossil fuel exports from 
the interior reaching markets in Asia), climate activists in Richmond are having to contend 
with petro-hegemony as it operates at scales of the local, state, national and global context. 
Mirroring the global archipelago constituting Michael Watts’ “oil assemblage” I described in 
Chapter 2 (2014), activism across the archipelago of local community resistance to fossil 
fuels that constitutes Blockadia must also be able to operate on multiple scales all at once 
(Collis 2015; Klein 2014). 
 
California’s cap and trade bill is exemplary of how and why the movement must address 
petro-hegemony at different scales. Having quickly discovered the limits of municipal 
government and its jurisdiction over Chevron’s refinery, Richmond’s activists brought their 
campaign to another industry captured state institution, the Bay Area Air Quality 
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Management District (BAAQMD). Challenging the oil industry’s regulatory capture of this 
agency, climate justice organizations worked through a regional Bay Area coalition, the 
BAAQMD Network, to force the agency to impose emissions regulations on the Bay Area’s 
refineries. These regulations would have severely limited the refineries’ ability to process 
heavier crude oil with higher emissions intensity,177 like tar sands and diluted bitumen. As 
the story goes, literally the day before the agency put pen to paper and implemented the new 
regulations, Governor Brown’s AB 398 passed the legislature and was signed into law. The 
law prohibits local regulatory agencies like air districts from imposing local specific 
regulations on emissions from refineries, an article largely seen as one of the oil and gas 
industry’s top lobbying priorities (Aronoff 2017).178 Outraged, activists later argued that the 
industry lobbied for the provision to be included in the bill as a direct response to how close 
the BAAQMD Network came to imposing a significant increase in regulatory burden on 
California’s refineries. The provision has moved most emissions regulation outside the remit 
of local regulatory agencies and is now almost entirely overseen by the state through the cap 
and trade program.179 
 
 
177 Emissions intensity refers to the relative contribution to global warming different types of crude oil are 
capable of when refined. Heavy sour crude has a particularly high greenhouse gas emissions intensity and is 
also associated with higher toxic heavy metal content and other fine particulate matter (NRDC 2014). 
178 The official reason for this provision is that local jurisdiction over emissions would clash and potentially 
contradict the statewide caps and increase uncertainty in the industry. 
179 As Soto was quick to remind me, however, from limitations on permits for refinery facilities upgrades to 
more stringent standards for emissions of particulate matter threatening public health there are other regulatory 
actions BAAQMD could take to discourage refining heavy crudes in the region. (Increase in emissions of 
particulate matter is closely associated with crude oils with higher emissions greenhouse gas emissions intensity 
but are not regulated under cap and trade. Regulations on particulate matter emissions would also likely 
decrease greenhouse gas emissions). Meanwhile, Jean explained that BAAQMD are experts in “kicking the can 
down the road” and have consistently argued that this kind of regulatory action is also outside their remit 
(personal communication, July 18th, 2018). 
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Miya Yoshitani at APEN cited this specific example as having had a significant impact on 
her organization’s development of a state-policy arm, and, more generally, to a commitment 
amongst Californian environmental justice organizations to developing statewide 
organizational capacity through networks of local grassroots organizations like CEJA 
(personal communication, July 12th, 2018). The 2018 Brown’s Last Chance, now called the 
Last Chance Alliance, is another recent example of a statewide coalition of climate justice 
organizations, many on the frontlines of fossil fuel extraction and refining, seeking to 
consolidate their collective strength at a statewide scale. Similarly, Gayle McLaughlin, 
recognizing the limits of local government, ran for Lieutenant Governor in 2018 with the 
purpose of sharing the lessons of the Richmond Progressive Alliance across the state and 
developing a California Progressive Alliance through a network of local municipal 
organizing initiatives. Despite moves towards scaling their efforts up and out of Blockadia, 
early analysis suggests at significant constraints on climate justice organizing at the scale of 
the state and beyond. Nevertheless, recent years have seen the organizational infrastructure of 
the climate justice movement in California begin prioritizing institutionalization and 
consolidation of networks at a statewide scale. These are now working through some of these 
constraints. 
 
Climate change is an inherently global crisis. Thus, emerging out of the global convergences 
of activists outside the annual UN climate talks, the climate justice movement has always 
also been a global phenomenon. From its founding questions of the climate debt owed by 
industrialized countries to industrializing and formerly colonized ones, to the resurgence of 
white nationalism capitalizing on resentment of (in part) climate-driven immigration, the 
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concerns of climate justice can never be isolated at the local scale – they are inherently 
global. This is just as true for frontlines keep-it-in-the-ground activism, where the drivers of 
climate change connect the movement across space, as it is for activism outside the United 
Nations climate talks, where the movement is connected through coming together in one 
place. As such, climate justice activists across the global supply chain of fossil fuels are 
forging “translocal solidarities” to contest strategic chokepoints in the transportation and 
processing of the commodity through a strategy called “segmented localism” (Routledge 
2011; Haluza-DeLay and Carter 2016, 464). Accordingly, as the political economy and 
associated infrastructure of tar sands oil is exposed, organizations in the Bay Area, the British 
Columbian lower mainland, and in the heart of the Alberta tar sands, are developing loosely 
coordinated strategic interventions that target different geographic locations of vulnerability 
in the industry’s supply chain. Relationships are being rekindled and strengthened across the 
Blockadia’s archipelago to contend with the porosity of borders to capital and stymie the 
transport and production of oil. As such, the movement cannot eschew intervention at the 
scale of global supply commodity chains and international political economy. 
 
In British Columbia, Washington, Oregon and California, campaigns against fossil fuel 
infrastructure have shared similar frames, stories, and are consistently working in alliances 
that encompass constituents reaching far beyond the proverbial choir. Naomi Klein argues 
that the carbon boom in North America has exposed many more communities to the impacts 
of fossil fuel production in the last ten years (Klein 2014). Consequently, communities in 
proximity to proposed infrastructure upgrades or transport routes have come together to 
interrupt the commodity supply chain through their local communities. In doing so, these 
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communities are developing regional relationships that cross state and provincial borders to 
forge translocal solidarities that in some ways transcend place-baced struggle (ibid). Out of 
these relationships a “thin green wall” from the coast of the Pacific Northwest all the way 
down the coast of Southern California is growing to block the transportation of fossil fuels 
from interior states and provinces to refineries on the Pacific Coast and markets in Asia 
(Grossman 2017). This blockade on transport and refining infrastructure along the 
continent’s Western Seaboard transcends nation and state borders and constitutes a 
significant impediment to the export fossil fuels off the West Coast. Finally, and particularly 
from the perspective of Indigenous movement leaders in the Pacific Northwest where Coast 
Salish Territories spans both sides of the border between what are now called British 
Columbia and Washington, the movement must also contend with the artificial nature of 
these borders. As such, climate justice, and the alliances it articulates into alignment, are 
forcing activists to rethink their relationships to borders and, indeed to the modern 
conception of the nation-state (ibid; Mann and Wainwright 2018).  
 
Meanwhile, the opposition to cap and trade amongst organizers in Richmond has resonances 
not only between individual nation-states but also at the scale of global climate governance. 
Climate justice activists’ analysis of cap and trade is tied to a political critique of climate 
solutions that are rooted in a matrix of domination constituting intersectional relationships of 
colonialism, extractivism, capitalism, and environmental racism, and out of which, it is 
argued, the climate crisis emerged. Resistance to the false solutions derived from this matrix 
is most often articulated at the global gathering of climate justice activists at the UNFCCC’s 
annual Conference of the Parties (COPs). The hegemonic status of carbon trading, carbon 
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offsets, market-based solutions, and the concomitant faith in the ingenuity of the market to 
innovate “technofixes,” is contested in the streets outside the United Nations gatherings.  
 
The articulations of climate justice and resistance to neoliberal climate solutions at this 
global scale percolate out into local frontlines anti-fossil fuels activism. However, these same 
articulations also absorb the experiences of frontlines communities around the world, who 
are confronting both extraction and false solutions, which are expressed in critical activist 
discourse in the global arena provided through the UN climate talks (Bond 2014). This forges 
a synthesis of different global and local articulations of climate justice that overlap but are 
remain unique to their local contexts. (This indicates, perhaps, the possibility of a counter 
hegemonic articulation of climate justice that draws together the distinct experiences and 
knowledges over local confrontations around the world, or what I will later call pluriversal 
hegemony). The “It Takes Roots Coalition” has, for example, brought together climate justice 
activist frontlines communities across the United States (including several from Richmond) 
to participate in workshops, coalition-building, and demonstrations outside the COPs 
alongside frontlines activists hailing from environmental justice struggles all around the 
world (It Takes Roots 2019). Through these networks, resistance to cap and trade, which has 
long been at the forefront of climate justice confrontation at the UN, is then rearticulated at 
the local scale, for example in Richmond. The critiques of neoliberal climate solutions 
contain, therefore, simultaneously global and local inflections. This dynamic illustrates how 
the climate justice movement can legitimately be called a global movement that is comprised 
of many local movements geographically dispersed across the world.   
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Questions of scale and contestation are not just geographic, however. They are also temporal, 
historically and politically situated with profound ideological and strategic implications for 
the movement’s theories of change. The extent to which combating petro-hegmony is 
implicated in confrontation with the larger matrix of domination in which it is embedded 
means we must engage in critical analysis of the scope of the movement’s intervention, its 
targets, and its purpose. This means asking, for example, difficult questions about the scale at 
which the movement should consolidate its power. Overthrowing petro-hegemony is the 
beginning, not the end, of the climate justice movement’s ambition. However, accepting this 
massively broadens the scope and scale of resistance that we must expect of the theories of 
change and strategies currently targeting petro-hegemony. If these are to rise to the 
monumental challenge of global revolution in the name of climate justice, which is ultimately 
where this line of thought leads, then we must consider how activism against the industry 
throughout Blockadia can lay the foundations for this broader assault. This also means that it 
is incumbent upon academics and activists alike to consider the different scales at which the 
climate justice movement’s political intervention is appropriate and can, or even should, be 
organized.180 In other words, if the political analysis of the global climate justice movement 
is one that requires us to look beyond carbon in the atmosphere or in the ground, and towards 
the matrix of domination that allows petro-hegemony to operate in the first place, then at 
what scale is it appropriate, or even possible, for the climate justice movement to challenge 
the hegemony of that matrix? This question is vital to climate justice activism precisely 
 
180 It is crucial to remember here that the climate justice movement is by no means alone in its confrontation 
with these systems of oppression. Contemporary movements intersect with climate justice but they have also 
developed their own strategies and theories of change that seek to dismantle white supremacy, patriarchy, 
capitalism, colonialism, and so on. We must learn from these and from the generations of scholars and activists 
that have devoted themselves to these questions before us. 
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because it is from this very matrix that neoliberalism’s racist and colonial false solutions, like 
cap and trade, geoengineering, and carbon offsets, emerge.  
 
To articulate the complexity of these questions another way, we might say that, from the 
perspective of climate justice, false solutions to climate change reinforce the primacy of the 
market, the promise of extraction-fueled infinite growth, and the alienation of human beings 
from the ecosystems in which we exist. Climate policies, like California’s cap and trade 
program, can also reinforce dynamics of colonial dispossession and accumulation that force 
Indigenous peoples off their land or otherwise undermines their ontological relationships to it 
(Glibertson 2017; Bond 2014; Tokar 2014). Thus, examples of neoliberal climate policies 
interacting with frontlines struggle against petro-hegemony indicates the extent to which the 
struggles on the frontlines of Blockadia are entwined with and inextricable from the 
intersectional matrix of domination in which petro-hegemony thrives. Richmond’s 
experiences with cap and trade are just one instance illustrating this broader trend.  Out of 
Blockadia, then, a broader strategy for upending the inequities and injustices inherent to 
capitalism, racism, colonialism, patriarchy and all of the systemic roots of ecological crisis, 
must be developed through confrontation with fossil fuel industry. If the assault on petro-
hegemony is to yield “a global revolution in the name of climate justice,” as Mann and 
Wainwright say it must, then we have to examine how activism and activists may move 
through, out of, and perhaps expand, Blockadia to develop the groundwork for an assault on 
the systemic roots of the crisis that go far beyond keeping fossil fuels in the ground. This 
opens up yet another scale towards which the climate justice movement and keep-it-in-the-
ground activism must be attentive.  
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There are multiple ways in which we might interpret scale. I understand scale through Sallie 
Marston’s broad formulation of the term as the “level at which relevant processes operate” 
that, to varying degrees, socially produced (Martson 2000, cited in McCarthy 2005). 
Throughout this dissertation I have encountered questions of scale in terms of policy, 
infrastructure, geography, alliances, movement building, theories of change, and political 
philosophy, but, until now, I have not engaged with them with anything like the rigor they 
deserve. They are all of vital consequence to any analysis of (counter) hegemony and so it is 
to each of these that I will devote this final chapter. Specifically, I will problematize them 
through analysis of three dimensions of scale. Firstly, the chapter engages the situated, 
conjunctural nature of petro-hegemony, how it operates at different scales throughout the oil 
assemblage, the difficulty of isolating “the local” as a unit of strategic analysis, and how 
petro-hegemony is entwined with a matrix of domination which is itself a hegemonic order 
that must be dismantled. I offer the concept of “layered hegemonies” as one way we might 
begin thinking about the relationship between hegemonies and counter hegemonies at 
different scales.  
 
Secondly, I critically examine the, often quite justifiable, argument that size equals power. 
Recognizing the enormity of the crisis and the dominance of our opponents, climate justice 
activists will often argue that it is only through building a mass movement of movements that 
our efforts will be commensurate with the scale of the fossil fuel industry and the matrix of 
domination in which it operates (Foran 2016). Here I assess the unit of the mass movement 
as an adequate approach to counter hegemonic strategy. I also question whether hegemony is 
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itself an appropriate set of power relations towards which we should aspire. Scale and 
hegemony are brought together in this discussion through problematizing the argument that 
critical mass (i.e. the size of the movement) is a fundamental precondition to achieving 
climate justice. I engage with Richard Day, Arturo Escobar, Jonathan Smucker and Adrienne 
Maree Brown to explore whether operating at the scales of hegemony is inherently 
oppressive and whether a movement’s aspirations towards becoming a “mass” hegemonic 
entity reproduces the very dynamics of domination we are seeking to abolish. I return to 
debates between strategic orientations that prioritize critical mass versus those that prioritize 
critical connections and draw on the synthesizing work articulated in Chapter Seven to 
problematize the mass movement. From this perspective, I argue that only a hegemony that 
articulates a world of many worlds, drawing on what Escobar calls a “pluriversal” 
perspective, can ensure counter hegemonic insurgency does not replicate the modes of 
domination embedded in current hegemonic orderings.  
 
Thirdly, and finally, I explore how climate justice activists are themselves encountering the 
task of building a counter hegemonic movement commensurate with the scale of petro-
hegemony and the systems of domination in which it is embedded. I outline a distinction 
between aggrandizement to scale and aggregation to scale. The former, I suggest, replicates 
a hierarchical, monolithic approach to counter hegemony. The latter, I hope, indicates one 
way activists can develop counter hegemonic networks premised upon the commitment to a 
world of many worlds. I argue that this is both a strategic and principled approach to scaling 
up to meet the crisis. Here I draw on the work of Gramscian scholars, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
rhizome, and Mark Purcell’s attempts to bring these theoretical traditions together. I then 
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place this theory in conjunctures of my case study research. This chapter offers only 
suggestions and is deliberately reserved in its argumentation because the scope of any one of 
the questions under analysis throughout these final pages would require a dissertation each.  
Nevertheless, through my field research it became abundantly clear that any assessment of 
the strategies being deployed to contest petro-hegemony would be woefully incomplete 
without some attention paid to questions of scale. Moreover, I believe it would be 
irresponsible to finish this dissertation without considering the ways in which climate justice 
activists might build a movement out of Blockadia that confronts not only petro-hegemony 
but the entire matrix of domination out of which the climate crisis has arisen. As such, 
hinting at directions and teasing out problems we may encounter as the movement moves 
through Blockadia is all I offer in these final pages. 
 
Part One: Layered Hegemonies  
 
Throughout this dissertation, I have explored the operations of hegemony and counter 
hegemony through very specific local and place-based conjunctures. This conjunctural 
analysis is a very effective way to illustrate the relations of power comprising petro-
hegemony as they touch down in the local. However, it is also something of an abstraction 
because the local place-based conjuncture is never really separated from the flows and power 
relations existing within, above, and around it. Invoking Gramsci, Escobar writes that 
conjunctural analysis allows us to explore the broader “organic crisis,” or the “planetary 
crisis, civilizational crisis, or a crisis of climate, energy, poverty and inequality, and 
meaning” in which we currently find ourselves. Through place-based and deeply 
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contextualized investigation we may assess “the particular forces and sites of tension, 
antagonism and contradictions at which this type of crisis manifests itself, and how they are, 
and might be, variously articulated by diverse political forces.” Thus, for Escobar, 
conjunctural analysis “illuminate[s] the spaces within which a counter-hegemonic struggle 
might emerge” (forthcoming, 10). However, if we explore the conjunctural as though it were 
abstracted from the broader context that it is shaped by, and in which it exists, then the 
question of at what scale the praxis of counter hegemony is appropriate can go untheorized. 
In other words, by overemphasizing the local we may ignore the matrix of flows and 
relations within which the local exists and out of which it is comprised.  As we explore the 
operations of petro-hegemony and develop counter hegemonic strategies through 
conjunctural analysis, we need to ensure these ideas are not isolated to, and only make sense 
within, the abstracted unit of “the local.”  
 
Michael Watt’s oil assemblage helps us identify the different scales at which petro-hegemony 
operates because it allows our analysis, and praxis, to move, almost seamlessly, between 
conjunctural specificity and the broader context in which that conjuncture has developed. 
The assemblage brings together all the different institutions, flows, actors, infrastructures, 
and organizations (and the connections between them) through which the functioning of 
petro-hegemony may be observed and analyzed. Attention to the oil assemblage illuminates 
how petro-hegemony is both situated within, and emerges out of, the different constituent 
parts that comprise the assemblage. In particular, attention to the different parts of the oil 
assemblage allows us to better understand the industry’s ability to intervene in and shape the 
relations of consent, coercion and compliance. As such, the different scales at which petro-
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hegemony operates through these constituent parts becomes visible through the lens of the oil 
assemblage.  
 
These power relations “touch down” in the local, in what Watts calls the “oil frontier,” and, 
because oil frontiers tend to be the sites of greatest conflict and contestation, it is at the scale 
of the local that these power relations are most easily observed. However, we must not allow 
this emphasis on the local and the frontier to obscure the ways in which the industry’s 
hegemony operates at other scales. Moreover, this means this means points of intervention 
must be engaged with against petro-hegemony throughout the constituent parts of the global 
oil assemblage, from scales of local, to regional, to state, to national, to global. Finally, 
intervention through the carbon rebellion in Blockadia may successfully overturn the 
relations of power upon which petro-hegemony depends and establish an alternative 
hegemony at a local or regional scale but could well remain intact at the scale of the state, 
province or nation. To varying degrees and in different ways, this has been a dynamic I 
observed in both Burnaby and Richmond.  
 
Activism through the carbon rebellion must remain attuned to how the global oil assemblage 
and petro-hegemony are themselves locked into, and dependent upon broader dynamics, 
flows, institutions, actors, and organizations that comprise a hegemonic intersectional matrix 
of domination. This matrix is constituted by the confluence of structural racism, patriarchy, 
colonialism and extractivism that also exists across multiple scales. These too must be targets 
of counter hegemonic climate justice activism if the climate crisis is to be addressed through 
activism in Blockadia in any kind of just way.  This matrix of domination is at the root of 
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climate injustice and, just like the oil assemblage, permeates, but far exceeds, the confines of 
localized oil frontiers. Thus Petro-hegemony’s hegemonic status necessarily depends upon 
the hegemonic status of this matrix of domination. As such, counter hegemonic intervention 
through the carbon rebellion cannot be fully realized unless interventions are also made 
against this broader matrix of domination.  Therefore, frontlines campaigns must also 
consider the implications of their strategic interventions against the fossil fuel industry for 
combating this matrix of domination through and beyond the localized limits of Blockadia. 
To make sense of how these hegemonies operate at different scales, how they interact with 
one another, and how we might begin to think of resisting them at different scales, I develop 
a concept called “layered hegemonies.” I explain this concept by way of examples in the 
section that follows. 
 
It is helpful to think of the oil assemblage as consisting of a globally expansive archipelago 
of institutions, organizations, actors, and infrastructures, and the flows existing between 
them. As Watts explains, it encompasses the oil companies themselves, municipal, tribal, 
state, and global governance bodies, law enforcement agencies, private security firms, 
financial institutions, regulatory agencies, non-governmental organizations, public relations 
companies, “astro-turf” groups, cultural institutions, construction companies and contractors, 
physical extraction, transportation and refining infrastructure, and the flows of capital, 
materials, labor, and discourses that connect them. Meanwhile, oil frontiers exist at sites of 
upstream extraction, midstream transportation routes, and downstream processing and 
refining operations (Bridge and LeBillon 2017). We can map all of this onto the terrains of 
struggle existing between the carbon rebellion and petro-hegemony. Consequently, the 
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concept of the oil assemblage can also help us identify different points of intervention in 
relations of consent, compliance, and coercion and how they emerge at scales exceeding the 
local. 
 
These power relations work through, and emerge out of, the oil assemblage from the 
micropolitics of the discursive construction of common sense to the geopolitics of global 
governance. The oil industry’s capture of regulatory agencies, described in both case study 
sites, offers one example of how the industry harnesses relations of coercion through the oil 
assemblage. The industry’s relationship with law enforcement and private security 
companies is another connection within the oil assemblage that allows the industry to deploy 
coercive tactics at the local scale. Exploring the flows between oil companies and public 
relations firms or cultural institutions (e.g. museum sponsorships) can help us identify the 
discourses through which consent to the industry is developed. Additionally, attention to the 
flows of investment between financial institutions and fossil fuel companies can help 
activists devise interventions in relations of compliance through, for example, a strategy of 
secondary targeting and divestment. The physical and metaphorical blockades constituting 
Blockadia and constitute interruptions in some of the flows of labor, capital materials and 
discourses within the oil assemblage that the functioning of petro-hegemony depends upon. 
 
We must consider, however, that the actors, institutions, organizations, and flows between 
them, that constitute the oil assemblage and allow petro-hegemony to function sometimes 
exist outside of, or are otherwise invisible, on the local frontlines of Blockadia. Indeed, if 
petro-hegemony is never truly confined to the local scale, we must also look to the 
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connections, actors, and institutions that allow petro-hegemony to function at grander scales. 
With regards to the example offered in this chapter’s introduction, for instance, the oil 
industry’s influence over much of the California Legislative Assembly brought the 
Legislative Assembly into the oil assemblage through connections existing at a scale above 
Richmond’s municipal government. Yet, as AB 398’s passage illustrates, the industry’s 
influence over the Legislative Assembly, in turn, has had consequences for Richmond, 
whereby the bill’s passage stymied local efforts to regulate Bay Area refinery emissions. This 
means that Richmond’s activists have had to challenge petro-hegemony not only at the 
municipal scale but at the scale of the state. It should go without saying, then, that action at 
one scale has consequences for other scales in which petro-hegemony operates. Meanwhile, 
the hegemonic status of carbon trading and neoliberal climate solutions globally, means that 
even as state and national governments take action on climate change, their policies will do 
little to directly impose limits on the extraction, transport and burning of fossil fuels. 
Amongst many in the climate justice movement, this calls into question the legitimacy of the 
state as an arena through which climate solutions could ever be achieved. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary for climate justice activists engaged in frontlines struggles to also be involved in 
contesting, or making connections with those challenging, the hegemonic status of neoliberal 
climate solutions at a global scale – for example, by sending delegations of climate justice 
activists to build networks at the annual UN climate talks. 
 
Petro-hegemony can be challenged and overturned at one scale while remaining potent and 
intact at another. Two prominent examples from my case studies help illustrate this point. 
The first, as I elaborated upon in this chapter’s introduction, is the passage of AB 398. The 
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fossil fuel industry, and specifically Chevron’s, hegemonic influence in Richmond has been 
subject to a coordinated assault for nearly two decades and, as its hegemony has been 
challenged, aspiring counter hegemonic forces are ascendant in the city.  This doesn’t 
necessarily say much about the industry’s hegemonic status throughout the rest of California, 
however. Indeed, while the discourses and practices of California’s oil and gas industry have 
come under increasing scrutiny in the state, the industry remains a highly influential force in 
state politics, culture and economy.181 It was precisely this hegemonic influence that ensured 
the California’s flagship climate change policies have done relatively little to curtail (and 
have arguably reinforced) the industry’s ability to continue extracting, transporting and 
refining fossil fuels in the state. Despite significant interventions from the climate justice 
movement, hegemonic climate change discourses remain focused on individual rather 
systemic responsibility. This ensures climate policies incentivize change at the demand side 
of the equation but ignores the supply-side. This dynamic is a product of petro-hegemony’s 
enduring potency across the state, and particularly within governing bodies at local, regional, 
and state levels. Hegemonic climate discourses promoted by California’s oil and gas industry 
are a threat to the efficacy of local struggles because, as AB 398 illustrated, state policy can 
often trump the jurisdiction and authority of local and regional decision-makers.  To address 
this, climate justice activists from frontlines Blockadia struggles must be, and are, engaging 
with points of intervention at scales exceeding the local.  
 
181 Even though consent to the industry has come under increasing pressure in California, through campaigns 
like the fossil fuel divestment movement and a growing awareness of the industry’s disproportionate 
responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions, the industry’s influence over political decision-making is still 
overwhelming (McKibben 2018). This is perhaps nowhere better evinced than in the fact that during Governor 
Jerry Brown’s tenure more than 21,000 new oil and gas wells were given permits and 77% of them were located 
in low income communities and communities of color (the Governor, it should be remembered, made climate 
change a fundamental component of his policy platform in a state with a global reputation for environmental 
awareness) (Center for Biological Diversity 2018; Cart 2018; Milman 2018). 
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I observed another illustration of this point in Canada where opponents of the Trans 
Mountain pipeline successfully sued the government, the NEB and Kinder Morgan in the 
Federal Court of Appeals. Through the federal court system, they were able to halt the 
construction of the pipeline for over a year and the likelihood of defeat in the courts could 
well have been decisive in Kinder Morgan’s decision to abandon the pipeline. However, this 
shift in relations of coercion at the federal level, (whereby the courts became a significant 
point of intervention for climate justice activists) was not accompanied by a shift in relations 
of consent or compliance, nationally. As such, the FCA’s quashing of the pipeline permits 
only stalled the project but did not stop it. Indeed, across much of Canada the industry retains 
a strong hold over the discourses that maintain consent to its projects and operations. In 
particular, the industry’s discourse of the pipeline being built “in the national interest,” 
parroted over and over again by allies in government and the corporate media meant that 
even though the FCA quashed the pipeline permits in a coercive intervention against the 
industry, the pipeline still has national consent.  
 
The pipeline is vehemently opposed in much of British Columbia yet vehemently supported 
in much of Alberta. Moreover, support for the pipeline is strong not just in Alberta but in 
other key provinces where the Liberal Party must fend off Conservative attempts to win their 
voters.  Indeed, following the courts’ ruling, across Canada, the Federal Canadian 
government enjoyed significant political cover as it carried out new environmental impact 
assessments and consultations to get the project back on track. This illustrates the importance 
of engaging in relations of consent at a grander scale when national or federal governments 
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have jurisdiction that supersedes provincial or local authority. Even when an oil company is 
forced to abandon its projects and interventions in relations of power are successful locally, 
petro-hegemony, the industry, and its projects, are not necessarily defeated at grander scales. 
As we saw in Canada, when the pipeline faced an existential threaten, the state simply bought 
it, took on the political and economic risk associated with it, and is now in a stronger position 
to get the project finished than Kinder Morgan ever was. Engaging in points of intervention 
in relations of power on these grander scales is therefore crucial to defeating petro-hegemony 
beyond the limits of the local. 
 
In addition to the different interlocking and interrelated scales at which the relationships 
between institutions and organizations within the oil assemblage advance petro-hegemony, 
we must also pay close attention to the physical infrastructures that are connected within the 
oil assemblage through flows of capital and commodities. Smooth connections between these 
infrastructures are critical to the political economy of fossil fuels. Analyzing these 
connections offers us another way of thinking about how petro-hegemony is developed 
across geographic scales. Moreover, viewing the oil assemblage from this perspective allows 
us to see how intervention at the local level may be most strategic where it disrupts vital 
nodes that make the political economy of oil possible. This means confronting petro-
hegemony at a local scale so that the flow of commodities and capital that make the 
functioning of the industry possible may be disrupted on a wider scale. Opponents of the oil 
industry can address the enormity of the oil assemblage by breaking up the industry’s 
operations into its constituent pieces and disrupting each of these at a local scale. This 
strategy is called “segmented localism” (Haluza DeLay and Carter 2016, 464). In the cases I 
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studied, for example, the flow of tar sands oil, or dilbit, from the site of extraction through 
pipelines, along railways, or on boats, to sites of refining and production, can be thought of 
as linking together different constituent parts of the oil assemblage. Severing the links 
between these sites by blockading transportation routes or preventing refineries from 
processing the raw product can prove a highly disruptive intervention in the political 
economy of the tar sands.  
 
Bitumen extracted from the Alberta tar sands is turned into dilbit as it is chemically diluted to 
decrease its viscosity so that it can flow through pipelines more easily. The Trans Mountain 
pipeline was officially proposed to transport dilbit from landlocked Alberta to markets in 
Asia. However, this oil will more likely end up in refineries along the West Coast of the 
United States (Allan 2018a). All but one of the five oil refineries in Burnaby have shut down 
because they do not have the equipment to process heavy sour crude like dilbit and are not 
importing enough oil to make them profitable. Meanwhile, Bridge and LeBillon explain that 
one of the greatest challenges facing the oil industry right now is that their oil refineries are 
“in the wrong place as the center of demand shifts to Asia” (2017, 61). Even so, the demand 
for oil in Asia remains set upon light sweet crude rather than heavy sour because most of 
their refineries still aren’t equipped with the technology to process heavier sulfurous crude. 
Thus, dilbit and tar sands are not in particularly high demand in Asia (Wilt 2018). 
Meanwhile, refineries that do have the technology can make a lot of money by importing 
cheap dilbit from Canada, processing it, and turning it into a lucrative array of oil products 
(Bridge and LeBillon 2017). As such, tar sands oil is most likely to be imported by refineries 
that already have, or are currently seeking to upgrade, their technology to process heavy 
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sulfurous crude. It is to the refineries on the West Coast of the US, including in the Bay Area, 
therefore, that the oil running through the Trans Mountain pipeline would most likely be 
transported (Greenpeace 2018c; Sunflower Alliance 2018; Bennet 2016; Goldberg 2017; 
Gafni 2013). Imports of Canadian heavy sour crude to the five Bay Area refineries more than 
doubled between 2016 and 2018 (EIA.gov 2019). These imports would very likely increase 
further if the Trans Mountain pipeline were built. In this way, frontlines struggle in 
Richmond and Burnaby are intimately connected across the vast geography of the oil 
assemblage. 
 
Data from the US Energy Information Association shows that while Chevron’s Richmond 
refinery has only imported heavy sulfurous crude from Canada on two occasions (80,000 
barrels in 2016 and 322,000 barrels in 2018), other Bay Area refineries like the Phillips 66 
refinery in Rodeo and the Shell refinery in Martinez import tar sands on a more regular basis 
(ibid). Meanwhile, heavier more sulfurous crude oils, particularly when mixed with diluents 
to form dilbit, are more volatile and especially corrosive to refinery infrastructure and 
pipelines. The 2012 explosion and fire at the Chevron refinery was a result of corroded pipes 
and the data shows that it was importing heavier sour crude to refine at this time. Reports 
after the fire suggest that it is quite likely, that corrosion from the refinery’s shift to 
importing heavier sour crude (though not necessarily Canadian tar sands) was a significant 
factor leading to the explosion in 2012 (NRDC 2014; Chemical Safety Board 2015). Both 
Chevron and Phillips 66 have, or are in the process of applying for, permits to upgrade the 
technology in their refineries to process heavier crude. Additionally, these oil companies that 
often own upstream and downstream assets, sell heavy sour crude across the border to US 
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refineries at a discount because of its poor quality and higher processing costs (Allan 2018a). 
As such, US refineries have a particular incentive to purchase cheaper crude from across the 
border and refine it into a whole range of lucrative products. These developments, alone, 
should indicate that the Bay Area refineries are preparing to process heavier sour crude, 
much of it likely from the tar sands, as supplies of lighter sweet crude become more 
expensive and harder to find (Bridge and LeBillon 2017). 
 
Meanwhile, as George Gonzales has explained, securing the United States’ access to 
Canadian tar sands is increasingly becoming a question of geopolitical stability for US 
geopolitical strategists (2016). Gonzales argues that increasing imports of oil from its allied 
neighbor to the north to US refineries (instead of relying upon supplies from the Middle East 
or South America) strengthens the US’s position in an increasingly unstable global political 
economy of oil.  This is another reason we can expect much of the tar sands that would be 
transported through any one of proposed pipelines out of Alberta to end up in US refineries 
like those in the Bay Area.  These geopolitical and the technical considerations, and the 
characteristics of the product itself, are all vital to understanding the functioning of petro-
hegemony at different scales. These are made visible through observing the connections 
within the oil assemblage. We must also be viewing them as potential points of intervention. 
For example, learning about the characteristic of the product, whether it’s corrosive, volatile, 
particularly toxic, highly valued or in short supply can help activists make strategic decisions 
about where the industry may vulnerable and which points of intervention to select in the oil 
assemblage. As such, fighting specific companies’ applications for permits to upgrade 
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refineries to process a particular type of oil or intervening in company’s requests to transport 
dilbit in local contexts can help disrupt the global supply of the world’s most polluting oils.  
 
Isolating Richmond’s position within the oil assemblage maybe analytically useful but it may 
also ignore the extent to which Richmond’s fossil fuel industry is embedded in the regional 
industry which is itself a nexus for the global supply and transportation of fossil fuels. From 
the Levine coal terminal, to Kinder Morgan’s import and export shipping hub, to Chevron’s 
refinery, to crude and coal being transported through the city by rail, fossil fuel infrastructure 
in Richmond cannot be disarticulated from the brooder political economy in which it exists. 
As such, it is very difficult to view the oil assemblage from the perspective of the city alone. 
Moreover, fossil fuel infrastructure in the city is inextricably intertwined with fossil fuel 
infrastructure throughout the Bay Area. We ignore these interconnections at our peril because 
observing how the oil assemblage is geographically interconnected through the location of 
infrastructure and flows of its product can also allow us to imagine ways in which alliances 
and solidarities across space, and which are not singularly limited to the local may emerge. 
These coordinated alignments can disrupt the different constituent parts fossil fuel 
infrastructure upon which the functioning of the industry depends. In fact, Naomi Klein has 
argued that the global spread of fossil fuel infrastructure is a key driver in the emergence of 
alliances and solidarities across vastly different communities in very different places that 
would never have considered themselves part of the same movement otherwise (2014).182 
 
182 For example, with regards to tar sands pipelines, Klein writes: “Beginning in northern Alberta, in a region 
where the worst impacts are being felt by Indigenous people, and often ending in places where the worst health 
impacts are felt by urban communities of color, these pipelines pass a whole lot of other places in between. 
After all, the same piece of infrastructure will travel through multiple states or provinces (or both); through the 
watersheds of big cities and tiny towns; through farmlands and fishing rivers; through more lands claimed by 
Indigenous people and through land occupied by the upper middle class. And despite their huge differences, 
everyone along the route is up against a common threat and therefore are potential allies. In the 1990s, it was 
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Thus, the very spread and scale of the industry, and local resistances to it, is connecting 
people into an expansive, even global, movement against petro-hegemony. 
 
Refineries are localized bottlenecks and transportations routes are translocal chokepoints in 
the global oil commodity chain. These are, therefore, vital nodes within the oil assemblage 
that activists can put pressure on to disrupt the supply of fossil fuels and ultimately keep 
fossil fuels in the ground. Activists across the Trans Mountain pipeline route and particularly 
in Burnaby, alongside activists in Richmond, are preempting expansion of tar sands 
infrastructure upstream (in the sites of extraction) by opposing the development of 
downstream refineries and midstream transportation routes. This is following a broader trend 
on the continents Western Seaboard. From the Northern coast of British Columbia down 
along the coast of the Pacific North West and all the way to export hubs in Los Angeles, 
what Zoltán Grossman calls a “thin green wall” is being built to halt the export of fossil fuels 
from interior provinces to the coast and from the coast to markets abroad (2017). This thin 
green wall, comprised of an archipelago of local frontlines of Blockadia, spans the Western 
seaboard from the Kitimat in northern British Columbia to Los Angeles in Southern 
California. It is helping address the vast geography and enormous scale of petro-hegemony as 
it operates through the global oil assemblage. The metaphor is yet another illustration of how 
the oil assemblage is a vital concept that allows us to view, connect, and resist the fossil fuel 
industry across multiple scales. 
 
 
trade deals that brought huge and unlikely coalitions together; today it is fossil fuel infrastructure” (2014, 272).  
In this way, the way the oil assemblage touches down in many different locals is actually helping build the 
movement. 
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All of the above being accounted for, even this green wall of local struggles on oil frontiers 
disrupting and interrupting the flow of oil from the interior to the coast currently being 
developed on an enormous scale will not be commensurate with the size and reach of petro-
hegemony if activists on the ground ignore the hegemonic matrix of domination consisting of 
extractivism, capitalism, patriarchy, colonialism and racism in which both the functioning of 
the global oil assemblage and the power relations of petro-hegemony are deeply intertwined 
and upon which they depend. This matrix operates at the scale of the global, the 
intermediary, the local, the body and the psyche. It is far more expansive than petro-
hegemony all the while providing the social foundations upon which petro-hegemony can 
thrive. As such, while petro-hegemony is embedded in the oil assemblage and the 
assemblage makes visible the ways different interventions and disruption in the relations of 
power composing petro-hegemony can be achieved, it is the matrix of domination that 
permeates and shapes all of these relations. In other words, petro-hegemony cannot exist 
outside the parameters of a fundamentally racist, colonial, patriarchal, capitalist and 
extractivist society. Moreover, the climate crisis itself is a product of this matrix of 
domination and just solutions to the crisis will not be forthcoming unless our response to the 
crisis also contributes to a counter hegemonic strategy to overthrow the hegemonic matrix of 
domination. This means that keep in the ground activists have to embrace intersectionality 
and the confluence of social struggles through a movement of movements if their activism is 
to be carried out in the name of climate justice. In this way, we should consider how one 
hegemony may exist within, be shaped by, and facilitate the operations of, a broader 
hegemony that encompasses it. 
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Of course, by definition two or more competing hegemonic forces cannot both be hegemonic 
in the same place at the same time. What I am describing, however is one complementary 
hegemony existing within another which are, together, mutually reinforcing. In hegemonic 
competition, only one force can be hegemonic while the others are counter hegemonic or 
aspiring hegemonic forces. Yet, when complementary and mutually reinforcing hegemonic 
forces are layered over one another, they not only coexist but infiltrate and permeate one 
another. Thus, petro-hegmony is suffused with the intersectional forces of colonialism, 
patriarchy, racism, capitalism and extractivism. It is precisely thanks to these that so many of 
us take the oil industry’s operations for granted, that the oil industry is able to force projects 
on Indigenous peoples without their consent and with the sanctioning of the state, that fossil 
fuel projects are predominantly located in communities of color, that particularly Indigenous 
women’s relation to the land is disrupted through fossil fuel extraction and pollution, that the 
so-called “natural world” is treated as endless source for plunder and extraction, and that 
hegemonic notions of masculinity, modernity, progress and rationality are so often bound to 
resource extraction which itself integral to the discourses through which petro-culture 
manufactures consent (Barrett and Worden 2014; Huber 2013; Bell 2016; Wilson 2014; 
Powys Whyte 2016).  
 
It is helpful, therefore, to think of the matrix of domination as a hegemonic complex in which 
petro-hegemony is able to exist. Moreover, the very solutions to the climate crisis stemming 
from this hegemonic matrix are ones that further entrench its hegemony and leave the fossil 
fuel industry unchallenged. As such, it is not only the direct assault on the fossil fuel industry 
and challenging petro-hegemony that must be undertaken in Blockadia, but also the 
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development of strategies and discourses that undermine the social context in which petro-
hegemony has been able to flourish.  This means keep it the ground activism needs to address 
this hegemonic matrix of domination through its intervention against the fossil fuel industry, 
while remaining focused on the specific targets of the movement within the oil assemblage. 
 
Audra Simpson’s concept of “nested sovereignties” is instructive in terms of how we might 
challenge “nested” or “layered” hegemonies (2014). She documents the ways Mohawk 
activists sought to disrupt the sovereignties of the US and Canadian nation-states on Mohawk 
territory spanning the border between the two countries. By asserting their own sovereignty 
through a whole range of interventions, Simpson illustrates the consequences of intervention 
at one scale of sovereignty for the broader context in which that sovereignty is able to 
operate. Most significantly, she shows how political intervention asserting Indigenous 
sovereignty at one scale could be developed into a strategy that helps unravel notions of the 
sovereignty US and Canadian nation-states at another scale. Here Mohawk activists deployed 
specific and targeted interventions at the local scale that sought to unravel the logic upon 
which settler nation-state sovereignty depends. In a similar way, climate justice activists can 
move through their resistance to petro-hegemony on local frontlines of Blockadia to a 
confrontation with broader systems of oppression. For example, activists could choose 
specific points of intervention and develop strategies and discourses to engage with them that 
simultaneously counter the power relations upon which petro-hegemony depends while also 
unravelling the broader matrix of domination in which petro-hegemony exists.183 Just as 
 
183 One example that seems immediately obvious to me is the use of the Native Rights Based Strategic 
Framework that simultaneously asserts Indigenous peoples’ rights and claims over their territories and could 
therefore be considered an intervention against a colonial system of oppression while the framework 
simultaneously serves to force fossil fuel companies to adhere to Indigenous peoples’ right to free prior and 
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Simpson documents the questions Mohawk activists had to face as they considered ways to 
confront these “nested sovereignties,” so too must climate justice activists consider how we 
confront the layering of hegemonies at different scales. 
 
In a similar sense, Wainwright and Mann’s invocation to build revolutionary power in the 
name of climate justice from Blockadia towards the establishment of what they call Climate 
X (what I would understand as a social context in which the ideas of climate justice have 
become hegemonic) is helpful. As they write, “the immediate challenge is one of cultivation, 
of working the material and ideological ground in which these movements can bloom as 
rapidly as possible and in their full multiplicity…” ( 2018, 178). In their argument, the 
cultivation of the material and ideological ground in which a revolutionary movement can 
bloom starts in Blockadia. It is in Blockadia, therefore, that the seeds of revolutionary action 
in the name of climate justice are sown, cultivated, and nurtured. Through our praxis and 
activism against the fossil fuel industry in Blockadia we might realize our revolutionary 
potential to overthrow the hegemonic matrix of domination and assert Climate X in its place. 
Thus, the process of addressing the layering of different scales of hegemonic power must, at 
least in part, begin at the local. This process starts with questions of how the strategies, 
narrative and tactics deployed through local confrontation in Blockadia may developed to 
simultaneously cultivate the material and ideological ground necessary for a wider 
confrontation with the matrix of domination in which the roots of the twin global crisis of 
inequality and ecological collapse are embedded.  
 
informed consent with regards to settler activities taking place on their territories. Another example might be 
activists capturing state institutions through elections in order to prevent fossil fuel companies winning permits 
to expand their operations, while also using their position in these institutions to funnel resources towards other 
activists developing climate solutions that transcend capitalism and extractivist economics.  
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I offer the concept of layered hegemonies to help us understand how the hegemonic power 
relations of consent, coercion and compliance shared between petro-hegemony and the 
matrix of domination are connected, suffused within one another, and serve to reproduce one 
another. When we see the ways that hegemonic contexts may be layered over one another 
and reinforce one another, we may also be able to view vulnerabilities and contradictions 
between their layers. This may help theorists and activists identify and target specific points 
of intervention that interrupt the dynamic of mutual reinforcement that exists between 
relations of consent, coercion and compliance at these different scales. Moreover, just as 
layered hegemonies overlap and reinforce one another, so too must the layers of counter 
hegemony. Thus, we are obliged to consider how the tactics and strategies we deploy on 
points of intervention against petro-hegemony undermine or reinforce the hegemony of the 
matrix of domination. Recognizing that activism at the scale of frontlines in Blockadia may 
help cultivate the terrain for a broader assault on points of intervention within the matrix of 
domination is crucial to how we develop strategies that not only undermine the fossil fuel 
industry but also advance climate justice. The question remains, however, what are the scales 
at which intervention is appropriate and possible for the climate justice movement and how 
do we achieve that kind of scale? This will be addressed in the following section. 
 
Part Two: Problematizing Critical Mass 
 
Given the enormity of the challenges and forces aligned against the climate justice 
movement, it is tempting to argue that the only response that could possibly be 
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commensurate with size and scale of our adversaries is a social movement of equal or greater 
size and scale. Remember, for example, Naomi Klein’s injunction: “to change everything we 
need everyone.” Similarly, if the scale of the crisis goes far beyond just keeping fossil fuels 
in the ground, then the movement must also commit itself to countering the even more 
pervasive hegemonic relations of power maintaining the matrix of domination. It may seem 
obvious, therefore, that we need to build a movement far larger, far more interconnected, and 
far more diverse than the one currently developing in the, still relatively isolated, frontlines 
of Blockadia. Indeed, the assumption embedded throughout this dissertation has been that in 
order to confront petro-hegemony the climate justice movement needs to grow, needs to gain 
the consent of far broader constituency of society, and that it needs to “scale up.” In other 
words, it needs to consolidate its power and demands at a greater scale.  Moreover, within 
counter hegemonic social movement strategy itself there seems to be an implicit axiom that 
size necessarily equals power. The more people who join the movement, the more to can 
achieve, and thus the greater the threat will be to the legitimacy of hegemon. In fact, size, 
growth, and achieving critical mass, seem, necessarily, to be of such fundamental concern to 
counter hegemonic strategy that it is often all too easy to forget to examine the assumptions 
underpinning them with anything like the critical rigor they merit.  
 
Having articulated just how massive and pervasive the challenges we face are, and the 
different scales at which the operate, it seems clear that intervention on scales that exceed the 
local is necessary. This means scaling up our movements so that they can operate at local, 
regional, national, and global scales. However, there are problems in scaling up movements 
and consolidating power at greater scales that we would do well to consider if we are not to 
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repeat the mistakes of so many movements that have come before (McCarthy 2005). This 
section argues that embedded within hegemonic strategy is an impetus towards scale and that 
this impetus, if unexamined, can lead us to ignore anti-democratic, authoritarian, and 
potentially self-destructive, components of counter hegemonic and aspiring hegemonic 
intervention. In doing so, I’ll explore whether counter hegemonic strategy is necessarily 
destined to replicate the very modes of domination we want to abolish, or whether we can 
conceive of ways in which social movements may become hegemonic without replicating 
these modes of domination. 
 
From Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, to Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
to Smucker’s Hegemony How To we find that the assumption fundamental to counter 
hegemonic strategy is the impetus to grow, to gain consent, to build the movement, and to 
consolidate that movement’s power at scale. Moreover, this is considered a democratic rather 
than vanguardist approach to social change because it requires the organizing, alignment and 
consent of a vast social bloc that other forms of revolutionary insurrection ignore. Thus, 
social movements must grow to a size and scale that is commensurate with that of our 
opponents. Ostensibly, this assumption seems quite reasonable: in order to become 
hegemonic and in order to counter the hegemonic status of their adversaries, social 
movements must wrest general public consent away from the hegemon and realign that 
consent around an alternative. When the movements discourses have become common sense, 
when its political agenda is enforceable through laws or other coercive apparatus, and when 
its social form has become almost inextricably entangled in the economic and social 
relationships the functions of society depends upon, we can say a social movement has 
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achieved hegemonic status. According to theorists of hegemonic strategy, this requires 
popular and populist intervention through mass participation, mass action, and, therefore, a 
mass movement. In more familiar terms, it is only through mass collective action that we can 
assert our power on a scale that is commensurate with that of our adversaries. 
 
In Gramsci is Dead, however, Richard Day argues this orientation towards critical mass can 
lead social movements into the arms of authoritarian, anti-democratic, and, at the very least, 
vanguardist, social movement praxis (2005). He critiques “the assumption that effective 
social change can only be achieved simultaneously and en masse, across an entire national or 
supranational space" (2005, 8). Moreover, in the very aspiration towards hegemony through 
achieving critical mass, there exists a movement towards erasure, homogenization, and 
universalism that is the antithesis of emancipatory radical social change. This resonates with 
the critiques of universalizing populist discourses I explored in Chapter Five. He accuses 
Gramsci and those following in his theoretical lineage of having done little to move beyond 
Lenninism, state-centrism, and the centralization of power in the hands of elite political 
actors. Day later writes, “since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the theory and 
practice of non-hegemonic (Day 2004) or prefigurative (Graeber 2004) modes of struggling 
for social change have gained traction in the radical scene.” (Day 2016, 189). Observing the 
strategies and tactics of the so-called “newest” social movements in which autonomism, 
anarchism, anti-statism, decentralization and horizontalism have all heavily influenced 
movement praxis, Day contrasts how these are formed around "non-universalizing, non-
hierarchical, non-coercive relationships based on mutual aid and shared ethical 
commitments" compared to those of hegemonic politics (2005, 9). Thus, he suggests that 
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hegemony may be an inadequate lens through which to understand the movement praxis of, 
particularly anarchist and autonomous, activists. Achieving hegemonic status is 
counterproductive and antithetical to their goals.  
 
David Graeber makes a similar point in his ethnography of direct action in the anti-, or rather 
alter-, globalization movement of the 1990s and early 2000s (2009). From the autonomous 
self-organization of the Zapatistas to the horizontalist affinity groups organized around the 
World Trade Organization summits, Graeber argues that the model of the mass movement 
making demands on the state, and ultimately seeking to replace state power, is fundamentally 
at odds with the ideological commitments and praxis of the new social movements. 
Identifying the deep suspicion of “the mass,” its potential for vanguardist elitism, and the 
erasures of difference the term conveys, thinkers like Graeber and Day have shown why 
activists within the “newest” social movements have rejected aspirations towards hegemony 
(Day 2016; 2005; Graber 2009).184  
 
Day explains that the goal of those seeking to radically transform the world is not hegemony 
but the spread of smaller self-determined and self-organized social groupings brought 
together on the basis affinity through place-based struggle and sharing an expansive sense of 
solidarity across space with thousands of other social struggles (2005). As one reviewer of 
Day’s argument puts it “The political task is not to increase a mass of subjects via conversion 
 
184 As Day writes “Proponents of non-hegemonic modes of social change do not deny the existence of currently 
hegemonic structures and systems, indeed they know these exist and are quite wary of their interventions. But 
rather than trying to take over the structures of power, prefigurative actors seek to render them redundant and 
ward off their reemergence” (2016, 189). Here, as described in Chapter Seven, we see the convergence of non-
hegemonic and prefigurative modes of intervention on the one hand, distinguished against hegemonic politics 
on the other. 
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but to make spaces more minoritarian and proliferate more of the minoritarian spaces” 
(Bratich 2007, 169). These authors have illustrated that the ways smaller groupings of 
activists, working together on the basis of affinity, seek to prefigure the world they want into 
being through their praxis. Their argument is that these are the groups most able to bring 
about revolutionary emancipatory change. As the discussion in Chapter Seven evinced, this 
seems to be precisely the opposite of the strategic approach Smucker and most Gramscians 
espouse. 
 
Nevertheless, these activists’ “anti-mass” or non-hegemonic position articulated by Day is an 
important response to the potentially authoritarian and homogenizing consequences of 
counter hegemonic politics. Moreover, they draw attention to argument that, as authors JK 
Gibson Graham, suggest “the judgment that size and extensiveness are coincident with power 
is not simply a rational calculation in our view but also a discursive choice and emotional 
commitment (JK Gibson Graham 2002, 51 cited in Escobar forthcoming, 21). In other words, 
intervention at the scale of mass politics and mass movements, which are aligned through 
universalizing narratives that are developed out of counter hegemonic strategy assumes, in a 
rather masculinist sense, that size inherently equals power. This assumption is rooted in 
discursive and ideological paradigms emerging out of “modernist and masculinist political 
thinking, that ineluctably disempowers the local and place-based by locating the decisive 
power to change things on the global.” As Escobar writes, this kind of thinking depends “on 
the ontological assumption of the existence of a One-World world, one real, and one 
possible” (Escobar forthcoming, 21). As such, it ignores how hegemonic politics’ orientation 
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towards “the mass” comes at the expense of the revolutionary potential of the autonomous, 
the local, the place-based, the particular, and the diffuse.  
 
Moving the conversation beyond the confines of the modern Western cannon, but certainly 
raising similar critiques, Arturo Escobar has argued that all theories of change, revolutionary 
or otherwise, that trace their roots back to European and Anglo-American thought since the 
Enlightenment, including Gramsci’s, falls subject to a “dual ontology” in which subjects and 
objects are considered as binary and distinct. Instead, Escobar describes an ontological 
politics derived out of the worldviews of subaltern, particularly Indigenous, groups all around 
the world. By this he means an understanding of the world developed in which there are no 
distinguishable subjects and objects, just the relationships and interconnections between 
things. This is an ontology derived from deep attention to the relationality of all things to one 
another.  
 
Out of this ontology emerges what Escobar calls the pluriversal perspective. The pluriversal 
perspective and pluriversal politics asserts that “another possible is possible” (forthcoming). 
In other words, we must embrace the multitude of worldviews that make up the social world. 
This is an embrace of the world of many worlds that radicals and autonomist groups have 
long sought to articulate. With its roots in modernist dual ontology, hegemonic politics 
assumes there are different social units that exist outside of their relationships to one another 
and have to be articulated together before the relationships between them can emerge. 
Pluriversal politics turns this formulation around, instead suggesting that the political 
dynamic we must pay attention to is the relationship itself, not an abstract account of the 
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individual parts of which it is apparently constituted. As Escobar explains, “In radical 
ontological politics, by contrast, there are no intrinsically existing entities to be found, since 
nothing preexists the relations that constitute it; in other words, reality is relational through 
and through” (forthcoming, 13). The pluriversal perspective posits that nothing exists outside 
of the relationships to one another, all things exist in relationship all the time, thus the 
relationship is the crucial dynamic under analysis. Therefore, pluriversal politics is about 
understanding how relationships cannot be reduced to singular constituent parts but rather 
how these relationships may produce a world of many worlds. 
 
We might think of pluriversal politics as entirely antithetical to counter hegemony. For 
example, the term hegemony is supposed to indicate the moral authority and leadership of a 
specific set of norms, practices, ideas, discourses which are, as I’ve argued, backed up 
through relations of consent, coercion and compliance. These become universalized as they 
are accepted as an uncontestable, common sense, conditions. It is true that hegemony must 
continuously remake itself to sustain its longevity, however, the revolutionary goal of 
aspiring hegemonic actors is to take the position of the hegemon and to have their hegemony 
be remade over and over again. From this perspective, revolutionary work is finished when 
the revolutionaries become the hegemon. Achieving and consolidating the movement’s 
ability to reproduce its hegemony is the end goal of revolutionary action. From a pluriversal 
perspective, on the other hand, revolutionary work is never finished. It is always in the 
making, always partial, and there are always other possibles/possibilities. This characteristic 
of hegemonic strategy reveals a potentially fundamental shortcoming in the ability of 
hegemonic politics to achieve its emancipatory potential. Pluriversal politics, is a 
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commitment to and a rejection the universalism and the very grand narratives out of which 
Gramsci’s theoretical insights and political strategy are derived. It therefore seems far more 
suited to the kind of proliferation of minoritarian spaces and the prefigurative horizontalist 
politics that Day and Graeber describe.  
 
Despite seemingly obvious contradictions, we should question the extent to which the 
analyses offered by Day, Escobar, and Graeber suggest that the counter hegemonic political 
strategy, with all its assumptions about scale, critical mass, and modernity, is simply 
incompatible with a subaltern emancipatory politics capable of addressing the roots of our 
planetary crises. These authors certainly identify the significant risks of engaging in 
hegemonic politics. Moreover, it is true that this risk is greatly intensified if we do not 
explore the assumption that “the mass movement” is the appropriate scale at which to take 
the fight to our opponents. However, I would argue that the presence of such risks does not 
inherently mean that we should eschew the politics of scaling up or that hegemonic politics is 
necessarily authoritarian. Rather, their critiques should encourage us subject the assumptions 
buried in counter hegemonic strategy to critical examination, and, if possible, rework counter 
hegemony into a pluriversal perspective through the discursive and material cultivation of 
revolutionary potential taking place in Blockadia.  
 
In his later work, Day concedes that “it could be said that those who want to work 
hegemonically are displaying an autonomous orientation towards those with whom they must 
articulate to achieve their aims” and that because of this “hegemony and autonomy are 
locked in an intimate embrace and that each cannot do without the other” (2016, 189). In 
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other words, because hegemonic articulation must inevitably seek to align a whole range 
different, often autonomous, groups and communities through their difference, in order to 
build a movement of movements, radical actors aspiring towards hegemony must necessarily 
maintain and reinforce the distinctive identities and worldviews of those communities, while 
also presenting a popular and populist alliance. This reflects a great deal of the conversation 
in Chapter Five in which I demonstrated how discourses of intersectional populism are being 
developed through a synthesis of the universal and the particular. Placing his arguments in 
conversation with Yannis Stravakakis who asks “Instead of erecting a wall between 
horizontalism and hegemonic processes… wouldn’t it be more productive to study their 
irreducible interpenetration, the opportunities and the challenges it creates? (2014, 121),” 
Day responds that “yes, indeed, I think it would” (2016, 190).185 I am of the same opinion 
and, like Day, argue that while counter hegemonic and autonomous politics are not always 
theoretically compatible, each one can be deployed strategically to address the specificities of 
conjuncture in which it is deployed. Escobar’s theorizing of the connections between counter 
hegemonic and pluriversal politics is instructive in this regard.  
 
I cite these deeply theoretical debates in such detail above because they have fundamental 
consequences for the question of at which scale intervention against petro-hegemony, and the 
matrix of domination with which is interwoven, is appropriate. Should we address them at 
the scale of a mass, translocal, and transnational movement of movements or at the unit of 
 
185 For a more detailed conversation about false binary between horizontalist and hegemonic political strategy 
and possible synergies between them also see James McCarthy’s Scale, Sovereignty and Strategy in 
Environmental Governance (2005). 
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the prefigurative, self-organized, autonomous diffuse networks of affinity groups?  Day and 
Escobar have both puzzled over similar questions.   
 
While Escobar is certainly critical of revolutionary theory and strategy with roots in the 
modern Western cannon, and thus forces us to question the appropriateness of counter 
hegemonic strategy to subaltern struggle, let us not forget that it is the World Social Forum’s 
famous meme “another world is possible” from which Escobar derives his reformulation 
“another possible is possible.” This is significant because the World Social Forum’s claim 
“another world is possible” was a direct and deliberately counter hegemonic response to the 
hegemonic TINA doctrine (There Is No Alternative) in the days when the hegemony of 
neoliberalism seemed at its greatest. Indeed, invoking this counter hegemonic articulation, 
Escobar is particularly interested in exploring whether Leftist political strategies emerging 
out of modernist dual ontology might nonetheless have some compatibility or synergy with 
pluriversal politics. His work suggests that in the case of counter hegemony and the 
pluriversal there is some potential for synergy. It is worth quoting him in full: 
 
In their practice many social movements blur the boundaries between counter-
hegemonic and ontological politics. Drawing on Audrey Lorde’s (1984) well-known 
provocation (“The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”), one 
might say that counter-hegemonic politics is that which uses the masters’ tools to 
push radical demands forward, to the system’s breaking point if possible. This might 
involve modernist practices such as claiming rights, using legal instruments … 
negotiating political rights with the State, etc. Strategies of this sort make counter-
hegemonic use of hegemonic tools with varying degrees of effectiveness… For these 
strategies to move along pluriversal politics, nevertheless, they need to take on an 
explicit political ontological character… while much can be done to advance these 
causes through the counter-hegemonic use of hegemonic tools, they also require an 
explicit ontological framing that advances the principles of interdependence and 
relationality. (Escobar forthcoming, 18) 
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Thus, the social movements Escobar describes move between pluriversal and hegemonic 
political strategies. However, just as my discussion of intersectional populism suggested in 
Chapter Five, aligning hegemonic and pluriversal strategies will require a deep commitment 
to the difference in identities, worldviews, communities and range of possibles constituting a 
mass movement. If we want a pluriversal hegemony, we must, as Escobar writes, insist that 
“each person, group, or community has to find its own way to engage with these axes, such 
as the re-localization of activities, the re-communalization of social life, and the 
depatriarchalization and decolonization of existence, in ways appropriate to their own 
location” (forthcoming, 8).  Nevertheless, it is possible, at least in theory, to countenance a 
hegemony that articulates a world of many worlds, a pluriversal hegemony. Indeed, to take 
the argument further, suffusing counter hegemonic politics with a pluriversal perspective 
may, in fact, be crucial to refuting the homogenizing and universalizing tendencies of counter 
hegemonic politics and mass movement strategy while retaining the advantages of mass 
collective action. 
 
A pluriversal hegemonic project that is able to develop a mass movement out of Blockadia 
while also countering the homogenizing, and potentially authoritarian tendencies of 
hegemonic politics would depend upon the reconciliation of two positions that are far too 
often articulated as oppositional. On the one hand, are political strategies orientated towards 
the development of “critical mass.” In Gramscian terms, this follows the logic that organizing 
and mobilizing millions of people into a mass movement through a war of position is the 
only response commensurate with the scale and influence of the hegemon. Having done so, 
the movement institutionalizes and consolidates consent and gains hegemonic status through 
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a war of maneuver. The strategies derived from this theory of change are clearly articulated 
in Jonathan Smucker’s Hegemony How To (2017) and have informed some of the key 
arguments made in this dissertation. His book is a defense of mass movements and building 
collective power against the anti-authoritarian autonomous currents of the Left that he argues 
have eschewed engagement with power. On the other hand, are political interventions and a 
theory of change which prioritizes “critical connections,” or critical relationships over critical 
mass. This orientation is best articulated in Adrienne Maree Brown’s Emergent Strategy. One 
of the purposes of her book is to encourage activists to “move at the speed of trust.” As she 
says, “We need each other. I love the idea of shifting from “mile wide inch deep” movements 
to “inch wide mile deep” movements that schism the existing paradigm” (2017,). Strategies 
developed from this perspective are orientated towards generating deep interpersonal and 
intercommunal relationships developed through a praxis of principled accountability, 
responsibility and trust within and between social groups seeking radical social change.  
 
Smucker certainly agrees that relationships, connection, and identity are fundamental to 
social movements. As he writes “There can be no serious social movement… without a 
corresponding serious group identity; a sense of solidarity and cohesion that encourages core 
member to contribute an exceptional level of commitment…” (2017, 96). However, as he 
goes on to explain, too much emphasis on the identity and relationships within the group can 
undermine movement building. As he argues, “The stronger the identity and cohesion of the 
group the more likely its members are to become alienated from other groups and from 
society as a whole” (ibid). This highlights what Smucker calls the political identity paradox 
or the idea that “while political groups require strong internal identity to foster the 
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commitment needed for effective political struggle, this same cohesion tends to isolate the 
group. And isolated groups are hard-pressed to achieve political goals” (ibid). He argues that 
these positions are in tension with one another, stating that “a group that focuses only on 
instrumental goals and neglects the well-being of its members will likely burn out its core 
while repelling potential newcomers,” meanwhile, “groups [that] become content to 
functionally operate as little more than therapy, [lose] interest in questions of political 
efficacy and strategy” (Smucker 2017, 80). Thus, a commitment to relationships should not 
distract from a movement’s instrumental goals.  
 
For Maree Brown, however, relationships or connection is an instrumental goal. According 
to her, the very point of relationship building and a commitment to critical connections is to 
break out of political isolation. Too often, we think of group identity and the relationships 
that go into developing solidarity as a barrier to broadening our movement. Maree Brown 
suggests, instead, that it is through making connections and relationships that our collective 
strength may be realized. Maree Brown identifies the consequences of a singular orientation 
towards achieving critical mass as including burnout, distrust, fragmentation, and 
reproducing the very modes of domination our movements oppose. The quality of a 
connection is what makes it critical and this is crucial to social transformation because 
relationships determine the strength of our movements.  
 
Smucker certainly believes relationships are a vital component of social movements too, and 
Maree Brown certainly would not suggest that collective action is anything other than 
imperative. Indeed, I argue that we should resist the temptation to read these two movement 
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intellectuals against one another and instead read them together, understanding how each 
compliments the other’s intervention. Therefore, cultivating the material and ideological 
ground of Blockadia must involve the combination of critical connections and critical mass.  
 
This is a movement praxis that recognizes that achieving a sustainable, democratic and 
resilient critical mass depends upon a commitment to critical connections. It also means 
remaining wary of over indulgence in what Smucker calls “the life of the group” and a 
singular attention to the relationships prefiguring the world we want at the expense of 
political and strategic engagement with the powers that be.186 Instead of movements that are 
“inch deep and mile wide” or “mile deep and inch wide,” why not strive towards the 
construction of movements that are mile deep and mile wide. This is not the contradiction it 
is often presented as. Rather, we can develop a movement praxis by which critical 
connections form the foundations of critical mass. Indeed, a pluriversal hegemony would 
depend upon resilient, accountable and democratic structure and culture infused into critical 
mass through the development of critical relationships. In this way counter hegemonic action 
could theoretically scale up without imposing homogeneity or reproducing domination. I 
later illustrate the mechanics of such a project through contrasting metaphors of 
aggrandizement to scale and aggregation to scale. 
 
 
186 This means developing internal strategies that both eschew insularity and embrace an outwards orientation, 
whilst also maintain group cohesion and solidarity. Smucker provides some direction here, writing that in order 
“to prevent insularity and encapsulation in our social movements and organizations, core members have to take 
responsibility for ensuring collective rituals and alternative narratives are oriented to connect with broader bases 
of society” (2017, 85). This is one of the tasks to which counter hegemonic actors must devote themselves. The 
other, however, is to actually represent the differences in our movement more honestly. 
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My assessment of intersectional populism in Chapter Five provided some insight into how 
pluriversal hegemony may be developed at the local scale.  However, we must question 
whether the critical connections intersectional populism requires are possible across struggles 
that are not local and place-based, where differences are more likely to be divisive. This 
means engaging with how intersectional populism at the local scale might be transformed 
into a pluriversal hegemonic alignment that transcends the local. We are, therefore, 
approaching the possibility of pluriversal, translocal, transnational solidarities across space 
and across difference. Stefan Kipfer’s summary of Gramsci’s project as one that 
fundamentally addresses the question of solidarity across space and difference is helpful 
here:  
 
Gramsci presented communist hegemony as an uncertain and open-ended project to 
build a new historic bloc that articulates short-term with longer-term revolutionary 
horizons while transforming the multiscalar spatial divides (within and between 
regions, between and across national divides) that traverse the relations between 
sociopolitical forces. A war of movement and a war of position, communist 
hegemony represented a modern form of cosmopolitanism within which the national 
is of strategic importance even as it is built upon both sub national alliances and 
transnational allegiances. (2013, 86) 
 
One of the central questions driving my dissertation has been, given Gramsci’s project, why 
have we, on the progressive Left, so often failed to realize broad based alignment, a critical 
cosmopolitanism, across space and difference? Reasons are multiple and complicated. To 
simplify, however, on the one hand, we might cite the profoundly tragic (and comical) 
stereotype, characteristic of the Left that we continually factionalize and divide into smaller 
and smaller articulations of our own purist interpretation of justice. This is the tendency 
Smucker chastises. On the other hand, it is also the case that despite Gramsci’s and 
Gramscian’s concern with alliances across difference, counter hegemonic projects and 
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alignments have not paid enough attention to how the very real differences that exist between 
different constituents of social movements, based on relations of class, gender, race, and 
particularity, are held in tension or negotiated (Short 2013). Developers of counter 
hegemonic strategy and theory have not devoted enough thought to the ways cultivating deep 
rooted relationships and connections form the foundations of counter hegemonic alignment. 
This is where Maree Brown’s insights are so crucial. However, while Maree Brown and 
Smucker help us think more carefully about collective action and connection across 
difference, we need also need to think more carefully about collective action and connection 
across space. Addressing the question of scaling up across space where Part Three will make 
this chapter’s major contribution. 
 
To conclude Part Two, then, fusing the insights of critical mass with critical connections is 
fundamental to addressing the complexities of scaling up in a pluriversal hegemonic politics.  
Thus, critical mass, building movements at scale and connecting them across scale, is not 
necessarily authoritarian or anti-democratic if it relies upon a deep commitment to critical 
connections. Out of this, I believe, we might construct a translocal, pluriversal hegemonic 
alignment. The final section of this chapter explores what this might look like in practice and 
asks not whether movements should grow but how they might grow. 
 
Part Three: Aggregating to Scale 
 
In Part One of this chapter I examined the different scales at which hegemonic forces 
operate. I provided example of how we can best understand the interaction between these 
 624 
different scales through a concept I called layered hegemonies. I argued that in recognizing 
the layers of hegemonic forces against which the climate justice movement is positioned, it 
can be tempting to assume that the only way to in address a crisis of this scale is to grow and 
expand a social movement that is commensurate with the scale of our adversaries. However, 
Part Two then problematized notions of “scaling up” by exploring the ways that growing a 
counter hegemonic movement, and engaging in hegemonic politics at all, can reinforce 
totalitarian or authoritarian modes of domination within social movements. In response, I 
provided some theoretical examples of how the authoritarian tendencies of scaling up may be 
resisted through a deep commitment to both critical mass and critical connections. 
 
In this final section, however, I will push the argument further by explaining how social 
movements that very often rely upon place-based populist discourses to mobilize constituents 
could, in some ways, deterritorialize alliances, forging a counter hegemonic alignment that 
isn’t just situated in place but exists across geographic space. Paying close attention to the 
autonomist and anarchist arguments raised by Day and Graeber and the significance of 
critical connections Maree Brown identifies, I consider a mode of scaling movements up 
called aggregating to scale. I argue this mode helps us eschew many of the authoritarian 
tendencies that anarchists and autonomists recognize in hegemonic politics while continuing 
to allow us to make strategic intervention in hegemony’s relations of power and develop 
broad alignment around visions of alternatives. I contrast this with a mode of scaling up 
called aggrandizing to scale which I argue retains authoritarian and expansionist tendencies. 
A movement that aggregates to scale through the emergence and cultivation of critical 
connections is one that can both launch an assault on petro-hegemony across translocal 
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networks while also establishing the foundations within Blockadia to confront the hegemony 
of the matrix of domination (and possibly replace it with an explicitly anti-totalitarian 
pluriversal hegemony). Rather like the aggregation of different groups into a movement, 
these are arguments derived from theories of change that do not necessarily fit neatly 
together and, as such, must be held together in productive tension rather than uncritically 
fused into a singular whole. 
 
Building a counter hegemonic movement across space and difference that is capable of 
addressing the crisis in terms commensurate with its scale while resisting authoritarian 
tendencies of hegemonic politics requires us to cultivate the critical connections between 
disparate groups into a hegemonic alignment without those groups losing their 
distinctiveness and individuality. However, as Kipfer reminds us, “Gramsci recognized that 
hegemonic politics required much more than a recombination of “autonomous” social forces 
… in an additive and instrumental project of coalition building. Linking [them] required a 
transformation of both” (2013, 95). The critical connections between groups through 
hegemonic alignment necessarily changes some of the identity of those groups and 
simultaneously the identity of the alignment.  
 
Gramsci positioned solidarities, which we might also understand in terms of critical 
connections, as “integral to the generation of collective political wills” (Featherstone 2013, 
68). Out of these connections emerges a transformation of the identities of the constituent 
parts into a hegemonic alignment. Remembering that Gramsci developed hegemony in the 
context of alignment across space, and particularly the divide between Italy’s rural peasantry 
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of the South and the working class of the industrialized North, Kipfer explains that “Gramsci 
argued that a national hegemonic project must itself be grounded in spatially differentiated 
constellation of subnational (but transnationally articulated) political forces” (2013, 91). 
Even as we reconsider the significance of the nation state in an intensely globalized world, 
alignment across space remains an integral component of hegemonic praxis. 
 
Counter hegemonic alignment is what I’ve argued the climate justice movement is doing to 
scale up across space and difference. However, such an alignment can be developed in 
different ways. Two modes of scaling up that I’ve identified are aggrandizing to scale and 
aggregating to scale. Aggrandizing to scale is an expansionist and growth-oriented approach. 
Rather like an amoeba, it starts from a single point source and expands outwards as it 
encompasses, envelopes, speaks for, and comes to lead all the oppositional forces it interacts 
with. In this formation there is a single, centralized leadership and bureaucracy, and decisions 
are made through a hierarchical chain of command. The incentive of different constituent 
parts allowing themselves to be enveloped by such a formation is that with its size, and 
fusing of the many into a singular whole, the potential for actually overthrowing the current 
hegemonic order is increased. 
 
Aggregating to scale is the opposite. Rather like the rhizomatic formations Deleuze and 
Guattari describe in A Thousand Plateaus (1987),187 the process of aggregating to scale 
unfolds as a multitude of source points (what Deleuze might call machines) send out shoots 
or tendrils that come into contact with one another and form critical connections tying one 
 
187 Though with some fundamental differences too, as I shall explain later.  
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group to the other, without the unfolding structing a clear beginning or end. Unlike the 
rhizome, however, aggregating to scale is not entirely organic or emergent. It requires 
leadership, strategy and forethought and means very deliberately cultivating critical 
connections within, across and between frontlines. It is carried out in a way that connects 
different struggles and different constituents into a broader movement with a clearly 
articulated critique of the current hegemonic order and an enticing, but necessarily 
ambiguous, vision of a world of many worlds to replace it. More than simply adding up all 
these different oppositional social forces and combining them as autonomous units into a 
purely utilitarian coalition, aggregating to scale depends upon critical relationships 
cultivating the fundamental agreement that each group is its own autonomous, self-
determining entity.  Meanwhile, as Grasmci reminds us, each group must also be willing to 
accept that through alignment some of its characteristics will change, just as the group’s 
introduction into the alignment will also transform the identity of that alignment. It is in the 
careful balancing of these two dynamics that critical connection and commitment to 
relationships based on consent is so important. 
 
Aggregating to scale is clearly a more democratic and empowering approach to movement 
building and alignment than aggrandizement. However, it still requires clear leadership, 
strategic engagement with the relations of power through which hegemony is exercised, and 
an intention to replace the current hegemony with a new hegemonic ordering. These are all 
things autonomists and anarchists like Day and Graeber remain critical of. Nevertheless, the 
leadership model employed is not one of top-down-hierarchy, but the leaderful approach 
expressed through the leadership development strategies I explored in Chapter Five. As I 
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suggested Chapter Five, it is through the development of a leaderful movement that leaders 
from each node within this aggregation are able to begin forging the connections between 
them. Meanwhile, as Chapter Seven has argued, successfully engaging on all three terrains of 
struggle to contest hegemony depends upon agreement around a diversity of tactics and a 
spectrum of strategy. This agreement can only be forged through critical connection, 
relationships, accountability, flexibility and critical improvisation.  
 
Assessing how the critical connections necessary for alignment could exist across space, the 
idea of aggregating to scale allows us to, at least partially, deterritorialize the theorizing of 
counter hegemonic alliances. Here, again, Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor of the rhizome is 
useful. A rhizome, as Mark Purcell helpfully elucidates, “is a network that is both acentered 
and nonhierarchical. Each element links to all others horizontally, on an equal footing. There 
is no “general,” no central or more important body that commands the network” (2011, 7).  
Imagining counter hegemonic alignment occurring through the critical connections made 
within the rhizomatic structure of a movement of movements illuminates how a network of 
very different agents and organizations might coalesce to confront petro-hegemony, despite 
their spatial separation. These networks find one another and are forged together out of 
necessity as they confront the different spatialized and multiscalar points of intervention on 
different terrains of struggle. In the oil assemblage, for example, activists in Richmond and 
Bay Area have formed a rhizomatic connection with those in Burnaby and British Columbia 
as they each engage different components of the industry’s global reach. Out of these 
necessarily spatialized confrontations, the different actors on each frontline are now 
undoubtedly part of the same movement. They have articulated themselves together and 
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through the critical relationships forming between them (of which I will provide examples 
shortly) they are forging a resilient, flexible, connection that grows the movement. 
 
In bringing Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic theory of connection together with Gramsci’ 
hegemonic alignment, I am drawing on the insights of Mark Purcell (2011).188 Purcell seeks 
“an approach to radical politics that values both 1) the post-Marxist neo-Gramscianism of 
Laclau and Mouffe, which embraces hegemony as a political project … and 2) the relatively 
more anarchist/autonomist thought of Deleuze and Guattari … which aims at a non-
hegemonic politics” (ibid, 1). He accuses Day and Graeber of having imposed an unhelpful 
schism between non-hegemonic and hegemonic political projects in which Deleuze and 
Guattari’s rhizome is placed on one side of the debate and Gramsci’s hegemonic alignment 
on the other. Their preference for non-hegemonic politics, withdrawing engagement from 
any of the relations of power through which hegemony is exercised, and instead prefiguring 
horizontalist relationships through logics of affinity, can be traced back to the anarchist and 
autonomist tendencies of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy.189 Deleuze and Guattari are 
themselves deeply suspicious of mass politics. As Purcell writes, “one place that non-
hegemonic politics is manifested is in their insistence that there is “no becoming 
majoritarian.” That is, [Delueze and Guattari] reject any project to become the norm, to 
occupy the dominant center of society” (ibid, 2). Of course, rejecting the notion of becoming 
the majority is the antithesis of counter hegemonic political strategy. Despite their 
 
188 Purcell’s argument is a direct response to Richard Day’s book Gramsci is Dead (2005) in an essay he titled 
Gramsci is Not Dead (2011). 
189 Similarly, with their emphasis on the emergence of political action and strategy through the connections 
made out of a movement’s rhizomatic formation, Deleuze and Guattari have a lot in common with Maree 
Brown’ Emergent Strategy, while clearly Smucker is more closely allied to Gramsci in Hegemony How To. 
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differences, however, Purcell argues that there is far more to be gained from bringing the 
non-hegemonic and the hegemonic political strategies together in productive tension than in 
keeping them apart. 
 
In particular, Purcell thinks there is great potential in forging Gramsci’s hegemonic politics 
with Deleuze and Guatarri’s rhizomatic politics to help think through strategies of alignment. 
As he writes “there is an important overlap between Gramsci and Deleuze and Guattari on 
this question of connections, of mobilized groups connecting up with each other to sustain 
and advance their project” (2011, 7). Purcell suggests we may bring these ideas together 
through something he calls networks of equivalence which is his own attempt to “imagine 
how a diverse proliferation of struggles can hold together in productive tension, to work in 
concert without being reduced to a single, unified movement” (ibid). This brings hegemonic 
and non-hegemonic politics together: 
 
With Gramsci, [networks of equivalence] pursue systemic political change through 
broad coalitional movements. However, they do not seek to establish a new order, a 
new system of domination that replaces the neoliberal one with a ‘better,’ socialist 
one. With Deleuze and Guattari, they insist on autonomy and hope to ward off both 
domination and totalization, by the state or any other entity. (Purcell 2011, 8) 
 
Here, the constituent parts of a movement are not “reduced to unity” and thus a totalizing 
account of politics but “neither do they remain entirely self-contained and autonomous” 
(ibid). Purcell argues for a both/and rather than an either/or approach to hegemonic and non-
hegemonic politics. In this way, we could imagine the relationship between hegemony and 
non-hegemonic politics existing in a dynamic choreography that refuses binary or linear 
interpretations. As activists and academics engage with it to draw ideas and constituents 
together, this relationship must always be considered complex, porous, layered, flexible and 
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improvisational. Following Stephen Collis (2014), we might return to the idea of dual power 
as one way to bring both sides of the argument into productive tension. Nevertheless, the 
term dual power may limit us to the binary relationships that the relationships demands we 
escape. To understand this relationship fully we need terminology that transcends binaries.  
 
I’ve borrowed Purcell’s network of equivalence idea and adapted it into the concept I called 
aggregation to scale. Aggregation to scale is a more deliberately hegemonic project, 
however. While it follows a similar logic to the networks of equivalence, it neither abandons 
majoritarian politics nor the attempt to build a new, better order. Instead, it seeks an approach 
to majoritarianism that contains within it an inherent critique of the shortcomings of 
majoritarian politics. Despite all the very real risks associated with totalitarianism that 
Deleuze and Guattari, Graeber and Day are so concerned about, I do not see how movements 
can make radical social change without ultimately claiming and establishing a new order. 
New orders seem inevitable whether we want them or not. Indeed, if the proliferation of 
minoritarian spaces and the worlds they prefigure were to become normalized, as surely even 
Day and Graeber must hope they will be, then they would all be contained by a new order 
that they have shaped. It is not the existence of an order that we should problematize but 
rather the contents of it and how these become incorporated into our theories of change. 
 
A new hegemonic order could well be one that encourages the flourishing of a pluriversal 
perspective and is able to encompass a world of many worlds. Moreover, while plans and 
visions are developed to help birth a new order, they can still make space for, be guided by, 
what Maree Brown calls emergence, or “the way small interactions and connections create 
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complex systems that become ecosystems and societies” (2017, 3). These, too, would be new 
orders of sorts and any new ordering that followed a logic of pluriversal hegemony would 
have to emerge out of such connections. Yet, we need political leadership, a leaderful 
movement, across this rhizome-like formation to help make the connections and build the 
coalitions and develop, or nurture the emergence, of strategies to confront the current 
hegemonic structures. Indeed, Maree Brown explains that emergent strategy is the intentional 
cultivation of these connections to make change. The critical connections cultivated through 
rhizomatic formations are vital to resilient, accountable, and democratic counter hegemonic 
alignments that exist not only in place but across space. Thus, in my engagement with 
Smucker, Gramsci, Day, Purcell, Deleuze and Guattari, and Maree Brown, I’ve sought to 
bring together counter hegemony, critical connections, and the rhizomatic form, to think 
through deterritorializing counter hegemonic alignment while maintaining a democratic and 
anti-authoritarian movement.  
 
Although most, if not all, of the theorists I’ve engaged with here are activists in their own 
right and are drawing upon their own participation and experiences in movements for radical 
social change, so far this conversation has been deeply theoretical. However, I now want to 
ground the abstraction I’ve described as deterritorializing counter hegemonic alignments 
through critical connection in rhizomatic formations in the conjunctures of my own case 
study research. The significance of deterritorialized alliances was made clear to me through 
Zoltán Grossman’s book Unlikely Alliances. Despite his emphasis on place-based 
allegiances, he identifies the metaphor of the “thin green wall” as a very real set of alliances 
existing across space. We can think of this as a translocal counter hegemonic alignment 
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against petro-hegemony. Through a strategy of segmented localism in response to the vast, 
spatialized expanse of interconnecting fossil fuel infrastructure, activists throughout climate 
justice movement are already making critical connections across space in a rhizomatic 
formation. These emergent translocal solidarities are able to coordinate assaults on different 
points of intervention in petro-hegemony, throughout the global oil assemblage, while 
maintaining frontlines leadership and attention to local specificities. In this way the so called 
thin green wall blocking the transport of fossil fuels to and along the continent’s Western 
seaboard is an excellent example of the movement aggregating frontiers of Blockadia to scale 
up their counter hegemonic resistance. 
 
To confront the scale of the fossil fuel industry’s reach, scaling up alliances across space is a 
necessity in the climate justice movement. As APEN’s Miya Yoshitani explained, this is 
something activists in Richmond learned after they found themselves unable to defeat 
Chevron’s upgrade at both the scale of regulation through the city council and the scale of 
regional agencies: 
 
Some of the things that we were trying to get out of our demands with Chevron – in 
particular [regulating] particulate pollution and greenhouse gases [that was] part of 
their project and that would have helped prevent things like Bakken crude and tar 
sands from being processed in Richmond –  when we tried to win those things, and 
lost some of that, not all of them, but some of that in that fight, we then went to try to 
do [the same] on a regional level, instead of a regulatory level. And then lost that 
because on a state level, the oil lobby was very effective at killing the progress that 
we were making on a regional level, [through] the Air Management District. 
(personal communication, July 12th, 2018). 
 
To impose greater regulatory burden on the Bay Area refineries, Richmond’s climate justice 
activists and their regional allies have tried shifting from one point of intervention to the 
next, across different scales of the oil assemblage. In legal theory and international relations 
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this is called venue shopping or forum shopping (Busch 2007). Miya described that process 
as “testing all the different arenas of struggle” (personal communication, July 12th, 2018).  
This process has seen APEN devote a great deal more resources to developing coalitions and 
networks of allies on a regional and statewide scale.190 
 
Miya explained that in the context of the climate crisis, winning against Chevron in 
Richmond must ultimately mean shutting down the refinery. However, in the context of 
climate justice, winning must also mean doing so in a way and on a timeline “that is just for 
the communities and the workers.” Drawing on activists’ experience in Richmond, Miya 
suggested that such a victory could not be won in Richmond alone and would require 
complimentary state and federal transformations: 
 
Building that base of power, changing the local politics so much and literally being 
able to shift the politics of the city council, that's all been really critical and 
important... But we know we're not going to win without complimentary state policy 
that's driven by the lessons that we've learned locally in Richmond…So being able to 
build power with other groups around the state who are experiencing very similar 
realities on a local level, and bringing those total forces to bear at a state level, we 
need that in order to actually win what we need to win in Richmond. (personal 
communication, July 12th, 2018) 
 
Miya identified serious limitations to activism at the local scale, particularly when 
confronting an industry as large and powerful as the fossil fuel industry. All of this means 
 
190 Similarly, Gayle McLaughlin sought to share the lessons of the Richmond Progressive Alliance in 
communities up and down the state during her run for California’s Lieutenant Governor in 2018. Employing the 
same organize to run, run to organize philosophy in her statewide candidacy, McLaughlin helped nurture the 
critical connections necessary for scaling up the movement. Out of this has emerged over a dozen new local 
alliances and an attempt to build a California Progressive Alliance (CPA). The CPA would be “a statewide, 
non-partisan network of all the local alliances and other corporate-free progressives groups in California.” As 
Gayle told me, her run was primarily about building connections and relationship amongst progressives across 
the state: “I really want to keep all the wonderful relationships that I built statewide going, and build even more.  
As an organizer, this is key to making real progressive change” (personal communication, July 18th, 2018).   
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that, for organization like APEN, building coalitions of local frontline struggles against fossil 
fuel infrastructure across the state is a crucial part of countering petro-hegemony. According 
to Miya: 
 
That's why we've put so much effort into building out new strategies of state 
organizing, state policy work, and state electoral work and built our own 
C4191…because without that there's no way that we get to the point where we're 
actually closing down the refinery, having a just transition for Richmond, where the 
local economy has transitioned in a way that actually meets real needs for local 
people… I don't know if we'll ever be a national organization, but I know we have to 
build power there as well because I don't think that the change that's necessary is 
possible without a transformation of the federal government too. (personal 
communication, July 12th, 2018)   
 
For climate justice activists, however, this does not mean formalizing a statewide 
hierarchical, bureaucracy to tell local organizations where and when they need to ramp up the 
pressure. Miya argued that leadership and strategy had to come from the local frontlines. 
Meanwhile, decisions made at a statewide scale would have to be made through the lens and 
participation of different local activists. She argued that one of the fundamental failures of 
the larger, more powerful and better resourced ENGOs has been that they have no roots in 
local organizing and on the ground struggle. As she told me, their detachment form the local 
“is part of why they never win … they don't get it right because they're not actually attached 
to how things happen on the ground, and what's actually really needed, and what works both 
strategy-wise, and solution and infrastructure-wise” (personal communication, July 12th, 
2018).   For Miya, one of the key takeaways from organizing in Richmond was that even as 
the movement has scaled up and leaders have formed statewide coalitions, statewide 
campaigns are “still grounded in local organizing, in the realities of people who are living in 
 
191 Under the US Internal Revenue Service rules, a 501c3 non-profit organization may not engage in electoral 
and partisan activities or support politicians’ campaigns, while a 501c4 may do political and legislative work 
like lobbying but may not advocate for specific political candidates. 
 636 
Richmond, and who are fence line communities and who are on the frontlines of local 
struggle.” Here, I think, Miya articulates a strong argument for aggregating movements to 
scale rather than aggrandizement. Two examples of statewide and national coalitions that 
APEN contributes to are the Climate Justice Alliance (which spearheads the Our Power 
Campaign) and the California Environmental Justice Alliance. These maintain an 
organizational bureaucracy and employ their own staff but are all comprised of local 
frontlines organizations and are held together through a shared narrative and vision rather 
than strict hierarchy or division of labor.  
 
Narrative can be a powerful tool not just for articulating alignments, as Chapter Five 
demonstrated, but also for scaling them up across space. Reflecting on his work supporting 
the Our Power campaign’s story-based strategy, Patrick Reinsborough told me that:  
 
The Our Power campaign is fundamentally trying to address scale by having a shared 
narrative rather than necessarily having shared organization or shared bureaucracy, as 
often happens with national coalitions… I think one of the great powers of narrative 
for scaling organizing is that the right narrative can provide a unity that doesn't 
compromise the diversity of all of the different folks who are choosing to share it and 
be a part of it. (personal communication, September 26th, 2018)   
 
This suggests narratives, like those premised upon intersectional populism, are not 
necessarily place-bound but can connect and align movements across space. Moreover, 
excited by 350.org’s ability to connect over 150 locally organized affiliated group in the US 
by “lock[ing] in some core meaning of their core memes and then release[ing] them and 
allow[ing] people to self-organize around them,” Patrick recently joined the organization to 
experiment with scaling up nationwide organizing through narrative intervention (personal 
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communication, September 26th, 2018).192 The right narrative allows for cohesion across 
different groups in different geographies without compromising particularity. As Patrick 
explained, such an articulation would be “like a common headline with as many different 
sub-headlines for different audiences and constituencies and communities as are needed to 
represent the authenticity of their experience of their struggles into a shared narrative that can 
invite, hopefully, millions more people,” because, according to him, “this is the scale we 
need to get to” (personal communication, September 26th, 2018).   Theoretically, then, if that 
narrative were to become a hegemonic one, we could consider it to be pluriversal to the 
extent that it is able to represent the worldviews and visions of possibles of the multiplicity of 
its constituents. Narrative is thus a crucially important part of how movements might 
aggregate local organizations and actors to scale up across wider geographies. 
 
One of the key narratives that has aligned frontlines in the so called thin green wall and has 
helped deterritorialize alliances is obviously that of keeping fossil fuels in the ground to halt 
climate breakdown.193 However, as Patrick told me, the climate narrative is “also a way of 
framing the issue that allows lots of other social forces to engage, to build the actual political 
 
192 Patrick is not uncritical of the simplified, universalizing tendencies of 350.org’s narrative. As he told me: 
“I've watched 350 since the beginning and seeing the power of how it has scaled, there's tensions and 
complexities there…and most of that is sort of a [tension between] breadth versus depth…The original 350 
narrative went pretty far and wide, because it was very focused on what, now, more and more people recognize 
is carbon fundamentalism… simplifying the whole story of the systemic crisis on our planet, the history that led 
up to it, and the changes that we need to make in order to address it, into this one number, 350 dot org, this one 
planetary boundary. That's not a bad way to tell the story, in some ways, but 350 has taken a long time to 
become the kind of organization that could tell a more holistic story” (personal communication, September 26th, 
2018).    
193 It is worth noting here that the keep-it-in-the-ground framing is far from universally appreciated, even in the 
climate movement. For example, as Jean, Steve, and Janet told me, during the San Francisco March for Climate 
Jobs and Justice in 2018, the People’s Climate Movement national committee (which has organized that last 
few mass People’s Climate Marches) was very concerned that the Californian activists’ demands to keep fossil 
fuels in the ground could antagonize potential allies in the labor movement (personal communication, July 18th, 
2018). The march’s dual emphasis on jobs and climate justice, however, saw union chapters across the Bay 
Area pledge their support for it. This indicates that where keep-it-in-the-ground is a leading frame, it must be 
accompanied by equally important demands for investment in alternative sources of livelihoods. 
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and economic power, necessary to take on the fossil fuel industry” (personal communication, 
September 26th, 2018).  I’ve described many of the place-bound alliance building narratives I 
encountered in the movement in Chapter Five. However, to understand how a rhizomatic 
movement might be aligned across space through narrative, we need to pay attention to the 
way a set of memes, meanings, or visions, are “locked in,” while also allowing constituent 
groups to self-organize and to develop strategies appropriate to their context. One example of 
this was the song-sharing between the Secwepemc and Bay Area Activists I described in 
previous chapters. The warrior women’s song that was sung at almost every direct action 
event I witnessed in British Columbia was shared with activists seeking to prevent 
BAAQMD’s approval of permits for the expansion of Phillips 66’s Rodeo Refinery. Pennie 
Opal Plant from Idle No More SF Bay told me that in singing this song as they left the 
hearing room, the one hundred or so activists involved were very deliberately making the 
connection between their opposition to tar sands refining in the Bay Area and the frontlines 
of struggle in British Columbia (personal communication, July 19th, 2018). By articulating 
their solidarity with First Nations currently fighting the Trans Mountain pipeline through 
resisting a shared adversary, these activists have strengthened the critical connections 
between their two frontlines. 
 
In addition to expressing solidarity through shared symbols and songs, or through 
engagement with the regulatory system, activists in the Bay Area also blockaded Kinder 
Morgan’s train depot in Richmond on at least two occasions for several hours. Their press 
releases framed climate change, health implications impacting local residents, and asserting 
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Indigenous sovereignty, as shared reasons for the frontlines in Burnaby and Richmond 
connecting their struggles to confront a common enemy.  
 
Despite the importance of narrative, these critical connections are not just discursive, or 
comprised of narratives alone, nor are they born out of simple moral obligation. They are 
developed in the knowledge that the relationships that exist between things matters and, thus, 
out of the strategic imperative of fighting the industry in its upstream, midstream and 
downstream operations. The activists who blockaded Kinder Morgan’s gates in Richmond 
did so not just out of an ethical or ideological commitment to movement allies in British 
Columbia, but to draw attention to the dangers of tar sands refining locally in the Bay Area. 
The connections linking Burnaby to Richmond, Richmond to the Bakken oil fields of the 
Dakotas, or Richmond to Standing Rock through the development of Bakken shale economy, 
are articulated strategically to align the movement across the continent. As Naomi Klein 
writes:  
 
The various toxic threats these communities are up against seem to be awakening 
impulses that are universal, even primal—whether it’s the fierce drive to protect 
children from harm, or a deep connection to land that had been previously 
suppressed. And though reported in the mainstream press as isolated protests against 
specific projects, these sites of resistance increasingly see themselves as part of a 
global movement… Social media in particular has allowed geographically isolated 
communities to tell their stories to the world, and for those stories, in turn, to become 
part of a transnational narrative about resistance to a common ecological crisis. (2014, 
262) 
 
While these impulses may well be universal, their articulation into alignment across scale has 
also paid close attention to difference and particularity. Yet, as Klein goes on to explain, the 
alignments forged in particular places across the geography of the oil assemblage are also 
about strategic interventions where the industry is vulnerable: 
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What these campaigns are discovering is that while it’s next to impossible to win a 
direct fight against the fossil fuel companies on their home turf, the chances of 
victory greatly increase when the battleground extends into a territory where the 
industry is significantly weaker—places where nonextractive ways of life still 
flourish and where residents (and politicians) are less addicted to petro and coal 
dollars. (2014, 277). 
 
Out of these connections frontlines communities are aggregating the movement to scale. 
Through resistance to the same global infrastructure, their alignment against fossil fuels 
throughout the commodity chain manifests itself as a material and strategic interest that 
connects these frontlines together.  
 
All this might suggest that the forging of these connections is easy when in actual fact they 
take a great deal of work and successful alignment is never guaranteed. While the 
connections formed through Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome seem to occur organically in 
their theorizing, a hegemonic alignment in which constituents aggregate themselves together 
to scale needs to be cultivated and nurtured by movement leaders at different nodes of the 
network. Grassroots leaders can often play this role like they do in the Climate Justice 
Alliance. However, in the cases I studied, organizations like Greenpeace, Stand.earth, and 
350.org (all of which have a strong presence in both the Bay Area and the Vancouver region) 
have also been important actors facilitating the connections between these two frontlines. For 
example, Stand.earth has helped facilitate meetings between Tsleil-Waututh campaigners and 
activists in the Bay Area. Such meetings have included press conferences, panels and 
workshops for community members to attend and learn more about the connections between 
the frontlines. 
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In September 2018, Stand.earth organized a panel with Tsleil-Waututh campaigner Cedar 
George, Idle No More and Stand.earth activist, Isabella Zizi , Sunflower Alliance member, 
Shoshana Wechsler, Tsleil-Waututh Councilor and Chair of the Sacred Trust, Charlene 
Aleck, Contra Costa County Supervisor and BAAQMD member, John Gioia, and Idle No 
More’s Pennie Opal Plant.  The panelists explained the importance of confronting the 
industry at all stages of the supply chain, shared experiences from their local contexts, and 
articulated the connections between their struggles in terms of climate injustice and the 
systemic roots of the crisis. The following day, Idle No More SF Bay and Indigenous 
Women of the Americas led a prayer walk and teach in with Tsleil-Waututh campaigners at 
the Philips 66 refinery in Rodeo to educate the community about the connections between 
their frontlines (Stand.earth 2018).  
 
The relationship between activists in the Bay Area and British Columbia has also been used 
strategically to put more pressure on BAAQMD. For example, in November 2018, 
Stand.earth’s International Programs Direct, Tzeporah Berman, Charlene Aleck, and Pennie 
Opal Plant presented to a BAAQMD hearing together on the specific dangers associated with 
refining tar sands and diluted bitumen as well as the broader implications of expanding 
markets for tar sands (Stand.earth 2018b).  Both the panel and the hearing were livestreamed 
by Stand.earth and shared on social media. In instances like this the connections between 
these frontlines are strengthened and articulated publicly as alignments within the broader 
movement for climate justice. Behind the scenes, these convergences help activists 
coordinate their strategies to target different points of intervention according to where in the 
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oil assemblage they are each situated. These examples also demonstrate how connections 
don’t necessarily just happen but require cultivation and leadership. 
 
Finally, following direct action events in 2017 and the growing awareness of the connections 
between the construction of the Trans Mountain Pipeline in Canada to refinery upgrades and 
increased tanker traffic in the Bay Area in 2018, a regional Bay Area network has emerged 
called the Protect the Bay Coalition. After two years of campaigners demonstrating the 
connections between tar sands extraction in Alberta to its transportation through British 
Columbia to shipping it down the West Coast to the Bay Area refineries, grassroots activists 
in the Bay Area are prioritizing resistance to tar sands. This coalition of organizations 
developed out of the growing concerns that refineries are upgrading their equipment 
specifically to process tar sands from Canada and other heavy sour crude sources. The 
coalition, comprised of several organizations including Communities for a Better 
Environment, Sunflower Alliance, Idle No More, and Stand.earth, formed in 2019 
determined, “to prevent the expansion of the Phillips 66 refinery and marine terminal in 
Rodeo that would allow it to import toxic crude oils like tar sands from Canada.” As they say 
on their website, “We will NOT allow our community to be poisoned any more than it 
already has been by increasing the amount of tar sands refined in our communities” (Protect 
the Bay 2019). This example is particularly significant because it demonstrates how the 
rhizomatic connection between Burnaby and Richmond created an offshoot of its own in the 
form of a new regional coalition. 
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As Naomi Klein says, the flipside of the growing threat of the carbon boom in North 
America, and especially the threat tar sands pose to communities along the commodity chain, 
is that against the expansion of upstream, midstream, and downstream operations a 
burgeoning and increasingly interconnected movement of local movements is being 
articulated into alignment. Just like place-based alliances, critical connections across space 
are developed out of more than ideological and discursive commitments and are rooted in 
material and strategic interests. The strategic logic connecting Burnaby and Richmond is 
quite simple: if activists in Burnaby can prevent the construction of the Trans Mountain 
pipeline, communities in Richmond won’t have to deal with the burden of increased exposure 
to toxins from upgraded refineries processing more toxic crude. Meanwhile, if activists in the 
Bay Area can prevent refineries from expanding to process heavier crude, they will cut off an 
important market for diluted bitumen imports. This damages the economic prospects of the 
tar sands, rendering tar sands extraction a less attractive investment, and giving anti- tar 
sands activists in Canada more strategic leverage. Together, alignment across midstream and 
downstream interventions contribute to a strategy of segmented localism in which Albertan 
tar sands may be kept in the ground at the site of extraction, as the industry’s supply lines are 
disrupted, transportation routes intercepted, and markets for its produce are closed down. 
Isolating the industry in this way, activists may be able to keep vast reserves of some the 
world’s most carbon intensive oil in the ground and unburned, thus contributing to global 
efforts to arrest climate catastrophe. The question, now, is: how does the process of 
aggregating these frontiers to scale the movement up cultivate the material and ideological 
terrain for a broader confrontation with the matrix of domination with which petro-hegemony 
is so deeply entwined? 
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From the examples provided above, we can see the emergence of a climate justice movement 
that is not fixed in Blockadia but is, rather, moving through Blockadia and articulating a 
pluriversal alignment of a movement of movements. As it moves through these frontlines, I 
argue, the movement is sowing the seeds and cultivating the material and ideological terrain 
for a counter hegemonic assault on the matrix of domination. Yet, in their reflections on the 
potential emergence of Climate X194 as a counter hegemonic response to Climate Leviathan, 
Mann and Wainwright provocatively, and I would add mostly unfairly, argue that the climate 
justice movement is not nearly as radical as its constituents might like to think it is: 
 
As fervently as we might demand “system change not climate change,” we have yet 
to really elaborate – let alone in a democratic or broad-based manner – what “system 
change” looks like beyond the absence of fossil fuels. Indeed, most of the time, the 
tacit assumption is that “system change” means a green, renewable based capitalism. 
We find ourselves focused almost entirely on environmental “bad guy” capitalists like 
mining or petroleum corporations, as if without them things would be mostly 
acceptable …” (2018, 170-171) 
 
Their provocation is one I’ve left unanswered throughout much of the dissertation, but I 
should now rise to it.  
 
On the one hand, their critique could well be levelled at my own contribution to climate 
justice scholarship and activism. The arguments in these pages have specifically concerned 
interventions against the “bad guy capitalists” represented by fossil fuel industry on the 
 
194 As a reminder, Climate X would be born out of a global revolution made in the name of climate justice. 
Because they don’t know what exactly it could look like, Mann and Wainwright say X is the most appropriate 
denominator to describe this new world. “Climate X is worldly and open, and affirms the autonomous dignity of 
all. It must be a movement of the community of all – including the excluded – that affirms climate justice and 
popular freedoms against capital and planetary sovereignty.” They go on to explain that the founding principles 
of Climate X are equality, dignity, solidarity but question whether “that planet is imaginable, let alone 
realizable?” (2018, 180). 
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frontlines of Blockadia. Moreover, I have provided only relatively vague suggestions of 
visions of futures around which the movement could articulate a broad, deep, and pluriversal 
alignment. However, this lack of precision does not indicate the absence of visions of system 
change, but rather the multiplicity of visions on Blockadia’s frontlines. Indeed, local 
struggles against mining and petroleum corporations around the globe see communities come 
together and in doing so, they imagine the worlds they want to see. Other worlds are made 
possible through this act of coming together. Invariably, these worlds are not simply what we 
have now but with the absence of fossil fuels. Just transitions are specific to the contexts in 
which they are being fought over, and, in each of these frontlines, organizers and 
campaigners help develop community consciousness of the many other worlds that possible. 
These visions, including a multiplicity of just transitions, go far beyond the embrace of 
“renewable capitalism” of which Mann and Wainwright have accused the movement. In fact, 
without actually engaging with frontlines activists in their theoretical debates, Mann and 
Wainwright have missed this point almost entirely. As such, while they call for a movement 
that cultivates the material and ideological terrain to develop revolutionary potential in the 
name of climate justice, their argument ignores the ways climate justice activists are already 
doing exactly this in their confrontations with the fossil fuel industry in Blockadia. 
 
Through activism in Blockadia, climate justice activists can be, or otherwise are, developing 
the discursive interventions, narrative alignments, and strategic tools necessary for a broad-
based counter hegemonic assault on the matrix of domination. By organizing communities to 
confront petro-hegemony in many different points of intervention and on different terrains of 
struggle, organizers are providing onramps for a wider community consciousness of the 
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systemic roots of the climate crisis. Through these interventions they are illustrating why the 
fossil fuel industry is merely a symptom of the matrix of domination. In challenging this 
symptom, however, activists are laying the groundwork for a more systematic confrontation 
with the hegemonic confluence of extractivism, capitalism, colonialism, patriarchy, and 
racism. Confrontation with the industry thus becomes symbolic of these systemic critiques 
but is not substituted for them. Almost all of the activists I talked to demonstrated deep 
awareness that while the industry symbolized, thrived upon, and indeed exacerbated 
environmental racism, patriarchal relations to the land, extractivist ideology, and settler 
colonial arrogance, none of these would necessarily go away simply by shutting down 
refineries or rescinding pipeline permits. Time and again, the economics of a just transition 
was invoked as a crucial component of the confrontation with the fossil fuel industry 
precisely because activists were profoundly aware of the deeper systemic roots of their 
struggles that couldn’t be addressed by shutting down the fossil fuel industry alone.  In fact, 
this understanding is what formed the foundations of many of their commitments to alliance 
building across a multiplicity of social struggle,s and was built into the messages activists 
would deploy on the frontlines.  
 
As most frontlines activists would argue, the struggles against the fossil fuel industry are 
inherently connected to struggles against racism, colonialism, patriarchy, capitalism, and 
extractivism. In addition, Naomi Klein writes that activism in Blockadia is fostering 
community desires for self-determination, deeper democracy, and community control over 
shared resources: 
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Resistance to high-risk extreme extraction is building a global, grassroots, and broad-
based network the likes of which the environmental movement has rarely seen. And 
perhaps this phenomenon shouldn’t even be referred to as an environmental 
movement at all, since it is primarily driven by a desire for a deeper form of 
democracy, one that provides communities with real control over those resources that 
are most critical to collective survival—the health of the water, air, and soil. (2014, 
254) 
 
While Mann and Wainwright are still debating whether or not the climate justice movement 
is radical or not, or whether Klein herself is opposed to all forms of capitalism or just 
neoliberal capitalism, the movement is laying the groundwork for a counter hegemonic and 
systemic assault on the matrix of domination. The expansion of Blockadia is mobilizing a 
consciousness in which the protection of water, health, air and soil, are closely entwined with 
the desires for community self-determination and deeper democracy. This desire sets up each 
of these communities in direct conflict with the matrix of domination. Thus, the ideological 
and material terrain is cultivated as communities mobilize themselves in response to the 
threats to health, water, climate, air and soil posed by the fossil fuel industry. Organizers and 
campaigners help forge the critical connections between and within communities to provoke 
recognition of how exposure to these threats is stratified according to conjunctures within the 
matrix. In this way, resistance to fossil fuels also becomes the call for decolonialization, 
smashing the patriarchy, abolishing structural racism, and overthrowing capitalist 
extractivism.  
 
Not only do communities build a certain consciousness through activism in Blockadia, they 
also learn to develop and execute strategies to challenge relations of consent, coercion, and 
compliance, and engage with different points of intervention. This means that in their 
confrontation, and transformation through engagement with, petro-hegemony they are 
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becoming equipped with skills and, potentially an analysis of power relations, that will allow 
them to fight against the matrix of domination too. Moreover, through interventions on 
particular points of intervention, activists are able to address multiple layers of hegemonic 
power. For example, by shifting discursive conditions against the fossil fuel industry, in 
many cases, activists are also disrupting the discursive conditions the matrix of domination 
itself depends upon. Similarly, by winning court rulings in favor of Indigenous and First 
Nations’ right to self-determination on their territories, the Native Rights Based Strategic 
Framework helps set precedents to halt the encroachment of colonizing forces. Thus, through 
activism in Blockadia, communities are coming to terms with the systemic roots of petro-
hegemony and the climate crisis. In doing so they are developing complimentary strategies 
that may help them intervene upon the relations of power petro-hegemony depends on but 
also in the relations of power that maintain the matrix of domination’s hegemonic status.  
 
All that being said, connecting up the different frontlines of Blockadia and cultivating 
revolutionary potential through them will not be enough to overthrow the matrix of 
domination. In order to aggregate to a scale that it is able to challenge the full reach of petro-
hegemony and the matrix of domination, the movement must not just connect the frontlines 
of Blockadia, but build out of Blockadia, or perhaps build Blockadia out. By this I mean the 
movement must be, and in some cases very much is, cultivating critical connections between 
frontlines climate justice activism, climate justice activism behind the frontlines, and all the 
social struggles climate breakdown inevitably touches. Examples of activism and political 
engagement that takes place behind the frontlines might include Fossil Free and the global 
fossil fuel divestment campaign, Sunrise Movement and it’s targeting of elected officials, 
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Extinction Rebellion’s disruptive tactics to force governments to declare and act on climate 
emergency, the youth climate strikes, climate liability lawsuits against the industry, and the 
rise of the Green New Deal. 
 
In addition, there are many electoral campaigns with which climate justice activists must 
decide whether or not they want to engage. For example, the Canadian Green Party’s 
growing popularity and the emphasis on ambitious climate policy in the run up to the 2019 
election helped place climate breakdown at the forefront of Canadian political discourses. 
Capitalizing on this opening, climate justice activists tried to use these elections to force the 
national conversation in the direction climate justice, First Nations’ self-determination, and 
the country’s relationship to fossil fuel extraction. Yet in doing so, they also risked 
reinforcing the legitimacy of the Canadian state as the source of final authority and decision-
making power. Similarly, thanks in large part to youth activists with the Sunrise Movement, 
climate change is finally receiving significant attention in the Democratic Party Primaries in 
the US. In his run for the presidency Senator Bernie Sanders has offered a radical climate 
plan that aligns closely with the Green New Deal and learns from the mistakes of the 
project’s earlier drafts. This plan would see massive state-led investment in energy transition, 
commits to full decarbonization of the economy on a timeline in line with what climate 
science demands, and promises to create 20 million new green jobs (Berniesanders.com 
2019). Some climate justice activists view this is precisely the kind of radical action plan that 
is needed. But again, we must question how endorsements of this plan positions climate 
justice activists with regards to their relationship with the hegemony of state sovereignty and 
state-led solutions.  
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Party politics and the Green New Deal at the scale of the nation state could be considered 
very much in terms of aggrandizing to scale rather than aggregating to scale. They are in 
danger of institutionalizing top-down, one size fits all climate solutions, that are 
unaccountable to the movement and are led by institutions of the state that few within the 
radical contingents of the movement have much reason to trust. In some ways, these 
approaches reflect the organizations that promote them. For example, the centralization of 
decision-making power in the Sunrise Movement’s organizational model mirrors that of 
many large bureaucratic ENGOs, although admittedly the introduction of local Sunrise 
chapters may have helped decentralize some decision making more recently. Similarly, the 
purpose of winning power through the state in party election campaigns would be to impose 
a set of policies and to have that imposition backed up with the coercive authority of the 
state. These are models of social change many within the movement are critical of.  
 
All of this is to say that making the critical connections between frontlines climate justice 
leaders skeptical of consolidating the movement at the scale of the state and national 
organization seeking to do exactly this is rife with contradictions and complexities that 
climate justice activists must negotiate. Developing connections between frontline activists 
and their counterparts behind the frontlines is a challenging process because there are 
fundamental differences in organizational philosophy and theories of change. Rather than 
putting aside their differences, however, the question is whether they are able to engage with 
each other, coordinate together, and act and move with one another, despite their differences, 
or whether the contradictions are so great that cooperation is impossible. Again, a great deal 
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can be learned from Adrienne Maree Brown’s emphasis on critical connections and 
relationships here. 
 
Many of the debates about organizational philosophy, consolidation at scale, and theories of 
change are reflected through the climate justice movement’s complicated relationship with 
the Green New Deal. The program may be one of the most powerful strategic interventions 
we currently have to intervene in relations of compliance. Strategies on in the war of 
economies are currently where interventions through the carbon rebellion framework are 
least forthcoming. A nationwide mobilization facilitated by the enormous resources at the US 
government’s disposal to shift the economic base away from fossil fuels would totally upend 
the dynamic of dependency the fossil fuel industry currently enjoys. Intervention in the war 
of economies will require resources of this magnitude whether they are decentralized or 
otherwise. For this reason, however, many climate justice activists have been very supportive 
of the Green New Deal. Nevertheless, this state-led program could easily see dependency 
simply reinvented and reformed around the state and massive centralized renewable energy 
projects instead. In terms of climate justice, shifting dependency from one source of 
overwhelming authority to another is hardly a solution. Indeed, while agreeing with much of 
its contents, the Climate Justice Alliance refused to endorse Alexandria Ocasio Cortez’ 
Green New Deal resolution, in part, for its failures to engage with and incorporate frontlines 
activists (Climate Justice Alliance 2018). In addition, Mann and Wainwright are very critical 
of Green New Deal solutions because they argue that, just like Roosevelt’s original New 
Deal, the program is ultimately intended to save capitalism, the nation-state, and the modes 
of domination that rest upon them, at a time when these are in greatest crisis (2018). These 
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debates indicate the deep contradictions within the movement over how it scales up and at 
what scale climate solutions should be introduced. 
 
All this being said, there are ways that the dynamic of dependency that the Green New Deal 
addresses could be reformed around interdependence within and between communities, as 
opposed to dependence on the state or corporations. Infusing the Green New Deal with 
grassroots, frontlines leadership and the just transition’s principles of decarbonization, 
decolonization, democratization and decentralizing of energy and power could see a much 
larger degree of community self-determination built into the program. If climate justice 
activists are prepared to fight for the most radical possible interpretation of the Green New 
Deal, they may be able to shift its orientation away from a reformist agenda and infuse it with 
revolutionary potential. 
 
The Green New Deal is a floating signifier, an empty category to which different people and 
politicians have attached their own meanings, hopes, desires, agendas and policy. Moreover, 
as the Climate Justice Alliance now argues, some of these have the potential to unleash 
enormous resources for frontlines’ grassroots leaders to capture and develop their own 
context specific solutions in accordance with the economics of a just transition (2019b). The 
Green New Deal is not going away, indeed it has captured public attention and support in a 
way that arguably few climate policies ever have. As such, the program’s meaning, 
resources, and the policies it includes must be fought over and won by the climate justice 
movement. We might consider this approach to the Green New Deal as a form of dual power 
in which the resources of the state are unleashed which can then be claimed by non-state 
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actors seeking to prefigure and advance just solutions that transcend capitalism and the state. 
For example, among many other contributions, Sanders’ plan includes a $40 billion Climate 
Justice Resiliency Fund for frontline communities “to recover from, and prepare for, the 
climate impacts… and providing those frontline and fenceline communities a just transition 
including real jobs, resilient infrastructure, economic development” (Berniesanders.com 
2019). This, along with much more intentional inclusion of frontline leaders in the drafting of 
the policy, was amongst the key reasons the Climate Justice Alliance ultimately endorsed 
Sanders’ Green New Deal (Climate Justice Alliance 2019c). Of course, as of writing, we 
have no idea whether this plan will ever be realized in policy but the fact that it has moved 
from the political fringe to the mainstream in such a short space of time is reason enough for 
engaging with its implications for expanding Blockadia in these final pages. 
 
Clearly then, one way we might make interventions at the national scale accountable to 
frontlines communities, and simultaneously able to resist the centralization and 
bureaucratization so many attempts to consolidate movements at scale fall victim to, is to 
ensure that frontlines leadership is infused throughout these organizations and solutions. This 
process could follow a logic similar to that of the kind dual power intervention I described 
taking place in Richmond.  Through winning local office, resources from local government 
were channeled towards climate justice activist organizations developing just solutions that 
depended neither upon the state nor any particular industry. A similar approach could 
transform the Green New Deal and many other progressive climate solutions that follow a 
logic of aggrandizing to scale into a program that follows a logic of aggregation to scale and 
pluriversal hegemonic projects. Meanwhile, we must remember that neither the Green New 
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Deal nor any state-led, top down climate solutions, are a silver bullet in defeating either 
petro-hegemony or the matrix of domination. They must be considered part of the spectrum 
of strategy through which we might counter these hegemonic forces. In this way, activists 
who want nothing to do with the state can focus their attention on other points of intervention 
through strategies, tactics, and organizations they are more aligned with. It would be a huge 
mistake, however, for the entire climate justice movement to ignore or reject engagement at 
this scale outright.  
 
Finally, I have explored the debates around the Green New Deal here not just because it is 
relevant and timely, and certainly not because I think it is the only solution at scale that 
exists, but because it provides an important lens through which to think through how 
contingents of a movement of movements can address deeply held differences without 
disintegrating into ideological factionalism. The Green New Deal debate illustrates the 
complexities of building the movement out of Blockadia and, indeed, expanding the terrain 
on which Blockadia exists to make the connections necessary for a movement that is 
aggregating to scale. There will be principled, potentially irresolvable, disagreements over 
the scale at which the movement’s power is consolidated and solutions advanced. The point 
isn’t that we’re all going to get along without tension but rather to develop relationships 
which, despite those ongoing disagreements, allow us to work together nonetheless. Ideas 
like dual power, the spectrum of strategy, and a diversity of points of intervention available 
through the carbon rebellion framework may be crucial to the negotiation of these 
relationships and could prove vital to further confrontation with the matrix of domination.  
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Conclusion 
 
I introduced this chapter on the strategies, complexities and contradictions of the radical 
politics of scale through an account of climate justice activists’ experiences with addressing 
scale in Richmond. Specifically, I explored the reaction to the passage of Governor Brown’s 
flagship climate change legislation, AB 398 in 2017. This statewide bill not only disrupted 
activists’ attempts to regulate Bay Area refineries through regional agencies, but also 
demonstrated the hegemonic status of neoliberal climate solutions that emerge out of, and 
reinforce, a global matrix of domination configured through the confluence of structural 
racism, capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy.  Moreover, exposing the connections 
between oil infrastructure development in British Columbia and the Bay Area, activists 
showed how the bill will likely incentivize the expansion of a market for Canada’s tar sands 
oil in California. This example thus drew our attention to the ways the expanse of fossil fuel 
infrastructure, contained within the global oil assemblage, is connecting frontlines struggles 
across space. Drawing on these lessons, I argued that the passage of this bill illustrates how 
the hegemonic influence of California’s fossil fuel industry far exceeds the scale of local 
frontlines, and has been embedded in the state’s broader economic, political and cultural 
terrains. This example highlighted the ways that frontline activists are strategizing around the 
different scales at which mutually reinforcing hegemonies exist. In doing so, it to set the 
scene for this chapter’s main interventions. These were developed through exploration of 
three key ideas: layered hegemonies, problematizing critical mass, and aggregating to scale. 
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In Part One, I offered the concept of “layered hegemonies” as one way we might think about 
the relationship between hegemonies and counter hegemonies at different scales. I suggested 
that these hegemonic forces are inscribed within, compliment and reinforce one another, and 
that tactical enagement in specific points of intervention could challenge relations of consent, 
coercion and compliance shared between these layers. I then demonstrated how counter 
hegemonic agents confront the layering of hegemonic forces by growing their movements to 
a size, or to critical mass, so that they can engage with points of intervention on a full range 
of scales. Part Two, however, also problematized the assumption that achieving critical mass 
is an inherently emancipatory and democratic approach to radical social change. Exploring 
the tensions between horizontalist, non-majoritarian political strategies and counter 
hegemonic theories of change, I detailed the importance of combining critical connection and 
critical mass. I was not prepared to abandon majoritarian political strategy nor the aspiration 
towards scaling up our movements, however. As such, again searching for the potential of 
synthesis and synergy across strategic orientations towards scale, Part Three examined how 
activists in both case studies sought to connect their movements across space and difference 
in horizontal rhizomatic formations that nonetheless aspired towards hegemonic status. I 
suggested that an orientation towards aggregating to scale, rather than aggrandizement to 
scale, may facilitate the fluidity of connections and emergence within networks of 
movements, while still advancing leadership and coordination across them. I argued that this 
can allow us to engage in counter hegemony while also resisting some of the more 
totalitarian and anti-democratic tendencies of hegemonic politics. Through this process we 
might envision a pluriversal hegemony in which the next hegemonic order creates the 
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conditions necessary for a flourishing and thriving of many possibles, and a multiplicity of 
worldviews, towards which the principles of climate justice necessarily lead. 
 
Finally, this chapter plays an important role in the broader interventions made throughout this 
dissertation. It has confronted a fundamental critique in my positioning of the climate justice 
movement’s strategic goals. Through concepts like the carbon rebellion, I could be accused 
of framing climate justice simply in terms of keeping carbon in the ground and advancing a 
singular focus on “bad guy capitalists.” This singular focus on the fossil fuel industry fails to 
account for the systemic roots of the climate crisis which are combined and operate through a 
hegemonic matrix of domination. However, I have always believed that the fossil fuel 
industry is just one actor, and petro-hegemony just one force, on a much larger landscape of 
revolutionary struggle for climate justice. Nevertheless, this chapter has sought to clarify the 
relationship between countering petro-hegemony and the broader task of overthrowing the 
hegemonic matrix of domination in terms of multiscalar political strategy. Moving through, 
between, and out of the frontlines of Blockadia, I argued that the climate justice movement is 
developing the critical connections and the forging critical mass necessary for countering 
petro-hegemony. Meanwhile through their confrontations with petro-hegemony, activism in 
Blockadia is also cultivating the material and ideological terrain necessary for overthrowing 
the matrix of domination and establishing a pluriversal hegemony. In this way, then, we 
might imagine a movement that, as it aggregates to scale, is laying the foundations of a 
global revolution in the name of climate justice, for which, as Mann and Wainwright remind 
us, there is no historical precedent. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The climate crisis is terrifying, urgent, and brutally unjust. As the climate justice movement 
has so clearly articulated, however, our response to this crisis is also an opportunity to 
radically transform the systems of domination and extraction out of which the threat of 
climate collapse has emerged. Advancing a just transition away from the extractive economy 
and the ideas that perpetuate it, communities on the frontlines of resource extraction and 
climate disruption are leading with climate solutions that would not only rein in fossil fuel 
production and emissions but bring about fairer, more democratic, and more equitable ways 
of living. There is absolutely no guarantee that these efforts will be rewarded or that the 
climate crisis can be mitigated below catastrophic levels. Indeed, on most days the trajectory 
of climate (in)action portends the coming of a world of intensifying insecurity, violence, 
authoritarianism and ecological collapse. Moreover, a certain level of climate disruption and 
its consequences are “locked in” and their effects are already being felt, particularly by those 
least responsible and most vulnerable. Nevertheless, the degree and extent of those 
consequences, and our collective response to them, remain, only just, within our control. But 
time is clearly running out.  
 
There is no “arc of the moral universe” that inherently “bends towards justice” and, as Naomi 
Klein and so many others have taught us, no one is coming to save us but ourselves. Keeping 
fossil fuels in the ground has emerged as a moral imperative and a vital strategy to avert 
climate breakdown. However, neither governments nor the fossil fuel industry are going to 
act upon this imperative with anything like the ambition, or on anything like timeline, climate 
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science and basic moral decency demands. It cannot be achieved without a mass movement 
of movements, more powerful and sophisticated than any we have seen before. As Gramsci 
reminds us, then, we must approach this situation with pessimism of the intellect and 
optimism of the will. In other words, we must be uncompromising in our assessment of the 
scale of this crisis and the structures and forces that stand in our way. Meanwhile, pessimism 
quickly descends into cynicism which in turn justifies inertia. Climate cynicism is even more 
cowardly and dangerous than climate denial. Optimism of the will is an antidote to despair 
that must be cultivated, but which can mobilize millions and inspire us to do things that may 
seem impossible today. Therefore, we must look for reasons to hope and then to act on that 
hope, as slim as it may seem. Rebecca Solnit puts it well: 
 
 Hope is not a lottery ticket you can sit on the sofa and clutch, feeling lucky. It is an 
axe you break down doors with in an emergency. Hope should shove you out the 
door, because it will take everything you have to steer the future away from endless 
war, from the annihilation of the earth's treasures and the grinding down of the poor 
and marginal... To hope is to give yourself to the future - and that commitment to the 
future is what makes the present inhabitable. (2010, 29) 
 
In some ways this dissertation has been an unashamed search for, and defense of, this kind of 
active hope. The campaigns and communities organizing on the frontlines of Blockadia that I 
have visited, despite all the challenges they’ve faced, offer reasons for hope and should 
inspire us to act. My dissertation is driven by both pessimism of the intellect and optimism of 
the will. In petro-hegemony I have offered an unflinching account of the structures and 
forces against which we must align ourselves. Through the carbon rebellion and my study of 
the climate justice movement’s strategies, narratives, and tactics, meanwhile, I hope to have 
offered a framework that may help guide our action as we confront the systemic roots of the 
climate crisis. These have nourished an optimism of the will. 
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This dissertation has studied power, strategy, and social movements. I embarked upon this 
endeavor knowing that much of what I believed previously about all three was wrong, or 
only partially right.  As such, this dissertation has been an attempt to get more right and less 
wrong, starting by asking different questions. Through this dissertation, I have investigated 
relations of power as they pertain to the fossil fuel industry and the climate justice 
movement. In doing so, I have explored the strategies, narratives and tactics that are being 
deployed to intervene in these power relations. The questions driving my research and its 
contributions can be distilled into a relatively simple formulation: how might we, as the 
climate justice movement, better understand the power of the fossil fuel industry and, through 
that understanding, develop strategies and tactics that can respond to it? The answers, as 
I’ve shown, are complex and nuanced. I have not tried to identify, devise, or advocate for a 
‘winning strategy,’ a game changing tactic, or the precise narrative that will organize and 
mobilize millions around our cause. In part this is because I have no reason to believe a 
single strategy, tactic, or narrative will ever be sufficient to produce the kind of radical social 
change that we need. It is also because climate justice activists are already very good at 
devising strategy, developing narratives, and deploying tactics. Instead, my contribution has 
been to develop a framework of understanding that organizes these strategies, narratives, and 
tactics into interventions in specific relations of power which scholars and activist alike 
might use to map and coordinate engagement with hegemonic relations of power. 
 
I have theorized, developed, challenged, complicated, and advanced this framework over the 
course of each of the previous chapters. In concluding this dissertation, I want to demonstrate 
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how the arguments and ideas discussed in each chapter build upon one another to provide a 
holistic view of petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion. I want to demonstrate how this 
framework might be used and developed, contextualized and complexified. And, I want to 
show how the emergence of the carbon rebellion could be facilitated, encouraged, and 
cultivated on the frontlines of climate justice through concepts like intersectional populism, 
the spectrum of strategy, and aggregating to scale. 
 
I started this dissertation with an account of climate justice, its revolutionary potential, and 
the imperative of keeping fossils in the ground and of focusing on the supply and production 
side of fossil fuel emissions. I argued that the climate justice movement’s keep-it-in-the-
ground contingent is one significant aspect of the movement’s broader purpose. Through this 
discussion, I made a case for why the fossil fuel industry remains one of the paramount 
obstacles to climate action and climate justice and, therefore, why it must be defeated if 
climate justice is to be achieved. I also added a condition to this assertion which was that 
while the industry may be a paramount obstacle to achieving climate justice, removing the 
industry from the equation alone will not be enough to achieve climate justice. I argued that 
through confrontation with the industry, climate justice activists may cultivate a political 
terrain with further revolutionary potential. Nevertheless, this dissertation set out with the 
fossil fuel industry well and truly in its crosshairs. Understanding how its power operates, 
and thus how its power may be challenged, has been the primary concern related in these 
pages.  
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Seeking further insight into the operations of power I turned to Gramsci and in particular a 
rereading of his theory of hegemony. Here I came to understand power not as a unified thing 
one possesses but as a set of relationships shaped by different social actors’ ability to make 
interventions in them. Through profound engagement with theoretical approaches to 
hegemony I advanced the case that in developing the term as a conceptual category, Gramsci 
intended for hegemony to indicate the simultaneous combination and relationship between 
the power relations of consent and coercion. I contended that theories of hegemony that 
emphasize consent to the exclusion of coercion are unable to offer us a holistic account of the 
maintenance, advancement, and contestation of hegemonic of status. Delving deeper into 
Gramscian and Marxist thought, I added a third, primarily economic, relation of power that I 
argued must also necessarily be contained within the category of hegemony: compliance. 
Compliance blurs relations of consent and coercion and is founded on a dynamic of 
economic dependency upon conditions produced by the hegemon. In this rendition of 
hegemonic theory, consent defines the terrain of culture and civil society, coercion the terrain 
of the state and the enforcement of rules, and compliance defines the economic terrain. As 
such, hegemony contains within it three interrelated and interactive power relations: consent, 
coercion, and compliance. Counter hegemonic strategy must engage with all three. I believe 
this on its own may be valuable addition to scholars’ and activists’ engagement with power. 
This rereading is intended to provoke conversation and debates concerning power and may 
be applicable in a wide variety of social struggles, not limited climate justice.  
 
Applying this revised account of hegemony and counter hegemony to the fossil fuel industry 
and the climate justice movement, I developed a theoretical framework through which we 
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might better understand and organize strategic interventions in each of the three hegemonic 
relations of power. Petro-hegemony, therefore, is the term I used to explain how the fossil 
fuel industry maintains and extends its interests by intervening in and shaping relations of 
consent, coercion, and compliance. Drawing on a wide range of literature and providing 
examples from each, I argued we could think of the industry mediating and organizing 
strategies to intervene in relations of consent through petro-culture, relations of coercion 
through the petro-state, and relations of compliance through petro-capitalism. Thus, petro-
culture, petro-capitalism, and the petro-state are the constituent mediators of petro-
hegemony. With examples from the literature and my two case studies I argued that this is 
one highly productive way of thinking about the power of the fossil fuel industry and offered 
it as an important contribution to theories of corporate hegemony and socioecological studies 
of the fossil fuel industry. 
 
Gramscian scholarship doesn’t just account for the power of the hegemon however, it also 
provides lessons for counter hegemonic, or as Jonathan Smucker calls them, “aspiring 
hegemonic” actors. To assess the strategies, tactics, and narratives the climate justice 
movement can leverage in response to this understanding of the industry’s power, I 
positioned the climate justice movement as a counter hegemonic force and illustrated what 
this would mean for its interventions against the industry. In this way I developed the carbon 
rebellion framework as the mirror opposite of petro-hegemony. Activists can organize, 
deploy and assess their strategies through the carbon rebellion. Like petro-hegemony we can 
imagine interventions through the carbon rebellion as both contributing to the development 
of, and being organized by, three mediators: a political culture of opposition and creation for 
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climate justice (PCOC) through which interventions in relations of consent and alignment of 
interests are carried out, regimes of climate justice, through which the movement intervenes 
in relations of coercion, and the economics of a just transition, through which the movement 
can break the dynamic of dependency upon which relations of compliance are premised.  
 
The carbon rebellion’s PCOC corresponds to petro-culture under petro-hegemony, the 
regimes of climate justice correspond to the petro-state, and the economics of a just transition 
correspond to petro-capitalism. Between each of these mediators exists a terrain of struggle 
defined by either coercion, consent, or compliance, along with a vast array of corresponding 
points of intervention. Through these mediators the industry’s agents and climate justice 
activists’ advance strategies, narratives, and tactics to capture, infiltrate, challenge, remove, 
influence, and claim points of intervention. To overthrow petro-hegemony, climate justice 
activists engage in each terrain of struggle and claim victories over the most strategic points 
of intervention on each terrain. 
 
Petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion is ultimately the answer I provide to how we might 
understand the industry’s power and how, through that understanding, the climate justice 
movement could respond to it. I explored, challenged, and illustrated different dimensions of 
this argument through two case studies: Climate justice activism against the fossil fuel 
industry in Richmond, California and Burnaby, British Columbia. These case studies proved 
to be ripe with examples of the industry’s interventions through the petro-state, petro-culture, 
and petro-capitalism. They also yielded crucial illustrations of the strategies, narratives and 
tactics climate justice activists are deploying against the industry. Identifying these 
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interventions in later chapters, I showed how they might be organized into the carbon 
rebellion framework. Nevertheless, the case studies offered only limited examples of this 
coordination and coherence across strategies already in operation. As such, I argued that we 
might understand the carbon rebellion as emergent in nascent forms but requiring deliberate 
cultivation and nourishment to facilitate its development and allow it to thrive on the 
frontlines of Blockadia.  
 
Placing this theoretical framework in contexts of environmental racism, settler colonialism, 
neoliberal accumulation and dispossession, as well as relations of privilege and power within 
the movement, necessarily complicated and challenged these ideas in significant ways. 
Encountering the messy realities of struggle on the frontlines, I came across disputes that 
climate justice activist must engage with productively, work through together, and where 
possible, resolve, if the carbon rebellion is to be realized. In this way, the case studies led me 
to several crucial questions about how the carbon rebellion might be organized and 
developed into a counter hegemonic formation in Blockadia, and what the implications of 
building such a force could be. Through an assessment of organizing and mobilizing 
strategies and an exploration of key debates over strategy and politics in the movement, the 
remainder of the dissertation engaged with vital questions about the formation and 
implications of counter hegemonic climate justice strategy in detail. In each instance I was 
looking for the potential of synthesis and synergy across divisions while doing justice to the 
value and authenticity of different arguments, as well as the distinct experiences upon which 
they are premised. I developed three concepts that help us move through these debates and 
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towards the counter hegemonic formation of carbon rebellion. These are intersectional 
populism, the spectrum of strategy, and aggregating to scale. 
 
Chapter Five described the organizing strategies deployed in Richmond and Burnaby to 
articulate into alignment a broad and diverse alliance of interests and actors against fossil fuel 
projects and for climate justice. Drawing upon social movement literature, much of it written 
by activists, I analyzed these strategies according their discursive implications and the extent 
to which they fostered relationships of accountability and trust between the constituents of 
the campaigns I studied. I found that the discursive interventions in both case studies have 
invoked progressive populist rhetoric to align their respective communities through an “us 
versus them” narrative. In both cases, the us was broadly circumscribed and inclusive of a 
large diversity of peoples and social struggles. This was defined against an invasive or 
threatening them, in the form of the fossil fuel industry (particularly Chevron and Kinder 
Morgan) and their allies in government. This produced a universalizing narrative in which 
the entire community was framed as a cohesive unit positioned against fossil fuel projects. 
Emphasizing the centrality of race, class, gender and colonialism within these campaigns, I 
noted the importance of particularist discourses and relations of difference and privilege that 
such universalizing narratives erase or obscure. The tensions between particularist 
discourses, emphasizing very real differences and the primacy of identity, and universalizing 
discourses, that can build larger movements but risk remaining unaccountable to internal 
differences and relations of privilege, threaten the emergence of carbon rebellion. I worked 
through these tensions developing the term intersectional populism.  
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Drawing upon intersectionality theory and Collins’ “matrix of domination,” I argued that 
intersectionality cannot be reduced to the divisive pathologies of which identity politics is 
often accused. Instead, I worked with Collins (2012), Grossman (2017), Smucker (2017), and 
others, to reinforce intersectionality as a crucial movement building concept. I argued that 
intersectionality can articulate common ground across intersections of oppressive forces 
while remaining accountable to how the impacts of the fossil fuel economy are structured and 
stratified according to the interrelations of race, class, gender, and colonialism. In this way, 
discourses and movement practice inscribed with intersectional populism are able to both 
articulate common cause and a broad and cohesive “we” against an externalize “other,” 
whilst foregrounding the lived experiences of, and positioning as movement leaders, those 
who are most marginalized by the interlocking matrix of domination that has brought the 
movement together. A resilient, accountable, and broad-based political culture of opposition 
and creation is fundamental to the formation of the carbon rebellion. Through the PCOC, I 
argued that a commitment to intersectional populism can help us produce a counter 
hegemonic alignment and alliance whose strength and numbers rest upon relations of 
accountability and trust. To this argument I also added the significance of materializing and 
not just articulating shared interests in order to forge solidarity with other social struggles. I 
demonstrated how the economics of a just transition could be part of that process. 
 
Another set of deep divides these case studies identified within the climate justice movement 
concern debates over competing strategic orientations, and politico-strategic orientations, 
which currently make the formation and interventions of the carbon rebellion much more 
difficult. The carbon rebellion framework advances the idea that engagement with the full 
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range of points of intervention across all three terrains of struggle forms the foundations of 
counter hegemonic struggle. As such, a large and diverse array of tactics, narratives, and 
strategies are required to engage with all the available points of intervention on all three 
terrains of struggle. In other words, if our political or ideological commitments limit the 
range of tactics and strategies necessary to engage with the full range of available points of 
intervention, before we’ve even assessed what the situation requires, then we limit our 
counter hegemonic potential and hinder the development of the carbon rebellion. I explored 
how strategic prejudices, what I called politico-strategic orientations, limit the range of 
tactical interventions we could be advancing. I argued that in synthesizing, and where 
possible synergizing, the positions on different sides of these debates, we might contribute to 
the development of a spectrum of strategy.  
 
I developed the spectrum of strategy concept to think about how a movement containing a 
large array of values, politics, experiences, and strategic preferences could, nonetheless, 
come to embrace a diversity of tactics. I argued that the spectrum of strategy helps us break 
out of a divisive binary that categorizes tactical interventions as either reformist or radical 
and instead places them all on a spectrum of confrontational to non-confrontational 
intervention.  I developed this idea out of the potential for synthesis I discover in my 
assessment of each of the movement’s three major strategic schisms: the role of the state in 
climate justice activism, the appropriateness of direct action, and preferences for either 
organizing or mobilizing strategies. 
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In debates concerning the role of the state in climate justice strategy, I sought to synthesize 
anti-authoritarian concerns with movement strategies that engage institutions of the state. The 
concepts of dual power and revolutionary reforms (Lakey 1976) were helpful here. They 
illustrated ways of engaging the state that do not inherently involve capitulating to its 
inevitability nor compromising on deeply held movement principles. In my discussion of the 
debate between organizing and mobilizing strategies, I argued that not only are both 
important but that the combination of the two is vital to advancing counter hegemonic 
strategy through the carbon rebellion. Working with the Engler brothers (2017), I show how 
mobilizing and organizing strategies have been synergized into a cyclical relationship that 
they call momentum-based organizing. Necessarily, this opened up a larger range of 
strategies and tactics available to the whole movement. Thirdly, in my assessment of debates 
over the appropriate use of direct action tactics, I argued that direct action may be considered 
appropriate and valuable when the surrounding social conditions in which it would be 
deployed allows tactics to be deployed relentlessly, escalate, and grow the movement’s base 
of participation and support. This moved the debate over whether or not direct action may be 
considerate appropriate away from investment different actors may have in maintaining 
relationships with elites or remaining true to political principles, and towards assessment of 
how the conditions on the ground might legitimize or delegitimize direct action.195 Though 
synthesizing and synergizing positions held on all sides of these debates, the spectrum of 
strategy draws a multiplicity of strategies into carbon rebellion, makes commitments to a 
 
195  I added two caveats here. One was to recognize the extent to which almost all strategic preferences are 
inflected with political prejudices. The other was to invite readers to think broadly about how direct action 
could be legitimized and grow the base of support rather than allow the necessity of legitimizing direct action 
justify capitulation to a potentially more conservative base. 
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diversity of tactics possible, and, crucially, multiplies the number of points of intervention 
available to movement engagement. 
 
The theoretical framework developed in these pages, combined with the conjunctural 
conditions I observed in both case studies, obliged me to thoroughly engage with questions 
of scale. These considerations proved to be of paramount importance to the construction, 
development, and revolutionary potential of carbon rebellion. I interpreted and analyzed 
scale in different ways. Firstly, working with Michael Watts’ oil assemblage concept, I 
acknowledged the multiple scales at which the fossil fuel industry operates (2014). Fossil 
fuels and the fossil fuel industry simultaneously permeate our lives, politics, economy, and 
culture, at the bodily, local, regional, national and global scale. With examples from the 
California-statewide, context and the Canadian context, I showed that petro-hegemony may 
be defeated or overthrown at local and even regional scales, while remaining relatively intact 
at the national or statewide scale. This forces climate justice activists to consider 
interventions that address petro-hegemony beyond the confines of the local and to transcend 
the slogan, “think global, act local.”  
 
Secondly, the industry and petro-hegemony do not exist in isolation but interact with, shape, 
and are shaped by, the broader social structures, forces and conditions in which they operate. 
As such, petro-hegemony comes to thrive upon, depend upon, and shape, a wider matrix of 
domination structured by settler colonialism, structural racism, class, patriarchy, 
extractivism, and the violence that these inflict. Here, I suggested at the possibility of a 
layering of hegemonies in which hegemonies of different social forces complement and 
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thrive upon one another. Thus, we might consider how, following the logic of 
intersectionality out of which Collins’ matrix of domination emerged, hegemonic white 
supremacy exists within and inscribes hegemonic neoliberalism and, therefore, how petro-
hegemony exists within, makes possible, and thrives upon both white supremacy and 
neoliberalism. The layering of hegemonies means activists must engage with how their 
strategies, narratives, and tactics might be oriented towards the intersectional and multiscalar 
characteristics of hegemonic domination. 
 
The first and second interpretations and engagements with scale necessarily lead to the third: 
the scale at which carbon rebellion must confront petro-hegemony and the matrix of 
domination in which it is embedded. I encountered questions about the scale of the 
movement itself and the extent to which it can, and even necessarily should, scale up to a size 
commensurate with the forces and structures it opposes. I sought to engage with the 
revolutionary potential of carbon rebellion by showing how activism opposing the expansion 
of the fossil fuel industry is exposing movement constituents to the broader matrix of 
domination in which the industry operates. This means the carbon rebellion’s intervention 
cannot be limited to petro-hegemony if petro-hegemony is to be overthrown. Thus, in order 
to contribute to what Mann and Wainwright call a global revolution in the name of climate 
justice, carbon rebellion must be developing revolutionary consciousness on the frontlines of 
Blockadia and scale this up and out of Blockadia. 
 
This led me to consider how the climate justice movement and its counter hegemonic 
interventions might be scaled up through the carbon rebellion framework without replicating 
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the systems of hierarchy, domination, and authoritarianism embedded in contemporary, and 
all previous, hegemonic orderings and alignments. I placed theoretical insights on hegemony 
in conversation with anarchist and autonomist theory that is deeply critical of hegemonic 
politics and counter hegemonic engagement. Here I challenged assumptions within counter 
hegemonic political strategy about scaling up movements but remained committed to counter 
hegemonic strategy and the carbon rebellion as a framework of intervention. I argued that 
there is a tendency in hegemonic political strategy to aggrandize to scale but that a truly 
emancipatory and anti-authoritarian counter hegemonic strategy must resist this tendency in 
favor of an approach I called aggregating to scale.  
 
Aggrandizing to scale is an approach to growing social movement that replicates 
authoritarian tendencies, erodes accountability, and relies upon centralized leadership in its 
organizational structure. In this model a movement grows out of a central hub or core and its 
constituents or members are absorbed into its orbit. The model promises a clear chain of 
command, an apparently efficient bureaucracy, common purpose and direction, and strength 
in numbers. Yet, embedded in its organizing logic is a drive towards conquest and 
expansionism for the sake of expansionism. These logics are likely to replicate some of the 
very modes of domination against which constituents of the movement are fighting. Drawing 
on Purcell (2011), Deleuze and Guattari (1987), and Adrienne Maree Brown (2017), I 
proposed a model of counter hegemonic movement building that is premised upon 
connection between different hubs and nodes of the movement. The movement’s growth is 
measured in the number and quality of the connections between struggles, peoples, and 
organizations of which it is comprised. I called this aggregating to scale. The role of 
 673 
movement leaders is to forge connections between struggles and to articulate alignment and 
solidarity. Each constituent part of the movement retains its own identity and remains an 
entity unto itself rather than being absorbed into a monolithic formation. Nevertheless, in 
forging connections with others to form a mass movement, aggregating to scale also requires 
that each constituent part of the movement’s identity is changed in the process of alignment. 
 
My contribution here was to fuse orientations towards critical mass and critical connection, 
orientations towards hegemonic and non-hegemonic politics, together in organizing model 
that aligns a broad and diverse coalition of constituents while allowing those constituents to 
retain their individuality and autonomy. In this way, I have argued for a counter hegemonic 
politics that achieves critical mass through the cultivation of critical relationships. Drawing 
Adrienne Maree Brown and Jonathan Smucker’s ideas together, I have argued for connection 
over unity as the foundation of counter hegemonic intervention.  Through such connection, 
the carbon rebellion might cultivate the seeds of broader revolutionary action.  
 
This dissertation has developed a theoretical framework through which to better understand 
the power of the fossil fuel industry and the climate justice movement’s response to it. 
Building this theoretical framework out of and in conversation with empirical case study 
research forced the framework to respond to several critical challenges. In responding to 
these challenges, I demonstrated obstacles to the formation of the carbon rebellion on the 
frontlines of Blockadia as well as suggesting conceptual and practical approaches that might 
allow use to navigate those obstacles. Through interventions in Environmental Sociology, 
Political Ecology, Energy Studies, Social Movement Studies, Critical Theory, and many 
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other fields my interdisciplinary training in Global Studies has allow me to access,  I have 
offered innovative approaches to thinking about power, hegemony and counter hegemony, 
climate justice, social movements, energy, and the role of the fossil fuel industry in our 
society. As such, I believe that at the very least these pages will provoke thought, debate, 
and, I hope, action. The ideas explored in these pages are also intended as practical 
contributions to climate justice activists devising strategies to confront the fossil fuel industry 
and dismantle the matrix of domination upon which it thrives. 
 
As we confront the climate crisis in what may well be one of the most consequential decades 
in human history, I offer this dissertation as a modest contribution to the struggle for a fairer, 
more just, more equitable, more democratic, and more sustainable society. I do so genuinely 
believing that the ideas and arguments developed throughout these pages have consequences. 
Moreover, building upon the work and ideas of hundreds of others, I believe I have distilled a 
set of arguments that scholars and activists alike may now critique, build upon, and develop 
in many different directions. A great deal more is left to be said and explored with regards to 
the rereading of hegemony that I offer, and not just amongst scholars interested in the politics 
of climate justice. I have left the interactions or relationships between relations of consent, 
coercion, and compliance largely untheorized but believe further investigation into how one 
relation of power influences another in different conditions is vital. The relationship between 
hegemonic configurations of power and other approaches to power are largely excluded from 
this dissertation but offer a critical avenue of further exploration. Furthermore, the 
relationship between hegemonies and the possibility of layered hegemonies is an idea I’ve 
advocated for but did not fully explore within the parameters circumscribed by my research 
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agenda. This is another avenue of possible further investigation. Similarly, while I argued 
that the carbon rebellion can and must cultivate the seeds of revolutionary action on the 
frontlines of Blockadia, a great deal more attention could be paid to precisely how it does so 
in its confrontations with the fossil fuel industry. 
 
To conclude this dissertation, then, it is my sincerest hope that the ideas and arguments 
developed in these pages will provide scholars and activists alike with a clearer assessment of 
the path ahead and an interpretative framework with which to navigate it. Indeed, I intend to 
translate this work into tools and resources that can be shared and taught in workshops and 
trainings with communities already taking the fight to the fossil fuel industry. These ideas 
have been developed in generalized theoretical forms but with a deliberate focus on how they 
might also be contextualized within the specificities of different frontlines struggles. The 
framework I have developed, petro-hegemony and the carbon rebellion, and the questions I 
have worked through in each of these chapters provide readers with an innovative, and I 
believe, important, account of power as well as a set of concepts with which to map it. But 
this framework is not just glorified power mapping tool, although it certainly is that. It is also 
an apparatus through which activists might assess their own interventions in relations of 
consent, coercion, and compliance to develop a holistic approach to challenging the fossil 
fuel industry’s hegemonic status strategically and decisively. I offer these ideas as part of a 
theory of change amongst many other theories of change. They are not intended to replace, 
but to complement, the knowledge and vital action climate justice campaigners, organizers 
and activists are already engaged in. Finally, I offer these contributions to thought and action 
because they have inspired me with hope and evidence that “another world is not only 
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possible,” but as Arundhati Roy has so poignantly put it, “she is on her way.” If nothing else, 
then, this dissertation is a defense of hope and an invitation to act upon it.  
 
Welcome to the carbon rebellion. 
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